The decisive and distinguishing characteristic of Divine inspiration is its quality of moral power for a Divine work of illumination and regeneration. In this, not in any alleged infallibility of a literary record, but in its continuous, efficacious, expansive energy, as demonstrated, in Israel alone among the nations, by a progressive riddance from superstitions and sins and a corresponding development of truth and righteousness, till the work is crowned by the advent of the Son of God, and in the diffusion of the finally purified faith of Israel as the religion of mankind, is its impregnable sign and proof. The teacher who has not grasped these fundamental principles is in danger of so confounding the word of God with the word of human ignorance or passion, that it will be a marvel if he do not in the end promote the skepticism which he deplores. His pupils, in after-contact with critics and doubters, are dangerously exposed to that keen though shallow form of unbelief, which is founded on the fallacies of well meaning but mistaken Christian teaching. ARTICLE VII.-THE SUBSTITUTES FOR CHRISTIANITY PROPOSED BY COMTE AND SPENCER. ONE satisfactory method of investigating a proposed theory, is to apply to it the tests used by its advocates to invalidate an opposing theory. It is logic as well as 66 sport, to have the engineer Hoist with his own petard." The argumentum ad hominem becomes an argument of general value, in case the test proposed is a just and accurate test, capable of universal application. The issue is made complete if the test in question, after being used to invalidate the theory of its author, is then successfully applied to the theory or posi tion he assails. In the present Article, inquiry is made as to whether either Comte or Spencer has proposed a criterion by which the relative superiority of Positivism, Cosmism, and Christianity, can be judged. A test proposed by Comte is treated as inapplicable, because it assumes the point under discussion. This test is known as the famous "law of the three stages," which regards progress as marked by three modes of philosophizing-the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive. A test proposed by Spencer is treated as a correct one and of universal validity as applied to religious systems. It is his much ridiculed, but philosophically profound, statement of the Law of Evolution, which, to use his own technical language, necessitates a change from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity. The result of the investigation is to show that not only the system of Comte, but Spencer's system as well, is defective, when judged by the Spencerian test, while Christianity alone satisfies its requirements. The question as thus made up, is the question of our times. More specifically, it is the question between CHRISTIANITY AND ITS MODERN RIVALS. "Archaic," "obsolete," " outgrown," ," "a worn chrysalis," are the designations applied to Christianity in certain intellectual coteries of the day. Proof that the chrysalis must perish, is found in the bursting forth of a more perfect form of life. The old is not old till it has been replaced by the new. As Christianity triumphed in the first century by the expulsive power of a new vitality superseding both heathenism and Judaism, so it will be done away in the nineteenth century only as it is forced out of existence by the outgrowth of a fuller vitality. It is easy to criticise. It is hard to construct. While destructive criticism of Christianity has been frequent, constructive attempts to provide substitutes for it have been rare. When they appear, they are to be cordially received and candidly examined. Prominent among such modern attempts, are the Positivism of Auguste Comte, and the Cosmic Theism of Herbert Spencer. Each of these systems is claimed by its founder to represent a higher form of development than Christianity. Each commands attention, because sufficiently well defined to admit of the same radical investigation that Christianity expects and invites. Positivism dedicates its shrines to Humanity instead of to God; Cosmism rears altars "To the Unknown and the Unknowable." The superiority of the Deity of Humanity consists in this: that it is "real, accessible and sympathetic, because of the same nature as its worshipers, though far superior to any one of them."* So we are assured by Comte. the other hand, it is claimed by Spencer, with how much consistency this is not the place to inquire, that any attempt to pierce the inscrutableness of the Infinite is impious and impossible. He also claims that Cosmism, by recognizing this fact, presents a purer concept of Deity in the Unknowable than is presented in the semi-humanized God of Christianity. Positivism and Cosmism, then, assert themselves to be higher forms of development than Christianity for two exactly contradictory reasons: Positivism, because it is more anthropomorphic than Christianity, and Cosmism, because it is less anthropomorphic than Christianity. How are we to decide between these conflicting claims? By what criterion are we to judge whether either of the new religions can establish itself against the old? It is always courteous and fair to allow the challenged party to choose his own weapons. We therefore ask, in undertaking On * Comte's Positive Polity (translation), vol. i., p. 317. Cf. vol. iv., p. 30. Inas the criticism of these systems from the side of Christianity, has either Comte or Spencer proposed a test that can be applied alike to Positivism and Cosmism on the one hand, and to Christianity on the other? The Comtean "law of the three stages" is too well-known to be passed unmentioned in this connection. According to this theory, there are three modes of philosophizing: the theological, which investigates the cause of phenomena and endows it with volition and intelligence, as Christianity; the metaphysical, which asserts the ultimate cause of phenomena to be a mere abstract entity, as Cosmism; and the positive, which confines itself to the interpretation of phenomena, declining as futile all questions in respect to cause. much as progress, according to Comte, consists in a gradual change to the views of the Positivist, the metaphysical mode of philosophizing being regarded as an inferior style of thinking, and the theological as worse still, it is manifest that the test proposed is useless for the present purpose, because it assumes the very point in question. A more practicable test is furnished by the Cosmic philosophy. Fiske, speaking of progress in the evolution of society, quotes the following with approval: Old "means not old in chronology but in structure; that is most archaic which lies nearest to the beginning of human progress considered as a development, and that is most modern which is the farthest removed from the beginning."* The scant century since Positivism and Cosmism have seen the light, when compared with the eighteen hundred years that have witnessed the steadily increasing growth of Christianity, does not, then, prove the latter to be less advanced or less suited to the needs of the time. Our query is reduced, therefore, to this which one of the three systems in question lies "nearest to the beginning of human progress considered as a development"? "Old in structure" does not mean "old in years." What, affirmatively, does it mean? Again the Cosmic Philosophy, in enunciating an Evolution formula furnishes a reply. "Progress," we are told, "from lower to higher + If there is any doubt as to the applicability of this law to religious systems, Mr. Spencer dissipates it. After treating of the genesis of primitive religious beliefs he says: "How entirely natural is the genesis of these beliefs will be seen on now observing that the law of Evolution *יי forms is a progress from forms that are less, to forms that are more differentiated and integrated. We are also told that "while the two correlative processes go on hand in hand, it is none the less true that a comprehensive formula of evolution must explicitly describe them both."+ Differentiation is the process by which the homogeneous becomes heterogeneous, that is, the process by which like units become unlike. Integration is the process by which the heterogeneity, or unlikeness of units, becomes more defined, and, at the same time, is fused into a higher unity or coherence. Fiske illustrates the difference between incoherence and coherence in organic Evolution "by the contrasted facts that a slightly-evolved animal, like a common earth-worm, may be cut in two without destroying the life of either part; while a highly-evolved animal, like a dog, is destroyed if a single artery is severed." Differentiation and integration being both essential, it follows that Evolution necessitates a change (a) from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous; (b) from the indefinite to the definite; (c) from the incoherent to the coherent. The homogeneous must become heterogeneous, and the heterogeneity must again become integrated, in order that development may take place. In other words, development involves a change, as the Hegelians would put it, from a unity without difference to a completer unity made up of distinct differences. Obviously, the Evolution formula does not differ, save in its Spencerian dress, from this fundamental principle of Hegel's, by which he distinguishes "all bad philosophy from what alone deserves the name of philosophy." Synthesis is valuable and "advanced" only as the analysis that precedes it is thorough and complete. As an example, we may take the science of Chemistry. Compare that theory of the ancients which regarded all substances as compounded of the "four is as clearly exemplified by it as by every other process."-Sociology, vol. i., p. 450. And again: "The law which is conformed to by the evolving human being and which is consequently conformed to by the evolving human intelligence is of necessity conformed to by all the products of that intelligence."-Sociology, vol. i., p. 453. * Fiske's Cosmic Philosophy, vol. i., p. 348. + Ibid., vol. i., p. 347. Fiske's Cosmic Philosophy, vol. i, pp. 336-7. |