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& scientific solution, at all satisfactory, of the problem of the origin of the world and man.

I bold this position, then : theology has absolutely nothing to do with deriving cosmological or anthropological theories from religious belief. It should show how and why we come to a belief in the creation of the world, and that man is in the image of God, how and why we can retain the belief in its strength in the face of Darwinism as well as Copernicism, Thereby it will fulfill its task as a science of religion and not of nature.

We have now advanced to a stage in the discussion where our conflict is no longer to be considered as a conflict between obsolete theological and earnest scientific anthropology. If we have reproached the theologians with having derived scientific propositions from religious belief under a misconception of its peculiar nature, we must now reproach their opponents with having derived dogmas from the propositions or hypotheses of exact science under a like misconception of its proper limitations, dogmas, too, which assuredly have a direct bearing on the sphere of religion and are only too often in open antagonism with Christian faith. This has been done by the advocates of evolution. This hypothesis has been used to support and spread a belief in materialism.

To furnish instances I need only mention the names of Strauss and Häckel. We must, therefore, make a clear distinction between the scientific hypothesis, evolution, and dogmatic Darwinism.

Christian faith can with difficulty become satisfied with that hypothesis, but with the dogmatic 'conclusions drawn from it, it can never be reconciled.

Now then we have no longer a conflict between science and faith, but between faith and faith, namely, between old Christian faith and materialistic faith newly arrayed with the help of the evolution doctrine.

Let us look at this a little closer. Without entering the field of natural science we may as laymen draw a distinction between the doctrine of the descent of man itself and the doctrine of natural selection. The first only says, conjecturally, that the higher species have developed out of lower forms. It does not decide whether this development was the result of outside influences only, or whether these outside influences were only the means, under favorable 'conditions,' of setting free latent powers, especially those of a spiritual nature.

The doctrine of natural selection, on the contrary, if I understand it correctly, recognizes in these outside conditions of development: heredity, environment, climate, time, etc., immediately the causes and the only causes of the appearance of the higher species as well as of mental life. Now nobody disputes that the development of mental life depends upon physical conditions, but that these physical conditions are the causes of the development of mental life is an hypothesis which can not yet be clearly represented in ideas, much less supported by a single example. The notion that mind has developed out of sense is almost equivalent to saying that mind is merely a function of the physical powers.

It has not been possible and probably never will be possible to show how nervous action becomes consciousness, or how a muscular movement changes into an act of the will. Certainly it is a gross self-deception to consider mind as a mere function of matter. If we begin in earnest to regard matter as the cause of logical, æsthetic, or moral and religious functions, we begin to regard as matter something which is no longer pure matter, if I may so speak. When we regard it as endowed with spiritual powers we regard it in reality as spirit, and the whole conflict between materialism and idealism turns out to be a mere question of words.

When we accept the doctrine of the descent of man, what more do we know about the essence of matter, of mind, and of the relations which subsist between these two fundamental principles which our thought must not only necessarily separate from each other but also unite together? Viewed in a scientific light this doctrine has given us nothing, absolutely nothing, which has brought us even a single step nearer the solution of that eternal riddle. Therefore the working out of this hypothesis in support of dogmatic materialism is thoroughly arbitrary and unnecessary; and further, we may judge about the grounds of belief in materialism after the rise of evolution in exactly the same way we were justified in judging of them before.

Here again now we cannot insist too strongly on the point, that, when we discuss the contradictions between materialism and Christianity, just as before, we have to do with the contradictions between two views ef the world, two kinds of belief, and not at all with the contradictions of science and religion.

Materialism as a general view of the world does not come under the category of science, but under the category of relig. ion. It has then to be measured by the standard which we, generally speaking, are able to apply to religious belief in accordance with its peculiarity. Therefore we may say that correctness and truth are to be attributed to every general view of the world according to its capacity to call forth and guarantee a true moral culture.

In the first place we have to consider its qualifications to give us a general, satisfying, theoretical interpretation of the world which shall be equally just to spiritual and to physical facts.

Every religious view of the world must base its right to life on its value as a means of culture. The capacity of a faith morally to ennoble men, to reconcile them to their condition in the world, to make them relatively happy in the best sense of the word, and to give them inward satisfaction, will always be the chief proof of its truth, if truth is the proper word. No faith at all, neither materialistic nor Christian, is theoretically capable of proof. But if we look at the practical value of these two as means of culture we can scarcely institute a comparison or raise the question of rivalry between them. What could materialism oppose to Christianity's ideals of life? Where can we find a view of the world which as a means of culture is to be compared with Christianity ? We ask the question because very many of our contemporaries have become unconscious of the immense value of the ideas of Christianity as a means of culture and chiefly on account of the unhappy.mixture of scholastic theology and Christian faith. Surely, too, we have not only to deal with the moral ideas of Christianity but also with its specifically religious ideas.

The belief that the guidance and government of the world is under the control of a highest Intelligence and a just Will; the religious belief that above us rules a Love aiming at our true welfare, always ready to forgive, is certainly of just the same eminentiy practical meaning as the moral belief that our worth as men is not derived from the accidental circumstances, which condition birth and fortune, but only from our moral destiny. We have, however, been brought by a lazy habit into so external and mechanical a relation to these ideas on whicb our true living depends that moments of special illumination seem to be needed to enable us to feel and understand how they are bound up in us. The ideas and ideals which Christianity sets up are not our only subject.

The real historical guarantees of their truth which it gives is: the incomparable historical helps for their realization which it bas had the disposal of, claim our attention.

We need not remain standing in the porch, we should enter the Holy of Holies of the Christian religion, if we want to exhibit its incomparable worth as a practical means of culture. Is it possible to desire to retain the moral ideal of Christianity and at the same time to hold in contempt the means which the teaching and the life of Christ furnish us, for its realization, the certainty of reconciliation with God, the moral power of his Spirit which alone deserves the name of Holy Spirit, the hope in the coming perfection of the individual as well as of the world?

Indeed, only such hints as these are necessary to make the attempt, to attribute to the materialistic belief such value as a means of culture as is possessed by Christianity, appear either ridiculous or frivolous.

But what, says some one, is the good of laying so much stress upon the value of Christianity as a means of culture if so-called scientific truth is not on its side but on the side of materialism? This prejudice is very widespread, but it is only a prejudice, as hinted above. But even on this point we may insist that purely theoretically considered materialism has no advantage over the Christian faith.

Suppose the Christian view of the world to be one-sided, taking the moral interests of human life as its standpoint, does not the materialistic view start from a consideration of nature in a no less one-sided manner? If the former is unable to solve the problem how the bodily world came out of spirit, the latter is as little able to show how spirit is developed from matter, or how matter produces spirit. When looked at in a strictly scientific manner each view of the world leaves as many problems unsolved as the other. But when we test the capability of each, the materialistic as well as the Christian, to give men a satisfying explanation of their existence in the world, then, on the theoretical side the superiority of Christianity seems to be beyond question.

We should also clearly maintain that general views of the world, so-called, do not, on the whole, admit of a strict scientific form, and that we have in them always a free explanation of the total life of the world from that standpoint which regards man as the center. We men seek a satisfactory explanation of the total life of the world, with which life we have grown up, and we naturally will feel satisfied with such a judgment only of the world as does not take away from us the ideal and moral interests, which are our standards, but gives validity to its own meaning when used to explain the world.

From this point of view we may assert that, since Christianity makes the spiritual, not the physical world, its starting point, and consequently explains nature as a means of attaining the ideal aims of man, it interprets the world only by the standards of precedence things have for men.

We do not need to become ascetics, if this attitude and the judgment of the world from it are explained as the one necessary for men and therefore true.

Every one who accords to the ideal and moral interests their superior value must also recognize that from them our general view of the world should be derived.

The truth, or as I should prefer to say, the just claim of Christian idealism take root thoroughly in the moral aims which by the power of the practical force of attraction belonging to them, will be recognized to-day, by individuals as well as by society, as the standard laws of our existence as


If any body wanted to make proselytes for the materialistic faith with the natural consequences he would bave to give up our moral culture and bring Christian society back to the stage of men in the state of nature. But who would earnestly pro

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