In re Peter Coleman, on Habeas Corpus. minute book of the Court, reciting the proceedings and showing the adjudication made. This is the same point now urged here. Judge Freedman, in his decision in that case, details the practice of the Supreme Court from the close of 1858 to the close of 1873, in naturalization proceedings, and shows it to have been the same, in all cases, as in the case of Coleman. He held, that what was so done constituted a sufficient record, and that the want of any further or different record, and the absence of an entry in the general minute book of the Court, did not render the admission to citizenship invalid. He, therefore, denied the application, on the ground that no necessity existed for granting it, because there was no defect in the record, which required perfection by amendment. It is urged, by the attorney for the United States, that there is nothing to show that the book labelled on the back "Naturalization Index," and found in the office of the clerk of the Superior Court, was ever regarded by that Court as a record, or that that Court even knew of its existence; that it is as much a private, unofficial book as the note paper in the clerk's desk is private, unofficial paper; that there is nothing to show when the entries in it were made, nor by whom they were made; that, for all that appears to the contrary, they were made up from the affidavits alone, some time after the time when the affidavits purport to have been made; that it does not appear that the book was kept even by the authority or direction of the clerk of the Court; and that it may have been made up by, and have been the property of, some deputy who used it as an aid in making searches. There is no evidence tending to show that what is thus conjectured has any foundation in fact. It was open to the United States to show, that the "Naturalization Index" was not regarded by the Superior Court as a record, or that its existence was unknown to that Court, or that it was a private, unofficial book, or that the book was not kept by the authority or direction of the clerk of the Court, or that it was the property of some deputy. The record in the present case contains a certificate signed by the present clerk of the Superior Court, and at In re Peter Coleman, on Habeas Corpus. tested by the seal of that Court, certifying that the copy, before set forth, of the entry in regard to Coleman, in such "Naturalization Index," "is a true extract from the record of naturalizations of this Court, remaining in my office, to date," which date is November 22d, 1878. When a certificate of the clerk of a Court, under its seal, certifying that a book is a. "record of naturalizations" of the Court, is presented and accepted as evidence of the existence in the book, of the original entry of which a copy is annexed to the certificate, and no evidence is produced that the signature of the clerk is forged, or that the seal is not an impression from the true seal, or that the book has no existence, or that the entry is not in it, and when it appears that the book is in the office of the clerk of the Court, and has on it and in it marks designating it as the property of the Court, and as containing transactions of the Court, and when the entry in question in it corresponds with the contents of papers on file in the office of the clerk of the Court, which papers purport to be genuine, and the genuineness of which is not impeached, and which purport to have been filed on the day when the particular transaction took place, it is a proper legal conclusion, that the Court regarded the book as one of its records, and knew of its existence, and that it is not a private, unofficial book, and that it was kept by the authority and direction of the Court and of its clerk, and that it was not the property of some deputy. So, too, it is a proper legal conclusion, on the same evidence, that the entry in the book was made at a proper time and by proper authority. In regard to the oaths or affidavits on file in the Superior Court, it is contended, by the attorney for the United States, that it is impossible to say, from the initials of the Judge alone, that he ever made any decision concerning the affidavits, or, if he did, what decision he made, or that the decision was made in Court; that, even though it be conceded that he examined the affidavits, and approved them, and put his initials on them, as a fiat that they be filed, yet it does not appear that he di so when in Court and acting as the Court; In re Peter Coleman, on Habeas Corpus. that the absence from the regular minutes of the Court of an entry that the question of the naturalization of Coleman was before the Court, without proof that the omission was accidentally made by the clerk, is evidence, that, if the Judge considered and passed upon the affidavits, he did so out of Court; that the affidavits are ex parte affidavits, and not legal evidence; and that it is to be inferred from the affidavits that the affiants were not examined in Court, but merely signed and swore to the affidavits. These positions are recited, to show that they have been considered. The oaths or affidavits are all on one page of paper, with the title at the top: "Superior Court of the city of New York. In the matter of Peter Coleman, on his application to become a citizen of the United States. Minor." Each one of them purports to be "sworn in open Court." The attestation signature to each jurat is, "James M. Sweeny, Clerk." This is an attestation that the oath was taken in the Court, in open Court, in the presence of the Court, when the Judge holding the Court was sitting as a Court. As the initials on the page are the initials of a Judge who was a Judge of the Court at the time, and competent to hold it, it is to be presumed, from such initials, in connection with the other evidence, that he did hold the Court, and that he wrote his initials as an authority to the clerk to do what is found to have been done, namely, to enter the name of Coleman in the "Naturalization Index," as admitted to citizenship, with the date, and the other matters found in the book kept, and as authority to file the oaths or affidavits, and as an assertion that the Court held by him, and he while holding the Court, had received the application of Coleman and acted judicially on the matters covered by the oaths or affidavits, and been satisfied by the evidence, as to the residence and character of Coleman, and had admitted him thereupon to be a citizen of the United States. As the Court is to be satisfied by proof, of the existence of the necessary prerequisites to admission to citizenship, it is to be presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that Coleman and his witness deposed, on examination on oath in In re Peter Coleman, on Habeas Corpus. open Court, to the several matters set forth over their respective signatures as being deposed to by them on oath, and certified by the clerk as sworn to by them in open Court, and that they did so to the satisfaction of the Court. None of the objections taken in respect to the affidavits are regarded as tenable. It. therefore, appears, that Coleman was duly and legally admitted to citizenship; and that the legality of his admission was not invalidated by any act or omission which occurred either prior or subsequently to his admission. As he was legally admitted, it was proper for the Court to give to him the certificate of citizenship which was given to him; and that certificate was not unlawfully issued or made. On this ground he is entitled to his discharge from arrest. But, there is another ground on which Coleman is entitled to be discharged. Even if there were such a defect in the record of the Superior Court as to make the certificate given to him one that was unlawfully issued or made, he was not guilty of an offence, under § 5,426, unless, when he used the certificate, he knew that it was unlawfully issued or made. As it appears that he complied fully with all the conditions imposed on him as prerequisites to his admission, and that the unlawfulness, if any, was in the want of form in the record of the Court, and as he received at the time from the Court a certificate stating that all the statutory requisites had been complied with, and that the Court had ordered that he be admitted to be a citizen, and that he was accordingly admitted by the Court to be a citizen, no Court would permit a jury to convict him of using such certificate knowing that it was unlawfully issued. So manifest was this, that the moment the facts were brought to the attention of this Court, on the hearing on the habeas corpus, it announced that Coleman would be discharged immediately, on this ground alone. Thereupon, the attorney for the United States stated, that he did not think the evidence disclosed sufficient guilty knowledge on the part of Coleman of the defects in the certificate of citizenship, and that he consented that he should go at The La Mothe Manufacturing Co. v. The National Tube Works Co. large. He was accordingly released from custody, but no formal decision was made, in order that the other questions presented might be argued, considered and decided. An order will be entered discharging Coleman from custody. Stewart L. Woodford, (District Attorney,) and Samuel B. Clarke, (Assistant District Attorney,) for the United States. E. Ellery Anderson and George W. Wingate, for Coleman. THE LA MOTHE MANUFACTURING COMPANY vs. THE NATIONAL TUBE WORKS COMPANY. Subdivision one of § 639 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, in regard to the removal of causes from State Courts, is superseded and repealed by the Act of March 3d, 1875, (18 U. S. Stat. at Large, 470,) in respect to a case which is covered both by said subdivision and by § 2 of said Act. What is a sufficient appearance by a defendant corporation, to give to a Court jurisdiction over it, so as to make its proceedings to remove the cause to s Federal Court valid. What are sufficient averments in a petition for the removal of a cause. Where a complaint put in, in the State Court, before the removal of a cause, prays for relief purely equitable, and, also, for relief purely legal, the plaintiff must replead, in the Federal Court. (Before BLATCHFORD, J., Southern District of New York, January 4th, 1879.) BLATCHFORD, J. The defendants, a Massachusetts corporation, have removed this cause into this Court from the Supreme Court of New York. The plaintiffs are a New York corporation. The suit is one of a civil nature, brought and pending in the State Court, the matter in dispute exceeds |