In re Peter Coleman, on Habeas Corpus. tion is brought up in a collateral proceeding, such as is the present proceeding, provided there is sufficient to reasonably amount to such act and such order. Here, the Superior Court has said to Coleman, by the certificate, that he has complied with all the requirements of the statute, and that it has made an order thereupon that he be admitted to be a citizen, and that it has admitted him to be a citizen. The evidence produced on the subject, from the files and records of that Court, shows, that the certificate stated the truth, in stating that Coleman appeared in the Court and applied to it to become a citizen, and produced to it such evidence, and made such declaration and renunciation, and took such oaths, as the statute required. The three oaths of Coleman, embracing also the necessary declaration and renunciation by him, and the oath of the witness as to his residence and character, are all sworn to in open Court, and are on one and the same page of paper, at the head of which is a title, showing that all the proceedings are in the matter of the application of Coleman to the Superior Court to become a citizen of the United States. The original page of paper is on file in that Court, and bears the mark of having been filed on the same day on which the certificate was issued. This filing was a recording, within the meaning of the statute. It is contended, by the attorney for the United States, that it has been shown that there was no matter of record in the Superior Court on which to found the certificate that was given to Coleman; that what was put on record was not an act of admission or an order of admission; that there should have been a record of a judgment of the Court, in the same form as the ordinary record of a judgment between parties; that there is nothing in this case that can be regarded as such record, even including what is found in the "Naturalization Index" and the affidavits, and what is in them and on them; and that, therefore, the certificate was unlawfully issued. The evidence in this case shows very clearly that the Superior Court regarded what is found in the "Naturalization Index," in regard to Coleman, in connection with the paper In re Peter Coleman, on Habeas Corpus. of oaths, &c., and the initials of the Judge on such paper, as amounting to an order for the admission of Coleman to be a citizen. The evidence shows that there was no other record or entry of any order for. the admission of Coleman; but, it equally shows, not only that the Court understood that there was an order for his admission, but, also, what it was that was understood by the Court to be an order for his admission. The certificate given by the Court under its seal states that there was an order made by the Court for his admission. It follows, that what is now found is what the Court referred to as the order. It is not claimed, that, between the end of 1858 and the beginning of 1874, any other form of order admitting to citizenship was made by the Superior Court in any case, different from what now appears to have been made in the case of Coleman, while it does appear, that, during all the time from 1858 to 1874, the form of the order of admission was the same as in the case of Coleman, (except that nothing appears as to any initials of a Judge,) and that such form covers the cases of between 50,000 and 60,000 persons, who appear by the books of that Court, before mentioned, to have been admitted by that Court, during that period, to be citizens, if Coleman was so admitted. It may be that some, and, perhaps, many of the entries in such books may have been intended as statements that persons were naturalized who were not in fact naturalized, who never appeared in the Court, and who never took any oaths, and on whose cases the Court never acted, or acted only to reject them, and it may be that certificates were issued like that issued to Coleman, not only in cases thus fraudulently entered in such books, but in cases where no entry appears in such books. But no such case is now presented to this Court. It is to be presumed, that, if it shall be judicially shown to the Superior Court that any entries of naturalization in its books are fraudulent, or that any fraudulent certificates have been issued under its seal, it will annul such entries and certificates. But the only question in this Court, on this branch of the case, is, whether what is found in the In re Peter Coleman, on Habeas Corpus. records of the Superior Court amounts to an order for the admission of Coleman to be a citizen. That Court, for a period of fifteen years, observed the same forms of procedure, and kept the same records, and made the same orders of admission, in all cases of naturalization, as in the case of Colemau, and none others. During that period, nineteen judges. occupied seats on the bench of that Court. They were: Joseph S. Bosworth, Murray Hoffman, John Slosson, Lewis B. Woodruff, Edwards Pierrepont, James Moncrief, Anthony L. Robertson, James W. White, John M. Barbour, Claudius L. Monell, Samuel B. Garvin, John H. McCunn, Samuel Jones, Freeman J. Fithian, John J. Freedman, James C. Spencer, William E. Curtis, John Sedgwick and Hooper C. Van Vorst. It is to be presumed, that, in each case of naturalization, during that time, a certificate was given, like in form to that received by Coleman, and averring that the Court had ordered the admission of the party. That series of judges must have regarded what was found on the files, or in the records or books of the Court, in each case, as an order of admission, or as a record showing that such an order had been made by the Court. The stipulation of facts states, that, in the case of each person whose name is entered in the book as naturalized, there are on file papers resembling in all respects those in the case of Coleman. There is, therefore, no entry in the book, of a naturalization for which there are no proper oaths, declarations and renunciations. If any certificates were ever put into the hands of any person, not based on any actual proceeding in the Court, they were certificates as to which both the entry in the book and the filed oaths, &c., were wholly wanting. The fact that there is no record in the Court of any order directing the establishment and keeping of the volumes containing entries of naturalizations between 1858 and 1874, is of no consequence. The very keeping of them, for so long a period, is equivalent to an order that they be kept; and the absence of any order or practice, during that period, as to any other form of order of admission or record of admission, shows that what was kept and done is In re Peter Coleman, on Habeas Corpus. The form of to be regarded as a record and as the record. record in use before 1859, and that in use since 1873, cannot, in this collateral proceeding, be regarded as any better or more satisfactory form of record or order than that used during the period between 1858 and 1874. No case is cited, where what is found of record and on file in the case of Coleman has been held to be not a sufficient record or order of admission. In Spratt v. Spratt, (4 Peters, 393,) the naturalization was held to be good. This was the case, also, in Stark v. The Chesapeake Ins. Co., (7 Cranch, 420,) and in The Acorn, (2 Abb. U. S. Rep., 434,) and in Ritchie v. Putnam, (13 Wend., 524,) and in McCarthy v. Marsh, (5 N. Y., 263.) There are decisions that the docket entries of a Court are not admissible without laying a foundation therefor by showing why a copy of the record is not produced. Such was the case in Ferguson v. Harwood, (7 Cranch, 408,) and in Leveringe v. Dayton, (4 Wash. C. C. R., 638.) But, where docket entries stand in the place of any other record, and are regarded by the Court which makes them, as the record, they receive from other Courts the same consideration, as a record, which is accorded to them by the Court which permits them to stand in the place of any other record, provided there is no express provision of law prescribing any other record. In Phila. &c. R. R. Co. v. Howard, (13 Howard, 307,) a copy of the docket entries of a Court in a suit were produced, to prove the pendency of the suit. It was objected, that a formal record ought to have been shown. It appeared that the docket entries and files of the Court stood in place of the record. The Supreme Court says: "When a formal record is not required by law, those entries which are permitted to stand in place of it are admissible in evidence." It then cites with approval the case of Regina v. Yeoveley, (8 Ad. & Ell., 806,) where it was held, that the minute book of the sessions was admissible to prove the fact that an order of removal had been made, it appearing that it was not the practice to make up any other record of such an order; and it In re Peter Coleman, on Habeas Corpus. also cites with approval the kindred cases of Arundell v. White, (14 East, 216,) Jones v. Randall, (Cowper's R., 17,) and Commonwealth v. Bolkom, (3 Pick., 281.) In Washington, &c. Steam Packet Co. v. Sickles, (24 Howard, 333,) the plaintiffs, contending that a prior verdict and judgment in their favor against the defendants, estopped the defendants as to material questions in the cause, offered, as evidence of such verdict and judgment, docket entries thereof in a Court of the District of Columbia. The defendants objected that the docket entries were simply memoranda or minutes from which a record of a verdict and judgment were to be made. The Supreme Court says: "It appears, that, in this District, as in Maryland, the docket stands in the place of, or, perhaps, is, the record, and receives here all the consideration that is yielded to the record in other States. These memorials of their proceedings must be intelligible to the Court that preserves them, as their only evidence, and we cannot, therefore, refuse to them faith and credit. (Bateler v. State, 8 G. & J., 381; Ruggles v. Alexander, 2 Rawle, 232.) " These decisions are conclusive of the present question. The statute, in requiring the proceedings to which it refers ⚫ to be "recorded by the clerk of the Court," required no other record, in respect to Coleman, than that which was made, either as respects the order of admission or any of the oaths or affidavits. In In re Christien, before Judge Freedman, of the Supreme Court of the city of New York, October 15th, 1876, persons in the exact position of Coleman applied to that Court to have the record of the proceedings in that Court, admitting them to citizenship, perfected by an entry nunc pro tunc of the fact of such admission in the minute book of that Court. The sole ground of such application was, that the validity of the admission of the party to citizenship was disputed, on the allegation that there was no legal record of the judgment admitting him to citizenship, for the reason, that the clerk of the Court did not write out an entry in the |