he be not an indifferent spectator of these things, then he will not act as a perfectly indifferent spectator, and wholly let men alone, and order things in no respect differently for those ends one way or other. But so it must be, if God maintains no moral government over mankind.

§7. As man is made capable of knowing his Creator, so he is capable of knowing his will in many things, i. e. he is capable of knowing his ends in this and the other works which he beholds. For it is this way principally that he comes to know there is a God, even by seeing the final causes of things; by seeing that such and such things are plainly designed and contrived for such and such ends; and therefore he is capable of either complying with the will of his Creator, or opposing it. He is capable of falling in with God's ends, and what he sees his Creator aim at, and co-operating with him, or of setting himself against the Creator's designs. It is manifest, that it is the Creator's design, that parents should nourish their children, and that children should be subject to their parents. If a man therefore should murder his children, or if children should rise up and murder their parents, they would oppose the Creator's aims. So if men use the several bodily organs to quite contrary purposes to those for which they were given, and if they use the faculties of their own minds to ends quite contrary to those for which they were fitted, (for doubtless they were given and fitted for some end or other,) he may perversely use his dominion over the creatures against the ends to which they were given. For, however far we suppose man may be from being capable of properly frustrating his Creator, yet he is capable of shewing that his will is contrary to his Creator's ends. He may oppose his Creator in his will; he may dislike God's ends, and seek others. Now, the Creator cannot be an indifferent spectator of this; for it is a contradiction to suppose, that opposition to his will and aims should be as agreeable to him in itself, as complying with his will. And if he is not an indifferent spectator, then he will not act as such, and so he must maintain a moral government over mankind.

§ 8. This argument is peculiarly strong, as it respects man's being capable of falling in with, or opposing God's ends in his own creation, and his endowing him with faculties above the rest of the world. It is exceeding manifest concerning mankind, that God must have made them for some end; not only as it is evident that God must have made the world in general for some end, and as man is an intelligent, voluntary agent; but as it is especially manifest from fact, that God has made mankind for some special end. For, it is

apparent, in fact, that God has made the inferior parts of the world for some end, and that the special end he made them for is to subserve the benefit of mankind. Therefore, above all, may it be argued, that God has made mankind for some end. If an artificer accomplishes some great piece of workmanship, very complicated, and with a vast variety of parts, but the whole is so contrived and connected together, that there is some particular part which all the other parts are to subserve, we should well conclude that the workman had some special design to serve by that part, and that his peculiar aim in the whole, was what he intended should be obtained by that part. Now, man, the principal part of the creation, is capable of knowing his Creator, and is capable of discerning God's ends in the formation of other things; therefore, doubtless, since God discovers to him the ends for which he has made other things, it would be very strange, if he should not let him know the end for which he himself is made, or for which he had such distinguishing faculties given him, whereby he is set above other parts of the creation. Therefore, in the use of his own faculties, he must either fall in with the known design of the Creator in giving them, or thwart it. He must either co-operate with his Creator, as complying with the end of his own being, or wittingly set himself as his enemy. Of this the Creator cannot be an indifferent spectator; and therefore, by what was said before, must maintain moral government over mankind.

But

§ 9. It may be argued, that God maintains a moral government over the world of mankind, from this, that the special end of the being of man is something wherein he has to do with his Creator. The special end of the brute creation is something wherein they are concerned with men. man's special end is some improvement or use of his faculties towards God. For the special end for which God made mankind, is something very diverse and very superior to those ends for which he made any part of the inferior creation; because God has made man very different from them. But man's special end does not respect any other parts of the visible creation. All these are below him, and all, as we observed before, are made for him, to be subservient to his Their special end respects him; but his special end does not respect them. For, this is unreasonable in itself: if they are in their formation and end subordinated to him, and subjected to him, then the Maker sets a greater value on him than them, and therefore he has not made him for them. For that would be to suppose them most valuable in the eyes of their Maker. And it is manifest, in fact, that the being of mankind does not subserve the benefit of the inferior creatures, any

use.

farther than is just necessary to turn them to his own use, and spend them in it.

To this we may add, that the happiness of the greater part of mankind, in their worldly enjoymen's, is not great enough, or durable enough to prove that the end of all things in the whole visible universe is only that happiness.-There fore, nothing else remains, no other supposition is possible, but that man's special end is something wherein he has imme diately to do with his Creator.

§ 10. If God has made men above other creatures, with capacities superior to them, for some special end, for which other creatures are not made, that special end must be something peculiar to them, for which they are capacitated and fitted by those superior faculties. Now, the greatest thing that men are capacitated for, by their faculties, more than the beasts, is, that they are capable of having intercourse with their Creator, as intelligent and voluntary agents. They are capable of knowing, esteeming, and loving him, and capable of receiving instructions and commands from him, and capable of obeying and serving him, if he be pleased to give commands, and make a revelation of his mind. Surely this is not without some end. He that has done nothing in the inferior world in vain, has not given man this capacity in vain, The sun has not its light given it without a final cause; and shall we suppose, that mankind has this light of the knowledge of their Creator, without a final cause?

Thus, it is evident, that the special end for which God has made man, is something wherein he has intercourse with his Creator, as an intelligent, voluntary agent. Hence, the consequence is certain, that mankind are subject to God's moral government. For, there can be no such thing maintained, as a communication between God and man, as between intelligent, voluntary agents, without moral government. For, in maintaining communication or converse, one must yield to the other, must comply with the other; there must be union of wills; one must be clothed with authority, the other with submission. If God has made man to converse with himself, he is not indifferent how he is conversed with. One manner

of behaviour must be agreeable to his will, and another not; and therefore God cannot act as indifferent in this matter. He cannot let man alone, to behave toward him just as he pleases; therefore there must be moral government. God cannot be indifferent, whether he is respected and honoured, or is contemned and hated.

§ 11. Now as the consequence of the whole, I would infer two things:

1. A future state of rewards and punishments. For, unless there be such a state, it will certainly follow, that God, in fact, maintains no moral government over the world of mankind. For, otherwise, it is apparent, that there is no such thing as rewarding or punishing mankind, according to any visible rule, or indeed, according to any order or method whatsoever. Without this, there may be desires manifested, but there can be no proper laws established, and no authority maintained. Nothing is more manifest, than that in this world there is no such thing as a regular, equal disposing of rewards and punishments of men according to their moral estate. There is nothing in God's disposals toward men in this world, to make his distributive justice and judicial equity visible, but all things are in the greatest confusion. Often the wicked prosper, and are not in trouble as other men.They become mighty in power; yea, it has commonly been so in all ages, that they have been uppermost in the world. They have the ascendant over the righteous. They are mounted on thrones; while the righteous remain in cottages. And, in this world, the cause of the just is not vindicated.Many wicked men have the righteous in their power, and trample them under foot, and become their cruel persecutors: And the righteous are oppressed, and suffer all manner of injuries and cruelties; while the wicked live, and reign in great glory and prosperity.

2. What has been said, does invincibly argue a divine revelation. Because, if God maintains a moral government over mankind, then there must be rewards and punishments. But these sanctions must be declared: For instance, the punishments which enforce God's laws must be made known. To suppose that God keeps up an equal, perfect moral government over the world, and yet leaves men wholly at a loss about the nature, manner, degree, time, place, and continuance of their punishment, or leaves it wholly to their guesses, or for them to argue it out from the nature of things, as well as they can, and every one to make his judgment according as his notions shall guide him, is a very unreasonable supposition. If moral government be maintained, the order and method of government must be visible; otherwise it loses the nature of moral government. There may be a powerful disposal, as inanimate, unintelligible things are the subjects of God's government, in a visible and established order; but no moral government. The order of government serves to maintain authority, and to influence and rule the subject morally, no farther than it is visible. The notion of a moral government, without a revelation or declaration of the mind of the head by his word, or some voluntary sign or signification, in the whole of it is absurd. How absurd is it to suppose, that there should

be converse and moral government maintained between the head and subjects, when both are intelligent, voluntary agents, without a voluntary communication of minds and expressions, thoughts and inclinations, between the head and the members of the society!

§ 12. It need not be looked upon as any objection to men's remaining in being after the death of their bodies, that the beasts that are made for man cease to be when they die. For it is manifest, in fact, that man is the end of the rest of the creatures in this lower world. This world, with all its parts, inanimate, vegetative, and sensitive, was made for an habitation for man during his present state: And if man be the end of the rest of the creatures, for which the rest were made, and to whose use they are subordinated, then man is instar omnium. The end of all is equivalent to the whole. Therefore there is no need of any thing else to be preserved; nothing is lost; no part is in vain. If the end of all be preserved, all is preserved: because he is all, the rest is only for his occasional use. The beasts subserve man's use in the present state; and then, though they cease, yet their end is obtained, and their good, which is their end, remains still in man. Though the tent that was set up for man to sojourn in during his state of probation, ceases when that occasion is over, surely that is no argument that the inhabitant ceases too,

And that the beasts are made for man, affords a good positive argument for a future state of man's existence. For that all other creatures in this lower world are made for man, and that he himself should be made for no more than they, viz, a short continuance in this world to enjoy the good things of it, is unreasonable.

13. The natural world, which is in such continual labour, as is described in the first chapter of Ecclesiastes, constantly going round in such revolutions, will doubtless come to an end! These revolutions are not for nothing. There is some great event and issue of things, some grand period aimed at. Does God make the world restless, to move and revolve in all its parts, to make no progress? To labour with motions so mighty and vast, only to come to the same place again? Some great end is nearer to an accomplishment, after a thousand revolutions are finished, than when there was only one finished. The waters of the sea are not so restless, continually to ascend into the heavens, and then descend on the earth, and then return to the sea again, only that things may be as they were before. One generation of men does not come, another go, and so continually from age to age, only that at last there