frozen-and in many instances could not be frozen without harm to the production effortfor the duration of the war. Hence, the wage stabilization that was sought provided tolerances for the correction of inequities.

But what were these inequities? What limits should be established for their correction? In this general range of problems, the Board's contribution was outstanding. Prior to the Stabilization Act, the public members, in particular, recognized that general criteria to govern decisions in wage cases would have to be established. Almost from the beginning, the shadow of the steel case was on the Board. The responsibility of the Board to develop a wage policy was sharpened by the President's message to Congress on April 27, 1942. This message stated that "wages in general can and should be kept at existing scales," and that "all stabilization or adjustment of wages will be settled by War Labor Board machinery which has been generally accepted by industry and labor for the settlement of all disputes."

Less than 3 months later, the Board's decision in the Little Steel case laid the foundation of wartime wage stabilization policy. In this case, decided on July 16, 1942, a limit was set to general increases in wage rates to compensate for increases in cost of living. In the months after the President's message, moreover, the Board felt its way toward definitions of the terms "inequalities" and "substandards of living," which had been specified as bases for wage adjustments. Thus, when the Stabilization Act was passed, considerable progress had already been made in defining the conditions under which wage adjustments could be made within the stabilization framework. On November 6, 1942, less than a month after the passage of the Stabilization Act, the Board issued a policy statement which incorporated the Little Steel formula and specified other general criteria for deciding dispute and voluntary wage cases. George W. Taylor thus comments in the Termination Report:

The policy statement of November 6, 1942, set forth the solid basis upon which the varied needs of wage stabilization were effectively reconciled. It possessed the strength and status, moreover, which could only be given through development by an agency on which labor and industry were directly represented. It is, indeed, doubtful whether a stabilization program providing for wage increases to avoid manifest injustices while protecting against the ravages of infla

tion could have been worked out except by a tripartite board. On the other hand, the development of such a program by a tripartite board was possibly the most exacting test of such a machinery which could have been devised. Because of these factors, and because of the importance of the economic stabilization program to the welfare of the country and to the effective prosecution of the war, the November 6, 1942, Statement of Board Policy on Wage Stabilization stands out in my mind as the most significant achievement of the War Labor Board.

The wide discretion enjoyed by the Board in the development of wage policy ceased after the crisis in the stabilization effort in the spring o 1943. Thereafter, the Office of Economic Stabili zation played a more positive role that ultimately resulted, with the Board's assistance, in clarifica tion of policy, notably in criteria for judging wage inequities among establishments. The genera effectiveness of the stabilization program was also enhanced. The Termination Report describes in detail the wage stabilization policies of the Board, including policy with respect to such problems as equal pay for women, installation of incentive systems, and various types of "fringe" adjustments that loomed so large in the last year or so of the Board's existence.

Operations and Procedures

The statistical picture of Board activity is impressive. From January 12, 1942, to August 18, 1945, it closed 17,650 dispute cases involving an estimated 12,200,000 workers. Some of these cases were large and exceedingly complex; some of the small cases presented acute problems of policy. The Board was highly conscious of the importance of procedures likely to result in deci sions that rendered substantial justice to the par ties. The procedural requirements tended to make the elapsed time between certification of cases to the Board and the issuance of directive orders comparatively long, but it made for better decisions, fewer appeals, and greater compliance The processing time in voluntary wage adjustmen cases, of course, was generally considerably shorte than in dispute cases.

During the period of its active existence, the Board disposed of 437,894 voluntary application for the approval of wage adjustments. The case involved more than 26,000,000 employees. A

• Includes duplicate count where Board decided two or more cases involvin same group of workers.

overwhelming proportion of both the dispute and voluntary wage adjustment cases were decided by the regional boards and the special industry commissions. The National Board, for the most part, handled only cases of outstanding significance or of inter-regional scope, and served as a final court of appeals from the decisions of the regional boards and industry commissions.

Decisions in dispute cases were always made on a tripartite basis. With respect to the far greater volume of applications for approval of wage adjustments (the voluntary cases), the situation was significantly different. In March 1943, the Board authorized its regional boards to delegate to their wage stabilization directors authority to rule on certain categories of voluntary cases. The extent of this delegation of authority increased progressively. Thus, almost 96 percent of the decisions in the 203,496 voluntary cases decided in the regional boards between July 1, 1944, and August 17, 1945, were made by the wage stabilization directors. These decisions were not tripartite decisions, although appeals could be taken through the tripartite machinery.

In the concrete application of the wage stabilization program, therefore, responsibility rested very substantially upon the national and regional wage stabilization divisions, which were staff groups within the Board. This helped, at least in part, to overcome the problems inherent in the administration of public policy by a Board of which twothirds of the members were, in a sense, representatives of "interest" groups. The contributions of the tripartite structure have been sufficiently emphasized; the adaptations of Board organization to give substantial authority in wage administration to staff personnel deserves considered attention.

The nature of the Termination Report probably precluded adequate treatment of the contributions of the Board staff to the work of the agency in both dispute settlement and wage stabilization. These contributions were by no means entirely on the level of administration and application of policy. In the field of wage control, for example, the national wage stabilization director made significant contributions to policy and waged a persistent and often difficult campaign to achieve tight

standards of policy application. This is one of the many areas in which the report can be fruitfully supplemented by additional research.

Conclusion

In an introductory statement to the Termination Report, William H. Davis, first chairman of the Board and later Director of Economic Stabilization, quoted Browning's lines on unrealized aspirations. After this graceful allusion to human imperfection, Mr. Davis proceeds to discuss some of the elements that lent strength and character to the Board. It was a strong Board, and one that rendered substantial justice in the many thousands of cases that came before it. Both the maintenance of industrial peace and comprehensive wage control were tasks of extraordinary difficulty, and presented many problems of policy and procedure for solution. The Board provided, for the most part, workable solutions. Its contributions to the war effort were genuine and significant.

With the end of the war, the no-strike-nolockout agreement lapsed, and the Board's authority to settle industrial disputes evaporated. Wage control policy was decisively modified. The liquidation of the Board was completed on December 31, 1945, and on the following day the National Wage Stabilization Board was created in the United States Department of Labor to administer the new wage policy. In the meantime, a new labor-management conference had failed to reach agreement on methods and procedures for minimizing industrial disputes in the reconversion period.

There was no orderly transition from war to peace in industrial relations or in wage-price policy and relationships. Could it have been different? The answer is complicated and must be sought in a balanced analysis of the many factors that affected the direction of economic development in the immediate postwar period. In such an analysis, the influence of the Board on the formulation of postwar policy would have to be taken into

account.

The National Wage Stabilization Board, January 1, 1946-February 24, 1947. Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1948. 594 pp. (Historical Reports on War Administration.)

Construction Machinery:

Unit Man-Hour Trends, 1945-471

AVERAGE FACTORY MAN-HOURS expended per unit in the manufacture of construction machinery declined, during the postwar period 1945-47, for the first time since 1940. The Bureau of Labor Statistics index of total factory man-hours expended per unit, based on reports received from 41 representative producers of construction machinery,2 rose one point between 1945 and 1946, and then declined almost four points in 1947. The index for 1947 was only five points above the 1939 base, lower than that for any year since 1943 (table 1).3

The significant decline from 1946 to 1947 came as the result of technological improvements introduced in late 1945 and in 1946, together with an appreciable decrease in the severity of shortages of important components and materials, intensified managerial attention to reduction of overhead, and improvement in the average experience of the work force.

The slight rise in unit man-hours in the first postwar year was due in part to the factors which depressed efficiency during the late war years (including shortages of materials and parts, and of competent and experienced workmen, absenteeism, and dilution of supervisory and work forces). The most important problems peculiar

1 Prepared by George E. Sadler, of the Bureau's Productivity and Technological Development Branch, on the basis of the industry report (mimeographed) prepared by Frank M. Tucker and Thayer David Moss. An earlier report covering the period 1939 to 1945 appeared in the July 1947 issue of the Monthly Labor Review.

These 41 companies, which include practically all the largest firms in the industry, operate more than 90 establishments, and accounted for over three fifths of all construction machinery manufactured during the period Septem ber 1944 to July 1945.

A number of revisons have been made in the indexes presented in the initial report, on the basis of a broader coverage of the establishments in the industry.

to the reconversion period were the realignmen of facilities for production of different machines the institution of plant and equipment moderni zation and replacement programs (which led t increased overhead and loss of efficiency durin the transition) and readjustment of produc models from armed-service to civilian-custome requirements.

Type of Labor

One of the most significant findings of the stud for the 1945-47 period was that the average num ber of direct-labor man-hours per unit decreased steadily, accelerating the gradual decline of ove 1 percent a year which had begun after 1943. Th decrease was effected in spite of many factor which tended to depress production efficiency throughout the war and reconversion periods The direct-labor index, which stood at 103 per cent of the 1939 base in 1943, had decreased slightly over 2 points by 1945. It declined 4 point between 1945 and 1947-to 97.2-falling below the 1939 base for the first time since 1940.

This steady decline in average number of man hours per unit for labor applied directly to pro duction was a clear reflection of technologica improvements which were reported generally i the industry during the past 4 years, and of th continued high level of output. Numerou changes were reported in 1946 and 1947, especially as the industry discontinued wartime operations and machinery became available. The full effec of these changes probably had not yet been fel during the period studied, since, as previousl noted, factors incident to large-scale changes i factory lay-out tended to decrease efficiency (an increase man-hours per unit) during the transi tion. Shortages of materials and components, scarcity of experienced and capable personnel, and high turn-over continued to exert an unfavorabl

influence, although the effect of these factors was less severe in 1947 than in the earlier years. As a consequence, it is not unreasonable to assume a continuation after 1947 of the decrease in direct man-hours expended per unit in this industry.

The index for indirect-labor man-hours, which comprised about half of total-factory man-hours in 1947, rose approximately 4 points from 1945 to 1946, indicating a continuance of the unbroken upward trend in overhead labor initially appearing in 1940. The general trend in indirect-labor man-hours per unit was sharply upward from 1940 to 1946, reaching a point 20 percent above the 1939 base. In 1947, however, the index showed a decline of slightly more than 6 pointsto a level 14 percent above the 1939 base.

Chart 1.-Trends in Man-Hours Expended Per Unit, Construction Machinery, All Reporting Products (1939-100)

Reports from company officials indicated that the rise in overhead labor in 1946 above the already high level of the late war years was due largely to extensive changes necessary in plant and equipment. These changes involved increased requirements for maintenance, mechanical work, production engineering, movement of materials and equipment, and managerial manhours, with occasional severe disruption in the smooth flow of production. A stabilizing factor, however, was the continued backlog of orders, which assured a steady high volume of output.

The significant decline from 1946 to 1947 in indirect labor per unit was due in large part to

completion of postwar reconversion, with adjustment and improvement of facilities and a consequent decrease in the relative amount of supervisory, production-engineering, and mechanicallabor man-hours. In addition, management efforts to reduce overhead achieved some success, aided considerably by the opportunity to eliminate some of the wartime functions such as plant protection and detailed control of production, materials, tools, and services.

Variations Between Products

During the reconversion period 1945-47, the average number of man-hours expended per unit of output declined for all major products and product groups except crushers, scrapers, and power shovels. This trend resulted from substantial technological improvements, partial easing of the shortage of experienced workers, greater availability of materials, and other favorable influences. Decreases in the Bureau's product indexes ranged from about 2 points for track-laying tractors and the ditcher-bucket loader group to as much as 24 points for self-propelled rollers."

Increases reported for power shovels and scrapers were relatively slight, but a 12-point rise for crushers, continuing a long-term trend which first developed in 1941, raised the total factory manhour index for this item to a point well above that for any other type of construction machinery.

The continuing severe shortage of heavy steel plate and good quality large castings (which are relatively more important components for these foregoing items than for most other types of construction machinery) were cited by producers as the outstanding cause for the continued increase in man-hour requirements.

During the first postwar year (1946), slight increases in total factory man-hours per unit were reported for all groups except rollers, tractor attachments, and ditchers-in part because of prob

During the initial 1939-45 period, relatively favorable trends in total factory man-hours per unit of output were reported for track-laying tractors, self-propelled rollers, power shovels, and the ditcher-bucket loader group. Generally unfavorable experience was reported by producers of concrete machinery, tractor attachments, graders, crushers, and scrapers.

In 1945, total factory man-hours per unit for self-propelled rollers were only 87 percent of 1939, while the 1945 indexes for track-laying tractors and power shovels indicated unit man-hours virtually identical with those for 1939. Moderate increases, ranging up to 10 percent, were reported for manufacture of bulldozers, the ditcher-bucket loader group, and clamshell buckets. Substantial rises, ranging up to 32 percent, were reported for trailbuilders, con. crete machinery, crushers, scrapers, and motor graders.

lems incident to conversion and reorganization of facilities in many plants, and in part because of continuing shortages of materials and experienced workmen. No rises were particularly severe, the largest (7 percent) being reported for the crusher group. The implications of shortages of labor and materials were not entirely unfavorable, since these shortages arose from the continued high level of production necessary to meet unfilled orders.

Between 1946 and 1947 the predominant trend was reversed, and all groups except crushers, power shovels, and the ditcher-bucket loaders group

experienced favorable changes. Most of the decreases were substantial-16 index points for graders, 14 for rollers, 9 for the concrete machinery group, 6 for tractors, and 4 for tractor attach ments. Manufacturers generally attributed the declines to the improved supply of components and workmen, to technological changes previously effected, and to increased attention to reduction of overhead.

Direct man-hours per unit declined from 1945 to 1947, for self-propelled rollers 23 points, for tractor attachments 7 points, and for scrapers 3