ments, and such testimony, where it is that of an interested party, is entitled to but little weight if it is inconsistent with the reasonable presumptions arising from circumstantial evidence. The probability that an intelligent man who enters upon a course of speculative dealings with a bucket shop does so with the understanding that the purchases or sales are to be merely colorable is so strong as to amount to a presumption of fact. It is quite incredible that Blitch should have believed that Baxter & Co. were "carrying," for the purposes of his speculation, $140,000 worth of property, or the evidence of title thereto, on the trifling margin of 1 per cent. The recital in the confirmation slips, upon which it is said he relied, was pregnant with information to an alert business man that Baxter & Co. was not doing business legitimately. It was such an unnecessary and unusual statement as to suggest at once that it was a precaution adopted by Baxter & Co. for its own protection in case the validity or legality of its transactions should be questioned. Its presence indicated that it was inserted for some ulterior purpose. Central Stock & Grain Exchange v. Board of Trade, 196 Ill. 396, 63 N. E. 740; Weare Commission Co. v. The People, 209 Ill. 528, 70 N. E. 1076. "Here are the very clausulæ inconsuetæ pointed out in Twyne's Case as the sure badges of that which they are intended to hide." Taylor v. Taylor, 8 How. (U. S.) 205, 12 L. Ed. 1040, We are unable to doubt that each party understood the other, and that the implied understanding between them was, at the inception of and throughout their dealings, that their transactions should be those of the ordinary kind between customer and bucket shop proprietor. The courts ought not to indulge in any violent or improbable inferences from the facts to assist either of the parties to such dealings, or to differentiate their dealings from ordinary gambling transactions. These conclusions render it unnecessary to consider any of the questions as to the amount of the recovery presented by the appeal of either party. The order is reversed, with instructions to the court below to disallow the claim. In re A. B. BAXTER & CO. (two cases). In re WHITTAKER. In re JOSEPH. (Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. January 7, 1907.) Nos. 106, 240, 108, 241. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH RELATION-TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN BUCKET SHOPS. The transactions between two concerns engaged in business as brokers or bucket shops, one located in New York and the other in Atlanta, Ga.. held not such as to create the relation of principal and agent between them, but merely that of correspondents. [Ed. Note. For cases in point, see Cent, Dig. vol. 40, Principal and Agent, § 41.] Petition to Review Order of, and Appeal from, the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. J. J. Adams, for petitioner. F. M. Czaki and Fried & Czaki, for respondent. Before WALLACE, LACOMBE, and TOWNSEND, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM. The appeal in this case presents the question whether the firm of Houser & Co. was the agent of the alleged bankrupt at Atlanta in soliciting orders to be executed by Baxter & Co. at New York for the purchase and sale of stocks and products. Upon a state of facts similar in all essential particulars, it was decided in Municipal Telegraph & Stock Co. v. Ward, 138 Fed. 1006, 70 C. C. A. 284, that the relation of principal and agent did not exist. That decision is controlling in this court as an authority, and an independent examination of the question is unnecessary. It is proper to say, however, that there are two cases to the same effect decided in the appellate branch of the New York Supreme Court, viz.: Holman v. Goslin, 103 App. Div. 606, 93 N. Y. Supp. 126, and Willard v. White, 56 Hun, 581, 10 N. Y. Supp. 170. Smith v. New York Stock & Clearing House Co., 25 N. Y. Supp. 261, relied on as a decision to the contrary, is differentiated from the other decisions in the very important fact that the "correspondent" deposited all moneys received by him as margins and commissions in the bank account of the corporation, and also in the fact that the corporation had arranged directly to protect the customers of the correspondent from loss of margin or profits in their dealings with him. It follows that the court below erred in allowing the claim of Whittaker. The order is reversed, with costs. UNITED STATES v. PARK & TILFORD. (Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. January 7, 1907.) No. 83 (4,075). CUSTOMS DUTIES-UNUSUAL COVERINGS-ADDITIONAL DUTY. Under Customs Administrative Act June 10, 1890, c. 407, § 19, 26 Stat.. 139 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1924], the "additional duty" provided therein for unusual coverings used "otherwise than in the bona fide transportation" of their contents to the United States, is not a substitute for the usual duty on coverings which accrues by including their cost in the dutiable value of their contents, as also provided in said section; but both duties should be imposed, the latter because the coverings subserve a use intransportation, and the former because they subserve an additional use after transportation. [Ed. Note. For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 15, Customs Duties, § 20.] Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. This cause comes here upon appeal from a decision of the Circuit Court, Southern District of New York (142 Fed. 202), affirming a. decision of the Board of General Appraisers (G. A. 6,111 [T. D. 26,608]), which reversed the action of the Collector of the Port of New York in assessing certain imported merchandise under the Tariff Act of 1897. Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, 30 Stat. 151 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1626]. J. Osgood Nichols and Henry A. Wise, Asst. U. S. Attys. Before WALLACE, LACOMBE, and TOWNSEND, Circuit Judges. LACOMBE, Circuit Judge. The articles in question are wooden boxes or cabinets containing cigars. They are more elaborate and ornamental than the ordinary cigar box of commerce, and it is undisputed that they are unusual coverings, designed, not only for the transportation of the cigars packed in them, but also for the purpose of enhancing their attractiveness when exposed for sale, and supplying a pleasing receptacle to contain them. The appraised value of the cabinets was $5 each, and they were invoiced as "sample cases" containing cigars. The customs officers included the value of the cabinets in determining the actual market value of the cigars, upon which the ad valorem duty of 25 per cent. on cigars was assessed and paid. The collector also imposed an additional duty upon the cabinets at 35 per cent. ad valorem, as manufactures of wood, under paragraph 208. Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, § 1, Schedule D, 30 Stat. 168 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1646]. It is conceded that, if imported empty, the latter rate of duty would be the proper one; but it is contended that the collector was not warranted in imposing a double duty on the cabinets. His action was taken under section 19 of the customs administrative act (Act June 10, 1890, c. 407, 26 Stat. 139 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1924]), which reads as follows: "Sec. 19. That whenever imported merchandise is subject to an ad valorem rate of duty, or to a duty based upon or regulated in any manner by the value thereof, the duty shall be assessed upon the actual market value or wholesale price of such merchandise as bought and sold in usual wholesale quantities, at the time of exportation to the United States, in the principal markets of the country from whence imported, and in the condition in which such merchandise is there bought and sold for exportation to the United States, or consigned to the United States for sale, including the value of all cartons, cases, crates, boxes, sacks and coverings of any kind, and all other costs, charges and expenses incident to placing the merchandise in condition, packed ready for shipment to the United States, and if there be used for covering or holding imported merchandise, whether dutiable or free, any unusual ar ticle or form designed for use otherwise than in the bona fide transportation of such merchandise to the United States, additional duty shall be levied and collected upon such material or article at the rate to which the sam would be subject if separately imported. That the words 'value' or 'actual market value' whenever used in this act or in any law relating to the anpraisement of imported merchandise shall be construed to mean the actual market value or wholesale price as defined in this section." The language of this section is certainly plain and unambiguous. It provides, first, that, whenever imported merchandise is subject to an ad valorem duty, the value upon which that duty is to be assessed shall include the value of all cases, crates, boxes, and coverings of any kind. This is a requirement applicable to all importations of ad valorem goods. There is nothing in this part of the section to indicate that, under any contingency, a different rule shall be applied in assessing the valuation of any importation of such goods. The section next provides that, if there be used for holding the merchandise, whether dutiable or free, any unusual covering, additional duty shall be levied upon such covering at the rate to which the same would be subject if separately imported. If this duty is to be "additional," it would seem to be the plain intent of the act that the aritc'e which pays the "additional" duty shall also pay an initial duty. If it were intended that, in the event of an unusual covering, it should pay duty only at the rate to which it would be subject if imported separately, there would be no need to use the word "additional" at all. It is true that, when the imported merchandise is free, the duty on the unusual covering is not properly an "additional" one, but the word exactly covers a case like the present, and, unless it is to be wholly disregarded, should require the levy of two duties on the covering; one on such article as subserving a use in transportation, and the other on such article as subserving an additional use after the transportation, In the majority opinion filed by the Board of General Appraisers, it is not disputed that such is the literal construction of the section; but they reach the conclusion that it was not the intent of Congress to exact a double duty. They suggest that the literal construction would produce a condition repugnant to fair dealing in the administration of customs laws; that it has been the policy of Congress so to frame these laws as to render them the least possible burden to the citizen and uniform in their administration; and that such construction is in conflict with the report of the committee of Congress in presenting to the House of Representatives the bill which upon its enactment by Congress became this act. It is no uncommon occurrence, however, to find in tariff acts provisions expressly devised to accomplish some purpose other than the mere collection of duty. Some articles are exposed to such a rate of duty as will practically prohibit their importation. In some cases cumulative duties are provided for. Paragraph 313, Act 1897. Duty so high as to be characterized as penal is sometimes exacted to put a stop to some undesirable practice. Thus, when imported merchandise was inclosed in coverings designed for use otherwise than in the bona fide transportation of the merchandise, a duty of 100 per cent. was imposed by the tariff act of 1883. Act March 3, 1883, c. 116, § 7, 22 Stat. 486 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 750]. It is a fact of which the courts which hear customs causes will take notice that there has been much litigation as to the question of the usualness or bona fides of various "coverings," and that Congress has enacted many provisions to prevent the government from suffering loss of revenue by reason of the adoption of some unusual covering, designed to subserve a double purpose. It certainly would not be surprising to find that Congress had at last decided to accomplish this by prescribing a double duty, and we find nothing repugnant to fair dealing in such an enactment. In the case at bar, the cabinets, at 25 per cent, plus 35 per cent. pay only a little more than half what they would have paid under the act of 1883. It appears, moreover, from the references to the Congressional Record set forth in the government's brief, that the report of the House committee upon which the Board of General Appraisers relied was made at a time when the bill did not contain any provision for "additional" duty. It was amended to its present shape subsequently, in the Senate (Cong. Rec. vol. 21, pt. 4, p. 3973), and the insertion of this word "additional" during the progress of the bill through the legislative body fairly indicates an intention to subject coverings like these to a double duty. The decision of the Circuit Court is reversed. ALASKA EXPLORATION CO. v. NORTHERN MINING & TRADING CO. (Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. March 4, 1907.) No. 1,349. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-DEEDS-RECORD-NOTICE. Where a deed to an undivided interest in an Alaska mining claim was neither witnessed by two witnesses nor acknowledged, as required by B. & C. Comp. Or. §§ 5342, 5350, 5354, 5355, made applicable to Alaska by Act Cong. May 17, 1884, c. 53, § 7, 23 Stat. 24, such deed was not entitled to record, and hence the record thereof was not constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser. [Ed. Note. For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 48, Vendor and Purchaser, 538.] In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Second Division of the District of Alaska. S. T. Jeffreys and W. S. Wood, for plaintiff in error. Ira D. Morton, J. C. Campbell, W. H. Metson, Frank C. Drew, C. H. Oatman, and J. A. Mackenzie, for defendant in error. Before GILBERT and ROSS, Circuit Judges, and WOLVERTON, District Judge. ROSS, Circuit Judge. The defendant in error sued the plaintiff in error and another corporation to recover possession of an undivided three-sixteenths of a certain mining claim in Alaska. The bill of exceptions shows that on the trial the plaintiff introduced evidence going to show that the claim was located by one Pierce Thomas, who, on the 4th day of October, 1902, executed to the plaintiff a deed for a three-sixteenths interest in the claim. The plaintiff in error sought to overcome that conveyance by showing that Thomas had made a previous conveyance of the entire claim to one Kimber, under whom the plaintiff in error claims, It is not pretended that the defendant in error had any actual notice of such prior conveyance, but it was sought by the plaintiff in error to show constructive notice to it by the introduction of a certified copy of the record in the office of the recorder of the mining district in which the claim is situated of a deed from Thomas to Kimber of the entire claim; it being provided, by the Alaskan statute of June 6, 1900, that all records theretofore made in good faith in any regularly organized 152 F.-10 |