151 FEDERAL REPORTER. thus overruling the importers' claim that it went into effect April 10, 1903, the tenth day after ratifications were exchanged. The Supreme Court has, however, recently decided that the treaty went into effect December 27, 1903. The Dalton Company is therefore not entitled to the reduction claimed. U. S. v. American Refining Co., 202 U. S. 563, 26 Sup. Ct. 717, 50 L. Ed. 1149; Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. U. S., 202 U. S. 580, 26 Sup. Ct. 720, 50 L. Ed. 1153. The appeal is therefore dismissed. UNITED STATES v. M. J. DALTON CO. (Circuit Court, E. D. Pennsylvania. February 15, 1907.) No. 12. CUSTOMS DUTIES-IMPORTATIONS FROM CUBA-TIME OF TAKING EFFECT OF TREATY. The treaty between Cuba and the United States, signed December 11, 1902, did not go into effect until December 27, 1903, the date proclaimed by the President, and imports from Cuba entered prior to that date were not entitled to the 20 per cent. reduction provided for therein from the duties imposed by Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, 30 Stat. 151 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1626]. Appeal from Decision of Board of General Appraisers. William M. Stewart, Jr., and J. W. Thompson, for the United States. Hatch, Keener & Clute, for appellee. HOLLAND, District Judge. The importation of the goods involved in this case arrived at Philadelphia on December 18, 1903, one day after the President issued his proclamation putting into effect the treaty between the United States and Cuba. The importers claimed a reduction in duties of 20 per cent., and the Board of General Appraisers, in their decision rendered March 25, 1905, held that the Dalton Company was entitled to this reduction, on the ground that the President did not have the power to postpone the operation of the treaty until December 27, 1903. From this ruling the collector appealed to this court. The Supreme Court has held in the case of U. S. v. American Refining Co., 202 U. S. 563, 26 Sup. Ct. 717, 50 L. Ed. 1149, and in Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. U. S., 202 U. S. 580, 26 Sup. Ct. 720, 50 L. Ed. 1153, that the treaty went into effect December 27, 1903. So that the appeal in this case must be sustained; and it is sa ordered, 1. BRUN et al. v. MANN. (Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. November 7, 1906.) No. 2,306. 1. COURTS-FEDERAL COURTS-JURISDICTION IN ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSONS-FACTS-DECISION. A decree of a federal court had been allowed as the only claim against the estate of a deceased person in the county court of a state in which administration was pending. The only property of that estate consisted of certain lands and water rights appurtenant. The statutes of the state imposed the duty upon the administratrix to institute a proceeding either in the county court or in the district court of the state to sell the unexempt real property to pay debts. She claimed that the real estate was exempt, and refused to commence the proceeding. Held, the federal court in which the decree was rendered had jurisdiction to entertain a suit commenced by the complainant in that decree and to render a decree for the sale of the land notwithstanding the pendency of the administration in the county court. [Ed. Note. For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 13, Courts, § 801.] 2. SAME-JURISDICTION TO ENFORCE THEIR JUDGMENTS AND DECREES PLENARY. The jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and the duty, which they may not renounce, is imposed upon the national courts to enforce their judgments and decrees and to decide by their own independent judgment every controversy which conditions their complete execution. This power may not be lawfully destroyed, limited, or diminished by the legislation of the states or the decisions of their courts. [Ed. Note. For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 13, Courts. §§ 795, 796. 801.] 3. Same-DEPENDENT SUIT-NATURE-PURPOSE-MAINTAINABLE WITHOUT DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP OR FEDERAL QUESTION. A suit in equity dependent upon a former action of which the nationa! court had jurisdiction may be maintained without diversity of citizenship or a federal question (1) to aid, enjoin, or regulate the original suit; (2) to restrain, avoid, explain, or enforce the judgment or decree therein; or (3) to enforce, or obtain an adjudication of liens upon or claims to property in the custody of the court in the original case. 4. SAME JURISDICTION OF CONTROVERSIES ARISING DURING ADMINISTRATION, BUT NOT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES AS SUCH. The national courts have jurisdiction of controversies arising during the pendency of the administration of estates of deceased persons in the state courts which condition the enforcement of their judgments or decrees or the rights of aliens, citizens of other states, and other parties who might invoke their action and their adjudications if the controversies arose otherwise, and their decisions and decrees prevail over the statutes of the . states and the decisions of their courts. But the federal courts have no jurisdiction of the administration of the estates of deceased persons as such. 5. SAME JURISDICTION AS EXTENSIVE AS THAT OF STATE COURTS OF GENERAL JURISDICTION. Rights created and remedies provided by the statutes of the states to be pursued in the state courts of general jurisdiction may be enforced and administered in the national courts either at law, in equity or in admiralty, as the nature of the rights and remedies may require. As the state statutes conferred jurisdiction on the district court of the state to decree a sale of real estate during administration, the federal court had like jurisdiction in a proper case. [Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 13, Courts, §§ 972 151 F.-10 151 FEDERAL REPORTER. 6. SAME-COUNTY COURTS-SALE Of Land. The general rule is that the court which first acquires jurisdiction of specific property in a suit or proceeding to enforce a lien upon it or to subject it to sale wherein it may be necessary to take possession or dominion of it may retain the exclusive legal custody of it until the suit is at an end or until ample time for its termination has elapsed. But the legal custody and jurisdiction of this land by the county court was limited by the grant of jurisdiction to the district court and to the federal court to sell it during administration. [Ed. Note. For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 13, Courts, §§ 1345, 1410.] 7. ACTIONS-CAPACITY TO SUE - CONSTITUENT OR CESTUI QUE TRUST HAS, WHEN LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE OR TRUSTEE REFUSES. A constituent or cestui que trust may sue and make his representative or trustce a defendant when the latter refuses, after reasonable demand, to commence a suit or take a proceeding which it is his duty to institute for the benefit of the former. 8. COURTS FEDERAL COURTS - EQUITABLE JURISDICTION ABSENCE OF ADE It is an absence of an adequate remedy at law in the national courts only that conditions their jurisdiction in equity. Such a remedy in the state courts is immaterial. 9. EQUITY-LACHES-NONE WHEN ANALOGOUS ACTION AT LAW NOT BARRED AND NO UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES. The doctrine of laches is an equitable principle which is invoked to promote. but never to defeat, justice. analogous action at law is not barred and no unusual conditions invoke It has no function where the its application. [Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 19, Equity, §§ 191-196.] 10. STATUTES-CONSTRUCTION-WORDS AND PHRASES HAVE THEIR COMMON SIGNIFICANCE-NO ROOM FOR CONSTRUCTION WHEN PLAIN. Plain Words and phrases should receive their common, ordinary significance unless it clearly appears that they were used in some other sense. statutes raise a conclusive presumption that the legislative body intended what it expressed, and they may not be repealed or modified by construction. [Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 44, Statutes, §§ 266, 267.] 11. PUBLIC LANDS-HOMESTEADS-EXEMPTIONS-"DEBT CONTRACTED" DOES NOT EXEMPT FROM EVERY "LIABILITY INCURRED" FOR TORTS. The exemption of lands acquired under the homestead laws and the timber culture laws (2 U. S. Comp. St. 1901, pp. 1534, 1535; Act March 4, 1896, c. 40, § 4, 20 Stat. 113, 114; 2 U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1398, § 2296: Act May 20, 1862, c. 75, § 4, 12 Stat. 393) from any "debt contracted" previous to their acquisition, does not exempt them from liabilities for the torts of the entrymen previously perpetrated. 12. COURTS CONFLICTING JURISDICTION-JURISDICTION OF RES-PAYMENT OF CLAIM-DUTY TO DETERMINE ADVERSE CLAIMS-SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS IN OTHER COURTS. When, in a suit in equity for the sale of property to satisfy the claim of the complainant, a court acquires jurisdiction of the property and of the parties, subsequent proceedings by any of the parties in other courts, without leave of the court which first acquired jurisdiction, are ineffectual to establish claims to the property or its proceeds adverse to those of the complainant. But the duty is imposed upon the court which first acquires such jurisdiction to hear and determine such adverse claims when seasonably presented to it. (Syllabus by the Court.) Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Colorado. On October 11, 1901, the complainant, Mann, exhibited his bill in the court below against Kate E. Brun, the widow and the administratrix with the will annexed of the estate of Tillett, and against Kate E. Brun, and Jessie Wakeman, legatees under Tillett's will, to subject two tracts of land one of which had been patented to Tillett in 1892 under the timber culture laws of the United States (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, pp. 1534, 1535; Act March 4, 1896, c. 40, § 4, 20 Stat. 113, 114) and had been devised by him to Jessie Wakeman, and the other of which had been patented to Tillett in December, 1892, under the homestead laws of the United States (2 U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1398, § 2296; Act May 20, 1862, c. 75, § 4, 12 Stat. 393) and had been devised by him to Kate E. Brun, to the payment of a judgment which had been rendered in favor of the complainant and against the administratrix and the estate of Tillett in the court below for $19,718.56 on April 1, 1899. The defendants challenged the right of the complainant to the relief he sought by demurrers and by answers, and the defendant Brun sought affirmative relief by a cross-bill. But the court granted a decree for the sale of the land to satisfy the judgment, and refused relief to the defendants. This decree is questioned by the appeal. The jurisdiction of the court below to entertain the suit, its jurisdiction to order a sale of the real estate pending administration in the county court of the state, the equity of the bill, and the refusal of the court to grant affirmative relief to Brun, are challenged by the assignments of error. An acquaintance with the essential facts which condition the issues thus presented is indispensable to a correct understanding of their discussion and decision. On January 3, 1885, Mann, who was then a resident and citizen of the state of Nevada, recovered a judgment against Tillet, a citizen and resident of Colorado, and against one Bloomfield, in the court below for $30.591, for carrving away and converting the cattle of the plaintiff to the defendants' use On September 13. 1892. in consideration of a conveyance of a piece of prairie land worth about $1.700, made by Bloomfield, Mann satisfied one half of the judg ment and released Bloomfield from all liability on account of the judgment, but expressly reserved his claim against Tillett for the payment of the other half. In the latter part of 1892 the two tracts of land in controversy were patented to Tillett. On March 18, 1896, Tillett died testate, but left no property except the lands in controversy and a small amount of money which was exhausted in the payment of the expenses of his last sickness and of his funeral. His will was proved in the county court of Prowers county, in the state of Colorado, which, under the laws of that state, had jurisdiction of the probate of wills and of the administration of estates, and one Thompson, the executor, qualified as such; but he died on April 29, 1897, and Kate E. Tillett, the widow, who subsequently by marriage became Kate E. Brun, was appointed and qualified as administratrix with the will annexed. On January 24, 1897, Mann filed in the county court his claim against the estate of Tillett for the amount of his judgment and interest. Kate E. Tillett shortly after her appointment as administratrix exhibited her bill in the court below to procure a decree of discharge and satisfaction of Mann's judgment, and he filed a cross-bill in that suit, wherein he prayed for a revivor of his judgment. That suit resulted in a decree rendered about April,-1899, to the effect that Mann's judgment was revived against the administratrix and against the estate of Tillett for the sum of $19,718.56 to be paid in due course of administration, and that a copy of the decree should be certified to the county court of Prowers county for allowance, classification, and payment. The administratrix ap pealed, and this decree was affirmed by this court on October 15,.1900. Tillett v. Mann, 43 C. C. A. 617, 104 Fed. 421. In April, 1899, the claim of Mann for this $19,718.56, based on the judgment of revivor, was filed in and allowed by the county court of Prowers county as a claim against the estate. No other claim was presented or allowed, and the administratrix presented no petition and took no action to apply the lands of the estate to the payment of Maun's claim. Thereupon, on September 21, 1901, he made a written demand of her as administratrix that she should file a pétition in court and proceed to secure a sale of the land to pay his claim, and she refused to do so. Mann then, on October 11, 1901, exhibited his bill in the court below and commenced this suit. At the time of its commencement Kate E. Brun had made no claim for expenses of administration or for a widow's allowance, although Tillett had been dead for more than five years and she had been administratrix more than four years, and the only claim against the estate in the county court was that of the complainant. After the suit was commenced, and on October 3, 1902, Kate E. Brun resigned as administratrix and the county court allowed her $1,128.60, for her expenses as such. In November, 1902, she applied to the county court for the appointment of appraisers to estimate and set-off to her a widow's allowance. The court appointed such appraisers, who, without notice to Mann, reported her allowance to be $2,085. She then gave notice to Mann that she intended to apply to the county court for an approval of that allowance, and the court below, upon application, enjoined her from proceeding further upon that course. In June, 1903, she made application to the court below for leave to file a supplemental cross-bill, in which she set forth her claim to a widow's allowance and a claim for an allowance for expenses and services as administratrix, and the court denied her application. A final hearing was had in this suit, and on May 9, 1905, the final decree was rendered. A. C. Phelps, for appellants. R. T. McNeal (E. T. Wells, on the brief), for appellee. Before SANBORN and VAN DEVANTER, Circuit Judges, and PHILIPS, District Judge. SANBORN, Circuit Judge, after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court. The real controversy between the parties to this suit is whether or not the lands patented to Tillett in 1892 are exempt from liability to pay the judgment in favor of Mann, which is founded on Tillett's wrongful taking and conversion of the plaintiff's cattle in 1881. The acts of Congress under which Tillett secured the lands provide that no land acquired thereunder shall be liable for the satisfaction of any "debt contracted prior to the issuance" in the one case of the patent (2 U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1398, § 2296; Act May 20, 1862, c. 75, § 4, 12 Stat. 393), and in the other of the final certificate thereunder (2 U. S. Comp. St. 1901, pp. 1534, 1535; Act March 4, 1896, c. 40, § 4, 20 Stat. 113, 114). The complainant insists that his claim is not a debt contracted by Tillett, but that it is a liability incurred by him for a wrong, and hence that the land is not exempt from the payment of his claim. The defendants challenge this contention and claim the exemption of the lands and the water rights appertaining thereto. If this issue be decided in favor of the complainant, he will be entitled to a sale of the lands, and, if it be determined in favor of the defendants, the lands are free from the complainant's claim. This controversy did not arise until the judgment of revivor had been rendered and the amount of that judgment had been allowed as a claim against the estate of Tillett and it had been classified by the county court of Prowers county for payment in the month of April, 1899. Upon the proof and allowance of this, the only claim, against the estate, the duty devolved upon the administratrix under the statutes of Colorado (2 Mills' Ann. St. §§ 4751, 4770, 4778) to institute and conduct a proceeding in the nature of a suit in equity either in the county court or in the district court of Prowers county, in accordance with the practice of courts of chancery, |