Wimbledon, the Clink liberty, and the district of Lambeth Palace. The statute afterwards, by sect. 17, enacts that the justices of the peace, acting in and for the cities of London and Westminster, the liberty of the Tower of London, the Borough of Southwark, and the counties of Middlesex, Essex, Kent and Surrey, shall not, at their respective General or Quarter Sessions of the Peace, or any adjournment thereof, try any person or persons charged with any capital offence, or with any of the following offences committed or alleged to be committed within the limits of this Act: that is to say, "housebreaking, stealing above the value of five pounds in a dwelling-house, horse-stealing, sheep-stealing, cattle-stealing, maliciously wounding cattle, bigamy, forgery, perjury, conspiracy, assault with intent to commit any felony, administering or attempting to administer poison with intent to kill or to do some grievous bodily harm, administering drugs or other things or doing any thing with intent to cause or procure abortion, manslaughter, destroying or damaging ships or vessels, the breaking of shops, warehouses, counting-houses, and buildings within the curtilage of dwelling-houses, killing sheep with intent to steal the carcases, the uttering of all forged instruments," and the various offences enumerated in stat. 1 Wm. 4. c. 66, as to forgery, "forging the assay marks on gold and silver plate," and all the offences relating to coin enumerated in stat. 2 Wm. 4, c. 34," the abduction of women, bankrupts not surrendering under their commission or concealing their effects, breaking down bridges and banks of rivers, taking rewards for helping to stolen goods, personating any officer, seaman or other person, in order to receive any wages, pay, allowance or prize money due or supposed to be due, or any out-pensioner of Greenwich Hospital, in order to receive any out-pension or allowance due or supposed to be due, sending threatening letters and using threats to extort money, larceny on navigable rivers and canals, and stealing and destroying goods in progress in manufacture, and larcenies after a previous conviction, embezzlement, larceny by clerks and servants, and receivers of stolen goods, whether such person or persons shall be charged as principal offenders or as accessories before or after the fact." See 2 Arch. Peel's Acts, 448, 461.

The above enactment may perhaps fairly be deemed to imply, that the Courts of Quarter Sessions referred to in it, might lawfully have taken cognizance of the several offences enumerated in it, if that Act had not passed; and it may also be considered as a legislative declaration, that all other Courts of Quarter Sessions still have jurisdiction of the above offences. But as to felonies punishable with death, although there is nothing in the commission of the peace, or in any other than the above statute upon the subject, which prevents the justices at Sessions from taking cognizance of them as well as other felonies, yet in prac

tice the Courts of Quarter Sessions throughout the kingdom never, I believe, hear or determine any such felonies.

As to the extent of the jurisdiction of the Court of Quarter Sessions, namely, the district for which it may act, it is always defined by the commission of the peace. Formerly, where a corporate town formed part of a county, and the county justices had a concurrent jurisdiction with the corporate justices within the town or its liberties, confusion frequently arose from the clashing of the two jurisdictions. But since the late Municipal Corporation Act, 5 & 6 Wm. 4, c. 76, this cannot hereafter happen. The boundaries of the several boroughs are now well defined; see Id. s. 7, 8; and these are now deemed the boundaries of those boroughs for all purposes, and, amongst others, as indicating the district within which the Courts of Quarter Sessions for each of those boroughs shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction. See Arch. Corp. Act, 30–33. ix. x. A case recently decided by the Court of King's Bench, puts this matter beyond doubt. The facts were these:-At the last General Quarter Sessions for the county of Gloucester, an application was made to confirm and enrol an order of two justices of the county, made since the passing of the Corporation Act, for diverting and turning a public footpath in the parish of Clifton. Clifton was formerly a part of the county of Gloucester for all purposes; it was afterwards added to the city of Bristol, by the Boundary Act (2 & 3 W. 4, c. 64, sch. O), as far as respected voting for members of parliament; and by the recent Corporation Act (5 & 6 W. 4, c. 76, s. 7,) the metes and bounds of the several boroughs to which it relates (including Bristol), shall be the same as those assigned to them by the Boundary Act. It became a question, therefore, whether this 7th section of the Corporation Act had not taken the jurisdiction in this respect from the magistrates of the county, and vested it in the magistrates of Bristol; and the Sessions, holding that such was the case, and that neither the magistrates who made the order, nor the Court of Quarter Sessions for the county, had jurisdiction with respect to this footway, refused the application. A motion was therefore made to the Court of King's Bench, and a rule nisi obtained, for a mandamus to the justices of the county, requiring them to receive and enter the application as of the last Sessions, and to enter continuances, &c. But upon cause being shewn, the Court held, that, with respect to the boroughs mentioned in the first section of schedules A. and B. of the Corporation Act (and of which Bristol was one), every place included within the bounds of any of those boroughs, as described by the Boundary Act, was, by the 7th and 8th sections of the Corporation Act, made a part of that borough for all purposes; that the parish of Clifton, therefore, was part of the borough of Bristol, and the justices of the county had no jurisdiction within it. R. v. The Justices

of Gloucestershire, B. R. H. 1836. Arch. Corp. Act, ix. x. Also, by the 111th section of the Corporation Act, no part of any borough, in or for which a separate Court of Quarter Sessions of the Peace shall be holden, shall be within the jurisdiction of the justices of any county, from which such borough before the passing of this Act was exempt.

By Statute.] In many other cases, jurisdiction has been given to the Court of Quarter Sessions, either original or as a court of appeal, by the express words of particular Acts of Parliament; such, for instance, as their jurisdiction in appeals against orders of removal, against other orders of justices in some cases, against poor rates, against overseers' accounts, against summary convic tions by justices in many cases, &c.; such also as their jurisdiction in matters relating to apprentices, bastards, benefit societies, coroners, dissenting and catholic chapels, gaols, lunatic asylums, stopping up or diverting highways, vagrants, &c. But as it is intended to treat at large of the jurisdiction and practice of the Sessions in these and other instances, in the third and fourth chapters of this work, it is not necessary that they should be noticed more fully in this place.

In Boroughs.] By stat. 5 & 6 Wm. 4, c. 76, s. 107, (the recent Corporation Act,) the Courts of General or Quarter Sessions of the Peace for any borough may be holden until the 1st May, 1836, in like manner and with the same powers as if the Act had not passed; but after the 1st May," all powers and jurisdictions to try treasons, capital felonies, and all other criminal jurisdictions whatsoever, granted or confirmed by any law, statute, letters-patent, grant or charter whatsoever, to any mayor, bailiff, alderman, recorder, or other corporate or chartered officer, or corporate or chartered justice of the peace whomsoever, in any borough" shall cease.

But by sect. 103 of the same Act, it is enacted, "that the council of every borough, which shall be desirous that a separate Court of Quarter Sessions of the Peace shall be or continue to be holden in and for such borough, shall signify the same by petition to his Majesty in council, setting forth the grounds of the application, the state of the gaol, and the salary which they are willing to pay to the recorder in that behalf; and it shall be lawful for his Majesty, if he shall be pleased thereupon to grant that a separate Court of Quarter Sessions of the Peace shall be thenceforward holden in and for such borough, to appoint for such borough, or for any two or more of such boroughs conjointly, a fit person, being a barrister at law of not less than five years standing, who shall be and be called the Recorder of such borough or boroughs, and shall hold such office during his good behaviour." And by sect. 105, "the recorder of every borough shall hold, once in every quarter of a year, or at such other and

more frequent times as the said recorder in his discretion may think fit, or as his Majesty shall think fit to direct, a Court of Quarter Sessions of the Peace in and for such borough, of which Court the recorder of such borough shall sit as the sole judge; and such Court of Quarter Sessions of the Peace shall be a Court of record, and shall have cognizance of all crimes, offences, and matters whatsoever, cognizable by any Court of Quarter Sessions of the Peace for counties in England, and the recorder shall have power to do all things necessary for exercising such jurisdiction, notwithstanding his being such sole judge, as fully as any such last-mentioned Court." But in all boroughs to which a separate Court of Quarter Sessions shall not be so granted, the justices of the peace for the county in which such borough is situated, shall exercise the jurisdiction of justices of the peace in and for such borough, as fully as by law they and each of them can or ought to do in and for the said county. Id. s. 111, and see s. 110.

It may be necessary to add, that the word "borough" in the several clauses of the Corporation Act just now mentioned, must be deemed to refer only to the cities and boroughs, &c. enumerated in the schedules A. and B. of that Act. Sect. 142.

From the above sections of the Corporation Act, it appears that in all the boroughs to which it relates, (being nearly all the cities and boroughs in England and Wales, with the exception of London), to which a separate Court of Quarter Sessions has been or shall be granted, the jurisdiction of such Court is and will be the same precisely as that of the Sessions of the county. That in such of these boroughs as are named in the first sections of the schedules A. and B. of the Corporation Act, the metes and bounds thereof, as settled by the Boundary Act, will describe the district within which such jurisdiction shall be exercised. See R. v. Justices of Gloucestershire, ante, p. 8. But of such of these boroughs as are named in the second sections of the said schedules, the metes and bounds are declared by stat. 5 & 6 W.4, c. 76, s. 7, to be the same as hitherto, without reference to the Boundary Act. In either case, the county justices, in or out of Sessions, cannot exercise jurisdiction within the metes and

bounds of such borough. Vide Id. s. 111, supra.

2. Where and before whom the Sessions are to be holden. In Counties.] The Sessions must be holden at some place within the county or division for which they are holden. This is differently arranged in different counties: in some counties, they are always holden at the same place; in others, at different places each quarter; and in others, the same Sessions are holden at different places within the county, by adjournment.

It must be holden before two justices at the least; this is

expressly required by the terms of the commission. See ante, p. 2, and see R. v. Justices of Carmarthen, 4 B. & Ald. 291. As to the Quorum clause in the commission, it may be necessary to state, that most justices are now assigned to be of the quorum. And in all cases where an act is to be done by two or more justices, and it is required by any statute that one of them shall be of the quorum, their act, order, adjudication, &c. shall nevertheless be valid, although it do not express that one of the justices are of the quorum. 26 Geo. 2, c.27. and see 7 Geo. 3, c. 27, 4 Geo. 4. c. 27.

The justices present at the Sessions should refrain from voting or taking any part in matters in which they individually have a personal interest. See Anon. 1 Salk. 396. Re Foxham Tithing, 2 Salk. 607. R. v. Great Chart, Burr. S. C. 194, 2 Str. 1173. By stat. 16 Geo. 2, c. 18, s. 1, indeed, justices are empowered to act in all matters relating to the laws for the relief, maintenance and settlement of the poor, for passing and punishing vagrants, for the repair of highways, and concerning parochial taxes, levies or rates, notwithstanding they are rated to or chargeable with the taxes, levies or rates within any parish, township or place affected by such act. But the statute contains a proviso (s. 3.), that it shall not extend to authorize or empower any jus tice of peace for any "county or riding at large, to act in the determination of any appeal to the Quarter Sessions for any such county or riding, from any order, matter or thing relating to any such parish, township or place, where such justice of the peace is so taxed or charged or chargeable as aforesaid." And where it appeared that, upon the trial of an appeal against an order of removal, there were fifteen justices present, seven of whom were for quashing, and eight for confirming it; but it was objected that of these eight, three justices were rated in the removing parish, and therefore could not vote; but the Sessions, notwithstanding, confirmed the order, subject to the opinion of the Court of King's Bench upon the point: upon the matter coming before the latter Court, they quashed the order of Sessions, and directed the justices to enter continuances to the following Sessions, when they might again decide the appeal. R. v. Yarpole, 4 T. R. 71. So, where it appeared that, upon the trial of an appeal against the allowance of overseers' accounts, one of the justices declined to join in the decision because he was a rated inhabitant of the parish; but afterwards, upon application to the Sessions to grant a case, this justice and two others voted for it, and two against it, so that a case was granted: upon the case being returned on the certiorari, a motion was made to quash the certiorari, on the ground that the justice, being a rated inhabitant of the parish, could not vote even upon the question of granting a case; and the Court were of this opinion; they said the safer course was to hold, that magistrates should not interfere in any way, in