Points decided.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, APPELLANTS, . W. B. ROSS, J. M. BRITE, WM. R. JORDAN, A. T. LIGHTNER, W. H. WILLIAMS, BLACKBURN WYATT, AND J. J. MURPHY, RESPOND

ENTS.

SHERIFF AND TAX COLLECTOR.- The offices of Sheriff and Tax Collector, although held by the same person, are separate and distinct offices. OFFICIAL BONDS OF PERSON HOLDING TWO OFFICES. In the absence of a statute to the contrary expressly, a person holding two separate offices must give two separate official bonds. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.—If a statute providing for the organization of a new county contains no provision in relation to official bonds, they must be given in conformity to the general law upon that subject.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Sixteenth District, Kern County.

The plaintiffs appealed.

By the statute enacting and organizing the County of Kern, it was provided that the Sheriff of the County should be, ex officio, Tax Collector. The statute contained no provision to the effect that his official bond as Sheriff should serve also as his official bond as Tax Collector, or that he should be required to give but one bond, which should be for the faithful performance of the duties of both offices. The respondent, Ross, was elected Sheriff, and gave a bond with his codefendants as sureties of which the conditions were as follows: "The conditions of the above obligations are such, that whereas, at a special election held in and for the County of Kern, on the 12th day of July, 1866, the above bounden William B. Ross was duly elected Sheriff, and ex officio Tax Collector for said county; Now, therefore, if the said William B. Ross shall well and faithfully perform all the duties of said office, then this obligation shall be void; otherwise, to be and remain in full force and effect."

This action was brought upon the foregoing bond, to recover of Ross and his co-defendants the amount of an alleged defalcation in the office of Tax Collector. The defendants demurred, upon the general ground that the bond declared on was the bond of Ross, as Sheriff only, and not as Tax Collector, and that, therefore, no recovery could be

had upon it for a non-performance of the duties of the office of Tax Collector. The Court below sustained the demurrer upon that ground.

Attorney General and Thomas Laspeyre, for Appellants.

Coffroth & Spaulding and J. W. Freeman, for Respond

ents.

SANDERSON, J., delivered the opinion of the Court:

The offices of Sheriff and Tax Collector of Kern County, though held by the same person, are, nevertheless, separate and distinct offices. (Lathrop v. Brittain, 30 Cal. 680.) In the absence of any statute expressly providing that one official bond only shall be required of a person who holds both offices, and that such bond shall be for the faithful performance of the duties of both offices, a separate bond for each office is as much required as if they were held by different persons. (People v. Love, 25 Cal. 520.)

The statute creating Kern County contains no provision to the effect that the bond of the Sheriff shall also be his bond as Tax Collector. It contains no provision whatever upon the subject of the Tax Collector's bond, but leaves it to the general law. (Stats. 1861, p. 419, Secs. 25 and 26.) While, under the revenue law just cited, two offices, in certain counties, are allowed by the twenty-fifth section to be held by the same person, as in the statute creating the County of Kern, yet, by the twenty-sixth section, each Tax Collector, irrespective of the fact whether he is also the incumbent of some other office, is required to give a separate bond, as therein provided. It is, undoubtedly, within the power of the Legislature to provide that there may be but one bond for both offices, as was done, in effect, under the revenue law of 1854 (People v. Love, supra); but since it was decided by this Court that the offices of Sheriff and Tax Collector, under the Constitution, are separate and distinct offices (People v. Edwards, 9 Cal. 286), it has not been the practice of the Legislature to do so, so far as we are advised. As was said in the case of the People v. Edwards, the offices

Points decided.

are not so blended that the bond executed for the faithful performance of the duties appertaining to the one would embrace, in the absence of a statute to that effect, the obligations belonging to the other.

Had no provision been made in the statute creating the County of Kern, in relation to official bonds, the whole matter would have fallen within the general laws upon the subject. (See laws upon the subject of official bonds, and the offices of Sheriff, Clerk, Recorder, etc.) So far as it deals with the subject, however, and no further, it takes it out of the operation of those laws.

Judgment affirmed.

C. K. GARRISON, RESPONDENT, . PATRICK MCGLOCKLEY, BARNEY MCMAHON, BARRY MCMAHON, JOHN DOE, SALLY HART, MARY BUCKLEY AND JAMES DEERING, APPELLANTS.

PRACTICE. If the instructions of the Court below, to the jury, are not brought before the Supreme Court, they will be presumed to have been properly and rightly given.

IDEM. When a question of fact, about which there was a direct and substantial conflict of evidence, has been submitted to a jury, under proper instructions of the Court, the verdict determines it, and this Court has uniformly declined to interfere with the verdict.

ADVERSE POSSESSION. The cases of McCracken v. Oity of San Francisco (16 Cal. 591), and Kimball v. Lohmas (31 Id. 154), as to what constitutes adverse possession, approved.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Fourth District, City and County of San Francisco.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

E. A. Lawrence, for Appellants.

W. H. L. Barnes, for Respondent.

SPRAGUE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court:

The only question involved in this case is, was the possession of the defendants adverse to plaintiff for five years next preceding the commencement of the action?

The plaintiff alleges title and right of possession, and that defendants wrongfully withhold from him such possession. Defendants deny plaintiff's title and right of possession, and plead title in themselves by virtue of a quiet, peaceable, continuous, undisturbed possession in themselves, adverse to plaintiff and to all the world, for more than five consecutive years next preceding the commencement of the action.

There is no question but that plaintiff established a clear record-title on the trial, and that defendants established an actual possession in themselves for more than five consecutive years immediately preceding the commencement of the action; hence, the only controverted point presented for determination upon the evidence was, as to the character of defendants' possession, whether it was adverse or in subordination to, and in recognition of plaintiff's title.

As the instructions of the Court to the jury, on the submission of the issues to them upon the evidence, are not before us, we must presume that all the material issues were fully and correctly presented to the jury, to be by them determined upon the evidence, upon a correct statement of the law, by which they were to be governed in the application of the evidence to the issues.

Upon the question as to the character of defendants' possession, whether the same was commenced and continued under an assertion of title and right in themselves, as against plaintiff and all others, or whether, at any time during their possession, they, by their acts or declarations, acknowledged plaintiff's right and title, and that their possession was in subordination thereto, there was a direct and substantial conflict of evidence; and the same having been submitted to the jury, under proper instructions of the Court, as we are bound to presume, their general verdict in favor of the plaintiff determines the question as to the character of defendants' possession, that the same was not adverse, but in subordination to and in recognition of plaintiff's title.

Under such circumstances, this Court has uniformly declined to review the evidence, or to disturb the verdict of a jury. As to what constitutes adverse possession, see Mc

Points decided.

Cracken v. San Francisco, (16 Cal. 591); Kimball v.
Lohmas, (31 Id. 154.)

We discover no error in the record.
Judgment and order affirmed.

WM. H. DURFEE, RESPONDENT, v. GEORGE T. PLAISTED, APPELLANT.

PATENT. If a patent be vold on its face, or was issued without authority, or was prohibited by law; or if the Government in whose name it is issued had no title, it may be attacked collaterally.

PATENT TO THE PURCHASERS OF THE SUSCOL RANCHO.- A patent issued pursuant to the provisions of the Act of Congress granting the right of pre-emption, etc., to the purchasers of the Suscol rancho, is the record of the Government that the land was subject to entry by the patentees, and was entered by them in conformity to law; and is conclusive evidence of the regularity, as well as of the validity of the action of the officers, in confirming the title of the patentees as purchasers from Vallejo or his assigns.

IDEM. No one who does not connect himself with the source of title to the Susco! rancho, will be permitted to inquire whether the conditions of the statute were complied with, or whether the officers issuing the patent rightfully performed their duty.

STATUTE

CONCERNING THE SUSCOL RANCHO CONSTRUCTION OF.- The statute does not prohibit a purchaser of land within the limits of the City of Vallejo, situated on said rancho, from presenting his claim for, and entering such land.

IDEM. The exception "of such lands as may be designated by the President," contained in the proviso to the fifth section of the Act, has reference only to such designation as thereafter might be made.

APPEAL from the District Court, Seventh District, County of Solano.

The action was for the recovery of a lot of ground in the City of Vallejo, and within the limits of the Suscol rancho. The plaintiff claimed title through several mesne conveyances, under the Act of Congress of March 3d, 1863 (12 U. S. Stats. 808) "granting the right of pre-emption, etc., to the purchaser, of the Suscol rancho," and a patent issued in conformity therewith.

On the trial, the plaintiff offered in evidence the patent of the United States to the parties under whom he claimed. To which defendant objected, on the ground that it did not. appear that any of the grantees named in the patent were