expenses reimbursed. His private letters have since proved that his object, at that time, was not to procure separation from England; but his alacrity in entering into the contest, and his constancy throughout its continuance, refute the insinuation, only countenanced by certain forged letters, that he was not hearty in the cause of independence.

About fourteen thousand people were at this time collected around Boston, where General Gage was held in a state of siege. Washington reached the colonial camp in July, 1775, and proceeded to give to the assembled multitude the form and discipline of a regular force. His next endeavours were to extend the period for which men enlisting were obliged to serve, and to ensure the maintenance of the troops by appointing a Commissary-General to collect supplies, instead of depending for them on the voluntary and uncertain contributions of the several States. Neither of these wishes was complied with, and the want of every requisite obliged Washington to change the siege into a blockade, until the following March, when, having obtained artillery and engineers, he forced the English to give up the town and embark on board their fleet. His conduct during

this siege is admirable, both for the resolution with which he maintained the blockade with an inferior army composed of untried men, and the patience with which he endured the reproaches of the people, to whom the real difficulties of his situation, with respect to arms and ammunition, could not be disclosed. He also established the principle, that captured Americans should be treated as prisoners of war.

In April, 1776, Washington anticipated the British in occupying New York, and the adjacent islands. Before the arrival of Lord Howe, in July, independence was proclaimed; and the American general refused to negotiate unless acknowledged as the functionary of an independent government, saying, that America, being her own mistress, and having committed no fault, needed no pardon. A severe defeat on Long Island, and subsequent losses, compelled him to abandon the State of New York to the English, to retreat with great loss through New Jersey, and to take shelter behind the Delaware, near Philadelphia. He showed much skill in preventing the British from taking advantage of these reverses, which he sought to repair by surprising their posts at Trenton and Princetown, in Jersey, where he

made many hundred prisoners. These successes were well timed, and revived the broken spirit of the country.

In 1777 Washington applied to Congress for more extensive powers, which were granted him, with the title of Dictator, by which he was empowered to act on his own responsibility in all military affairs. But he was not supplied with the means of acting effectually; and the campaign of that year was one of misfortunes, the Americans being defeated at Brandywine, and forced to yield Philadelphia to the English. During the winter months Washington occupied a fortified camp at Valley Forge, and his army, ill-supplied with ammunition and provisions, was daily in danger of being destroyed by hunger or the enemy. He freely expressed his opinion to Congress of their misconduct, and his remarks occasioned a faction which desired to displace him from his command, and to substitute General Gates; but this was never seriously attempted.

The campaign of 1778 was favourable to Washington; he recovered Philadelphia, and following Clinton in his retreat through NewJersey, brought him to action at Monmouth, The issue of this engagement gave new confi

dence to the people, and completely restored him to the good will of Congress. During the years 1779 and 1780 the war was actively carried on in the South, and Carolina and Virginia were reduced by the British. In the autumn of 1780 Major Andre, who had been sent by Clinton to concert with Arnold measures for betraying the post at West Point, was seized within the American lines, and tried and hanged as a spy. Whatever were the merits or misfortunes of the British officer, the duty of Washington was too plain to be mistaken, and the obloquy he incurred in its performance was undeserved.

Washington had throughout contended that the country could only be delivered by raising a permanent army, and consolidating the union. of the States, so as to form a vigorous government. Five years' experience had taught Congress the inefficiency of temporary armies, and they resolved to form a permanent one with a system of half-pay and pensions, as an inducement to enter the service. But as the government of each State was empowered to levy its own taxes, and conduct all the measures for carrying this resolve into effect, such delay was occasioned, that although Count

Rochambeau arrived from France in August, 1780, with an auxiliary force of five thousand men, the American army could not actively co-operate with him during that year.

The temporising policy pursued by the States had severely tried the constancy of Washington, but did not lead him to despair of final success. The army, suffering extreme want, was kept in the field chiefly by attachment to his person. Attentive to alleviate their hardships, he did not permit any disorderly license; and although early in 1781 he allowed Congress to pacify the revolted troops, he, on a second occasion, shortly after, forcibly compelled the mutineers to submit, and summarily tried and executed many of them.

The pecuniary aid of France, and increased activity of the American Government, enabled Washington to resume offensive measures in the summer of 1781. Earl Cornwallis, then in Virginia, and but feebly opposed by LaFayette, sent a part of his army to strengthen Clinton in New York. Shortly after De Grasse arrived off the coast of Virginia with a French fleet. Washington took advantage of this conjuncture to transfer the war to the South. Deceiving Clinton as to his real design, he