tween that straight line, if he had continued, between then and the time you struck, to have gone by without your hitting him?

"A. Yes, sir."

This testimony shows the substantial accuracy of the diagram.

The statutory enactments of this State in force at the time of this accident bearing on this point read:

"Whenever any persons shall meet each other on any bridge or road, traveling with carriages, wagons, carts, sleds, sleighs or other vehicles, each person shall seasonably drive his carriage or other vehicle to the right of the middle of the traveled part of such bridge or road, so that the respective carriages, or other vehicles aforesaid, may pass each other without interference." Section 4291, 2 Comp. Laws 1897.

This statute is entitled "The Law of the Road." Section 6, subdivision 4, of Act No. 318 of the Public Acts of 1909, provides:

"Whenever a person operating a motor vehicle shall meet on a highway any other person riding or driving a horse or horses or other draft animals or any other vehicle, and there being no occasion to stop as above provided, the person operating such motor vehicle shall seasonably turn the same to the right of the center of the traveled portion of the highway; while the person approaching shall likewise turn from the center of the traveled portion of the highway so as to pass the motor vehicle on the opposite side of the center of the highway to which the motor vehicle has been turned. And any person so operating any motor vehicle shall, at the intersection of a public highway, keep to the right of the intersection of the centers of such highways when turning to the right and pass to the right of such intersection when turning to the left."

In the instant case there is testimony that the automobile in which plaintiff was riding was going south on Antoine street and when it reached the north curb 204-Mich.-44.

of Columbia street the automobile of defendant was proceeding west on Columbia street and when the driver of the automobile on Antoine street was at the north curb of Columbia street, she sounded the automobile horn and at that time the automobile of defendant was east of the east curb of Antoine street and continued west thereon, on the south side of the center of the street and instead of passing to the right of the center of the two streets, continued west on Columbia south of the center of the two streets and collided with the car of the plaintiff when that car was where it had a right to be, and the defendant's car did not have a right to be.

We think the inferences fairly to be drawn from this situation and this testimony made a question for the jury both as to the contributory negligence of the plaintiff and the negligence of the defendant. See Amanta v. Railroad Co., 177 Mich. 280; Congdon v. Railway Co., 179 Mich. 175; Bouma v. Dubois, 169 Mich. 422; Brown v. Mitts, 167 Mich. 469; Weber v. Beeson, 197 Mich. 607.

Judgment is reversed and a new trial is ordered, with costs in favor of the plaintiff.

BIRD, C. J., and OSTRANDER, STEERE, BROOKE, FELLOWS, STONE, and KUHN, JJ., concurred.

PEOPLE v. SZYNKAREK.

INTOXICATING LIQUORS-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-ILLEGAL POSSESSION -STATUTES.

This court having decided in People v. Marrhausen, ante, 559, that the "Damon Act," Act No. 161, Pub. Acts 1917, was repealed by the "Wiley Act," Act No. 338, Pub. Acts 1917, a conviction under the former act of having illegal possession of intoxicating liquors, cannot be sustained.

Exceptions before judgment from Oakland; Rockwell, J. Submitted January 17, 1919. (Docket No. 122.) Decided April 3, 1919.

Walter Szynkarek was convicted of violating Act No. 161, Pub. Acts 1917. Reversed, and respondent discharged.

Charles S. Matthews, for appellant.

Glenn C. Gillespie, Prosecuting Attorney, and Lee H. Pryor, Assistant Attorney General, for the people.

STEERE, J. Respondent brings this case here on exceptions before sentence, to review his conviction under an information charging that he

"On the 7th day of August, 1918, at the township of Lyon in the county of Oakland aforesaid, did at a certain farm dwelling house, owned by him, situated on Grand River avenue, so-called, at the intersection of the dividing line between the townships of Novi and Lyon in said county, then and there occupied by one Frank Richards, who was then and there in the employ of the said Walter Szynkarek as a farm tenant, did bring and carry, and did then and there possess a great quantity of malt, brewed, spirituous and intoxicating liquors, over eight ounces, to wit: three boxes of bottled wine, a quantity of bitters and brandy and

one jug of wine, said liquor not being then and there for use for medical, mechanical, chemical, scientific or sacramental purposes, but for the purpose of being used as a beverage, contrary to the provisions of Act No. 161 of the Public Acts of the State of Michigan of 1917," etc.

For several years previous to May 1, 1918, respondent was engaged in the authorized business of running a saloon where intoxicating liquors were sold, in the city of Detroit. In March, 1918, he purchased a farm in Lyon township, Oakland county, intending, as he states, "to go out on a farm" when the State went dry as it would on the first of May following, when prohibition went into effect pursuant to section 11 of article 16 of our present constitution. On May 1, 1918, when he went out of the saloon business, he moved a quantity of liquor left over from his stock, consisting mostly of beer and wine, to his farm and stored it in a room in the cellar of the dwelling house, locking the door with a padlock to which he alone had a key. He claimed to have done this for the purpose of safely storing the liquor there until it was determined whether he later might lawfully dispose of it, as would be the case if the movement to make sale of beer and wine legal in the State of Michigan prevailed. Up to the time of his conviction he continued to reside in Detroit, with a tenant by the name of Richards upon his farm living in the dwelling house, he visiting the place from time to time. Prior to his arrest he had removed most of these wet goods from his cellar and concealed them in a neighbor's barn, owing, as he testified, to the fact that some men working upon his place had at one time broken into the cellar and got some of the liquor.

On or about August 7, 1918, officers of Oakland county went to respondent's farm in his absence with a search warrant and broke into the locked room in

the cellar where they found and seized some of the goods yet there, following which respondent was prosecuted and convicted for having the liquor in his possession, the court instructing the jury,

"the law is very clear that respondent had no right to possess this liquor, and have it in his possession either in his place of business in Detroit or at his farm residence in the township of Lyon."

It is undisputed that this liquor was a part of respondent's saloon stock which he had bought, taken possession of and owned at a time when it was lawful for him to do so. It is not charged or claimed that he sold or attempted to sell any of it after May 1, 1918. The charge against him is having liquor in his possession in violation of Act No. 161, Pub. Acts 1917, the so-called Damon act, which this court recently held was repealed by the later so-called Wiley act in People v. Marxhausen, ante, 559, which is controlling in this case.

The judgment is therefore reversed and defendant discharged from his recognizance.

BIRD, C. J., and MOORE, BROOKE, FELLOWS, STONE, and KUHN, JJ., concurred. OSTRANDER, J., did not sit.