by a telegram Bindner sent to Mosely at Grand Rapids, Mich., on December 4th, telling him the car in question and certain others had been rejected, and Mosely informed plaintiffs of it on December 5th. The original bill of lading was then in possession of the Indianapolis bank with the draft. After the original order and draft were returned to plaintiffs they gave the Grand Rapids bank a check for the amount of the draft and surrendered the original order to defendant's division freight agent in exchange for a bill of lading reconsigning the car to plaintiffs at Memphis, Tenn., where the goods could be and were disposed of, to the best advantage, as is claimed, but at a loss, for recovery of which this action was brought. Plaintiffs' contract was with Marshall & Kelsey, of Indianapolis, to whom they sold this carload of potatoes to be delivered at Louisville, Ky., with right of inspection at point of delivery. The right of the purchaser to examine the goods while in the hands of the carrier before accepting them was at the point of delivery only. There is nothing in the acts relied upon which restricts or affects the right of any of the parties connected with the transaction as the law upon that subject previously stood. The law relative to the effect of a "notify" clause in the bill of lading as heretofore settled in this jurisdiction and many others is well digested with numerous citations, as follows, in 10 C. J. p. 259: "Where a bill of lading or a shipping receipt contains a clause providing that a third person shall be notified of the arrival of the goods, or where it contains this clause and an additional clause reciting that the goods are shipped to the consignor's order, the carrier is not authorized to treat the person to be notified as a consignee, and if it delivers the goods to him without production and surrender of the receipt or the bill of lading, it will be liable to the true owner of the goods for any loss resulting from such delivery." This court has spoken definitely to that effect and emphasized the significance of a provision in the order bill of lading that its surrender properly indorsed shall be required before delivery of the consignment. Perkett v. Railroad Co., 175 Mich. 253; Turnbull v. Railroad Co., 183 Mich. 213; Thomas v. Blair, 185 Mich. 422; Churchill v. Railway Co., 188 Mich. 376. It is defendant's contention that these decisions are largely emasculated in their general import and become wholly inapplicable here by reason of the negotiable characteristics given a bill of lading by the act of congress passed August 29, 1916, to take effect January 1, 1917, entitled "An act relating to bills of lading in interstate and foreign commerce" (39 U. S. Stat. at Large, p. 538), construed in connection with the Carmack amendment of the interstate commerce act under which this action was brought. position is pointedly stated in part as follows: Counsel's "The rules of ordinary contract law have absolutely nothing to do with this case because this case involves a negotiable instrument and not a contract of the common law. *** Mr. Bindner, while he had possession of the bill of lading, exercised the authority which its mere possession conferred and obtained the car from the Big Four. Bindner by virtue of his possession (not ownership) of the bill of lading, was a person to whom the Big Four, the delivering and terminal carrier, was justified in making delivery of this car. The Big Four did make delivery of the car to Bindner while he was in possession of the bill of lading, and thereby did what it was authorized to do by section 9 of the bills of lading act." That act, containing 45 sections, is in its nature related to and supplemental of the interstate commerce law, which, as enacted in 1887, underwent various amendments by the act of June 29, 1906 (34 U. S. Stat. at Large, p. 584, chap. 3591), especially as to section 20 relative to carrier's liability, commonly called the Car mack amendment, which made the initial carrier in interstate transportation liable for through carriage to point of destination under the bills of lading required to be issued therefor. The material concluding portion of that lengthy amendment of section 20 (of the 1887 act-section 7 of the 1906 act) is as follows: "That any common carrier, railroad or transportation company receiving property for transportation from a point in one State to a point in another State shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor and shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof for any loss, damage or injury to such property caused by it or by any common carrier, railroad or transportation company, to which such property may be delivered or over whose line or lines such property may pass, and no contract, receipt, rule or regulation shall exempt such common carrier, railroad or transportation company from the liability hereby imposed: Provided, That nothing in this section shall deprive any holder of such receipt or bill of lading of any remedy or right of action which he has under existing law.” Section 9 of the act of 1916 relating to bills of lading, upon subdivision (c) of which defendant relies, is as follows: "SEC. 9. That a carrier is justified, subject to the provisions of the three following sections, in delivering goods to one who is "(a) A person lawfully entitled to the possession of the goods, or "(b) The consignee named in a straight bill for the goods, or "(c) A person in possession of an order bill for the goods, by the terms of which the goods are deliverable to his order; or which has been indorsed to him, or in blank by the consignee, or by the mediate or immediate indorsee of the consignee." The section immediately preceding (8) and three sections following (10, 11, 12) also relate to delivery, and so far as material are as follows: "SEC. 8. a carrier, in the absence of some lawful excuse, is bound to deliver goods upon a demand made either by the consignee named in the bill for the goods, or, if the bill is an order bill, by the holder thereof, if such a demand is accompanied by"(a) An offer in good faith to satisfy the carrier's lawful lien upon the goods; "(b) Possession of the bill of lading and an offer in good faith to surrender, properly indorsed, the bill which was issued for the goods, if the bill is an order bill; and "(c) A readiness and willingness to sign, when the goods are delivered, an acknowledgment that they have been delivered, if such signature is requested by the carrier. "In case the carrier refuses or fails to deliver the goods, in compliance with a demand by the consignee or holder so accompanied, the burden shall be upon the carrier to establish the existence of a lawful excuse for such refusal or failure. "SEC. 10. * ** * where a carrier delivers goods to one who is not lawfully entitled to the possession of them, the carrier shall be liable to any one having a right of property or possession in the goods if he delivered the goods otherwise than as authorized by subdivisions (b) and (c) of the preceding section; and, though he delivered the goods as authorized by either of said subdivisions, he shall be so liable if prior to such delivery he "(a) Had been requested, by or on behalf of a person having a right of property or possession in the goods, not to make such delivery, or "(b) Had information at the time of the delivery that it was to a person not lawfully entitled to the possession of the goods. * * "SEC. 11. * * * if a carrier delivers goods for which an order bill had been issued, the negotiation of which would transfer the right to the possession of the goods, and fails to take up and cancel the bill, such carrier shall be liable for failure to deliver the goods to any one who for value and in good faith purchases such bill, whether such purchaser acquired title to the bill before or after the delivery of the goods by the carrier and notwithstanding delivery was made to the person entitled thereto. "SEC. 12. * * * if a carrier delivers part of the goods for which an order bill had been issued and fails either "(a) To take up and cancel the bill, or * * "(b) To place plainly upon it a statement that a portion of the goods has been delivered with a description, * he shall be liable for failure to deliver all the goods specified in the bill to any one who for value and in good faith purchases it, whether such purchaser acquired title before or after the delivery of any portion of the goods by the carrier, and notwithstanding such delivery was made to the person entitled thereto." These are Federal laws, for controlling interpretation by the Federal courts in their final analysis, and the State courts when called upon to deal with them are governed by the construction declared in decisions of those courts, where they have spoken. Counsel do not cite and we have not found any adjudication directly construing the provisions of the statute upon which defendant relies. The scope and purpose of the Carmack amendment, of which the later act is but supplemental, has frequently been before the United States Supreme Court for consideration of its various provisions. Its manifest purpose is, as interpreted by that court, to create in the initial carrier unity of responsibility for transportation to destination and bring contracts for interstate shipments under one uniform law, to which end a proper receipt, or bill of lading, must issue therefor. "The liability of any carrier in the route over which the articles were routed, for loss or damage, is that imposed by the act as measured by the original contract of shipment so far as is valid under the act.” Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639 (33 Sup. Ct. 391). In Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491 (44 L. R. A. [N. S.] 257, 33 Sup. Ct. 148), holding |