was called up by the assistant cashier of the Peninsular State Bank of Detroit, which bank is the correspondent of the Ann Arbor bank, and through which bank the Ann Arbor bank had sought to clear the Hastings bank certificate, and was informed that the $950 certificate had been protested by the Hastings bank on December 5th. It appears that the Ypsilanti bank, however, did not check out the money, that is, the $700, until after Mr. Walz had received this information from the Detroit bank. The certificate of deposit in question reads as follows: "HASTINGS CITY BANK "HASTINGS, MICH., Dec. 18, 1916. "F. N. Wadhams has deposited in this bank nine hundred fifty dollars, $950.00, payable to the order of self, upon the return of this certificate, properly endorsed, with interest at 2 per cent. per annum if left six months. "Subject to the rules of the savings department. "No interest for fractional part of one month. "Interest to cease one year from date, unless renewed. "A. A. ANDERSON, "C." It will be noticed that it was presented for payment at the Ann Arbor bank on December 3, 1917, more than 112 months after its date. The decree provides that the Ann Arbor bank was not a goodfaith purchaser and did not get the Hastings certificate in due course, not having taken it within a reasonably short time of its issue, and directs the Hastings bank to pay to the plaintiff the amount of the decree and costs. It further directs the bank to turn over the balance of the $950 certificate to the court, same to be subject to the further order of the court after the rights of the parties in interest shall have been determined. The intervening defendant, the State Savings Bank of Ann Arbor, appeals. As stated by counsel for appellant in their brief, there are two questions presented on this appeal: (1) Was the certificate of deposit for $950 a nego tiable instrument? (2) Was the State Savings Bank a holder in due course? 1. The negotiable instruments law provides that an instrument is negotiable which conforms to the following requirements (2 Comp. Laws 1915, § 6042): "First. It must be in writing and signed by the maker or drawer; "Second. It must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a certain sum of money; "Third. It must be payable on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time; "Fourth. It must be payable to order or to bearer; and "Fifth. Where the instrument is addressed to a drawee, he must be named or otherwise indicated therein with reasonable certainty." The first requisite is present, and no question is raised in regard to it, and likewise the fourth and fifth requisites are not involved or questioned in this appeal. The second requirement, however, is questioned by the plaintiff, who claims that the certificate of deposit is conditional in three respects, viz., that it was payable out of a particular fund; that it is conditional, because subject to the rules of the savings department; and that the amount is uncertain, because of the provision as to interest. With reference to the claim that the certificate of deposit was payable out of a particular fund and therefore conditional, it is argued that because the certificate of deposit is carried in the savings department of the bank and subject to its rules, it is merely a charge on a particular fund, and therefore conditional. We are not impressed that there is any merit to this 204-Mich.-25. contention. While it is true that under our law the banks divide their business into savings and commercial departments, nevertheless the certificate of deposit was issued by the bank and thus became the obligation of the bank and not of its savings department. The negotiable instruments law provides (2 Comp. Laws 1915, § 6044): "An unqualified order or promise to pay is uncon- . ditional within the meaning of this act, though coupled with: "First. An indication of a particular fund out of which reimbursement is to be made, or a particular account to be debited with the amount." * * * The rule applicable to this situation is thus stated in 8 Corpus Juris, p. 123: "The true test in every case is, Does the instrument carry the general personal credit of the drawer or the maker, or only the credit of a particular fund?" In the situation here presented, we are clearly of the opinion that the certificate of deposit, as we have said, carried the credit of the Hastings City Bank, and not merely that of its savings department. Regarding the claim that the certificate of deposit is nonnegotiable, as it lacks the certainty required of commercial paper because it appears on its face that it is "subject to the rules of the savings department," we think it is sufficient to say that the rules and regulations of the savings department are provided for by the banking law and act as a protection to the bank against sudden demands to be met out of its rather unliquid assets. In our opinion, this protection given by the banking law to the bank should not be construed to operate to put it out of the power of a savings bank to issue negotiable certificates from its savings department; in which department, under the banking practice, they are generally carried. The certificate of deposit provides for interest at 2 per cent., if left for six months, and further provides that interest is to cease one year after date, unless renewed. We do not think there is anything uncertain about this, as it can readily and easily be ascertained, on examination of the certificate itself, the amount due thereon at any time. Cate v. Patterson, 25 Mich. 191. Is the certificate payable at an uncertain time? The rule of the bank with reference to time of payment was as follows: "Thirty days' notice must, in all cases, be given in writing to the cashier at his banking office, during banking hours, before a depositor will be entitled to withdraw his deposit or any part thereof." * There does not seem to be anything uncertain about this rule. By virtue of its terms the certificate becomes due 30 days after notice in writing given to the cashier. The time is clearly therein fixed, which must inevitably happen, and therefore it complies with the rule laid down in Wilson v. Campbell, 110 Mich. 580 (35 L. R. A. 544), where it is said, as to the certainty of time required: "I think it is sufficient if a time be fixed which must inevitably happen." We are of the opinion that the certificate of deposit herein under consideration meets all the requirements of the statute and must therefore be said to be a negotiable instrument. 2. The negotiable instruments law provides (2 Comp. Laws 1915, § 6093) as follows: "A holder in due course is a holder who has taken the instrument under the following conditions: "First. That it is complete and regular upon its face; "Second. That he became the holder of it before it was overdue, and without notice that it had been previously dishonored, if such was the fact; "Third. That he took it in good faith and for value; "Fourth. That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it." It is urged that the certificate is not complete and regular upon its face, because it carries 2% interest, when it appeared usual and customary to pay 3%. We see no merit in this contention, as the parties thereto could agree upon any interest which is not contrary to law. In an adjudicated case, Tripp v. Curtenius, 36 Mich. 494 (24 Am. Rep. 610), the certificate carried no interest at all. In Beardsley v. Webber, 104 Mich. 88, the certificate carried 6% interest. This court has held that a certificate of deposit is a promissory note payable on demand. Cate v. Patterson, supra; Tripp v. Curtenius, supra; Birch v. Fisher, 51 Mich. 36; Beardsley v. Webber, supra. This certificate was payable on demand, or 30 days thereafter, according to the rules of the bank. Section 73 of the negotiable instruments law (2 Comp. Laws 1915, § 6112) provides: * * * "Where it is payable on demand, presentment must be made within a reasonable time after its issue." * * * Counsel for the plaintiff strenuously urge that the certificate was not presented within a reasonable time, that is, holding it for eleven months should be construed by the court as an unreasonable length of time, as a matter of law, and many cases with reference to promissory notes involving this question are called to our attention. In determining what is a reasonable time, we can again refer to the negotiable instruments law, section 2 (2 Comp. Laws 1915, § 6041), where it is said: *** "In determining what is a 'reasonable time' or an 'unreasonable time', regard is to be had |