"The further contention is made, that the law invests the commissioners' court, in connection with the county health officer, with exclusive and final jurisdiction in the matter of establishing and maintaining pest houses and detention camps to prevent the spread of smallpox and other infectious and contagious diseases, and that the exercise of this jurisdiction is not subject to review by any judicial tribunal." After considering the statutory provisions involved, the court said: "The authority of the commissioners' court to proclaim quarantine, and to have it established, maintained, and enforced through the county physician, is not brought in question by this suit. It may, and perhaps should be, admitted that the exercise of that authority is not subject to review by judicial tribunals; but it does not necessarily follow that all the acts of the officers and agents of the county in relation to the subject-matter are beyond the reach of judicial authority. The authority of such court to proclaim and cause the enforcement of quarantine does not carry with it the arbitrary power in the officers and agents of the county to unnecessarily violate the rights of others. The existence of such authority does not imply that the officers and agents of the county may establish and maintain a nuisance, either public or private, not necessary to the end to be accomplished." The language of Lord Watson in the case of Metropolitan Asylum Dist. v. Hill, L. R. 6 App. Cas. 193, 212, decided by the house of lords, is quite persuasive as bearing upon the construction to be given the language here under consideration. He said: "And I am disposed to hold that if the legislature, without specifying either plan or site, were to prescribe by statute that a public body shall, within certain defined limits, provide hospital accommodation for a class or classes of persons labouring under infectious disease, no injunction could issue against the use of an hospital established in pursuance of the act, 204-Mich.-19. provided that it were either apparent or proved to the satisfaction of the court that the directions of the act could not be complied with at all, without creating a nuisance. In that case, the necessary result of that which they have directed to be done must presumably have been in the view of the legislature at the time when the act was passed. "On the other hand, I do not think that the legislature can be held to have sanctioned that which is a nuisance at common law, except in the case where it has authorized a certain use of a specific building in a specified position, which cannot be so used without occasioning nuisance, or in the case where the particular plan or locality not being prescribed, it has imperatively directed that a building shall be provided within a certain area and so used, it being an obvious or established fact that nuisance must be the result. In the latter case the onus of proving that the creation of a nuisance will be the inevitable result of carrying out the directions of the legislature, lies upon the persons seeking to justify the nuisance. Their justification depends upon their making good these two propositions-in the first place, that such are the imperative orders of the legislature; and in the second place, that they cannot possibly obey those orders without infringing private rights. If the order of the legislature can be implemented without nuisance, they cannot, in my opinion, plead the protection of the statute; and, on the other hand, it is insufficient for their protection that what is contemplated by the statute cannot be done without nuisance, unless they are also able to shew that the legislature has directed it to be done. Where the terms of the statute are not imperative, but permissive, when it is left to the discretion of the persons empowered to determine whether the general powers committed to them shall be put into execution or not, I think the fair inference is that the legislature intended that discretion to be exercised in strict conformity with private rights, and did not intend to confer license to commit nuisance in any place which might be selected for the purpose." The following authorities will be found instructive on the questions involved in this case: Cherry v. Williams, 147 N. C. 452 (61 S. E. 267, 125 Am. St. Rep. 566, 15 Ann. Cas. 715); Kestner v. Homeopathic Hospital, 245 Pa. 326 (52 L. R. A. [N. S.] 1032, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 123, 91 Atl. 659); Anable v. Board of Com'rs of Montgomery Co., 34 Ind. App. 72 (71 N. E. 272, 107 Am. St. Rep. 173); Everett v. Paschall, 61 Wash. 47 (31 L. R. A. [N. S.] 827, 111 Pac. 879, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1128); Stotler v. Rochelle, 83 Kan. 86 (29 L. R. A. [N. S.] 49, 109 Pac. 788); Harper v. City of Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 365; Gilford v. Babies' Hospital, 21 Abb. New Cas. 159 (1 N. Y. Supp. 448). But we think plaintiffs' contention finds support in the former adjudications of this court. In Pennoyer v. City of Saginaw, 8 Mich. 534, this court held a municipality liable for the continuance of a nuisance created by it. In Cubit v. O'Dett, 51 Mich. 347, it was said: "The highway overseer no doubt has a discretion in deciding how and where he will expend highway labor; but it is a discretion limited by the rights of individuals, and when he invades those rights, he becomes liable." In the recent case of Attorney General v. City of Grand Rapids, 175 Mich. 503 (50 L. R. A. [N. S.] 473, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 968), this court, reversing the decree of the court below, found that the defendant. by emptying sewage into the Grand River created a nuisance to lower riparian owners and the public, and entered a decree for injunction as prayed in the bill. This court there quoted with approval from the case of Spokes v. Board of Health, L. R. 1 Eq. 42, the following: "What difference can it possibly make as to the commission of an illegal act, whether a man acts on behalf of thousands or on behalf of himself only?" The case much relied upon by the trial judge in reaching the conclusion he did was Upjohn v. Richland Township, 46 Mich. 542 (39 Am. Rep. 16, note). That case like this was an equity case, which this court considers de novo, but its facts were materially different. The claimed nuisance there was a cemetery. The defendant sought to increase the size of its cemetery by the use of additional grounds across the road from the original grounds. There was some doubt as to whether there was as much contemplated danger from such addition as from a nuisance the complainant was maintaining on his own land. But in that case the complaining party had purchased his premises after the original cemetery was established. If the cemetery was a nuisance, he had gone to the nuisance. Here the nuisance has been brought to the complaining parties. But in that case, while this court recognized the broad discretion vested in boards of health, it at the same time recognized the power of the court of equity to enjoin injury to private rights by them. We conclude that the provisions of the charter under consideration do not vest in the defendant board of health the power to locate a pesthouse in a thicklysettled, residential district, where, by reason of its location, it would be a nuisance, and where its permanent maintenance would work continuing damage to adjoining and nearby property and would result in the destruction of the home in its comfort and wellbeing; and that the discretion lodged in the board is a discretion to be exercised by it in determining between different lawful locations It follows from what has been said that the decree of the court below must be reversed and one here entered in conformity with the prayer of the bill. Plaintiffs will recover costs of both courts. BIRD, MOORE, STEERE, BROOKE, STONE, and KUHN, JJ., concurred. OSTRANDER, C. J., did not sit. YOUNG & CHAFFEE FURNITURE CO. v. CHAFFEE 1. TRADE-NAMES-SIMILARITY OF NAMES-CONFUSION-STATUTES— INJUNCTION. The names "Chaffee Brothers Furniture Company" and "Young & Chaffee Furniture Company" are not so nearly similar as to be liable to cause uncertainty and confusion to arise in violation of section 9018, 2 Comp. Laws 1915, and a court of equity should not issue the stringent writ of injunction upon the bare possibility of confusion by the careless and indifferent reader. 2. SAME-INCORPORATION-SECRETARY OF STATE. The question as to whether confusion would arise is one for determination in the first instance by the secretary of State, although his determination is not final. 3. SAME MONOPOLIES-UNFAIR COMPETITION-EQUITY. The law does not favor monopolies, and honest competition should not be stifled or prevented; it is unfair competition which courts of equity prevent by injunction. 4. SAME RIGHT TO USE FAMILY NAME-DECEPTION OF PUBLIC— ESTOPPEL. Generally speaking, one has the right to use his own name in his business; but he may not use it in such a way as to lead the public to believe that they are dealing with another, or that his wares are the wares of another; and he may dispose of the right to use his name in connection with a certain business so as to be estopped from claiming the right to its use in that business. 5. SAME-SALE OF BUSINESS-ESTOPPEL. Where one brother owned stock in plaintiff corporation, engaged in the furniture business, and two other brothers were employees of plaintiff, sale of said stock without any covenant not to use family name, held, not to estop them from using their own name in the furniture business in such way as not to mislead the public. 6. SAME MASTER AND SERVANT-EMPLOYEES' REPUTATION, RIGHT TO BENEFIT OF. While defendants were in the employ of plaintiff it was |