November, 1917, his standings were as follows: on filling, 70 points; on crown, 77 points; on plate, 70 points, and which results were entered upon the official records of this board and are a part thereof. That his degree of proficiency and technical skill attained in dentistry, as shown by his examination, was not sufficient according to the uniform standard set by respondent board in such cases to entitle him to a license to practice dentistry in Michigan, and he failed to pass the examination. That his case on said examination was dealt with and decided by the same methods and uniform rules which apply to every other applicant similarly situated. That by reason of his failure to pass his examination on two of the foregoing subjects, said applicant is and was not entitled to a dentist's license to practice under the laws of the State of Michigan. The applicable rules then and now in force provided as follows:

"Rule 15. Applicants taking the examination under the terms of reciprocal contracts with other States will be required to take the examinations in practical work only.

"Rule 18. In the theoretical work of the examination the applicant must have a general average of seventy-five per cent. In practical operative, and in practical prosthetic and crown work, if the applicant falls below seventy-five per cent. he shall fail to pass; but he may be re-examined on that in which he failed at the next regular examination.'

"Respondent, therefore, for the reasons and facts herein set forth, says that relator is not entitled to a license to practice dentistry or dental surgery in Michigan."

Section 2 of the act above referred to gives the said board power "to make by-laws and necessary regulations for the fulfillment of their duties under this act."

In the course of the correspondence between relator's attorney and the secretary of the respondent, as appears by petition of the relator, and under date of February 20, 1918, the secretary wrote said attorney as follows:

"I have to suggest that it appears that you have been misinformed concerning this board having informed Dr. Thiedemann that he had successfully passed the Michigan State board of dental examiners. "Entirely aside from the question, however, we believe that we are fully prepared to show why the doctor may not be given his license to practice dentistry in this State at this time. I do not recall at this moment the standings of the doctor, but whatever percentages he earned in the examination will be found upon the records properly placed to his credit.

"I have the honor to refer you for all further correspondence in the matter, to Dr. B. S. Sutherland, the new secretary, of Owosso, Mich."

Under date of March 4, 1918, appears the following letter from Dr. Sutherland, the secretary, addressed to the attorney of the relator:

"Dear Sir: Your recent letter regarding Dr. W. L. Thiedemann at hand and contents noted. I do not know, nor can I understand, just what contention Dr. Thiedemann is making or what inference you draw from the letters you mention. But permit me to say in all kindness that the records now in my hands do not show that he successfully passed this board.

"Yours very truly,

"B. S. SUTHERLAND."

These facts must have been known to relator two months before he filed his petition here.

Section 6750, 2 Comp. Laws 1915, being section 3 of the said act as amended, reads in part as follows:

"All persons who desire to begin the practice of dentistry in this State after the passage of this act, and who shall have a license from the dental board of another State, requiring preliminary education before examination for license equal to the standard required of applicants for examination and registration in this State, or who shall have received a diploma from the faculty of some reputable college duly organized under the laws of this or any other State of the United States, or any other country, shall have the right to apply to the dental board of this State for

examination as to their proficiency; and all successful applicants shall be licensed and registered by said dental board."

There can, we think, be no question of the power of the board to make reasonable rules and regulations in regard to such examination. And there can be no question as to the reasonableness of the rules here referred to.

An examination of this record shows that there was no plea filed to the return or answer of the respondent board. Section 4 of chapter 36 of the judicature act (3 Comp. Laws 1915, § 13440), relating to mandamus proceedings, reads as follows:

"Whenever a return shall be made to any such writ, the person prosecuting the same may plead to all, or any of the material facts contained in said return; and such issue of fact thus joined, shall be determined as in other cases: Provided, That all material facts stated in said return, that are not specifically denied by plea, shall be taken as admitted to be true. In case no plea is filed to such return, the cause shall stand for hearing upon the petition and return.”

It has been frequently held that in a case heard on petition and answer, the averments in the respondent's answer must be taken as true, in the absence of a plea. Michigan Railroad Commission v. Railway Co., 192 Mich. 426, 433; Anderson v. Newaygo Circuit Judge, 173 Mich. 608, 610.

There can, in our opinion, be no question as to the conclusiveness of the return of the respondent board, upon the question of the relator having failed to pass a successful examination. This is sufficient to dispose of the case.

The writ is therefore denied, with costs.

OSTRANDER, C. J., and BIRD, MOORE, STEERE, BROOKE, FELLOWS, and KUHN, JJ., concurred.

PEOPLE v. ELLIS.

1. CRIMINAL LAW-PROSECUTION DEFINITION.

A prosecution is generally understood to be a criminal action; a proceeding instituted and carried on by due course of law before a competent tribunal for the purpose of determining the guilt or innocence of the person charged with some crime or offense.

2. SAME STATUTES-CONSTRUCTION.

Criminal statutes cannot be extended to cases not included within the clear and obvious import of their language, and if there is doubt as to whether the act charged is embraced in the prohibition, that doubt is to be resolved in favor of the defendant.

3. SAME WIFE DESERTION-OFFENSE.

Where no proceeding or prosecution for bastardy had been had against defendant prior to his marriage with com. plaining witness, his subsequent desertion of her was not a violation of Act No. 310, Pub. Acts 1913 (section 7794, 2 Comp. Laws 1915), making it an offense to desert a wife married for the purpose of escaping prosecution.

Exceptions before judgment from the superior court of Grand Rapids; Dunham, J. Submitted October 17, 1918. (Docket No. 113.) Decided December 27, 1918.

Charles R. Ellis was convicted of wife desertion under Act No. 310, Pub. Acts 1913. Reversed, and defendant discharged.

Ellis & Ellis, for appellant.

Cornelius Hoffius, Prosecuting Attorney, and Willis B. Perkins, Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney (Fred P. Geib, of counsel), for the people.

STONE, J. This case is here upon exceptions before sentence. The defendant was convicted in the supe

rior court of Grand Rapids upon an information charging that:

"Charles R. Ellis

on, to wit, the 13th day of March, 1917, at the city of Grand Rapids, county of Kent, aforesaid, was then and there married to one Gertrude Britton, for the purpose of escaping a prosecution for bastardy, she, the said Gertrude Britton, having accused said Charles R. Ellis of making her pregnant with child, and she, the said Gertrude Britton, on the said 13th day of March, 1917, being then and there pregnant with child, for which the said Charles R. Ellis was liable to prosecution under the laws of this State, and he, the said Charles R. Ellis afterwards, to wit, on the 13th day of March, 1917, did desert and abandon said Gertrude Britton Ellis without any cause or reason, whatsoever. Contrary to the statute," etc.

The statute (Act No. 310, Pub. Acts 1913, being section 7794, 2 Comp. Laws 1915) is entitled:

"An act to provide punishment for wife desertion in certain cases."

It reads as follows:

"Every man or boy who shall marry any woman or girl for the purpose of escaping prosecution for rape, bastardy or seduction, and shall afterwards desert her without good cause, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than one thousand dollars or be imprisoned in the State prison for not more than three years: Provided, That no prosecution shall be brought under this act after five years from the date of the marriage: Provided further, That in all prosecutions under this act, the wife may testify against a husband without his consent."

We are met at the threshold with the proposition of defendant's counsel, duly raised by an assignment of error, that a proper construction of this statute requires the dismissal of the case and the discharge of the defendant for the reason that the words, "for