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CHESSBOROUGH JAMES HENRY KING MACKENZIE-KENNEDY v. THE UNITED STATES

[No. 42491]

[85 C. Cls. 405; 303 U. S. 646]

Petition for writ of certiorari denied by the Supreme Court February 28, 1938.

AUGUST H. MORAN, RECEIVER OF WARDMAN CORP. (INC.) v. THE UNITED STATES

[No. 41901]

[85 C. Cls. 492; 303 U. S. 643]

Petition for writ of certiorari denied by the Supreme Court February 28, 1938.

ERNEST M. BULL, SURVIVING EXECUTOR AND TRUSTEE OF THE ESTATE OF ARCHIBALD H. BULL, DECEASED, v. THE UNITED STATES

[No. L-383]

[84 C. Cls. 632; 303 U. S. 645]

Petition for writ of certiorari denied by the Supreme Court February 28, 1938.

INTERNATIONAL MANUFACTURERS SALES COM

PANY OF AMERICA, INC., A. S. POSTNOKOFF, TRUSTEE, v. THE UNITED STATES

[No. 43430]

[85 C. Cls. 683; 303 U. S. 651]

Petition for writ of certiorari denied by the Supreme Court March 14, 1938.

ALLEN POPE v. THE UNITED STATES

[No. K-366]

[Ante, p. 18; 81 C. Cls. 658; 76 C. Cls. 64; 303 U. S. 654]

Petition for writ of certiorari denied by the Supreme Court March 28, 1938.

WHARTON GREEN & CO., INC., A CORPORATION EXISTING UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, v. THE UNITED STATES

[No. 42894]

[Ante, p. 100; 303 U. S. 661]

Petition for writ of certiorari denied by the Supreme Court April 4, 1938.

INDEX DIGEST

ACCEPTANCE OF CHANGE ORDER.

See Contracts XXXV.

ACCEPTANCE OF PRELIMINARY PAYMENT.

See Contracts XXIX.

ACCOUNTING, METHOD OF.

See Taxes VI.
ACCOUNT STATED.
See Taxes L.
ACQUIESCENCE.

See Indians III.

ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION FOR LANDS.

See Indians II.

ADDITIONAL COST DUE TO DELAYS.

See Contracts XVII.

ADDITIONS TO INCOME.

See Taxes V.
ALIEN EXECUTOR.

See Jurisdiction III.

ALTERATIONS MADE WITHOUT CONSENT.

See Contracts XXV.

AUTHORITY OF ARMY OFFICERS.

See Contracts XIII.

AUTOMOBILE PART OR ACCESSORY.

See Taxes I.

BASIC PERIOD OF LIMITATION SUSPENDED.
See Taxes XLIX.

BOARD OF TAX APPEALS.

See Taxes XLV, XLVI, XLVII, XLVIII, XLIX, L.
BONUS STOCK.

See Taxes IV.

BOUNDARY COMMISSION REPORT.

See Indians III.

BREACH OF AGREEMENT.

See Contract XXX.

CAPITAL GAIN OR LOSS.

See Taxes XI, XXXV, XXXVI, XXXVII, XXXVIII, XXXIX,
XL, XLI, XLII.

CHANGES DUE TO UNUSUAL CONDITIONS.

See Contracts XXVIII.

CHANGES IN MATERIAL REQUIRED.

See Contracts XVIII.

CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS.

See Taxes XXXV, XXXVI, XXXVII, XXXVIII, XXXIX, XL,
XLI.

CLAIMS FOR ADDITIONAL AMOUNTS.

See Taxes XLIV.

CLAIMS FOR REFUND.

See Taxes II, IV, XXVII, XXXI.
CLUB DUES AND FEES.

See Taxes XXX.
COLLATERAL PLEDGED.

See Sale of Collateral.

COLLECTIONS AGAINST BAD DEBTS.

See Taxes XXI.

COMMISSIONER'S ASSESSMENT.

See Taxes XXIV.

COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS.

See Contracts XI.

COMMUTATION OF ACCUMULATED LEAVE.

Employe of Panama Canal Service, on retirement for age, held
to be entitled to commutation of accumulated leave under
valid Executive Order. Greene v. U. S., 85 C. Cls. 548. Fergu-
son, 606.

COMPENSATION WHICH IS INDEFINITE.

See Taxes XIII.

COMPUTATION BY COMMISSIONER.

See Taxes XLVIII.

COMPUTATION BY FIELD AGENT.

See Taxes VIII.

CONFLICT IN SPECIFICATIONS.

See Contracts XXXIII.

CONTRACTS.

I. Surety having, under mutual mistake of fact, paid
amount alleged to be due by contractor by reason of
default, is entitled to recover, where in Gertner v.
United States, 76 C. Cls. 643, it was held that con-
tractor was not in default and was not liable for the
damage to the work. United States v. State Bank, 96
U. S. 30, 36; Nelson v. United States, 35 C. Cls. 427,
429, cited. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 36.

II. Where contractor had notice from the advertisement

for bids that dredging operations would be performed.
before or after the contract was executed which
would result in deposit of silt on the site of the work
which it would be necessary to remove, and contractor
did remove not only the quantity for which the contract-
ing officer allowed payment, but also an additional
amount, there can be no recovery under the terms of
the contract. Severin, 53.

CONTRACTS-Continued.

III. Where the specifications plainly provided for the con--
tingency of unexpected depths in reaching bedrock,
and the bidders were aware of that contingency, there
can be no recovery to compensate for failure to calcu-
late the bid so as to include the contingency. Id.
IV. Where Government has ordered extra work performed.
and has received the benefit thereof; where additional
equipment is furnished; where drains could not be
laid as shown on the drawings and an extra cost was
entailed-recovery is allowed. Id.

V. Where there is no proof that actual damages have been
sustained, and where party claiming damages is
equally at fault, and amount of delay caused by either
party cannot be ascertained with reasonable accuracy,
liquidated damages will not be allowed. U. S. v.
United Engineering & Contracting Company, 234 U. S.
236, 242; Wyant v. U. S., 46 C. Cls. 205; Monks et al.,
Exrs., v. U. S., 70 C. Cls. 302, 338. Wharton Green, 100.
VI. Where delays by Government have made completion of

contract impossible by date specified, provisions of
contract fixing a time limit for completion are abro-
gated and there is nothing as to which decision of
contracting officer can apply. Id.

VII. Evidence held insufficient to sustain claim for damage on
account of land patent issued by Government. Lamm
Lumber Co., 171.

VIII. Where tribal contract provided in substance that any ad-
vance in stumpage rates to be paid by plaintiff should
not exceed fifty per cent of the increase in average mill
run wholesale net value of lumber at mills, during the
three years preceding, and evidence shows there was
no such increase in mill prices, an increase in stump-
age prices under the contract was without authority.
See Forest Lumber Co. v. U. S., herein, p. 188. Id.
IX. Where contract recited it was made by the Superin-

tendent of the Klamath Indian School, for and on
behalf of the tribe, and purchaser agreed to make pay-
ment to said Superintendent "for the use and benefit" of
the tribe, said Superintendent was acting by authority of
law, for the Government; and the Government, in what
it did, was acting under its own rights and powers,
and not as agent; where one executes a contract solely
under his own powers and rights he becomes liable
thereon although the instrument specifies that it is
executed in behalf of and for the benefit of a third
party. Id.

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