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SLACUM

V.

SIMMS

judgment of a competent court, which will be affirmed unless the error be apparent on the proceedings.

The proceedings are in pais, there can be no writ of error. This is the only mode in which the procedure can be corrected.

C. Lee and Jones, contra.

Fraud is never to be presumed; and it is not found. It was a mere ministerial act, which is not void by reason of interest.

This is not the mode by which the plaintiff can avail himself of the fraud, if it be one. The discharge is prima facie good.

It is expressly found that Wise did not participate in the fraud which Simms contemplated by his deed. He never acted under the deed as a trustee. His only knowledge of the fact was in his capacity of magistrate. As a magistrate he had no discretion; he was bound to grant the warrant of discharge upon the debtor's taking the oath, and delivering the schedule.

All the authorities cited in Comyns' Digest confine the incompetence to cases where the judge is a party upon record.

If a legal proceeding of this kind may be vacated at any subsequent time, by showing a remote collateral interest in the magistrate, there can be no security for property. The distinction is between a' direct interest as party, and a consequential interest. If the interest do not appear upon the record, the only remedy is by prohibition. As long as the proceeding remains unreversed by a competent tribunal, it is valid. Hard. 503. Brooks. v. Earl of Rivers. 12 Co. 114. Earl of Darby's case. Dyer, 220. a. 184. Cro. Eliz. 717. Bonham's case. Co.

Sir N. Bacon's case. 1 Lean. Errish v. Reeves. 8 Co. 118. Litt. 141. 4 Com. Dig. tit.

Justices, I. & T. 1 Salk. 398. 12 Mod. 587. 2 Salk.

425. Queen v. Rodgers. 2 Salk. 607. Sty. 137. Smith v. Hancock. Sty. 209.

Swann, in reply.

It is immaterial whether it be a ministerial or a judicial act. Sheriffs, witnesses, jurors are all rendered incompetent by interest; and à fortiori is a judge.

March 15.

MARSHALL, Ch. J. delivered the opinion of the court to the following effect:

The former case between these parties presented the single circumstance of fraud in Simms, the principal debtor, in which Wise had no share as it was then stated.

The decision in that case does not affect the present. It is here stated that the defendant Wise was one of the magistrates who granted the discharge, and who received a conveyance from Simms of all his estate, &c.

It cannot be doubted that if there had been a combination between the surety of the insolvent and the magistrate to grant the discharge, such surety could never plead that discharge in bar of this ac tion. Such would have been the law if Peter Wise the surety had been a different person from Peter Wise the magistrate. But being the same person, he is clearly incompetent. He is directly interested, and his interest appears upon the record.

But the case is stronger when we consider the irre gularity of the schedule of property delivered by Simms at the time of his discharge.

The whole schedule is in these words: "I have neither real or personal property, but what has been conveyed by a deed of trust to John Wise and Peter

SLACUM

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SIMMS.

SLACUM

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SIMMS.

Wise, jun. for the use of my creditors, as will appear, reference being had to the said deed."

He does not directly affirm that it is, or is not, his property. He might have taken the oath although he knew that the property contained in the deed remained in himself. The schedule, therefore, was not such as the law requires. The transaction is fraudulent upon the face of it.

The discharge, being granted by an incompetent tribunal, is wholly void.

Judgment reversed.

THE UNITED STATES. VOWELL AND

M'CLEAN.

Duties upon

ERROR to the circuit court of the United States, goods import for the district of Columbia, in an action of debt ed, do not accrue until their upon a bond given by the defendants in error to the arrival at the United States, for duties on a cargo of salt from St. port of entry. Ubes, which arrived and came to anchor within the The duty upon salt, which collection district of Alexandria, sixteen miles below ceased with the 31st of Decem- the town and port of Alexandria, on the 23d of Deber, 1807, was cember, 1807, but did not arrive at the port of not chargeable Alexandria until the first of January, 1808.

upon a cargo

which arrived within the collection district

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The collector of Alexandria refused to permit the before that day, cargo to be landed until the duties were secured. but did not ar- Vowell contended that the salt was not subject to rive at the port of entry until duty.

the 1st of January, 1808.

The facts being specially pleaded, and admitted in the replication, to which there was a general demurrer, the only question was, whether, as the duty upon salt ceased with the 31st of December, 1807, cargo, which arrived within the district, but not

this

at the port of Alexandria before the 1st of January, THE U. S. 1808, was liable to duty.

The court below was of opinion that it was not, and rendered judgment for the defendants, upon the demurrer.

The United States brought their writ of error.

Fones, for the United States.

The duty attached when the salt was imported into the district, and, perhaps, when brought into the United States.

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By the act of the 10th of August, 1790, vol. 1. p. 248. a duty of 12 cents a bushel is laid upon salt which, after the 31st of December then next, should be "brought into the United States, from any foreign port or place. So by the act of the 8th July, 1797, vol. 4. p. 35. an additional duty of 8 cents is laid upon all salt imported into the United States. By the act of March 3, 1807, vol. 8. p. 290. it is enacted, "that from and after the 31st day of December next, so much of any act as lays a duty upon imported salt, be and the same is hereby repealed; and from and after the day last aforesaid, salt shall be imported into the United States free of duty: Provided that for the recovery and receipt of such duties as shall have accrued, and on the days aforesaid respectively remain outstanding, and for the recovery and distribution of fines, penalties and forfeitures, and the remission thereof, which shall have been incurred before and on the said days respectively, the provisions of the aforesaid act shall remain in fulb force and virtue.”

The laws of the United States take a distinction between importing and entering, between a port and a place. Vol. 4. p. 317. § 23. and 24. Goods may be imported before they are entered or delivered. So if goods are brought in and destined to be delivered in different districts or ports, they are to be inserted

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V.

VOWELL.

THE U.S.in the manifest in successive order, and the law VOWELL. speaks of them as imported. The forfeiture for

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want of a manifest does not accrue at the time of entry, but at the time of importing or bringing in. So if goods are brought into the United States, to be exported again to foreign ports, the law speaks of them as imported, (vol. 4. p. 331, 332. § 32.) although they are not intended to be landed.

In vol. 4. p. 327. § 30. is the following expression: "at any port of the United States established by law, or within any harbour, inlet or creek thereof;" which shows that a port established by law, is coextensive with a collection district.

C. Lee, contra.

Until the vessel arrives at the port of entry, neither the duties on the goods, nor on the tonnage, Yet they both accrue at the same time.

accrue.

The question is, what is the fiscal meaning of the word imported.

The first collection law, which was passed on the 4th of July, 1789, (Child's edit. Laws, vol. 1. p. 25.)` has the same expression, imported into the United States. Yet it afterwards speaks of the time of importation, where it evidently means the time when a permit is applied for at the proper office. Some rule is necessary by which to fix the time of importation; it ought not to depend upon the question at what time the vessel arrived within the jurisdiction of the United States. The same act, when speaking of the ad valorem duties, refers to the time and place of importation, for the purpose of ascertaining the value.

If goods should be lost after arrival within the collection district, but before they reached the port of entry, no duties would accrue upon them. So if they are damaged, the value is to be ascertained not

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