26TH CONG....2ND SESS.

will ever be inposed to save a protective tariff? No man acquainted with the feelings of the people, or the action of legislative bodies elected by the people, would induce such a hope.

Our sources of internal revenue then, which do not spring from taxation, must be preserved and fostered, or a protective policy cannot be independently pursued.

Take the articles of wool and woollens, the great Northern and Eastern interests. So regulate the tariff that American wool holds the market against the foreign article, and that American cloths can enter into the consumption of the country in fair competition with the foreign, and then experience, as at this time, a deficiency of revenue, that arising from an immense public domain having been taken from the Treasury, and given to the States. What are you to do. Will higher duties produce more revenue? Not in the case supposed; for when the competition is even, or balancing in favor of the domestic interests, more duties will be prohibition; and while protection may be rendered perfect by such legislation, all revenue will be lost. You must reduce the duty, then, and thus invite importations to raise your revenue, and having no other resource, the policy would be compulsory.

It is a mistake, then, to assume that this measure will necessarily favor the protected interests and the protective policy. It may injure both. It is a mistake to suppose that forcing the Treasury to an exclusive dependence upon revenue from imports, will secure the system of protection. It may destroy it. The Treasury of the nation must be supplied; and if such imports as are consistent with the system of protection do not yield the requisite revenue, the protection must be yielded to the necessity for revenue.

There is another consideration growing out of the policy of making the Treasury dependent upon a revenue from imports alone, which deserves the serious examination of all, before it shall be adopted as the policy for our country. Where will rest the control, both as to our supply of revenue and the protection of our domestic interests, under such a policy? Will it be in the hands of Congress, or in foreign hands? Congress can invite, but Congress cannot compel importations. Those great interests which regulate the trade of the world govern our importations; and they are, at all times, subject to the influences of foreign interests and foreign policy, as well as our own. Make the Treasury of the nation exclusively dependent upon these importations, and it too must be equally in subjection to the same influences. The protective features of our tariff become, in their operation, injurious to some important interest of a country with which our trade is extensive, and produce a desire on the part of that country to change our rates of duty. Our Treasury is solely dependent upon revenue from imports, and by consequence proportionably dependent upon importations from the country in question. It stops its trade with us.

Our revenue

falls off, and our Treasury is made empty, while we are told, reduce your rates of duty, and the suspended trade shall be renewed and extended. Can Congress regulate this attempt to control our policy by a foreign power? By a countervailing policy it can; but that will not produce revenue, or fill our Treasury; and, if our sources of internal revenue be destroyed, cr given away, can only be adopted and sustained by a resort to direct taxation. What, in such a case, would be likely to be done? Would our system of protection be adhered to, er our duties be reduced? If we have the land revenue to supply the Treasury, the countervailing policy will be likely to govern us; but if it is to be resorted to, at the expense of direct taxation, protection will be very sure to be yielded, and the Treasury supplied by a reduction of our rates of duty. In short, if we place our Treasury in a condition to be exclusively dependent upon castoms, our policy must be to invite importations, to burden them as lightly as possible, lest they are turned into other channe's, to make he trade of foreigners with us as profitable as possible, that they may consent, through its means, to supply our Treasury.

Can considerations such as these fail to convince the tariff interests in our country that they are not

The President-Mr. Wright.

fostered by giving away our sources of internal revenue, and forcing ourselves into a state of entire dependence upon foreign trade for the supply of our National Treasury? It seemed to him not.

Nor could this view of the operation of this distribution, properly considered, render the measure, or the policy, more acceptable to the anti-ariff interests. They desire the least possible amount of duties consistent with a healthful and certain revenue, and it is admitted, on all hands, that the dis. tribution to the States of the land revenue will produce the instant necessity of an increase of duties to the full extent of the money taken from the Treasury for distribution. Whatever, therefore, may be the effect upon the protective policy, the influence of the measure upon the free trade principle cannot be equivocal.

These suggestions had been hastily and crudely given, and yet he hoped he had sufficiently developed his views to enable the members of the Senate to understand him. It was to them he desired to address himself upon this point. They would reflect upon the ideas he had thrown out, and he knew they would allow them all the weight they deserved, if indeed they should be found to de

serve any.

He would take up but a very few moments more of their time in briefly replying to some other ob servations of the Senator from Kentucky. If he understord that honorable Senator-and he begged him to believe that he did not wish to misunderstand him-he said that the present Administration had spent 135 milions of dollars in the four years of its term; and that upon roads, harbors, canals ships, fortifications, &c. there had been expended but nine millions of dollars.

He (Mr. WRIGHT) had not the means at hand to examine this matter, but he believed in the four years they had been in the habit of passing bil's annually for fortifications of from a half to a million of dollars-for the navy of from five to six millions, including a permanent appropriation of half a mill on to be exclusively expended for the increase of the navy, separate from the support, repairs, and the like, as well as sundry large appropriations for steam ships-for harbors large appropriations, nearly annually, if not entirely so; though for roads and canals he was happy to know little or nothing had been done, because he considered all such expenditures by this Government wrong in principle and impolitic in practice.

Mr. CRITTENDEN said, in justice to bimself, he should explain, that he did not include the repairing of ships, and the pay of the officers and the men, but the mere building of ships.

Mr. WRIGHT had understood the Senator to speak simply of the ships, and net of the pay, but he supposed he had intended to include rebuilding repairs, and similar expenditures.

Well, then, the Senator said there were some one hundred and twenty-six millions of dollars which had been expended within four years, and how expended? Why, expended in pursuance of arpropriations made by themselves (Congress,) and for that whole period they had had the honorable Senator's watchfulness and guardian care over them, constantly; and he baieved he did that honorable Senator no injustice when he said, that if he had seemed to feel more dissatised at one time than another with the votes of him, (Mr. WRIGHT,) it was when he voted against appropriations. Still be admitted there might have been abuses practised in expenditures he was not prepared to say there had not beer; but he said cheerfully-what the honorable Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. BUCHANAN] aid yesterday- he challenged investigation, not in a spirit of triumph, but with a patriotic ferling towards the country and its interests. If there had been abuse, let exposure and punishment be visited upon the guilty; on him, if he were the man; on his best friend; on any man, whoever he might be, in this vast nation, who had embezzled the pub. lic money, who had squandered it improperly, or who had been unfaithful in a pecuniary trust. He again said examine, but examine with justice and truth.

That was all the favor he asked; and he now appealed to that great party, for some of the members of which he cherished a feel ng bordering on friendship, to do to their opponents justice-to

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tell the truth of them-and to punish them only when they should be found, after careful and fair examination, to deserve it. The papers and re cords were soon to pass into their hands, and the means for investigation would be ampie. Let not the desire to find fault be paramount to the obligations of truth and justice.

Another subject has given employment to the honorable Senator's talent for satire in no stinted measure. He referred to the Senator's sedentary army of militia, which the President is said to have organized, to prosecute the Indian war i Florida.

Previous to the late elections, the honorable Senator and his party told a very different story, touching the military designs and propensities of the President. Then his purpose was a "standing army" of 200,000 men-militia, it is true-to be used, not to subdue the murderous Seminole, but to prostrate the liberties of this free country, to break down the Constitution and the Union, and establish a military despotism upon the ruins.

He (Mr. WRIGHT) could not forget this startling ground of the Opposition during the late contest, because he had then, as now, constantly found himself contending upon this point before meetings of the people, and then, as now too, as the result had proved, contending against antagonis's who were more than a match for him. Then the President was a fearful despot, a tyrant, and through the instrumentality of our neighbors, our friends, our fa thers, brothers, sons, the militia of the country, converted into a standing army, not of regular soldiers, with their permanent officers, but of militia, was 10 destroy the liberties of this our beloved land, and to rule our sixteen millions of people as a military despot, supported and sustained by these 200,000 citizen soldiers!

What is the President now? In what frightful aspect does the Senator present him to the country on this day? As imbecile in the extreme; as to terminate an Indian war of some four or five years' duration, which has baffled the efforts of our whole gallant little army for that entire period, by means of a sedentary army of SIX HUNDRED men. A corps of sedentary militia of that formidable number.

Of one thing he (Mr. WRIGHT) hoped he might now assure himself, and that was that this new army of six hundred sitting men would not frighten from their propriety the great party of which the honorable Senator was so distinguished a member, nor render them inconveniently uneasy in regard to the safety of the liberties of the country; most especially so when a few weeks must terminate the command of their present chieftain.

Look at these positions. That man who, on the first days of November, was to cleave down the liberty of the people by a standing army of militia, was now, in January, to defend the coun try by 600 men, whose duty it was to sit, not stand, and who were limited to an employment within twenty miles from the place on which they set. Now he thought there was a little extravagance in all this; and he could not believe, after all, that there would, thereby, be much added to the expenses of the Government.

Mr. CRITTENDEN read the order of General Reed, to which he had referred, but the Reporter could not obtain a copy. Of the authority of the order, Mr. C. said, he knew nothing. It had teen placed in his hands, and was a publication from a newspaper.

Mr. WRIGHT had only referred to the mallet, because it had been introduced by the honorable Senator. He thought it wholly irrelevant to the subject before the Senate, and was not disposed to consume further time about it. What he had learned from the remarks of the gentleman, and the extract he had read from an unknown authority, constituted the whole of his information upon the subject. He had never before heard of even the existence of this militia force, this sitting ar my; and he certainly did not desire to extend te marks upon a subject about which he knew nothing.

A word upon another subject. The honorable Senator complained that there had been a wanton expenditure of money for supplies for the army in Florida and the Creek and Cherokee countries,

26TH CONG....2ND SESS.

that provisions had been purchased for high prices, which were not used; and that they had been sold at public auction for low prices. These might be facts. The Senator read from a printed document which he [Mr. WRIGHT] had never seen, but which he presumed was good authority for his positions. Did it follow, however, that the present President was in fault in the matter? Did it follow, by necessity, that any person was in fault; and if any person, would it not be more just to state who was the officer in command, who had charge of the purchases spoken of, and under what public agent the property had been thus sacrificed?

There had been a period in our history, if he was not mistaken as to facts, when provisions purchased for the use of our armies, at a dearer rite even than those referred to by the Senator, had been piled together and burned, to furnish light for a distinguished retreating General from a retreating enemy; and yet, neither the General, nor the Administration under which he served, was condemned either for the military achievement, or the loss of the public property. This did not take place, as his memory told him, upon the Southwestern, but upon the Northwestern frontier, and not during the Florida war, but the war with England of 1812-'15.

Had the officer in charge of this property in the Indian country pursued this course; had he, instead of his auction sale, burned the supplies, and made a precipitate retreat, the Administration he served, as well as himself, might have been spared these sharp censures. He however, as Mr. WRIGHT believed, had accomplished the duty assigned to him, and was ready to dismiss his force to their homes, so far as they were militia, and to other service so far as they were regulars, and the supplies not be. ing wanted at the station where they were, and transportation being the principal ingredient of their cost, he took, whether wisely or not, the expedient of a public sale at auction, rather than that of a second transportation. If the prices paid at the sale were low, the loss was the greater, but it was not a total loss, nor was the property consumed to furnish a light, not for a pursued, but retreating general. He thought, therefore, he was authorized to say that if the entire public loss in tae one case was not cause for censure upon the general, but rather for his greater elevation, the partial loss in the other could not be a broad ground for the sweeping condemnation of a whole Administration.

CESSION AND DISTRIBUTION BILLS.

SPEECH OF MR. CALHOUN.

OF SOUTH CAROLINA. In Senale, January 23, 1841-On the amend ment proposed by Mr. CRITTENDEN to the pie. emption bill, to distribute the proceeds of the pub. Jands among the States.

Mr. CALHOUN said that the proposition of the Senator from Kentucky, [Mr. Crittenden] to d'stribute the proceeds of the sales of the public lands among the several States, was no stranger in this chamber. His colleague [Mr. CLAY] had introduced it many years since, when he was in the Opposition, and had often pressed its passage as an Opposition measure, and once with success, while the Treasury was groaning under the weight of a surplus revenue, of which Congress was willing to free it on almost any terms. It was then vetoed by General Jackson, and has had to contend ever since against the resistence of his and the present Administration.

But it is now, for the first time, introduced under different auspices, not as an Opposition, but an Administration measure-a measure of the coming Administration, if we may judge from indications that can scarcely deceive. It is brought in by a Senator, who, if rumor is to be credited, is selected as & member of the new cabinet, [Mr. CRITTENDEN] backed by another in the same condition, [Mr. WEBSTER] Supported by a third, [Mr. CLAY] who, all know, must exercise a controlling influence over that Administration. It is then fair to presume, that it is not only a measure, but a leading measure of General Harrison's administration, pushed forward in advance of his inaugu

Pre-emption Law-Mr. Calhoun.

ration by those who have the right of considering themselves his organs on this floor. Regarded in this light, it acquires a vastly increased importance --so much so as to demand the most serious and deliberate consideration. Under this impression I have carefully re-examined the measure, and have been confirmed in the opinion previously entertained, that it is perfectly unconstitutional, and pregnant with the most disastrous consequences; and what I now propose is to present the result of my reflection under each of these views, beginning with the former.

Whether the Government can constitutionally distribute the revenue from the public lands among the States, must depend on the fact, whether they belong to them in their united Federal character, or individually and separately. If in the former, it is manifest that the Government, as their com mon agent or trustce, can have no right to distri bute among them for their individual, separate use, a fund derived from property held in their united and Federal character, without a special power for that purpose, which is not pretended. A position so clear of itself, and resting on the established principles of law, when applied to individuals holding property in like manner, needs no illustration. If, on the contrary, they belong to the States in their individual and separate character, then the Gvernment would not only have the right, but would be bound to apply the revenue to the separate use States. So far is incontrovertible, which presen's the question, in which of the two characters are the lands held by the States?

To give a satisfactory answer to this question, it will be necessary to distinguish between the lands that have been ceded by the States, and those that have been purchased by the Government, cut of the common funds of the Union.

The principal cessions were made by Virginia and Georgia; the former of all the tract of country between the Ohio, the Mississippi and the lakes, including the States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan, and the Territory of Wiskonsan; and the latter of the tract included in Alabama and Mississippi. I shall begin with the cession of Virginia, as it is on that the advocates for distribution mainly rely to establish the right.

I hold in my hand an extract of all that portion of the Virginia deed of cession, which has any bearing on the point at issue, taken from the volume lying on the table before me, with the place marked, and to which any one desirous of examining the deed may refer.

The cession is "o the United States in Congress assembled, for the benefit of said States " Every word implies the States in their united Fede ral character. That is the meaning of the phrase United States. It stands in contradistinction to the States taken separately and individually, and if there could be, by possibility, any doubt on that point, it would be removed by the expression “in Congress assembled"-an as emblage which constituted the very knot that united them. I regard the execution of such a deed, in such an as emblage, to the United States so assembled, so conclusive, that the cession was to them in their united and aggregate character, in contradistinction to their individual and separate character, and by necessary consequence, the lands so ceded belonged to them in their former and not in their latter character, that I am at a loss for words to make it clearer. To deny it, would be to deny that there is any truth in language.

But as strong as this is, it is not all. The dred proceeds and says that all the lands so ceded, "shall be considered a common fund for the use and benefit of such of the United States as have become members of the Conf deration, or Federal alliance of said States, Virginia inclusive," and concludes by saying "and shall be faithfully and bona fide disposed of tor that purpose, and for no other use and purpose whatever." If it were possible to raise a doubt before, these ful', clear, and exp cit terms would dispel it. It is impossible for language to be clearer. To be "considered a common fund," an expression directly in contradistinction to separate or individual, and is by necessary implication as clear a negative of the latter, as if it had been positively expressed. This common fund to "be for the use and benefit of such of the United States, as have be

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come or shall become members of the Confederation or Federal alliance;" that is as clear as language can express it for their common use in their united Federal character, Virginia being included as the grantor, out of abundant caution.

[Here Mr. CLAY said in an audible voice, there were other words not cited. To which Mr. CAL H UN replied:]

I am glad to hear the Senator say so, as it shows, not only that he regards the expressions cited standing alone, as clearly establishing what I contended for, but on what he relies to rebut my conclusion. I shall presently show, that the expres sion to which he refers will utterly fail him. The concluding words are, "shall be faithfully and bona fide disposed of for that use, and no other use and purpose whatever." For that use-that is, the common use of the States, in their capacity of members of the Confederation or Federal allianceand no other; positively forbidding to use the fund to be derived from the lands for the separate use of the States, or to be distributed among them for their separate or individual use, as proposed by this amendment, as it is possible for words to do. So far, all doubt would seem to be excluded.

I re

But there are other words to which the Senator refers, and on which the advocates of the measure vainly rely to establish the right. After asserting that it shall be considered a common fund for the use and benefit of the States that are or shall become memhers of the Confederation or Federal alliance, Virginia inclusive, it adds, "according to their usual respective proportions in the general charge and expenditure." Now, I assert, if these words were susceptible of a construction that the fund was intended for the separate and individual use and benefit of the States-which I utterly deny-yet it would be contrary to one of the fundamental rules of construction to give them that meaning. fer to the well known rule, that doubtful expres. sions, in a grant or other instrument, are not to be so construed as to contradict what is clearly and plainly expressed-as would be the case in this instance, if they should be so construed as to mean the separate and individual use and benefit of the States severally. But they are not susceptib'e of such construction. Whatever ambiguity may be supposed to attach to them, will be readily explained by reference to the history of the times. The cession was made under the old Articles of Confederation, according to which the general or common fund of the Union was raised, not by taxation on individuals, as at present, but by re quisition on the States, proportioned among them according to the assessed value of their improved lands. An account had, of course, to be kept between each State and the common treasury; and these words were inserted simply to direct that the funds from the ceded lands were to be credited to States according to the proportion they had to contribute to the general or common fund respectively, in order, if not enough should be received from the lands, to meet their contribution, they should be debited with the deficit; and if more than sufficient, credited with the excess in making the next requisition. The expression can have no other meaning; and so far from countenancing the construction, that the common fund from the lands should be applied to the separate use of the States, it expressly provides how it shall be credited to the confederated or alled S'ates, in their account current with the general or common fund of that Confederacy. The opposite interpretation would im. ply the most palpable contradiction and ab urdity.

But it is asked, what would have to be done if their had been a permanent surplus? Such a case was scarcely supposable, with the heavy debt of the Revolution, and the small yield from the land at the time; but if it had occurred, it would have been an unforseen contingency, to be provided for by the United States, to whom the fund belonged, and not by Congress, as its agent, or trustee, for its management.

That this expression was intended merely to direct how the account should be kept, and not to make that the separate property of the States individually, which had been declared, in the most emphatic manner, to belong to them, and to be used

26TH CONG.......2ND SESS.

by them, as a common fund, in their united federal character, we would have the most conclusive proof, if what has been stated already was not so, in the fact that, in the deeds of cession from all the other States, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, North Carolina, and South Carolina, these words are omitted.

As to the cession from Georgia, it is impossible that there should be two opinions about it. It was made under the present Government, and in the very words of the Virginia cession, excepting the words, "according to their usual respective proportion in the general charge and expenditure." The omission, while the other portion was exactly copied, is significant. The old system of requisition on the States to supply the common treasury, under the Articles of Confederation, had been superseded by taxes laid directly on the people, under the present Government, and it was no longer necessary to provide for the mode of keeping the account, and for that reason was omitted. But the cession by Georgia was, in reality, a purchase. The United States has paid full consideration for the land, including the expense of extinguishing the Indian titles, and other charges; and of course the portion of the public domain acquired from that State may be fairly considered as standing on the same principle, as far as the present question is concerned, as that purchased from foreign powers.

So undeniable is the conclusion that the lands ceded by the States were ceded to them in their united and aggregate character as a Federal community, and not in their separate and individual, that the Senator from Massachusetts was forced to admit, if I understood him correctly, (and if not, I wish to be corrected,) that they were so ceded in the first instance, but only for the purpose of paying the public deb', and that on its final discharge, the lands became the separate property of the States. This, sir, is a perfectly gratuitous assumption on the part of the Senator, and is directly opposed by the deeds of cession, which expressly provide that it shall be a common fund for the use and benefit of the States in their united and Federal character, without restriction to the public debt, or limitation in point of time, or any other respects. This bold and unwarranted assertion may be regarded as an implied acknowledgment on his part of the truth of the construction for which I contend, and on which the Government has ever acted, but now attempted to be changed on a false assumption.

The residue of the public lands, including Florida and all the region beyond the Mississippi, extending to the Pac fic Ocean, and constituting by far the greater part, stands on a different footing. They were purchased out of the common funds of the Union, collected by taxes, and belong, beyond all question, to the people of the United States in their federal and aggregate capacity. This has not teen, and cannot be denied; and yet it is proposed to distribute the common fund derived from the sales of these, as well as from the ceded lands, in direet violation of the admitted principle that the agent or trusice of a common concern has no right, without express authority, to apply the joint funds to the separate use and benefit of its individual members.

But setting aside the constitutional objection, as conclusive as it is, I ask what consideration of expediency-what urgent necessity-is there for the adoption, at this time, of a measure so extraordinary as a surrender to the States, for their indi vidual use, of the important por ion of the revenue derived from the public domain, which, it is probable, will not fall short, on an average of the next ten years, of five millions of dollars? Is the Treasury now burdened with a surplus, far beyond the wants of the Government, for which all are anxious to devise some meɛasure of relief, as was the case when the Senator introduced and passed his scheme of distribution formerly? On the contrary, is it not in the very opposite condition-one of exhaustion, with a deficit, according to the statement of that Senator, and those who act with him, of many millions of dollars? And is not the revenue still declining, so that in a short time the present deficit will be double? To take a broader view, I would ask, is the condition of the country less unfavorable to the adoption of the measure than the state of

Pre-emption Law-Mr. Colhoun.

the Treasury? Is there an individual capable of aking a comprehensive view of our foreign relations at this moment, who does not see the imperious necessity of applying every dollar that can te spared to guard against coming dangers, more especially on that element where a revolution so extraordinary is going on, by the all-powerful agency of steam, both as to the means of attack and defence?

If, then, the state of the Treasury and the condition of the country so urgently demand the reten. tion of this important branch of revenue, for the common use and objects for which the Government was created, what possible motives can impel those who are shortly to be charged with its administration, to bring forward, at such a period, the extraordinary proposition to take from the necessities of the Treasury and the country so large a sum, to be distributed among the States for their separate and individual use? To this question but one answer has been or can be given-that many of the States want the money. They have contracted deb's for their own individual and local purposes, beyond their ordinary means, and which the dominant party in those States are unwilling to meet by raising taxes on their own people, for fear of being turned oni of power. The result has been a loss of credit, followed by a depreciation of their bonds, held by rich capitalists at home and abroad. The immediate object of this scheme is to raise the credit of the indebted States by distributing the revenue from the lands; that is, to surrender about one-fourth of the permanent revenue of the Union, and that the most certain, to enhance the value of the State bonds, now greatly depressed, because some of the indebted States do not choose to raise, by taxes on their own people, the means of paying their own debts. To have a true coaception of the whole case, it must be borne in mind that these bonds were taken by the capitalists on this and the other side of the Atlantic on speculation, in the regular course of business, as a profitable inve-t ment, and, many of them, at great depreciation; and that the demand on the common Treasury is substantially to make good, not only their losses, but to enable them to realize their anticipated profits. Such is the object.

We are thus brought to the question, in what manner is this deficit of at least five millions to be supplied? By taxes-additional taxes on the commerce of the country, preparing the way for still higher by combining the indebted States with the tariff interest, to impose heavier burdens on that important but oppressed branch of industry. Wines and silks are to be selected, under the plea of taxing luxury; and much manoeuvring has been resorted to in order to enlist the tobacco interest in favor of the tax, with, I fear, too much success. They are, I admit, fair objects of taxation, and ought to bear their due proportion of the public burden. I am prepared to act on that opinion when the tariff comes up for revision, as it must, at the next session. I go far her: Fix the amount which the just and necessary wants of Government may require, including the revenue from the lands, and I will cheerfully agree to lay as much on luxu ries as gentlemen will agree to reduce on necessaries. It is my favorite system, and I am prepared to go as far as any one in that direction. But I shall not agree to impose a cent on luxuries, or necessaries, on the rich or poor, to pay the debts for which this Government is in no way responsible, and which we cannot pay without a palpable violation of the Constitution, and gros: injustice to the great body of the community. I was struck with the fact, that, while the Senator [Mr. WEBSTER] held out at one moment that the duties on wines and siks would fall on the consumers, and, by consequence, on the rich, in the very next he informed us that they would not rise in price in consequence of the duties, and, of course, they would entirely escape from them. To prove that they would not increase in price in consequence of the duties, he assumed, as a principle, that where one country is the principal producer of certain articles, as France was of wine and silks, and another a principal consumer of them, as the United States were, a duty imposed on them by the latter would have the effect, not of raising the

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price in the country where it was laid, but to re. duce it where they were produced; that is, to reduce it in France, and not to raise it in the United States.

Now, I put it to the Senator, whether the lost, taking his own conclusion, could fall on the French producers of wines and silks, without, in its reac tion, falling also on the American producers of the produc's given in exchange for them-that is, the growers of tobacco, rice, and cotton, which farnish almost exclusively the means of payment? Is it not clear, if they cannot sell as high or as much to us, in consequence of the duties, that we in turn cannot sell as high or as much to them in consr. quence of the fall of price on their products? Their less must be followed by ours; and it follows, according to the Senator's own reasoning, that the five millions, which is proposed to be raised by duties, to make good the deficit caused by the distribution, would be filched from the pockets of the honest and industrious producers of our great staples, and not, as alleged by the Senator, from the wealthy consumers of wines and silk. It is out of their hard earnings that the means must be raised to enhance the value of the bonds of the States in the hands of foreign capitalists. The Senator must surely hold in low estimation the intelligence and spirit of the Southern planter, in supporting such a proposition.

But I take siill stronger grounds. The necessary effect of all duties is to diminish the imports; and the consequence of diminishing the imports is to diminish, in the same proportion, the exports. Imporis and exports are dependent each on the other. If there can be no imports, there can be no exports; and if there be no export, there can be no impor s. The exports pay for the imports, and the imports for the exports-the one always implies the other. So, if the imports are limited in amount, the exports must be limited, when fairly estimated to the same amount, and v ce versa. But the effects of all duties, whether they fall on the consumers of the articles on which they are laid, or on the producers, must be to diminish the amount of the imports, and, by consequence, of the exports. In a word, duties on imports affect the amount of the exports to the same extent that they do the imports; and it would have just the same effect in the end, whether the deficit of five millions which would be caused by the distribution, be raised by a duty on tobacco, rice, and cotton, or on the wines and silks for which they might be exchanged. The loss would fall, in either case, on the same interest, and to the same amount, and those immediately connected with it.

But I rise to higher grounds. As bad as the scheme is in a financial view, it is far worse in a political. The most deadly enemy of our sysen could not, in my opinion, propose a measure better calculated to subvert the Constitution and the Government. It would necessarily place the State Governments in direct antagonist relations with this on all questions except that of collecting and distributing the revenue, which would end in defeating all the objects for which it was institated, and reduce it ultimately to the odious capacity of a mere tax collector for the State Governments. In this there can be no mistake.

The money to be distributed would ge, not to the people of the States individually, but to the Sate Legislatures; or, to be more specific, to the ma jority, or rather to the dominant portion of the majority, which for the time might have be entro. They, and their friends and supporters, wend profit by the scheme. The money distributed would be applied in the most effective way to secure their ascendency, an to give them the lion's share of the profit. The dominant party in the States would thes be enlisted to continue and enlarge the distri bution; and when it is added, that the sums expended in the States would embrace powerful local interests, which would be seen and fell in its efects by large portions of the people, while the expend. tures of the Government would be on obje's of a general character, connected, for the most part, with the defence of the country against foreiga danger, which would be little felt or regarded by the great body of the community, except in war, or on the eve of hostilities, I hazırd nothing asserting, that the interests in favor of distributing

But the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. WEBSTER] and others, allege that the cession of the lands to the new States is itself but a mode of distribution, with a view, doubtless, to weaken the force of my objections to this amendment. If it be so, I can only say that it is not intended, and if I can be satisfied that it is, I would be the first to denounce it. Its object is to remedy what I believe to be great and growing disorders in the operation of our land system, as it now exists; but as dangerous as I regard them, I would never consent to remedy them by a measure which I regard as vastly more dangerous. But the Senator will, if I mistake not, find it far more easy to call it a scheme of distribution, than to prove it to be so, or even that it is in the slightest degree analogous to it in any particular, as I hope to prove in some subsequent stage of this discussion.

Let me

I have heard, Mr. President, with pleasure, the deep denunciations level.ed against the whole scheme of distribution, whether applied to the revenue from lands or taxes. It strengthens my confidence in the force of truth, and the conviction that, if one has the courage to do his duty, regardless of defeat for the time, he may hope to outlive error and misrepresentation. add, if any of the denunciations were aimed at me, they passed harmless over me, and fell on another, against whom I would be the last to utter a censure in his retirement and declining years, however opposed to him while in power. The Senate will understand that I refer to General Jackson. It is far from agreeable to me to introduce his name here, or to speak of myself; but I am compelled, from the remarks made in a certain quarter, to do so, not from any feeling of egotism, (for I am too inconsiderable to involve what concerns me individually in the discussion of so grave a subject,) but that I may not be weakened, as the opponent of this most dangerous measure, by any misconception of my past course in relation to the scheme of distribution.

It has, sir, been my fortune to be opposed to the scheme from the beginning. It originated with a former member of this body, Mr. Dickerson, of New Jersey, and recently Secretary of the Navy, as far back as the year 1827. His proposed object was to strengthen the protective tariff interest, by distributing a part of its proceeds, (if I remember correctly, five millions of dollars,) annually, among the States, in the manner proposed by this amendment. I took my stand against it, promptly and decidedly, on its first agitation, as a measure dangerous and unconstitutional, and well calculated to fix the protective system permanently on the country. The next year, the oppressive tariff of 1828 was passed, and the year afterwards General Jackson was elected President, with the expectation, as far as South Carolina supported him, that he would use his patronage and influence to repeal that obnoxious act, or at least greatly reduce he burthen it imposed.

But it was the misfortune of General Jackson ind the country, that when he arrived here to assume the reigns of Government, he was strongly prepossessed in favor of the plan of distributing the surplus revenue, after the final payment of the public debt, under the impression that it would be impossible to repeal that act, or reduce the duiss it imposed. How he received so dangerous an impression, I have never understood; but so it was. I speak not from my own knowledge, but from information that is unquestionable, that his inaugural address contained i passage in favor of the distribution, when it was aid before those whom he had selected for his first abinet; and that it was with difficulty he assented o omit it, so strongly was he imp:essed in its favor

Pre-emption Law-Mr. Colhoun.

-no doubt honestly and sincerely impressed. His first message to Congress, in December, 1829, contained a strong recommendation of that scheme, which was repeated with additional arguments in its favor in his second message the succeeding year. A recommendation from so high and influential quarter, could not but have a powerful effect on public opinion. The Governors of two great States, Pennsylvania and New York, recommended it to their Legislatures, who adopted resolutions in its favor. That the views which he then entertained may be fully understood, I ask the Secretary to read the portions of the two messages, which he will find marked in the volumes on his table, in the order of their respective dates.

[The Secretary read the following extracts from President Jackson's messages, 1st and 21 sessions, 26 h Congress:]

First session Twenty-sixth Congress.

After the extinction of the public debt, it is not probable that any adjustment of the tariff, upon principles satisfactory to the people of the Union, will, until a remote period, if ever, leave the Government without a considerable surplus in the Treasury beyond what may be required for its current service. As then the period approaches when the application of the revenue to to the payment of debt will cease, the disposition of the surplus will present a subject for the serious deliberation of Congress, and is may be fortunate for the country that it is yet to be decided. Considered in connection with the difficul. ties which have heretofore attended appropriations for purposes of internal improvement; and with those which this experience tells us will certainly arise whenever power over such subjects may be exercised by the General Government; it is hoped that it may lead to the adoption of some plan which will reconcile the diversified interests of the States, and strengthen the bonds which unite them. Every member of the Union, in peace and in war, will be benefited by the improvement of inland navigation and the construction of highways in the several States. Let us then endeavor to attain this benefit in a mode which will be satisfactroy to all. That hitherto adopted has, by many of our fellow-citizens, been deprecated as an infraction of the Constitution; while by others it has been viewed as inexpedient. All feel that it has been employed at the expense of harmony in the legislative councils.

To avoid these evils, it appears to me that the most safe, just, and federal disposition which could be made of the surplus revenue, would be its apportionment among the several States according to their ratio of representation; and should this mea sure not be found warranted by the Constitution, that it would be expedient to propose to the States an amendinent authoriz. ing it. I regard an appeal to the source of power, in cases of real doubt, and where its exercise is deemed indispensable to the general welfare, as among the most sacred of all our obligations.

Second session, Twenty sixth Congress.

I have heretofore felt it my duty to recommend the adoption of some plan for the distribution of the surplus funds which may at any time remain in the Treasury after the national debt shall have been paid, among the States, in proportion to the number of their representatives, to be applied by them to ob jects of internal improveinent.

Although this plan has met with favor in some portions of the Union, it has also elicited objections which merit deliberate consideration. A brief notice of these objections here will not, therefore, I trust, be regarded as out of place.

They rest, as far as they have come to my knowledge, on the following grounds. 1st. An objection to the ratio of distribution; 21. An apprehension that the existence of such a regulation would produce improvident and oppressive taxation to raise the funds for distribution; 34. That the mode proposed would lead to the construction of works of a local nature, to the exclusion of such as are general, and as would consequently be of a mure useful character; and last, that it would create a discreditable and injurious dependence on the part of the State Governments upon the Federal power. Of those who object to the ratio of representation as the basis of distribution, some insist that the importations of the respective States would constitute one that would he more equitable; and others, again, that the extent of their respective territories would furnish a standard which would be more expedient and sufficiently equitable. The ratio of representation presented itself to my mind, and it still does, as one of obvions equity, because of its being the ratio of contribution, whether the funds to be distributed be derived from the customs or from direct taxation. It does not follow, however, that its adoption is indispensable to the establishment of the system proposed. There may be considerations appertaining to the subject which would render a departure, to some extent, from the rule of contribution proper. Nor is it absolutely necessary that the basis of distribution be confined to one ground. It may, if, in the judgment of those whose right it is to fix it, it be deemed politic and just to give it their character, have regard to several.

In my first message, I stated it to be my opinion that "it is not probable that any adjustment of the tariff upon principles satisfactory to the people of the Union, will, until a reinote period, if ever, leave the Government without a considerable surplus in the Treasury, beyond what may be required for its current service." I have had no cause to change that opinion, but much to confirm it. Should these expectations be realized, a suitable fund would thus be produced for the plan under consideration to operate upon; and if there be no such fund, its adoption will, in my opinion, work no injury to any interest; for I cannot assent to the justness of the apprehension that the cstablishment of the proposed system would tend to the encouragement of improvident legislation of the character sup posed. Whatever the proper authority, in the exercise of constitutional power, shall, at any time hereafter, decide to be for the general good, will, in that as in other respects, deserve and receive the acquiescence and support of the whole country; and we have ample security that every abuse of power in that regard, by agents of the people, will receive a speedy and ef fectual corrective at their hands. The views which I take of the future, founded on the obvious and increasing improvement of all classes of our fellow-citizens, in intelligence, and in public and private virtue, leave me without much apprehenson on that head.

Senate.

I do not doubt that those who come after us will be as much alive as we are to the obligation upon all the trustees of political power to exempt those for whom they act from all unnecessary burdens; andlas sensible of the great truth, that the resources of the nation beyond those required for immediate and necessa ry purposes of Government, can no where be so well deposited as in the pockets of the people.

Such, I repeat, were unfortunately the opinions which General Jackson entertained on this all important question, when he came into power. I SAW the danger in its full extent, and did not hesi tate to take an open and decided stand against the measure which he so earnestly recommended; and that was the first question on which we separated. In placing myself in opposition to him, on a measure so vital, I was not ignorant of the hazard to which I exposed myself, but the sense of duty outweighed all other considerations. I clearly saw, that there would be an increased surplus revenue, after the final payment of the public deb', a period then rapidly approaching; and that, if it was once distributed to the States, it would rivet on the country the tariff of '28, to be followed by countless disasters from the combined effects of the two measures. Had it been adopted, the last ray of hope of repealing or reducing that oppressive and ruinous measure would have vanished. It would, by its seductive influence, have drawn over to its support the very States, whose prosperity it was crushing, not excepting South Carolina itself. The process is not difficult to explain.

For that purpose, I will take the case of South Carolina; and will assume that her citi zens paid, under the tariff of 1828, four millions of dollars into the Treasury of the Union, which is probably not far from the truth, and would have received back under the proposed distribution of the surplus, but one-fourth, making one million. The sum to be distributed, as has already been stated, would not have been returned to the people, but to the Treasury of the State, to be disposed of by the Legislature; or to speak more specifically, by the small portion, which, for the time, would have had control over the dominant majority of the Legislature. All who have experience in the affairs of Government, will readily understand that no disposition would have been made of it, but what they and their friends and supporters would have had a full share of the profits and political advantages to be derived from its administration and expenditure. Thus an interest would be created on the part of the controlling influence in the State for the time, adverse to it-an interest to sustain the tariff, as the means of sustaining the distribution, and that for the plain reason, that they would receive more from the former than they would pay as citizens under the duties.

Now, sir, when we reflect that the amount taken by the duties out of the pockets of the people, was extracted in so round about and concealed a manner that no one, no, not the best informed and shrewdest calculator, coald ascertain with precision what he paid, while that received back from distribution would have been seen and felt by those into hose hands it would have passed, it will be readily understood, not only how those who participated directly in its advantages, but the people themselves, would have been so delud d as to believe that they gained more by the distribution than what they lost by the tariff, especially when the dominant influence in the State would have been interested in creating and keeping up the delusion.

It is thus that the result of the scheme would have been to combine and unite into one compact mass the dominant interests of all the States, with the great dominant interest of the Union, to perpetuate a system of plundering the people of the products of their labor, especially the South, to be divided among those, with their parusans, who could control the politics of the country. It was against this daring and profligate scheme that South Caro. lina interposed her sovereign authority, and by that interposition, as I solemnly believe, saved the Constitution and the liberty of the country.

But that step, as bold and decisive as it was, could not accomplish all. To save the manufac turing interest, and avoid the hazard of reaction, it was necessary to reduce the duties on the protected articles gradually and slowly. The consequence was a continued overflow of the Treasury, notwith

126

26TH CONG....2ND SESS.

standing the duty on every article not produced in the country was repealed, amounting in value to one-half of the whole, to such an enormous extent had the protective duties been raised. A remedy had to be applied to meet the corrupting and dangerous influence of this temporary surplus, till the gradual reduction of the protective duties under the compromise act would bring them to the ordinary wants of the Government. There was but one remedy, and that was, to take it from the Treasury. The flow was too great fru most lavish expenditures to keep down. I saw, in advance, that such would be the case, and, with the design of devising a remedy beforehand, moved for a special commit tee, with the view mainly of freeing the Treasury of its surplus, as the great source of Executive influence and power. The committee concurring in that opinion, recommended that the Constitution should be so amended as to enable Congress to make a temporary distribution. The report fully explains the reasons for believing there would be a large and corrupting surplus, and why, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the distribution as proposed was the only remedy. I have marked a portion of it that will show the opinion I then entertained in reference to distribution, and which I ask the Secretary to read.

Second Session Twenty-third Congress. Your committee ate fully aware of the many and tardi sbjec tions to the distribution of the surplus revenue among the States, considered as a part of the ordinary and regular system of this Government. They adinit them to be as great as can be well imagined. The proposition itself, that the Government should collect money for the purpose of such distribution, or should distribute a surplus for the purpose of perpetuating taxes, is too absurd to require refutation; and yet what would be when applied, as supposed, so absurd and pernicious, is, in the opinion of your committee, in the present extraordinary and deeply disordered state of our affairs, not only useful and Balutary, but indispensable to the restoration of the body politic to a sound condition; just as some potent medicine, which it would be dangerous and absurd to prescribe to the healthy, may, to the diseased, be the only means or arresting the hand of death. Distribution, as proposed, is not for the preposterous and dangerous purpose of raising a revenue for distribution, or of distributing the surplus as a means of perpetuating a system of duties or taxes, but a temporary measure to dispose of an una voidable surplus while the revenue is in the course of reduction and which cannot be otherwise disposed of without greatly ag. gravating a disease that threatens the most dangerous conse. quences, and which holds out the hope, not only of arresting its further progress, but also of restoring the body politic to a state of health and vigor. The truth of this assertion a few observations will suffice to illustrate.

It may, perhaps, be thought by some, that the power which the distribution among the States would bring to bear against the expenditure, and its consequent tendency to retrench the disbursements of the Government, would be so strong as not only to curtail useless or improper expenditure, but also the useful and necessary. Such, undoubtedly, would be the consequence, if the process were too long continued; but, in the present irregular and excessive action of the system when its centripetal force threatens to concentrate all its powers in a single department, the fear that the action of this Government will be too much reduced by the measure under consideration, in the short period to which it is proposed to limit its operation, is without just foundation. On the contrary, if the proposed measure should be applied in the present diseased state of the Government, its effect would be like that of some powerful alterative medicine, operating just long enough to change the present morbid action, but not sufficiently long to superinduce another of an opposite character.

The measure recommended was not adopted. It was denied, and violently denied, that there would be a surplus, and I left it to time to decide which opinion was correct. A year rolled round, and conclusively decided the point. Instead of overrating, experience proved I had greatly underestimated the surplus, as I felt confident at the time I had. It more than doubled even my calculation. I again revived the measure; but before it could be acted on, instructions from State Legislatures, with intervening elections, turned the majority in the Senate, which had been opposed to the Administration, into a minority. I acquiesced, and gave notice that I would not press the measure I had introduced, and would leave the responsibility with the majority, to devise a remedy for what was at last acknowledged to be a great and dangerous evil. All felt that something must be done, and that promptly. In the greatly expanded state of the currency, the enormous surplus bad flowed off in the direction of the public lands, and was, by a sort of rotary motion, from the deposite banks to the speculators, and from them to the receivers, and back again to the banks, to perform the same round again, rapidly absorbing every, acre of the public lands. No one saw more clearly than the Senator from New York, [Mr. WRIGHT,] that an effectual and speedy remedy was indispensable to

Pre-emption Law-Mr. Wright.

prevent an overwhelming catastrophe; and he promptly proposed to vest the surplus in the stocks of the State, to which I moved an amendment to deposite it in their treasuries, as being more equal and appropriate. These were acknowledged to be the only alternatives to leaving it in the deposite banks. Mine succeeded, and the passage of the deposite act, which is now unjustly denounced, in a certain quarter, as distribution, and not as deposite, as it really is, followed.

As far as I am concerned, the denunciation is utterly unfounded. I regarded it then, and still do, as simply a deposite-a deposite, to say the least, as constitutional as that in State banks, or State stocks held by speculators and stockjobbers on both sides of the Atlantic, and far more just and appro. priate than either. But while I regard it as a depo. site, I did then, and now do, believe that it should never be withdrawn but in the event of war, when it would be found a valuable resource.

But had it been in reality a di-tribution, it would be, in my opinion, if not altogether, in a great measure, justified, under the peculiar circumstances of the case. The surplus was not lawfully collected. Congress has no right to take a cent from the prople, but for the just and constitutional wants of the country. To take more, or for other purposes, as in this case, is neither more nor less than robberymore criminal for being perpetrated by a trustee appoin'ed to guard their interest. It in fact belonged to those from whom it was unjustly plundered; and if the individuals, a d the share of each, could have been ascertained, it ought, on every principle of justice, to have been returned to them. But as that was impossible, the nearest practicable approach to justice was to return it proportionably, as it was, to the States, as a deposite, till wanted, for the use of the people from whom it was unjustly taken, instead of leaving it with the banks, for their use, which had no claims whatever to it, or vesting it in State stocks, for the benefit of speculators and stockjobbers.

As brief as this narative is, I trust it is sufficient to show that the advocates of this amendment can find nothing in my former opinion or course to weaken my resistance to it, or to form the show of a precedent for the extraordinary measure which it proposes. So far from it, the deposite act, whether viewed in the causes which led to it, or its object and effect, stands in direct contrast with it.

The

We stand, sir, in the midst of a remarkable juncture in our affairs; the most remarkable in many respects, that has occured since the foundation of the Government; nor is it probable that a similar one will ever again occur. This Government is now left as free to shape its policy, unembarrassed by existing engagements or past legislation as it was when it first went into operation, and even more so. entire system of policy originating in the Federal consolidation school has fallen prostrate. We have now no funded debt, no National Bank, no connection with the banking system, no protective tariff. In a word, the paper system, with all its corrupt and corrupting progeny has, as far as this Government is concerned, vanished, leaving nothing but its bitter fruits behind. The great and solemn question now to be decided is, shall we again return and repeat the same system of policy with all its disastrous effects before us, and under which The country is now suffering, to be again followed with ten fold aggravation; or, profiting by past experience, seize the precious opportunity to take the only course which can save the Constitution and liberty of the country-that of the old State Rights Republican policy of '987 Such is the question submit ed for our decision at this deeply important juncture; and on that decision hangs the destiny of our country. A few years must determine. Muchvery much will depend on the President elect. If he should rest his policy on the broad and solid principles maintained by his native State, in her purest and proudest days, his name will go down to posterity as one of the distinguished benefactors of the country; but, on the contrary, if he should adopt the policy indicated by the amendment, and advocated by his prominent supporters in this chamber, and attempt to erect anew the fallen temple of consoli. dation, his overthrow, or that of his country, must be the inevitable consequence.

Senate.

SPEECH OF MR. WRIGHT,

OF NEW YORK.

In Senate, Wednesday, January 27, 1841-The Preemption Bill being under consideration, and the question being upon the motion of Mr. CRIT TENDEN to recommit the bill to the Committee on Public Lands, with instructions to report a bill to provide for the distribution of the proceeds of the sales of the lands among the States.

Mr. WRIGHT said he would occupy a single moment to explain the singular stale of facts be fore the Senate, and to put himself right in the matter, as he could not hope, at this or any other time, to fulfil the expectations which the conversa tion now going on was likely to excite here and out of doors. It had been his intention to take part in the discussion of the question now before the body, but he did not know, until yesterday that the honorable Senater from Kentucky [Mr. CLAY] was desirous to follow him, or again to address the Senate in the course of this debate. A private Conversation between himself and the Senator, on that day, had notified him of both facts, and he had then manifested the willingness he then and now felt to accommodate the distinguished Senator on upon both points.

Still the discussion, in the course of that day, seemed to him to take a wide departure from the question before the Senate; and with the collateral matters thus drawn into the debate, he had little, and did not wish to have any thing more to do. His object had been to obtain the floor when they should have been disposed of, and he had refrained from making the attempt for this day, because it was expressly intimated to him that other Senators desired to occupy a part, or the whole of it in a continuance of the discussion of those collateral topics. He bad not, therefore, come to his seat with an expectation of addressing the Senate to day, and being reluctant to throw himself upon its atten. tion at any time, he was much more so, when he was consciously unprepared to offer the views he wished to present. Yet rather than see the day consumed, for the purpose of affording him time for preparation, and be, in the mean time, the declared object of that delay, he would now enter upon the task he had designed to attempt, and would ask the Senate to extend to him its patient indulgence, while he should pass, as briefly as he might, over his too voluminous noles.

He had not desired, if he could have avoided it consistently with his sense of his public duty, to address the Senate at all upon the great question which now occupies its attention, or indeed upon the bill to which the proposition now under consi deration relates, but occasions had arisen, in the course of the wide discussion, when that duty seemed imperative, and now he would endeavor to perform it with as little consumption of time as possible.

What is the proposition immediately before ust It is very simple, and may be perfectly intelligible to all who will try to understand it. It is to take from the permanent revenue of the country, at a time when that whole revenue is confessedly inadequate to meet the wants of the Treasury, from onefifth to one quarter of its whole amount, and to give it away, so far as the National Government and is Treasury are concerned; to do this at a time when no proposition to supply the deficiency of revenue to be thus caused is directly and practically before either House of Congress; and to do this, under these circumstances, within five weeks of the close of an annual session of Congress.

This was presenting the question of a distrib tion of the land revenue to the States in a manner in which it had never before been presented to his mind, at least, and he believed in a manner and under circumstances which had never before al tended its presentation to Congress, or to the country. In the course of the debate, much had bea said.of former propositions of this character, the high authority of distinguished statesmen hat been quoted in favor of the policy. In favor of t how? By thus giving away the public revenue when the Treasury of the people is in want? No But by discharging that Treasury from an income nient, a vicious, and a dangerous surplus; and y doing that in a constitutional mode; in obedien