the language be held to be ambiguous it must be "capable of being understood in more senses than one," or "obscure in meaning or in definiteness of expression." Standard Dictionary. Can it be said that this phrase will permit of a double interpretation? It is a clear statement that the tax enumerated shall be assessed unless so to do would be in violation of a treaty or treaties between the United States and some other country or countries. It is, in our judgment, lacking in ambiguity.

While the language interpreted in the case of United States v. Pulaski, 243 U. S. 97, 61 L. ed. 617, was more prolix, it amounted to no more than a statement that the legislation there involved should be effective unless "treaty provisions of the United States otherwise provide." It would have been a very simple matter to have inserted. language in the act appropriate to a clear exclusion of its application to the Cuban treaty. It has been the practice of Congress in past legislation to make specific reservation concerning the Cuban treaty when enacting tariff laws. Note the particularity with which it has made these reservations. In the tariff acts of 1913, 1922, and 1930 the language is identical. We quote section 316 of the Tariff Act of 1930:

Nothing in this act shall be construed to abrogate or in any manner impair or affect the provisions of the treaty of commercial reciprocity concluded between the United States and the Republic of Cuba on December 11, 1902, or the provisions of the Act of December 17, 1903, chapter 1.

We believe that the language used by Mr. Justice Holmes in the Pulaski case, supra, applies with equal force to this case, where he said:

*

* *

*

We have a clear opinion as to what the subsection means if the words are taken in their natural, straightforward, and literal sense. There is a strong presumption that the literal meaning is the true one, especially as against a construction that is not interpretation, but perversion; * But the section is not ambiguous on its face, and there is no sufficient ground for creating an ambiguity from without, when it is considered that the purpose to favor American shipping was the manifest inducement for putting the subsection in.

What right has the court to presume, in face of the general language used, that Congress intended to preserve the treaty with Cuba and at the same time violate its solemn engagements theretofore made with other friendly nations who were perhaps of greater importance to us in their commercial dealings than was the Cuban Republic? Of course, Congress has the power to modify existing treaties. That question was early decided in the case of Taylor v. Morton, Fed. Cas. 13799, affirmed 2 Black 481, 17 L. ed. 277, wherein Mr. Justice Curtis held, in relation to the question of conflict between the Russian treaty and a later act of Congress, that if there were such conflict, the act of Congress must prevail in a judicial forum. As was said in the case of the Cherokee Tobacco Co.:

* The effect of treaties and acts of Congress, when in conflict, is not settled by the Constitution. But the question is not involved in any doubt as to its proper solution. A treaty may supersede a prior act of Congress * * and an act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty. (Two Hundred and Seven Half Pound Papers of Smoking Tobacco et al. v. United States, 78 U. S. 621, 20 L. ed. 227, 229.)

In the case of Ribas Y Hijo v. United States, 194 U. S. 315, 48 L. ed. 994, 996, Mr. Justice Harlan has laid down the rule in the following language:

*; it is well settled that in case of a conflict between an act of Congress and a treaty-each being equally the supreme law of the land-the one last in date must prevail in the courts. (Many cases cited.)

But the intention to abrogate a treaty must clearly appear. Every intendment is that these engagements with friendly nations will be kept. On this question Mr. Justice Harlan said:

* Nevertheless, the purpose by statute to abrogate a treaty or any designated part of a treaty, or the purpose by treaty to supersede the whole or a part of an act of Congress, must not be lightly assumed, but must appear clearly and distinctly from the words used in the statute or in the treaty.

** "there must be a positive repugnancy between the provisions of the new laws and those of the old; and even then the old law is repealed by implication only pro tanto, to the extent of the repugnancy"; and that "if harmony is impossible, and only in that event, the former law is repealed, in part or wholly, as the case may be." Wood v. United States, 16 Pet. 342, 363, 10 L. ed. 987, 995; United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 88, 93, 20 L. ed. 153, 154; South Carolina v. Stoll, 17 Wall. 425, 431, 21 L. ed. 650, 654. In Frost v. Wenie, 157 U. S. 46, 58, 39 L. ed. 614, 619, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 532, 537, this court said: "It is well settled that repeals by implication are not to be favored.

* * *""

The same rules have been applied where the claim was that an act of Congress had abrogated some of the provisions of a prior treaty between the United States and China. Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U. S. 536, 550, 28 L. ed. 770 774, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255. In that case it was held that the treaty could stand with the subsequent statutes, and, consequently, it was enforced. (United States v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U. S. 213, 46 L. ed. 878, 883.)

In a later case to the same effect is the following language from Mr. Justice Brandeis:

* A treaty will not be deemed to have been abrogated or modified by a later statute unless such purpose on the part of Congress has been clearly expressed. Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U. S. 536; United States v. Payne, 264 U. S. 446, 448. Here, the contrary appears. (Cook v. United States, 288 U. S. 102, 120.)

The text writer in 38 Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure states the rule in the following language:

* It will not be presumed, however, that Congress intended to violate the provisions of a treaty (citing cases),

one of which is quoted to the following effect:

Before a court will impute to Congress an intention to violate an important article of a treaty with a foreign power, that intention must be clearly and un

equivocally manifested and the language of the law, which is supposed to constitute the violation, must admit of no other reasonable construction. In re Chin A On, 18 Fed. 506, 9 Sawy. 343.

In view of the habitual practice of Congress in making its reservations concerning the Cuban treaty as evidenced by the quotation above, and of the rule established by the citations noted, can we say that there was a clear intent on the part of Congress to abrogate the provisions of the treaties with Germany and Great Britain? On the contrary, it seems to us that the reservation in section 601 (a) displays a clear intent on the part of Congress not to abrogate or violate any treaty made between the United States and any country. It would be an unwarranted assumption on our part to impute any other intention to Congress than that of a sincere desire to preserve the integrity of our treaties.

The last point submitted by Assistant Attorney General Lawrence is stated in the following language:

The best legal authority, as indicated supra, seems to hold that treaties of the character in question are executory contracts, relating to the future and therefore not the law of the land, and any other construction would appear to oust the Congress from the jurisdiction reserved to it in the Constitution relative to -customs matters.

This controversy is practicallly as old as the Government itself. It was raised in the House of Representatives over the Jay Treaty of November 19, 1794. We observe in the article by Dr. Crandall, referred to above, that Chief Justice Ellsworth in a written opinion communicated to Jonathan Trumbull, March 13, 1796, said:

The instant the President and Senate have made a treaty, the Constitution makes it a law of the land; and of course, all persons and bodies in whatever station or department within the jurisdiction of the United States are bound to conform their actions and proceedings to it. Such a treaty ipso facto repeals all existing laws so far as they interfere with it. Citing Mss. Letters to Washington, Vol. CXVII, p. 287. (Crandall, p. 116.)

The question under debate there concerned the matter of making treaties which provided for the expenditure of money without an enactment on the part of the House of Representatives. One of the representatives had demanded that the papers, documents and other information used in negotiating the treaty be submitted to the House of Representatives. President Washington took advice of the members of his cabinet and also had a written opinion from Alexander Hamilton, with the result that he finally determined not to transmit the papers, expressing the view in substance that the power of making treaties rested with the Executive and the Senate.

It came up again under President Jefferson's administration over the treaty by which the territory at the mouth of the Mississippi was acquired (Louisiana Purchase). Mr. Jefferson in Washington's

administration had taken the position that the House should be consulted over treaties under negotiation, so that when he became President he asked the House of Representatives to make an appropriation for the purchase of the territory involved. The committee contracted to spend much more money that had been appropriated and the controversy arose anew, with this singular circumstance, that Mr. Madison, Secretary of State, and Mr. Gallatin, Secretary of the Treasury, who during Washington's administration had opposed President Washington's view, each now denied the right of the House to interfere. Secretary Madison stated:

The theory of our Constitution does not seem to admit the influence of deliberations and anticipations of the House of Representatives on a treaty depending in the Senate.

Secretary Gallatin stated that the House of Representatives—

neither can nor ought to act on the treaty until after it is a treaty. The foregoing information is from Dr. Crandall's work, cited above, where, beginning at page 128, is a lengthy article giving a complete history of this legislative controversy. He states that the question. has since been raised but little has been added to the arguments of 1796.

It was again raised over the purchase of Alaska in 1868 and the same author states:

That Congress is under no obligation to make the stipulated appropriation has not been seriously advanced by the House since 1868, although individual advocates of this view have not been wanting. (Crandall, p. 132.)

Mr. Attorney General Cushing in an opinion that was given on an international copyright agreement had with Great Britain, discussed the question of the conflict between treaties and statutes wherein he gives something of the history of this conflict and includes therein this general statement as paragraph 2 at page 293, Opinions of the Attorney General, Volume VI:

2. A treaty, assuming it to be made conformably to the Constitution, in substance and form, has the effect of repealing, under the general conditions of the legal doctrine that "leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant," all pre-existing Federal law in conflict with it—whether unwritten, as law of nations, of admiralty, and common law-or written, as acts of Congress.

He cites cases where the court gave efficacy to the terms of treaties in preference to asserted legal claims in conflict therewith. He cites also the treaty of the United States and France of July 18, 1931, wherein treaty terms conflicted with duty rates previously fixed by an act of Congress. He states at page 295:

These wines became chargeable at once with the lower duty [that is, the duty specified in the treaty]; and on the next revision of the tariff, by the act of July 14th, 1832, the rates of duty on French wines stipulated for by the treaty were enacted in due form by Congress.

On the question before him he said:

Upon principle, therefore, as well as upon the authority of precedents, judicial and administrative, my opinion is that the right of property or copyright of British subjects to be exercised in the United States, according to the convention in question, and a real reciprocity in that matter, are secured by the treaty (provided it shall be ratified) by its own force as a supreme law of the United States. (P. 297.)

A contrary opinion was expressed in the case of Turner v. American Baptist Missionary Union, Fed. Cas. No. 14251, 24 Fed. Cas. 344, which arose in the Circuit Court, District of Michigan, in a case involving a public land grant found at 5 McLean 344. In the course of his opinion the learned judge states:

A treaty under the Federal Constitution is declared to be the supreme law of the land. This, unquestionably, applies to all treaties, where the treaty-making power, without the aid of Congress, can carry it into effect. It is not, however, and cannot be the supreme law of the land, where the concurrence of Congress is necessary to give it effect. Until this power is exercised, as where the appropriation of money is required, the treaty is not perfect. It is not operative, in the sense of the Constitution, as money cannot be appropriated by the treaty-making power. This results from the limitations of our Government.

On the question as to whether Congress was bound to appropriate money to carry out the terms of the treaty with Spain Mr. Justice Brown, in the case of De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1, 45 L. ed. 1041, 1056, says:

* * * We express no opinion as to whether Congress is bound to appropriate the money to pay for it. This has been much discussed by writers upon constitutional law, but it is not necessary to consider it in this case, as Congress made prompt appropriation of the money stipulated in the treaty.

We further quote from that opinion at page 1055:

By article 2, § 2, of the Constitution, the President is given power, "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the senators present concur"; and by article 6, "this Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land." It will be observed that no distinction is made as to the question of supremacy between laws and treaties, except that both are controlled by the Constitution. A law requires the assent of both houses of Congress, and, except in certain specified cases, the signature of the President. A treaty is negotiated and made by the President, with the concurrence of two thirds of the senators present, but each of them is the supreme law of the land.

Self-executing treaties have authorized the extension of the 12-mile limit and furnished authority for prosecution of aliens for violations of the liquor law. Cook v. United States, 288 U. S. 102. This treaty amended the Tariff Act of 1922.

Treaties intended to be presently effective may, without the aid of legislation, add territory to the United States (Crandall, op. cit. 200 ff.), supersede conflicting state (Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199; Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S.