SUMMARY STATEMENT OF BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR OCTOBER TERM, 1898.
Number of cases on appellate docket at close of October
Number of cases disposed of at October Term, 1898
Number of cases remaining undisposed of, showing a reduc
The water works company contracted with the municipal corporation of
Raton to construct and maintain water works for it, and the corpora
tion contracted to pay an agreed rental for the use of hydrants for
twenty-five years. The works were constructed, and the corporation
issued to the company, in pursuance of ordinances, warrants for such
payments falling due one in every six months. Subsequently the
corporation repealed the ordinances authorizing payment of the war-
rants, and passed other ordinances in conflict with them, whereupon
the corporation refused to pay the warrants which had accrued and
others as they became due. Thereupon the company filed this bill to
enforce the payments of the amounts of rental already accrued, and as
it should become due thereafter. Held, That the remedy of the com-
pany upon the warrants was at law, and not in equity, and that the
court below should have dismissed the bill, without prejudice to the
right of the company to bring an action at law. Raton Water Works
Co. v. Raton, 360.
1. Stone v. Bank of Commerce, 174 U. S. 412, affirmed and applied to the
point that the agreement of the commissioners of the sinking fund of
Louisville and the attorney of the city with certain banks, trust com-
panies, etc., including the Bank of Louisville, that the rights of those
institutions should abide the result of test suits to be brought, was
dehors the power of the commissioners of the sinking fund and the city
attorney, and that the decree in the test suit in question did not
constitute res judicata as to those not actually parties to the record.
Louisville v. Bank of Louisville, 439.
2. Citizens' Savings Bank of Owensboro v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 636, also
affirmed and applied. Ib.
3. When a defendant, who has been duly served with process, causes an
appearance to be entered on his behalf by a qualified attorney, and the
attorney subsequently withdraws his appearance, but without first
obtaining leave of court, the record is left in a condition in which
a judgment by default for want of an appearance can be validly en-
tered. Rio Grande Irrigation and Colonization Co. v. Gildersleeve, 603.
See TAX AND TAXATION, 3, 4.
As a deed of general assignment for the benefit of creditors is made by
the bankruptcy act alone sufficient to justify an adjudication in in-
voluntary bankruptcy against the debtor making such deed, without
reference to his solvency at the time of the filing of the petition, the
denial of insolvency by way of defence to a petition based upon the
making of a deed of general assignment is not warranted by the bank-
ruptcy law. West Company v. Lea, 590.
1. A blockade to be binding must be known to exist. The Olinde
Rodrigues, 510.
2. There is no rule of law determining that the presence of a particular
force is necessary in order to render a blockade effective, but, on the
contrary, the test is whether it is practically effective, and that is
a mixed question, more of fact than of law. Ib.
3. While it is not practicable to define what degree of danger shall con-
stitute a test of the efficiency of a blockade, it enough if the danger
is real and apparent. lb.
4. An effective blockade is one which makes it danger is for vessels to at-
tempt to enter the blockaded port; and the question of effectiveness is
not controlled by the number of the blockading forces, but one modern
cruiser is enough as matter of law, if it is sufficient in fact for the pur-
pose, and renders it dangerous for other craft to enter the port. Ib.
5. The blockade in this case was practically effective, and until it should
be raised by an actual driving away by the enemy, it was not open to
a neutral trader to ask whether, as against a possible superiority of the
enemy's fleet, it was or was not effective in a military sense.
Ib.
6. After the captors had put in their proofs, the claimant, without intro-
ducing anything further, moved for the discharge and restitution of
the steamship, on the ground of the ineffective character of the block-
ade and because the evidence did not justify a decree of condemnation;
and in addition claimed the right to adduce further proofs, if its mo-
tion should be denied. Held, that the settled practice of prize courts
forbids the taking of further proof under such circumstances. Ib.
7. The entire record in this case being considered, the court is of opinion
that restitution of the Olinde Rodrigues should be awarded, without
damages, and that payment of the costs and expenses incident to her
custody and preservation, and of all costs in the cause, except the
fees of counsel, should be imposed upon the ship. Ib.
CAPTURES DURING THE WAR OF THE REBELLION.
1. Whether the capture of a steamboat on the western waters within the
line of the Confederate forces, in February, 1862, by part of the naval
forces of the United States on those waters, commanded by officers
of the Navy, and under the general control of the War Department,
but no land forces being near the scene of the capture or taking any
active part therein, was a capture by the army-quære. Oakes v.
United States, 778.
2. A libel for the condemnation, under the act of August 6, 1861, c. 60,
of a steamboat captured and taken into firm possession by naval
forces of the United States on the western waters during the War
of the Rebellion, was filed by the District Attorney in the District
Court of the United States for a district into which she had been
brought; the libel alleged that she had been seized by a quarter-
master for the reason that she was used with her owners' knowledge
and consent in aiding the rebellion, contrary to that act; she was
taken into the custody of the marshal under a writ of attachment
from the court; notice was published to all persons to appear and
show cause against her condemnation, and no one appeared or inter-
posed a claim. It seems that a decree thereupon rendered for her
condemnation and sale was valid against her former owners and all
other persons. Ib.
3. The act of March 3, 1800, c. 14, § 1, providing that vessels or goods
of a person resident within or under the protection of the United
States taken by an enemy and recaptured by a vessel of the United
States shall be restored to the owner on payment of a certain sum
as salvage, has no application to property captured by the United
States which had come into the enemy's possession by purchase or
otherwise with the consent of the owner or of his agent, and not by
capture or by other forcible and compulsory appropriation. Ib.
4. Communications between high civil and military officers of the so-called
Confederate States, preserved in the Confederate Archives Office, War
Department of the United States, or duly certified copies thereof from
that office, are competent evidence upon the question whether posses-
sion of a steamboat belonging to a citizen of the United States was
obtained by the Confederate States by capture or by purchase. Ib.
5. A petition under the act of July 28, 1892, c. 313, for compensation for
an interest in a steamboat, which alleges that she was captured by
the insurgents and recaptured by the United States during the War
of the Rebellion, is not sustained by evidence that she was captured
by the United States from the Confederate forces after they had
obtained possession of her by purchase. Ib.
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