Statement of the Case.

that there was error in the conclusions of the lower courts; that the decree must be

Reversed and the case remanded with instructions to set aside the decree of dismissal, and to order an inquiry into the question whether the intended acts of the defendants in the construction of a dam and in appropriating the waters of the Rio Grande will substantially diminish the navigability of that stream within the limits of present navigability, and if so, to enter a decree restraining those acts to the extent that they will so diminish.

MR. JUSTICE GRAY and MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA were not present at the argument, and took no part in the decision.

CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND AND PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY v. STURM.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS.

No. 236. Submitted April 5, 1899. Decided May 22, 1899.

Sturm sued the railway company in a justices' court in Kansas for wages due, and recovered for the full amount claimed. The company appealed to the county district court. When the case was called there for trial, the company moved for a continuance on the ground that a creditor of Sturm had sued him in a court in Iowa, of which State the railway company was also a corporation, and had garnisheed the company there for the wages sought to be recovered in this suit, and had recovered a judgment there from which an appeal had been taken which was still pending. The motion for continuance was denied, the case proceeded to trial, and judgment was rendered for Sturm for the amount sued for, with costs. A new trial was moved for, on the ground, among others, that the decision was contrary to and in conflict with section 1, article IV, of the Constitution of the United States. The motion was denied, and the judgment was sustained by the Court of Appeals and by the Supreme Court of the State. The case was then brought here. Held, that the Iowa court had jurisdiction, and that the Kansas courts did not give to the proceedings in Iowa the faith and credit they had in Iowa, and were consequently entitled to in Kansas, and the judgment must be reversed.

THE defendant in error brought an action against the plain

Statement of the Case.

tiff in error in a justices'.court of Belleville, Republic County, Kansas, for the sum of $140, for wages due. Judgment was rendered for him in the sum of $140 and interest and costs.

The plaintiff in error appealed from the judgment to the district court of the county, to which court all the papers were transmitted, and the case docketed for trial.

On the 10th of October, 1894, the case was called for trial, when plaintiff in error filed a motion for continuance, supported by an affidavit affirming that on the 13th day of December, 1893, in the county of Pottawattomie and State of Iowa, one A. H. Willard commenced an action against E. H. Sturm in justices' court before Oride Vien, a justice of the peace for said county, to recover the sum of $78.63, with interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum, and at the same time sued out a writ of attachment and garnishment, and duly garnisheed the plaintiff in error, and at that time plaintiff in error was indebted to defendant in error in the sum of $77.17 for wages, being the same wages sought to be recovered in this action;

That plaintiff in error filed its answer, admitting such indebtedness;

That at the time of the commencement of said action in Pottawattomie County the defendant was a non-resident of the State of Iowa, and that service upon him was duly made by publication, and that afterwards judgment was rendered against him and plaintiff in error as garnishee for the sum of $76.16, and costs of suit amounting to $19, and from such judgment appealed to the district court of said county, where said action was then pending undetermined;

That the moneys sought to be recovered in this action are the same moneys sought to be recovered in the garnishment proceedings, and that under the laws of Iowa its courts had jurisdiction thereof, and that the said moneys were not at the time of the garnishment exempt from attachment, execution or garnishment; that the justice of the peace at all of the times of the proceedings was a duly qualified and acting justice, and that all the proceedings were commenced prior to the commencement of the present action, and that if the case

Statement of the Case.

be continued until the next term of the court the action in Iowa will be determined and the rights of plaintiff in error protected.

The motion was denied, and the plaintiff in error pleaded in answer the same matters alleged in the affidavit for continuance, and attached to the answer a certified copy of the proceedings in the Iowa courts. It also alleged that it was a corporation duly organized under the laws of the States of Illinois and Iowa, doing business in the State of Kansas.

The defendant in error replied to the answer, and alleged that the amount due from plaintiff in error was for wages due for services rendered within three months next prior to the commencement of the action; that he was a resident, head of a family, and that the wages were exempt under the laws of Kansas, and not subject to garnishment proceedings; that plaintiff in error knew these facts, and that the Iowa court had no jurisdiction of his property or person.

Evidence was introduced in support of the issues, including certain sections of the laws of Iowa relating to service by publication, and to attachment and garnishment, and judgment was rendered for the defendant in error in the amount sued for.

A new trial was moved, on the ground, among others, that the "decision is contrary to and in conflict with section 1, article IV, of the Constitution of the United States."

The motion was denied.

On error to the Court of Appeals, and from thence to the Supreme Court, the judgment was affirmed, and the case was then brought here.

The defendant in error was notified of the suit against him in Iowa and of the proceedings in garnishment in time to have protected his rights.

The errors assigned present in various ways the contention that the Supreme Court of Kansas refused to give full faith and credit to the records and judicial proceedings of the courts of the State of Iowa, in violation of section 1, article IV, of the Constitution of the United States, and of the act of Congress entitled "An act to prescribe the mode in which the public acts, records and judicial proceedings in each State

Opinion of the Court.

shall be authenticated so as to take effect in every other State," approved May 26, 1790.

Mr. W. F. Evans and Mr. M. A. Low for plaintiff in error.

No appearance for defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

How proceedings in garnishment may be availed of in defence whether in abatement or bar of the suit on the debt attached or for a continuance of it or suspension of execution the practice of the States of the Union is not uniform. But it is obvious and necessary justice that such proceedings should be allowed as a defence in some way.

In the pending suit plaintiff in error moved for a continuance, and not securing it pleaded the proceedings in garnishment in answer. Judgment, however, was rendered against it, and sustained by the Supreme Court, on the authority of Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Sharitt, 43 Kansas, 375, and "for the reasons stated by Mr. Justice Valentine in that case."

The facts of that case were as follows: The Missouri Pacific Railway Company was indebted to Sharitt for services. performed in Kansas. Sharitt was indebted to one J. P. Stewart, a resident of Missouri. Stewart sued him in Missouri, and attached his wages in the hands of the railway company, and the latter answered in the suit in accordance with the order of garnishment on the 28th of July, 1887, admitting indebtedness, and on the 29th of September was ordered to pay its amount into court. On the 27th of July Sharitt brought an action in Kansas against the railway company to recover for his services, and the company in defence pleaded the garnishment and order of the Missouri court. The amount due Sharitt having been for wages, was exempt from attachment in Kansas. It was held that the garnishment was not a defence. The facts were similar therefore to those of the case at bar.

The ground of the opinion of Mr. Justice Valentine was

Opinion of the Court.

that the Missouri court had no jurisdiction because the situs of the debt was in Kansas. In other words, and to quote the language of the learned justice, "the situs of a debt is either with the owner thereof, or at his domicil; or where the debt is to be paid; and it cannot be subjected to a proceeding in garnishment anywhere else.. It is not the debtor who can carry or transfer or transport the property in a debt from one State or jurisdiction into another. The situs of the property in a debt can be changed only by the change of location of the creditor who is the owner thereof, or with his consent."

The primary proposition is that the situs of a debt is at the domicil of a creditor, or, to state it negatively, it is not at the domicil of the debtor.

The proposition is supported by some cases; it is opposed by others. Its error proceeds, as we conceive, from confounding debt and credit, rights and remedies. The right of a creditor and the obligation of a debtor are correlative but different things, and the law in adapting its remedies for or against either must regard that difference. Of this there are many illustrations, and a proper and accurate attention to it avoids misunderstanding. This court said by Mr. Justice Gray in Wyman v. Halstead, 109 U. S. 654, 656: "The general rule of law is well settled, that for the purpose of founding administration all simple contract debts are assets at the domicil of the debtor." And this is not because of defective title in the creditor or in his administrator, but because the policy of the State of the debtor requires it to protect home creditors. Wilkins v. Ellett, 9 Wall. 740; 108 U. S. 256. Debts cannot be assets at the domicil of the debtor if their locality is fixed at the domicil of the creditor, and if the policy of the State of the debtor can protect home creditors through administration proceedings, the same policy can protect home creditors through attachment proceedings.

For illustrations in matters of taxation, see Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491; Pullman's Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18; Savings and Loan Society v. Multnomah County, 169 U. S. 421.

Our attachment laws had their origin in the custom of