CASES ADJUDGED

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,

AT

OCTOBER TERM, 1898.

CAPITAL TRACTION COMPANY v. HOF.

ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF CO

LUMBIA.

No. 108. Argued January 5, 6, 1899. — Decided April 11, 1899.

This court has jurisdiction to review by writ of error, under the act of February 9, 1893, c. 74, § 8, a judgment of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, maintaining the validity of proceedings for a trial by a jury before a justice of peace, which were sought to be set aside on the ground that the act of Congress authorizing such a trial was unconstitutional.

The provisions of the Constitution of the United States securing the right of trial by jury, whether in civil or in criminal cases, are applicable to the District of Columbia.

By the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution, either party to an action at law (as distinguished from suits in equity and in admiralty) in a court of the United States, where the value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars, has the right to a trial by jury. By the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution, when a trial by jury has been had in an action at law, in a court either of the United States or of a State, the facts there tried and decided cannot be reëxamined in any court of the United States otherwise than according to the rules of the common law of England, that is to say, upon a new trial, either granted by the court in which the first trial was had or to which the record was returnable, or ordered by an appellate court for error in law.

VOL. CLXXIV-1

1

Opinion of the Court.

"Trial by jury," in the primary and usual sense of the term at the common law and in the American constitutions, is a trial by a jury of twelve men, in the presence and under the superintendence of a judge empowered to instruct them upon the law and to advise them upon the facts, and (except upon acquittal of a criminal charge) to set aside their verdict if in his opiniou it is against the law or the evidence.

A trial of a civil action, before a justice of the peace of the District of Columbia, by a jury of twelve men, as permitted by the acts of Congress, without requiring him to superintend the course of the trial or to instruct the jury in matter of law, or authorizing him to arrest judgment upon their verdict, or to set it aside for any cause whatever, is not a trial by jury, in the sense of the common law and of the Constitution, and does not prevent facts so tried from being tried anew by a common law jury in an appellate court.

Congress, in the exercise of its general and exclusive power of legislation over the District of Columbia, may provide for the trial of civil causes of moderate amount before a justice of the peace, or, in his presence, by a jury of twelve, or of any less number, allowing to either party, where the value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars, the right to appeal from the judgment of the justice of the peace to a court of record, and to have a trial by jury in that court.

The appeal authorized by Congress from judgments of a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia to a court of record, "in all cases where the debt or damage doth exceed the sum of five dollars," includes cases of judgments entered upon the verdict of a jury.

The right of trial by jury, secured by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution, is not infringed by the act of Congress of February 19, 1895, c. 100, enlarging the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia to three hundred dollars, and requiring every appellant from his judgment to enter into an undertaking, with surety, to pay and satisfy the final judgment of the appellate court.

THE case is stated in the opinion of the court.

Mr. R. Ross Perry for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Alexander Wolf for defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE GRAY delivered the opinion of the court.

On September 8, 1896, the Capital Traction Company, a street railway corporation in the District of Columbia, presented to the Supreme Court of the District a petition for a writ of certiorari to a justice of the peace to prevent a civil

Opinion of the Court.

action to recover damages in the sum of $300 from being tried by a jury before him.

The petition for a writ of certiorari alleged that Charles Hof, on August 17, 1896, caused a summons to be issued by Lewis I. O'Neal, Esquire, one of the justices of the peace in and for the District of Columbia, summoning the Capital Traction Company to appear before him on August 20, 1896, "to answer unto the complaint of Charles Hof in a plea of damage of $300," and the matter was postponed until September 8, on which day, after the company had put in its plea, and issue had been joined thereon, the attorney for Hof demanded of the justice of the peace that the action should be tried by a jury, and thereupon the justice of the peace issued a venire to a constable, commanding him to summon twelve jurors to appear before said justice on September 10; that the petitioner was advised that such a demand for the so-called jury was founded upon sections 1009-1016 of the Revised Statutes of the District of Columbia, and was intended to subject the petitioner, without appeal, to a form of trial before a justice of the peace, unknown to the common law, and, as the petitioner was advised, illegal and unconstitutional; that the petitioner was informed and believed that Hof's claim was for damages sustained by him through its negligence, while he was a passenger on one of its cars; and that it had a good defence on the merits to his claim, and sought a fair opportunity to make such defence before an impartial tribunal, and was ready and willing to give any security that might be required for the prompt payment of any final judgment which might be pronounced against it in due course of law.

The petition further averred that the only method in which Hof's claim against the petitioner could be tried by a jury according to the common law and the Constitution was by removing his suit from the justice of the peace into the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia; that if this was not done, the petitioner would be deprived of its constitutional right to a trial by jury, and would be in danger of being deprived of its property without due process of law, and would

Opinion of the Court.

be denied the equal protection of the laws; and that the amount claimed by Hof was within the jurisdiction of that

court.

Wherefore the petitioner prayed that a writ of certiorari might be issued to the justice of the peace to remove Hof's claim into that court for trial according to the course of the common law, upon such terms as to security for costs and damages as the court might think proper; and for such other and further relief as the petitioner might be entitled to.

The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia granted a writ of certiorari to the justice of the peace, as prayed for; and the justice of the peace, in his return thereto, set forth the proceedings before him in the action of Hof against the Capital Traction Company, showing the issue and return of the summons to the defendant, its oral plea of not guilty, the plaintiff's joinder of issue and demand of a jury, and the stay of further proceedings by the writ of certiorari.

On October 6, 1896, the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia overruled a motion of Hof to quash the writ of certiorari; and entered an order quashing all proceedings before the justice of the peace after issue joined. 24 Wash. Law Rep. 646. Hof appealed to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, which on February 17, 1897, reversed that order, and remanded the case with directions to quash the writ of certiorari. 10 App. D. C. 205. The Capital Traction Company thereupon sued out a writ of error from this court, under the act of February 9, 1893, c. 74, § 8. 27 Stat. 436.

The petition for a writ of certiorari presents for determination a serious and important question of the validity, as well as the interpretation and effect, of the legislation of Congress conferring upon justices of the peace in the District of Columbia jurisdiction in civil actions in which the matter in dispute exceeds twenty dollars in value, and providing for a trial by a jury before the justice of the peace, an appeal from his judgment to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, and a trial by jury, at the request of either party, in the appellate court. This court, therefore, has jurisdiction of the writ of error. Baltimore & Potomac Railroad v. Hopkins,