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of a Chinese citizen found within three years after entering this country in a house of prostitution, are stated in the opinion.
Mr. Corry M. Stadden, with whom Mr. George A. McGowan was on the brief, for appellants:
This court has jurisdiction. In Yeung How v. North, 223 U. S. 705, dismissed per curiam this term, there had been a trial on the main issues, and petitioner was a widow. The cases are dissimilar. The statute should receive a reasonable construction. United States v. Kirby,
In this case there is a husband and a child of the marriage. Even if the marriage left appellant an alien she was not an alien within the meaning of the Alien Immigration Acts. Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U. S. 1. Re Thakla Nicola, 184 Fed. Rep. 322.
As to the status of the Chinese wife of an Americanborn citizen, see T'soi Sim v. United States, 115 Fed. Rep. 925.
The fact that appellant could not be naturalized does not prevent her from becoming a citizen by marrying a citizen. See T. D. Jan.-Dec., 1900, No. 22551, construing 1994, Rev. Stat.
Naturalization is the only right withheld. Marriage and its legitimate effects are not affected.
Appellant's constitutional rights were invaded by the proceeding. United States v. Williams, 185 Fed. Rep. 598; Redfern v. Halpert, 186 Fed. Rep. 150.
The petition states why the record is not annexed thereto. It was too voluminous in the first place and it was inaccessible to the petitioner. The time was brief as the order was to deport forthwith. See Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U. S. 8.
As to what is abuse of discretion and arbitrary action on the part of the inspector and the Secretary, see United
States v. Chin Len, 187 Fed. Rep. 544; Lewis v. Frick, 189 Fed. Rep. 146; Ex parte Lee Kow, 161 Fed. Rep. 592; Ex parte Korner, 176 Fed. Rep. 478; Woey Ho v. United States, 109 Fed. Rep. 888.
An abuse of discretion is merely a discretion exercised to an end or purpose not justified by and clearly against reason or evidence. Sharon v. Sharon, 75 California, 48; 1 Cyc. 219; 14 Cyc. 383; Rothrock v. Carr, 55 Indiana, 334.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Harr, with whom The Solicitor General was on the brief, for appellee:
It does not affirmatively appear from the petition that appellant was denied a fair hearing by the immigration authorities, which is the foundation of the jurisdiction of the District Court. United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253; Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U. S. 8; Tang Tun v. Edsell, 223 U. S. 673.
Under the principles announced by this court in respect to administrative hearings, an alien has no right to be represented by counsel through all stages of the proceedings leading to his deportation. In re Can Pon, 168 Fed. Rep. 479, 483.
The regulations of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor for the enforcement of the Immigration Act give the alien full opportunity to show cause and to be represented by counsel from a certain point in the proceedings. It is not alleged that these regulations were not complied with.
The fact that the alien was an unwilling witness does not indicate any abuse of authority, nor the fact that her answers were incorporated into the record.
The immigration officers had no power to compel the attendance of witnesses.
That certain alleged hearsay evidence was considered by the immigration officers is immaterial, administrative
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proceedings not being subject to the limitations of a judicial trial; besides, the nature of such evidence is not set forth or the truth thereof denied.
The allegation that the hearings before the Secretary were not in fact hearings upon the merits is a mere conclusion of law, no facts being set forth in support of the contention.
The petition is defective in that it is not accompanied by copies of the proceedings before the immigration authorities which are attacked, or the essential parts thereof. Craemer v. Washington, 168 U. S. 124, 129; Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U. S. 270, 279; Haw Moy v. North, 183 Fed. Rep. 89.
The allegations in this case are fundamentally different from those in the Chin Yow Case, 208 U. S. 8, 11. There is no allegation here of any denial of opportunity to produce testimony or to secure the attendance of witnesses.
Under the laws of the United States, a Chinese woman does not become a citizen of the United States by virtue of her marriage to a citizen. Section 1994, Rev. Stat., only confers citizenship upon a woman married to a citizen of the United States “who might herself be lawfully naturalized.” These words here and in the act of February 10, 1855, 10 Stat. 604, from which it was taken, refer to the class or race who might be lawfully naturalized. Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496; Burton v. Burton, 1 Keyes (N. Y.) 359; Leonard v. Grant, 5 Fed. Rep. 11; Kane v. McCarthy, 63 No. Car. 299; United States v. Kellar, 13 Fed. Rep. 82.
A native of China is not a "white person" within the meaning of the term as used in the naturalization laws, In re Ah Yup, 5 Sawy. 155, and such statutes have never been made applicable to persons of the Chinese race. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 716.
Marriage to a citizen does not prevent the deportation of an alien woman for a violation of the immigration laws. Yeung How v. North, 223 U. S. 705. See, also, Hoo Choy
v. North, 183 Fed. Rep. 92, in which certiorari was denied by this court.
It is of no consequence that the American-born husband of Yeung How had died before she was ordered deported. If she had become a citizen by virtue of the marriage, that citizenship status would have continued after the death of her husband. Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496; 15 Op. A. G. 599.
The alien wife of a citizen who becomes an inmate of a house of prostitution is within both the letter and the spirit of the immigration laws. Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U. S. 1, has no application, because in that case the allegiance of natives of Porto Rico had been transferred to the United States.
The marriage of Li A. Sim to Low Wah Suey did not change her political status with respect to this country. Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. * 242, * 246, and cases cited; White v. White, 2 Met. (Ky.) 185, 191; Sutliff v. Forgey, 1 Cowen, 85; 5 Cowen, 713; Mick v. Mick, 10 Wend. 379; Connolly v. Smith, 21 Wend. 59.
If Li A. Sim had conducted herself properly, she would not, although an alien, have come within the operation of the immigration laws. Assuming that a citizen has the right to bring in a wife, although she be an alien, this does not authorize her to engage in immoral practices in violation of the restrictions placed by Congress upon all aliens.
It cannot be contended that the Immigration Act does not apply to the resident alien wife of a citizen because domiciled aliens have a quasi-citizenship according to certain authorities on international law (dissenting opinion in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 735), as this would exclude from its operation all domiciled aliens, and § 3 of the act is expressly directed at alien women or girls who become inmates of houses of prostitution after their entry into the United States. The only other ground of exemption is that the statute was not intended to disturb
the family relations; but this contention was overruled in Zartarian v. Billings, 204 U. S. 170, where the child of a naturalized citizen afflicted with trachoma was held not entitled to admission.
In re Nicola, 184 Fed. Rep. 322, has no application, because the women referred to therein belonged to a race that might be lawfully naturalized.
United States v. Mrs. Gue Lim, 176 U. S. 459, and Tsoi Sim v. United States, 116 Fed. Rep. 920, are also to be distinguished. The purpose of the Immigration Act in excluding alien prostitutes is to protect the public health and morals, and an alien woman who engages in such practices is as much within the purpose of the act when she is the wife of a citizen as when she is not.
MR. JUSTICE Day delivered the opinion of the court.
A. Sim, a Chinese woman, wife of Low Wah Suey, was ordered to be deported by the Department of Commerce and Labor, a hearing having been had before an immigration inspector at San Francisco and appeal taken to the Secretary of Commerce and Labor under the provisions of the act of Congress approved February 20, 1907 (34 Stat. 898, c. 1134), the warrant for deportation reciting that she had landed at the port of San Francisco, California, on the fifteenth of April, 1910, and had been found in the United States in violation of the act of February 20, 1907, as amended by the act approved March 26, 1910 (36 Stat. 263, c. 128), namely, that she was an alien, found as an inmate of a house of prostitution within three years subsequent to her entry into the United States.
The statutes of the United States under which the proceedings were had and the warrant issued are principally § 3 of the act of March 26, 1910, amending § 3 of the act of February 20, 1907, and 88 20 and 21 of the latter act. Section 3 provides:“. Any alien who shall be found