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A rate fixed on that part of interstate carriage which includes the ac
tual placing of the shipment into vessels ready to be carried beyond the state destination is, as to merchandise intended for points beyond the State, a burden on interstate commerce and beyond the power of the State to impose, even if the merchandise is billed from a point within the State to the point where the vessel is. Gulf, Colo
rado & Santa Fé Railway Co. v. Texas, 204 U. S. 403, distinguished. Through billing to the point beyond the State is not always necessary
to determine that a shipment is interstate. Southern Pacific Terminal
Co. v. Young, 219 U. S. 498. A rate fixed by the Ohio Railroad Commission for coal from state points
to “on board” vessels at the port of Huron, Ohio, and intended for shipment to some point beyond the State undetermined at time of shipment, and, for convenience, billed to the shippers' own order at Huron, held to be a rate affecting interstate shipment and void under the commerce clause of the Constitution as an attempt to
regulate interstate commerce. Quære: whether transportation under the circumstances of this case
is such a transportation within the State or to points without the State, partly by railroad and partly by water, as to be within the
jurisdiction and control of the Interstate Commerce Commission. 187 Fed. Rep. 965, affirmed.
The facts, which involve the validity of an order of the Railroad Commission of the State of Ohio fixing and establishing a rate on "lake-cargo coal" and whether such order was void as an attempted regulation of interstate commerce, are stated in the opinion.
Mr. Thomas H. Hogsett, with whom Mr. Timothy S. Hogan, Attorney General of the State of Ohio, Mr. Frank Davis, Jr., and Mr. Chas. C. Marshall were on the brief, for appellant.
Mr. W. M. Duncan and Mr. William B. Sanders for appellee.
MR. JUSTICE Day delivered the opinion of the court.
The case originated in a bill filed in the United States Circuit Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, against the Railroad Commission of Ohio and
other parties to enjoin the enforcement of an order of the Commission fixing and establishing a rate of seventy cents a ton on what is called “lake-cargo coal,” transported from the Number Eight Coal Field in eastern Ohio to the ports of Huron and Cleveland, Ohio, on Lake Erie, for carriage thence by lake vessels. A permanent injunction was granted in the Circuit Court against the enforcement of the rate, on the ground that it was a regulation of interstate commerce. An appeal was taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and that court affirmed the decree of the Circuit Court. (187 Fed. Rep. 965.) From the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals an appeal was taken to this court. An appeal was also prayed and allowed from the Circuit Court directly to this court, being case No. 505 on the docket of this term, which is submitted with the present case. A petition for a writ of certiorari to the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals has also been filed and submitted upon briefs.
The first question to be dealt with is one of jurisdiction. The question of the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Appeals was raised and decided in that court, which held that it had jurisdiction of the case, also intimating that there were grounds of jurisdiction which might have warranted a direct appeal to this court, and that court allowed the present appeal to this court.
The argument that the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Appeals is final is based upon the contention that, as Worthington, the complainant in the present case, was appointed receiver of The Wheeling & Lake Erie Railroad Company in a suit in equity in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, wherein jurisdiction depended upon diversity of citizenship, and since the jurisdiction to entertain an appeal in an ancillary proceeding is that of the original case, therefore, under the Circuit Court of Appeals Act,
the decree of the Court of Appeals is final. It is undoubtedly true that in cases of intervention in foreclosure suits, where jurisdiction depends upon diverse citizenship, jurisdiction of the intervening petition is determined by that of the original case. It is equally true that petitions in original proceedings to enforce rights and to protect the exercise of the jurisdiction of the court take their jurisdiction from that of the original case. St. Louis, K. C. & C. R. R. Co. v. Wabash R. R. Co., 217 U. S. 247, and the many previous cases in this court therein cited.
An examination of the bill in this case, which was filed under the authority of the Circuit Court, shows that the order of the Commission was attacked, not only upon the ground that its findings were alleged to be unsupported by the testimony and to have been made upon improper consideration of the facts, but also because the order affected and interfered with interstate commerce, in which the complainant was engaged and over which the Railroad Commission of Ohio had no authority because of the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. It further was alleged that the owners of the property constituting the receivership estate would be deprived thereof without due process of law; that they would be denied the equal protection of the laws, and that their property would be taken without compensation. It thus appears that jurisdiction was invoked, not only because the present case is ancillary to the receivership suit, which depended upon diverse citizenship, but upon grounds which involve alleged infractions of the Federal Constitution and rights secured thereby. The case was therefore one which might have been taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals, and the fact that it involved grounds which might have warranted a direct appeal to this court did not deprive the Circuit Court of Appeals of jurisdiction. American Sugar Refining Co. v. New Orleans, 181 U. S. 277; Macfadden v. United States, 213 U. S. 288.
The question then is: Is this one of the cases made final in the Circuit Court of Appeals by the act creating that court? The sixth section of that act provides that the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals "shall be final in all cases in which the jurisdiction is dependent entirely upon the opposite parties to the suit or controversy being aliens and citizens of the United States or citizens of different States; also in all cases arising under the patent laws, under the revenue laws, and under the criminal laws, and in admiralty cases." In all other cases there is a right of review by this court if the matter in controversy exceeds one thousand dollars. It is a verred in the bill and admitted in the answer that the amount in dispute exceeds in value the sum of $5,000. The case is therefore one not made final in the Circuit Court of Appeals, and the appeal to this court was properly allowed. Spreckels Sugar Ref. Co. v. McClain, 192 U. S. 397; Macfadden v. United States, 213 U. S. 288, 294; Standard Paint Co. v. Trinidad Asphalt Manufacturing Company, 220 U. S. 446, 460.
Case No. 505 is dismissed and the petition for writ of certiorari is denied.
Coming now to the merits of the case, the Circuit Court found the facts to be as follows:
"It appears that bituminous coal, such as is mined in the No. 8 District, is classified by the complainant, for tariff purposes, as (a) railway fuel, being coal sold to railroad companies; (b) lake-cargo coal, that is, coal intended for shipment by lake to points in the Northwest; and (c) commercial coal, comprising coal for commercial and domestic use, not included in the first two classes.
"The No. 8 Coal District of Ohio is situated in Jefferson, Harrison and Belmont Counties, and the members of the Pittsburg Vein Operators' Association of Ohio are interested in mining coal in that district. The traffic is large, about 400,000 tons of lake-cargo coal being shipped over
the complainant's railroad from that district in 1909, and transshipped by vessel to points in the Northwest.
“At and prior to the time of the complaint being lodged with the Railroad Commission by the Operators' Association, the tariff rate in force on the complainant's railroad on lake-cargo coal from the No. 8 District to Huron and Cleveland, Ohio, f. o. b. vessel, was ninety cents per ton. The rate covers, in addition to the rail transportation, the service of unloading the coal from the cars into vessels and trimming it in the holds of the vessels, so that they can safely proceed.
“The rate on commercial coal to Huron or Cleveland is $1.00 per ton.
“The vessels for lake-cargo coal are generally furnished by the operators, but the coal is sometimes sold f. o. b. vessel, the title to the coal in that case passing to the purchaser upon being properly loaded into the vessel.
“The coal in question is shipped from the mines to Huron or Cleveland, principally Huron, where the complainant has large dock facilities and expensive machinery and appliances for unloading coal into vessels, during the season of navigation, simply marked 'Lake coal' consigned to the operator, or to some office employé whose name is used as a mere matter of convenience for the purpose of designating a particular grade of coal. The operator notifies the railroad that at a certain time a vessel will be at Huron to load so many tons of a particular grade of coal. The railroad then picks up such cars of the operator's coal as are necessary to fill the cargo and moves them on to the dock alongside of the vessel, loads the vessel, trims or distributes the coal properly in her hold, and furnishes the shipper with a cargo statement showing the car numbers and weights and total tons of coal in the vessel, on which information the bill of lading for the vessel shipment is made out.
“It appears that all the coal shipped at the lake-cargo