are evidence of a pecuniary consideration. (Jackson v. Alexander, 3 John. 484. Same v. Root, 18 id. 60)

It is not indispensable that the consideration should be expressed in the deed; though it is always most advisable to insert it in the instrument. If none be expressed, and a valuable consideration be proved, it is sufficient. (Jackson v. Fish, 10 id. 456. Spalding v. Hallenback, 30 Barb. 292, 296.)

No precise form of words are required to raise a use. The proper and technical words are "bargain and sell;" but any other words that would have been sufficient to raise a use, upon a valuable consideration, before the statute, are now sufficient to constitute a valid bargain and sale. Thus, the words "remise, release, and forever quit-claim," or the words "release and assign," have been held to be sufficient to raise a use. (Jackson v. Fish, supra.) The words "make over and grant" have been held sufficient to pass lands by way of bargain and sale. (Jackson v. Alexander, supra. Lynch v. Livingston, 2 Seld. 422.)

A deed of bargain and sale, founded on a pecuniary consideration, to take effect in futuro, is effectual. (Jackson v. McKenny, 3 Wend. 233.)

In a deed of bargain and sale, a use can be limited to no other person than the bargainee, in whom the legal estate can be executed. (Jackson v. Cary, 16 John. 302. Same v. Myers, 3 id. 388.)

A rent may be reserved upon a conveyance of bargain and sale, and it is a sufficient consideration to support it. The consideration sufficient to support a bargain and sale has become, says Nelson, J. in Rogers v. Eagle Fire Ins. Co. (9 Wend. 619,) purely technical, without substance or value, and of course it is not important that courts should be over astute in the enforcement of the rule. A penny, a pepper corn, or red rose, has generally been adjudged a good consideration, by which he means a sufficient consideration. In the foregoing case, where A. by a deed poll, "in consideration of the performance hereinafter mentioned," granted all his estate, real and personal, to B. in fee, upon condition that B. should suffer and permit A. to remain in possession, and to use and enjoy all the said estate during his natural life, without yielding and paying any thing therefor; and that at the decease of A. the grantee should pay unto C. the sum of £100, and that during the natural life of A., the grantee should provide him with a maintenance; and in the deed was contained a clause in these words: "And the said B.

is to occupy and be in possession of my houses situate at the corner of Eagle street, for which he is to allow me £60 a year during my natural life;” and then, after some further provisions in relation to the management of the estate, the deed concludes with a clause, that from and after the decease of A., the grantee and his heirs shall hold and enjoy the premises by the deed given and granted, and dispose thereof to his and their own proper use; it was held that the deed as to the house at the corner of Eagle street was valid and operative as a conveyance to B. for the life of A. subject to rent, with a remainder to him in fee without rent. And it was further held that the deed might well be considered a bargain and sale, under the statute of uses as to the house at the corner of Eagle street, conveying a freehold in futuro, the reservation of £60 a year during the life of the grantor being a sufficient consideration to raise the use.

A bargain and sale, we have seen, is allowed still to be used as a mode of alienation, but it is deemed a grant under the statute. The principles which govern the one are applicable to the other. We have shown elsewhere some of the changes introduced into the revised statutes relative to conveyances, which it is not necessary to repeat. Most of them were borrowed from the decisions of the courts growing out of the conveyances to uses. (See note to 2 Cruise's Dig. ch. 9, tit. 32, § 1, Greenl. ed. 2 Preston on Conv. 475 to 479.) What has been said on the subject of deeds, the proof and acknowledgment and the recording thereof, appertains as well to the deed of bargain and sale as to the grant, or any other conveyance.

The lease and release is another mode of conveyance, which owes its origin to the statute of uses. It was formerly the most frequent instrument of assurance, but it fell into disuse in 1788, and is at present superseded by other and more simple assurances. It is however preserved by the revised statutes, and permitted to be used the same as formerly, but it is denominated a grant. It is in fact a bargain and sale for a year of the premises intended to be conveyed, and a common law release, operating by way of enlarging the estate. It was introduced originally in England to avoid both the statute of enrollment and the necessity of livery of seisin. The mode was for the vendor to convey to the vendee the estate to be conveyed by a bargain and sale for one or more years, and after the entry of the lessee, a deed of release of the inheritance was executed

to him in fee simple. The statute of uses transferred to the lessee the possession without an actual entry, and then the release of the reversion carried to the party whatever estate the releasor possessed. The lease and release were treated in the law as one conveyance. But one acknowledgment or proof was taken of the execution, and that was indorsed upon the release, which was alone recorded. It was not usual to record the lease, or to produce it on the trial of a cause to make out the title of the releasee to the premises. The recital of it in the release was deemed conclusive evidence of its existence upon all persons claiming under the parties in privity of estate. (Carver v. Jackson, 4 Peters, 88. Cruise's Dig. tit. 32, Deed, ch. 11, § 6.) Not only estates in possession, but estates in remainder and reversion can be conveyed by lease and release. The consideration to raise the use must be inserted in the lease.

This is usually a nominal consideration of one dollar; but a reservation of a pepper corn rent has been held to be sufficient to raise a use in a bargain and sale to ground a release. As the release is a common law conveyance, no consideration need be expressed to make it valid, though it is usual to insert the true consideration, as has been recommended in other conveyances.

The statute with respect to the proof and acknowledging of deeds, and of the recording of them, is applicable to the lease and release, and the doctrine with respect to parties and covenants is the same in all cases.

Deeds to lead or declare the uses of other convegances, and deeds of revocation of uses, were instruments of frequent occurrence in the English system of conveyance, and were occasionally used in this state. They are still admissible in some cases. The subject has already been considered in our chapter on trusts and powers, and of marriage settlements. There have been but few cases in this state arising upon conveyances made since the adoption of the revised statutes, in 1830.

CHAPTER VII.

OF ALIENATION OF REAL ESTATE BY THE ORDER OR PERMISSION OF SOME TRIBUNAL OR PUBLIC OFFICER.

There are a variety of cases where the owner of real estate is under a disability to convey the fee without the order or authority of the court. We will instance some of these cases.

1. Religious corporations cannot convey their lands in fee simple, without the intervention of some court. The general act of 1784, (1 Greenl. 60,) while it authorized such corporations to lease, take, receive, acquire, purchase, use and enjoy lands, tenements and hereditaments &c. to a certain amount, limited their power of disposition to demise, lease and improve the same. Special acts of the legislature were occasionally passed, incorporating certain persons without restriction as to the power of alienation. The necessity for selling their lands in fee simple, and of making different investments, was often felt by religious corporations, and relief was occasionally granted by special acts of the legislature. (See a reference to these acts, Will. Eq. Jur. 734, note.) At length, in 1806, the general act was so amended that the chancellor was authorized, upon the application of any religious corporation, in case he should deem it proper, to make an order for the sale of any real estate belonging to such corporation, and to direct the application of the moneys arising therefrom by the said corporation, to such uses as the same corporation, with the consent and approbation of the chancellor, should conceive to be most for the interest of the society to which the real estate so sold, belonged. (29 Sess. ch. 43, § 3.) But this provision did not extend to any of the lands granted by this state for the support of the gospel.

Since the abolition of the court of chancery, the application for leave to sell or mortgage the real estate of a religious corporation is made to the supreme court of the district, or the county court of the county where the religious corporation is located. (Code, § 30. Judiciary act of 1847, p. 323, § 16.)

The principal difficulty with respect to the alienation of real property held by a religious corporation was, that the legal estate in the hands of the purchaser, with notice of the trust, would be

chargeable with the charitable uses to which it was originally devoted. Real estate held by a corporation, for its ordinary purposes, or which it might acquire in the course of its business, might be sold and conveyed, and may be so still, in the same way as a natural person disposes of his own property. But real property held by a corporation to charitable uses, would be followed by a court of equity into the hands of the alienee with notice. This is the view taken of the subject, by the chancellor, in Dutch Church v. Mott, (7 Paige, 84.) And hence the necessity of the act, by which, with the leave of the court, real estate thus held in trust, may be aliened to a purchaser, free from the trust; so that the latter may take a clear and indefeasible estate in fee simple, freed from all charges thereon.

The mode in which the relief is granted is by petition to the court, showing the necessity and propriety of the application, and the assent of the persons interested beneficially in the property to the proposed sale and reinvestment. The deed should recite enough of the proceedings to give the court making the order jurisdiction, and should purport to convey the premises in pursuance of the order. In other respects the deed will resemble our statute grants, or the common deeds of bargain and sale. The most usual occasions for the application are, when the corporation is under the necessity of mortgaging their real estate to secure the payment of their indebtedness, or is desirous of changing the location of their religious edifice.

Another instance of persons under disability having to resort to the court for leave to sell their real estate, is in the case of infants. By the common law the rule seems to be universal, that all deeds or instruments under seal, executed by an infant, are voidable only, with the single exception of those which delegate a naked authority, which latter are void. (Bool v. Mix, 17 Wend. 119. Gillet v. Stanley, 1 Hill, 121.) Such deed of lands executed by an infant cannot be avoided until he comes of age, though he may enter and take the profits in the mean time. (Bool v. Mix, supra.) Previous to the year 1814 there was no mode of disposing of the real estate of infants but by act of the legislature. Special acts were frequently passed for this purpose; when at length on the 9th of April, 1814, the legislature authorized the infant, by his guardian or next friend, to apply to the court of chancery by petition, setting