page 131). This was also proved by nearly all the members of the board called by the contestee as witnesses in his behalf. (See Record, pages 1792, 1824, 1825, and 1844.) It is undisputed. The board sat from one to two hours each of the eight days, and in that time struck off over 12,000 names from a registration of about 60,000. This board was composed of twenty-four Democrats and four Republicans. The record shows that many of these twenty-eight revisers delegated their duties of purging the registry lists to unauthorized and unsworn parties-(Record, 1786-27, 1793, 1800, 1836, and 1850)-in many instances persons wholly unknown to them, who were sent to them by the Democratic central committee. (See same pages of the Record.) The fact also appears that the reviser for the Fourth ward of this district, that ward in which most of the above disfranchised voters lived, left his entire work of revision to irresponsible deputies, whose work was sent in, and the names reported by them were stricken from the list of voters in the manner above described. The testimony of one Michael Burke shows that he was one of these unsworn deputies, and reveals the frauds by which Republicans were intentionally stricken off the lists. He also swears-and his evidence is wholly uncontradicted-that there was an understanding and agreement between all these deputies-that they should act together in practicing these frauds. (See Record, page 71 and following.) It will be borne in mind that the law not only does not recognize these deputies, but specifically provides that this work of determining the qualifications of voters should be done by these revisers, sitting as a court and acting judicially on "actual knowledge" or "competent testi mony, and by a majority vote." The testimony shows that all of the above 155 men were legal and qualified voters, many of them being old residents, and that they did all in their power to entitle them to vote. We hold that their votes should now be counted by the House. The said voters had done everything the law required of them; they had exhausted their remedy; they had registered and gone to the polls and offered to vote, but their names having been stricken off they were not allowed to vote. The principle is well established and was adopted by this committee in the case of Bisbee vs. Finley (present Congress), that where judges of election improperly refuse a qualified voter the right to vote, his vote will be counted here. We submit the reason of that rule will apply as well to this case, where the voter has done everything in his power and the primary wrongful act was committed by the registration officers. McCrary on Elections, sections 10, 11, and 383, fully sustains this view in the following language: A case may occur where a portion of the legal voters have, without their fault and in spite of due diligence on their part, been denied the privilege of registration. In such a case, if the voter was otherwise qualified and is clearly shown to have performed all the acts required of him by the law, and to have been denied registration by the wrongful act of the registering officer, it would seem a very unjust thing to deny him the right to vote. In elections for State officers, however, under a constitution or statute which imperatively requires registration as a qualification for voting, it may be that the voter's only remedy would be found in an action against the registration officer for damages. (See also sections 11 and 383.) It will be observed that Judge McCrary, after stating the general doctrine, says that In elections for State officers, however, under a constitution or statute which imper atively requires registration as a qualification for voting, it may be that the voter's only remedy would be found in an action against the registration officer. This refers exclusively to State officers, while the office for which it is intended to count these votes is not a State office-that the United States Constitution has given this body full control over the question as to who are its members; and in the State of Missouri neither the constitution or any statute in force in Saint Louis makes registration an imperative prerequisite or qualification. (See constitution 1875, heretofore cited.) The old constitution of 1865 made registration a qualification, both in positive and negative language. (See constitution 1865, article 2, section 4 and 18.) But the constitution of 1875 only requires that to be a voter a man must be twenty-one years of age, a citizen of the United States, and a resident of the State for one year. Neither was there any statute in existence at the time of this election which applied to Saint Louis, which, either in express terms or by implication, made registration an imperative prerequisite or qualification. The charter of ordinances of the city of Saint Louis, adopted by its citizens, as shown above, provided for a system of registration heretofore mentioned, but it nowhere in express terms, in enumerating the qualifications of voters, makes registration a prerequisite or qualification for voting, and had it done so we hold that it would have been a violation of that part of the constitution which provides for the qualifications of voters, in this, that it would have made an additional qualification thereto. It will be observed that as Saint Louis never, directly or by implication, elected to be governed by the statute providing for the government of cities of the first class, the provisions therein concerning regis tration do not apply to, nor do they control, said city. The ordinance, instead of the charter of the city, being followed in the matter of the board of revision, it having been appointed twenty instead of thirty days before the election, we find that neither the charter nor statute had any binding effect on said board. The Constitution of the United States having declared that the legislatures of the several States shall provide for choosing members of Congress, and the constitution of Missouri having authorized the general assembly, and that alone, to enact a registration law, we hold that the above ordinance has no binding force or effect, and is invalid. We therefore rely upon the language of McCrary, section 11, that— In the absence of any positive law making registration imperative as a qualification for voting, it is a very plain proposition that the wrongful refusal of a registering officer to register a legal voter who has complied with the law and applies for registration ought not to disfranchise such voter. The offer to register in such a case is equivalent to registration. This would be held to be the law upon the well-settled principle that the offer to perform an act which depends for its performance upon the action of another person, who wrongfully refuses to act, is equivalent to its perform ance. But conceding (which we do not in this case) that the city ordinance relative to registration was constitutionally and legally enacted, and its provisions applicable to this election, we contend that these 155 votes should still be counted, and for the following reasons: The oath prescribed for, and taken by, the judges of election precluded them from hearing or determining the case of any voter whose name is not on their list; therefore, as to that class of voters, they are not really judges of election. The law in that case has provided another set of judges, whose duty it is to hear competent testimony concerning the case of each and every man whose name is suggested by any one should be stricken off, and after judicially hearing the case, they shall, by a majority vote, determine whether that man is a voter or not. So we say that if the judges of election could not receive the votes of these men they are not the judges of their qualifications to vote in any sense, their place for that purpose being filled by the board of revision. We hence conclude that if the only officers recognized by the city charter who had a right to judge of the qualifications of these 155 men have improperly, wrongfully, and fraudulently denied them the right to vote that this House should remedy that wrong and count their votes for him whose name was on their ballots. Furthermore, these votes should be counted on another ground, following a well-established principle of law. The proof in this case shows that the board of revision by whom the above voters were disfranchised acted at the outset and throughout their entire proceedings in absolute violation of not only the spirit but the letter of the law which gave them authority. The ordinance explicitly says that this board shall meet For the purpose of examining the registration and making and noting corrections therein as may be rendered necessary by either their knowledge of errors committed or by competent testimony heard before the board, a majority of said board shall be necessary to do business. By a resolution adopted at the beginning (heretofore cited) they declared they would neither hear testimony nor act upon the knowledge of the board. Thereafter names of voters were stricken off the list without even being read to the board, and merely upon the recommendation of an individual member, who, in many cases, as the proof shows, adopted without question, knowledge, or examination the reports of his unsworn and unauthorized deputies. When it is borne in mind that no actual notice was given to the voter thus stricken from the list, and that, even if he had such notice, there existed no remedy or law by which he could be reinstated, the necessity of holding this board to a strict execution of its powers will be apparent. It will be observed that the ordinance conferred upon the board of revision the power to examine and revise the registration list prepared by the recorder of voters, and making and noting corrections therein, to correct his errors or omissions, but the law nowhere empowered them to correct or revise their own. Now, it is a well-settled doctrine of law that as to courts not of record and other bodies having judicial functions no presumptions arise as to jurisdiction or the regularity of their proceedings, and that any judgment rendered by such court or body not in strict conformity with the law is void. (See Freeman on Judgments.) This board of revision, as shown by the record, acted from the beginning to the end in utter disregard and violation of the law. This ordinance gives the board power to strike from the registry lists by a majority vote, and either on the knowledge of the board officially or by competent testimony heard before the board, the names of those only "who have removed from the election district for which they registered, or who have died." The resolution divested the board of all its functions; it gave each member individually the right to not only strike off the dead and removed, but it gave him the right to strike off those not found; it gave him the right to write "vacant house" against a man's name, and that man was disfranchised; it gave him the right to strike off duplicate names; it gave him the right to strike off all who were in his judgment not citizens; and, lastly, it gave him the right to strike off any one whom he thought, for any reason, ought not to vote-and to do all this without any testimony, without any knowledge as to whether it was right, and without any notice to him whose name he struck off. And then the board beforehand sanctioned all this; told each reviser to do whatever he would; it, as a board, would stamp it as the act of the board. It will be seen by this ordinance that this board, besides striking off the names of those who had removed out of the precinct where they lived when they registered, and the names of those who had died, were required "to note the fact opposite the name of any person charged with having registered in a wrong name, or who, for any reason, is not entitled to registration under the provisions of this ordinance, which person shall be challenged by the judges of election when presenting himself to vote, and rejected unless he satisfy said judges that he was entitled to register." This board was precluded from striking off the names of these persons. Its only duty was to make note against them, and then the judges of election were to judicially examine into the qualifications of these voters. So the board not only violated and defied the law, but, by its acts, it prevented the judges of election from examining and determining the questions which the ordinance explicitly referred to them. If this board had been a court of general jurisdiction, even then its acts would have been absolutely void because of its failure to proceed in accordance with law. We therefore hold that the action of this board in striking off the names of the above voters was illegal and absolutely void and of the same effect as if done by any unauthorized party. Again, the proof shows that the action of the board of revision from its inception operated as a fraud upon all who were improperly stricken off by them, and that there was actual fraud on the part of some of those to whom was improperly delegated the duties and functions of the whole board, which fraud resulted in striking off and disfranchisement of these voters. This opportunity for fraud is evidenced by, the illegal resolution adopted, the manner in which the board did its work, and by the employment of unauthorized and unsworn deputies. The actual fraud is shown in the uncontradicted testimony of Michael Burke, one of the above deputies in the Fourth ward of this Congressional district, who unblushingly tells how he struck off of the list Republican voters; of his understanding that he was hired for that purpose, and agreement with other deputies to do the same work in their wards; in the fact that of the 12,000 names stricken off-the contestee after keeping in a conspicuous place in the leading Democratic paper of St. Louis an advertisement for all Democrats who had been wrongfully stricken from the registration list to appear and give their testimonyonly obtained three who were qualified voters; in the fact that in numerous instances, as shown by the testimony, some members of a family were stricken off said list and members of the same family left on, and in each of such instances the Republicans were stricken off and the Democrats left on; in the fact that five months after the election herein, as is shown by the testimony, another election was held in Saint Louis, before which a presumably fair registration was had, and at which every Republican candidate was elected by a very large majority, whereas at this election the Democratic candidates for President and governor each received a majority. We therefore hold that, as fraud vitiates all things, the frauds above enumerated vitiated the action of said board of revisers. For each and all these reasons, and because it seems just and right that where a legally qualified voter has done all that the law requires of him in order to vote, but he has been deprived of the privilege by the default, neglect, or fraud of any officer of election, his vote should be counted, and because it seems to us that these voters were, in the eyes of the law, on the list of voters furnished the judges of election (having been stricken off by illegality and fraud), we hold that these 155 votes should now be counted for contestant. II. The evidence shows that the following were legal voters of the State of Missouri and city of Saint Louis, and entitled to vote at the election in the third Congressional district of Missouri on the 2d day of November, 1880; that they had complied with the registration law of said city, having previous to the election registered their names before the proper officer; that on the day of election they offered their ballots at their respective and proper polling precincts in said city, and said ballots being for contestant for Representative in Congress from the third Congressional district of Missouri; that their names were, each and every one of them, found on the poll-list at the precincts where they offered to vote, but for various trivial and insignificant reasons, such as, for instance, the misspelling of names or the incorrectness of numbers, and, in some instances, for no reasons whatever, the judges refused to receive their votes, and they were not received or counted, viz: Record page. 420. Baker, Lee 506. Bierlin, John 834. Buttram, Louis 1041. Caeser, Philip 1032. Cheatham, William 761. Clark, Calvin 903. Fields, John 518. Garrett, John 816. Geiger, George H. 976. Gray, Samuel 648. Hatz, Sebastear 848. Heitert, H. C. 1240. Henderson, Isaac 753. Hensieck, Henry 591. Hohnnan, Fred. 564. Howard, Henry 771. Humes, Ben. 570. Hyde, Jacob Record page. 1703. Inderman, Henry We therefore conclude that these thirty-five votes should be counted for contestant, as the proof shows indisputably that the judges of election improperly refused to receive and count them. III. The evidence shows that at the date of election herein the following were legal and qualified voters of the State of Missouri, city of Saint |