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In the case of the Tioga Railroad Company es. the Blossburg Railroad, in 20 Wallace, 143, the court uses the following language:

These decisions upon the construction of the statute are binding upon us, whatever we may think of their soundness on general principles.

See Jefferson Branch Bank vs. Skelly (1 Black, 443); Gut rs. The State (9 Wallace, 37); Randall vs. Brigham (7 Wallace, 541); Secomb vs. Railroad Company (23 Wallace, 117); Polk's Lessee rs. Wendell (9 Cranch, 98); and Nesmith vs. Sheldon (7 Howard, 818). Numerous other adjudications of that court could be cited to the same effect.

It is now maintained that this doctrine applies only as a rule of property. The only excuse for this new idea to be found in the decisions in the Supreme Court is where the court say they will not follow the last decision of a State court changing the construction of its laws after the first decision has become a rule of property; otherwise the Supreme Court of the United States would follow the new construction given by the State court. To say that the Supreme Court of the United States will only follow a State court "on a rule of property" is a total miscon ception of the principle announced by the court. But whatever may be the rule in the Supreme Court of the United States, Congress has in every case, without exception, followed this rule, and in the Tennessee cases in the Forty-second Congress, and the Iowa cases in the Fortysixth Congress, extended the rule to following the construction of the State laws given by the governor of a State. The same rule was followed, and on the question of marked ballots, in case of Neff vs. Shanks in the Forty-third Congress, and Yeates vs. Martin in the Forty-sixth Congress. The same rule was followed in Bisbee vs. Hull, and the doctrine broadly laid down as correct in Boynton vs. Loring in the same Congress. We cite the language of the committee in these cases.

CONGRESS FOLLOWS THE STATE DECISIONS.

This rule was first established in the Forty-second Congress in what is called the Tennessee cases, when the report was made by the Hon. G. W. McCrary:

In a report from the Committee on Elections, adopted by this House April 11, 1871, in the matter of the Tennessee election (Digest of Election Cases, compiled by J. M. Smith, p. 1), the committee say:

"It is a well-established and most salutary rule that where the proper authorities of the State government have given a construction to their own constitution or statutes, that construction will be followed by the Federal authorities. This rule is absolutely necessary to the harmonious working of our complex government, State and national, and your committee are not disposed to be the first to depart from it.

This decision was cited with approbation in the Forty-sixth Congress in the Iowa cases, and in the report on these cases, signed by Messrs. Field, Keifer, Calkins, Camp, Weaver, and Overton, they say:

We are not disposed to be the first to depart from it, and we certainly think that such a decision, made in good faith and acquiesced in at the time by the people of the State, and followed by a full and fair election, should not be overthrown or questioned, except for the gravest reasons, founded on an undoubting conviction that it was plainly an error, and that the error had worked some substantial injury. In the same case Mr. Beltzhoover says:

2. The question whether the constitution of the State of Iowa "must be amended in order to effect a change in the election of State officers," it is one which it is the exclusive right of the State to decide. The persons to whom the constitution and laws of Iowa confide this decision have made it, and their determination is a finality, and is conclusive on all parties. The committee have not the right to review the decision.

The case of Curtin es. Yocum, in the Forty-sixth Congress, turned upon the construction of the constitution of Pennsylvania, and the mi

nority report, which was made by Mr. Calkins and signed by Messrs. Keifer and Weaver, relied upon the construction of the State court, and used this emphatic language, speaking of an unregistered voter:

We think this question, under the present constitution and laws of Pennsylvania, not an open one. The highest court of judicature of the State has decided it; at least it has given a construction to that part of the new constitution under consideration, and we quote therefrom.

This minority report was adopted by Congress, and a Greenbacker was permitted to retain his seat in a Democratic House.

In the case of Bisbee vs. Hull, in the Forty-sixth Congress, the decision of the supreme court of Florida was held to be conclusive by the committee and the House. When the admission of Mr. Hull, who held the governor's certificate, was under discussion, Mr. Calkins said:

How can this certificate stand, even as establishing a prima facie right, when the basis upon which it rests has been swept away by a decision of the supreme court of the State of Florida?

When the case was considered on its merits, the committee unanimously followed the decision of the supreme court of Florida, and a Democratic House unseated a Democrat and seated a Republican under it.

The report made by Mr. Keifer uses this emphatic language:

The opinion of the supreme court of Florida, pronounced by the chief justice, on the question of canvassing the vote of the county of Madison, will be found in the Record, p. 221.

"As already stated, duly certified copies of these returns were put in evidence by the contestee; they are signed by all the officers of the election; they are perfect in form, clear and explicit in the statement of the votes cast, and have all been adjudged by the unanimous opinion of the supreme court of Florida, in a case before it, to be good and valid returns of the election at these polls." (17 Florida Rep., p. 17.)

Again, in the case of Boynton vs. Loring, the report, which was prepared by Mr. Calkins, and signed by every member of the committee except Mr. Weaver, contains this clear and explicit announcement of the doctrine we contend for. It says:

But it is not necessary for us to decide this question, and we do not, much preferring that the courts of Massachusetts shall first construe their own statutes, and when they have undergone judicial construction we would follow the decisions of the courts of that State.

The Committee on Elections is as much a continuing body in contemplation of law as a court, and should have as much respect for its own rulings as a court has for its decisions, and "stare decisis" should be our rule. Under the rule that Federal authorities follow the construction given by State authorities to their own statutes, two Tennessee Republicans were seated in the Forty-second Congress, Shanks, a Repub lican, was seated in the Forty-third Congress, Yocum, a Greenbacker, Bisbee from Florida, and three Republicans from Iowa were seated in the Forty-sixth Congress. To undertake now to change this rule or limit it to a rule of property, may subject us to the same severe rebuke for oscillation administered to a State court by the Supreme Court of the United States. To say in one Congress we will follow the decision of the supreme court of Massachusetts in construing its statute when made, and in the next Congress refuse to extend the same rule to the supreme court of Mississippi, is glaring inconsistency or invidious distinction between States. If we have respect for ourselves, we should make no radical change of ruling that may subject us to the charge that we "immolate truth, justice, and law because party has erected the altar and decreed the sacrifice."

LIMITATIONS ON THE RULE.

But while the majority of the committee have expressed some views looking to a change in this rule, said to be essential to the preservation of our complex system of government, they do not go to that extent. They say:

It need, however, hardly be added that a line of carefully considered cases in the States, in which such courts have undoubted jurisdiction, so far as they would apply in principle, would go a long way towards settling a disputed point of construction in any State election law. In fact it may be said that it would probably be the duty of Congress to follow the settled doctrine thus established.

We have here two new limitations on the old rule. First, it must not be a single decision, but "a line of carefully considered cases." Second, the court must, in the opinion of Congress, when collaterally considering the subject, have had jurisdiction of the case. It is a new and somewhat startling proposition that the opinion of a supreme court is not to be considered authority until it has been repeated. If the citi zens of a State acquiesce in a decision of their own supreme court it may and often does happen that the court is not called on to reaffirm its opinion, because no one doubts or disputes its first ruling on the subject, and yet Congress is now asked not to regard as authority any thing less than a line of well-considered cases.

DO STATE LAWS BECOME FEDERAL LAWS?

Again the majority report says:

Another suggestion in argument needs greater amplification than we can give it now, which is: that by adopting the machinery of the States to carry on Congressional elections this House stands in the nature of an appellate court to interpret these election laws so far as they relate to Congressional elections; that it ought not in this view to be bound by the decisions of the State courts at all, unless the reasons given by them are convincing to the judicial mind of the House while acting in the capacity of a court.

The suggestion made in argument was that the State election laws became Federal laws when Congressmen were elected under them, and therefore Congress had the same right to review the decision of a State court in construction of these laws that the Supreme Court of the United States had to review the decision of a State court on any question arising under the twenty-fifth section of the judiciary act. This was an ingenious suggestion, but it is completely refuted by the Supreme Court of the United States in ex parte Siebold (10 Otto). The court say, "The objection that the laws and regulations, the violation of which is made punishable by the act of Congress, are State laws and have not been adopted by Congress, is no sufficient answer to the power of Congress to impose punishment. It is true that Congress has not deemed it necessary to interfere with the duties of the ordinary officers of election, but has been content to leave them as prescribed by State laws." Again, "the paramount character of those made by Congress has the effect to supersede those made by the State, so far as the two are inconsistent, and no further." The great question in this case was whether Congress could make a law to punish a man for the violation of State election laws in Congressional elections, and the able opinion of the court would have been wholly unnecessary if the new theory now advanced were true that the State laws become Federal laws simply because Congressmen are elected under them. Such an idea is wholly repugnant to the Constitution, which expressly provides that the States may make laws for the election of Congressmen while Congress may make, alter, or amend them.

THE SHOESTRING DISTRICT.

There is no satisfactory result flowing from this contest. The public have been led to believe that there was 17,000 Republican majority in the sixth district of Mississippi, familiarly called the "shoestring district," being five hundred miles long and only forty miles wide, and yet the majority of this committee, after a thorough investigation, only claim a majority for contestant of three hundred and eighty-five votes. The counties of Claiborne, Quitman, Sharkey, Tunica, and Wilkinson are shown by the census to have 5,795 majority of colored over white voters and yet there is no complaint made by the contestant, and no contest over the votes in these counties, although they gave 1,762 majority for the sitting member. Again, the public have been led to believe that great frauds have been practiced in this district, and yet the only fraud now claimed by the majority report is a change of one hundred and ninety votes at Kingston, in Adams County.

There is no dispute about the vote in the counties of Claiborne, Quitman, Sharkey, Tunica, and Wilkinson, and the vote in these counties, as shown by the sworn bill in chancery of Mr. Lynch, is as follows:

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Majority for Chalmers, 1,762.

In the disputed counties the returns certified to the secretary of state are as follows:

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Majority for Chalmers, 2,017.

Total majority, 3,779.

If we follow the supreme court of Mississippi, and reject the marked ballots, Chalmers is elected by a large majority.

If we count the marked tickets rejected in Warren County, 2,029 for Lynch, and 20 for Chalmers; the Rodney box in Jefferson, which is admitted, 247 for Lynch, and 92 for Chalmers; the Stoneville box in Washington County, 315 for Lynch, and 60 for Chalmers; Deadman's Bend and Palestine, in Adams County; if we further change the vote at Kingston, as it is claimed by the contestant, giving him 190 votes, and take the same from contestee, the result is:

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So that the contestant is clearly defeated, unless the certificates of the United States supervisors of elections and the certificates of clerks as to election returns over which they have no control and no power to certify are received as legal evidence. We therefore recommend the adoption of the following resolution :

Resolved, That John R. Lynch was not elected and is not entitled to a seat in the Forty-seventh Congress from the sixth district of Mississippi. Resolved, That James R. Chalmers was elected and is entitled to his seat in the Forty-seventh Congress from the sixth district of Mississippi. GIBSON ATHERTON.

S. W. MOULTON.
L. H. DAVIS.

GUSTAVUS SESSINGHAUS vs. R. GRAHAM FROST.

THIRD CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF MISSOURI.

Contestant alleges that the votes of a large number of the electors who offered to vote for him were illegally rejected by the judges of election, because their names were stricken off the registration list by the board of revision; because their names were misspelled or incorrectly numbered on the registration list; because some who had never registered or voted in Saint Louis registered only on the day of election, and because some who had never registered or voted in Saint Louis ap peared at the proper polling places and offered to register and to vote for contestant, but the officers whose duty it was failed and refused to register them. Contestant further alleges that a large number of ballots headed "Chronicle Selected Ticket," "Greenback Labor Ticket," and "Hancock Independent Ticket," containing his name for Representative in Congress were not counted, as being fraudulent and designed to mislead the voter.

That a large number of ballots were not counted for him because his given name was not printed thereon.

That a mistake was made in footing up the returns in one precinct by which a num

ber of votes were lost to him, and a number added to contestee.

That a ballot made up of parts of two tickets, with only one name for each office, and that of contestant for Representative, was not counted. Held, That neither the constitution of Missouri or any statute in force in Saint Louis made registration an absolute prerequisite or qualification to vote. The charter and ordinances of the city of Saint Louis provide for a system of registration, but do not in express terms make registration a prerequisite or qualification for voting.

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