former sovereign as a dissolution of the social compact, as the annulling of all their laws, as an extinction of their rights, and as reducing them to a state of nature, without government, or laws, or political rights, until a new social contract could be established. It was on this principle, that the legislature in 1779, by two several acts, the conspirator's act, and the absentee act, enacted that certain persons, and certain descriptions of persons, we re offenders in withdrawing themselves from the country, and joining or assisting the British armies before the declaration of independence ; and as offenders against the people, inflicted upon them the punishment of expatriation and forfeiture for that offence. It was, therefore, then considered as the law of the land, that all persons born within the territories of the government and people, although before the declaration of independence, were born within the allegiance of the same government and people, as the succestor of the former sovereign who had abdicated the throne. And as his successor, the same government and people have succeeded to all the crown lands within the territory, as lawfully appertaining to them. And as the inhabitants of England, born in the reign of the second James, were considered as born within the allegiance of his successor, William the third, because, boin in the territory of which he was the sovereign, he having succeeded by parliamentary designation; so all persons, born within the province of Massachusetts Bay during the reign of the late king are considered as born within the allegiance of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, as his lawful successor, Although soon after the declaration of independence, the people assumed, as the name and style of their poltical corporation, the appellation of "the government and people of the Massachusetts Bay in New England; " yet, when a new form of administering the government was adopted, the name of "the Commonwealth of Massachusetts" was assumed, not as successor to the government and people, but as a new and more appropriate appellation of the same political corporation, under a new form. of administration. And the provision for continuing the former laws and magistrates was adopted from great caution, and not as introducing in fact any new provision, without which we should have had neither laws nor officers. From the preceding observations it is very clear that the common law, which was in force, has superseded the necessity of defining by statute alienage or allegiance. And from the definiVOL. III. 68 tions of alienage and allegiance, the nature and effect of natural ization and of expatriation are manifect; for by the common law no subject can expatriate himself. Our ancestors considered it as a right essential to the charac. ter of freemen, to be bound by no laws but those to which they, either personally or by their representatives, had asse nted. This right was recognized as a fundamental principle of the En lish constitution, and was not forfeited or abandoned by them, when they, with the assent of the king, removed to this country. The claim set up by the British parliament to legislate for the colonies in all cases whatsoever was resisted with great unanimity and zeal; and with ultimate success. The allegiance of the demandant in the present action to the king of Great Britain was founded on his birth within his dominion of the province of Massachusetts Bay; and upon the abdication of the king, that allegiance accrued to the commonwealth, as his lawful successor. He must therefore in our courts of law, be deemed a subject and not an alien; it not being alleged that he has been expatriated by virtue of any statute or any judgment at law. Costs. See Particular Titles. Counsel. See tit. Attorney.. Counterfeiting. See tit. Forgery. Courts.* (A) OF COURTS, p. 540. (B) OF COURTS OF GENERAL JURISDICTION, p. 557. * A court is defined to be a place where justice is judicially administered; Co. Lit. 58. In every court there must be at least three constituent parts, the actor, reus and judex; the actor or plaintiff, who complains of the injury done; the reus, or defendant, who is called upon to make satisfaction for it; and the judex or judical power, which is to examine the truth of the fact, to determine the law arising out of the fact, and if any injury appears to have been done, to ascertain its nature, and by its officers to apply the remedy; 3 Blac. Com. 2. 5. A court of superior jurisdiction cannot be ousted except by express words of an act of parliament or necessary implication; Shipman v. Henbert, 4 T. R. 107; (E) How COURTS OF LIMITED PROCEED, p. 574. JURISDICTION MUST (F) WHEN A SUPERIOR COURT WILL INTERFERE AND CORRECT OR ANNUL THE PROCEEDINGS OF AN (G) HOW FAR THE JUDGMENTS OF ONE COURT ARE BIN- ments." And see tit. "Judg (H) OF THE RESPONSIBILITY AND DUTIES OF JUDGES OF COURTS OF RECORD, p. 584. Carter v Knight, 3 T. R. 442. And a Superior Court may decide questions that come incidentally before them though they be not questions immediately within its cognizance; Sutton v Johnstone, 1 T. R. 493. For the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, see tit. "Jurisdiction," where the the cases are abridged. It may not be entirely useless to present a short view of the subject, here. By the constitution of the United States, Art. 3. Sec. 2. the judicial power extends to all cases of law and equity arising under the constitution, the laws and treaties of the Union; to all cases affecting anbasadors, other public ministers and counsels; to all cases of Admiralty and maraatime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; controver sies between two or more States; to controversies between a state, when plaintiff and citizens of another state, or foreign citizens or subjects; to controversies between citizens of different states, and between citizens of the same state, claiming land under grants of different states; and between a state, or citizens thereof, and foreign states; and between citizens and foreign states. The original jurisdiction of the supreme court is confined to but few cases; to cases which affect ambasadors, other public ministers and counsels, and to thoso in which a state is a party; and it has ever been doubted whether this power is exclusive; Vide Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137; The United States v. Ravara, 2 Dal!. 97; Pennsylvania v. Kosloff, 5 S. & R. 545, and the United States v. Ortega, 11. Wheat. 467. The appetite jurisdiction of the court depends upon the act of Congress of the 24th of Sept 1789 s. 25, which declares that wherein any final judgment or decree in any suit in the highest court of law, or equity of a state, is drawn in question the validity of a treaty, and the decisions are against its validity; or where is drawn in question, the construction of a treaty, and the decision is against the title, right, or privilege, set up or claimed under it, may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the supreme court of the United States, upon a writ of error; and upon reversal the cause may be remanded for final decision, or the supreme court may, at their discretion, if the cause shall have been once remanded before, proceed to final decision of the same, and award execution. For a construction of the above section; see Clarke v. Harwood, 3 Dall. 343; and as to the extent of this appellate power; see Weston v. City Counsel of Charleston, 2 Peters' Rep. 494; and Fairfax v. Hunter Lessee, 7 Cranch, 608. Whether the court have power to issue the compulsory process of mandamus, to a state court to enforce a judgment of reversal has not been decided. It is said by Chancellor Kent, in his Commentaries, vol. 1. p. 321, in speaking of the case of Fairfax v. Hunter's Lessee, that if the appellate jurisdiction be founded, as no doubt it was in that case, on a solid basis, it would seem to carry with it, as of course, all the coercive power incident to every jurisdiction, and requisite to support it. And although the appellate power of the supreme court is given (A) OF COURTS IN GENERAL. 1. WIKE'S LESSEE V. CAULK, June T. 1820, 5 Har. & Johns. Md. Rep. 42. S. P. ABAT, ET AL. V. SONGY'S ESTATE, 1 Martin's Lou. Rep. 274. Per Cur. Dorsey, J. It is a well established principle of The dec is law, that the proceedings of any tribunal, not having jurisdiction over the subject matter which it professes to decide, are void. ions of a court hav ing no juris by the constituti u the court is limited by the judiciary statutes, and they imply a neg- The circuit courts of the United States have jurisdiction, concurrent with the courts of the several states, of all suits of a c vil nature at common law, or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds $500, exclusive of costs, and the United States are plaintiff, or an alien is a party, or the suit is between a citizen of the state, where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another state. Vide the cases abridged, and 1 Kent's Com. p. 302; Muns v. Dupon', 2 Wash. C. C. R. 463. And the court has original cognizance in equity, and at law, of all suits arising under any law of the United States, relative to copyrights by the act of 17th of April, 1800, and 15th of Feb. 1819, s. 1. And the circuit court has cognizance, with certain exceptions, of all crimes and offences under the authority of the United States, above the degree of misdemeanors; 1 Kent's Com. 302; United States v. Warrall, 2 Dall. 384; United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 7 Cranch, 33; United States v. Coolidge, 1 Gallison, 488. To bring a case within the jurisdiction of the circuit court, it is necessary to set forth the tacts and circumstances, which give the court jurisdiction; Bingham v. Cabat, 3 Bail. 362; Turner v. Enville, 4 Dall. 7; Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 Dall. 8. So when a citizen or alien is cor ce:ned the circumstances must be stated on the record; ibid.; Mossman v. Higginson, 4 Dall. 12. The principle is, that the character of the parties must appear on the record, to support the jurisdiction; Montelet v. Murray, 4 Cranch, 46; Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 5 Cranch, 303; Sullivan v. The Fulton Steam Boat Company, 6 Wheat. 450. And no contrivance or fraud will defeat the jurisdiction where it attaches by a change of domicil, &c.; Cooper the subject decide is not voida That the proceedings of tribunals having no jurisdiction to decide diction over the case, are not voidable, but void, is a proposition equally clear, matter it and among other cases, was fully established by this court in the professes to case of Patridge v. Dorsey's Lessee, at Dec. T. 1815, where the void, and court decided, that a plaintiff in an ejectment might show that a ble only. decree of the chancellor, ordering lands to be conveyed in a case where he had no jurisdiction to make such a decree, was void, and he therefore could give no title, though such decree had not been appealed from or reversed. 2. M'CALL V. PEACHY, Oct. T. 1797, 1 Call's Va. Rep. 48. S. P. When the court have The question was, whether this court had jurisdiction of a cause from the high court of chancery, upon an appeal from an o jurisdic interlocutory decree pronounced there, and appealed from by consent of parties. Roane, J. It is said consent of parties can give this court juris diction, although otherwise we have none. It was properly observed at the bar, that from the law alone, this court has derived its power, and that in cases not proper for the cognisance of the court under the law, they can have no authority whatsoever. Carrington, J. By examining all the laws upon the subject, ▼. Galbraith, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 546; Maxfield v. Levy, 4 Dall. 339; Case v. Clark, 5 Mason, 70; Cartlett v. Pacific Insurance Company, 1 Paine, 591. Where courts of law and equity, have concurrent jurisdiction, relief will be granted by the court, having possession of the case; Hall v. Dana, 2 A.k. 281. And it decision is conclusive on all courts having concurrent jurisdiction; ib'd; Bemus ▼. Stearns, 16 Mass. Rep. 203. The courts of common law, of each state, may inquire and decide whether an admiralty court of the United States, had jurisdiction of a case where goods were taken as a prize; Slocum v. Wheeler, 1 Coan. Rep. 429. And the state courts have concurrent jurisdiction, with the instance court of admiralty of a marine trespass; Percival v. Hickey, 18 Johns. Rep. 257. The county courts have jurisdiction, concurrent with the superior courts, of assaults and batteries, in North Carolina; but where the jurisdiction is attached by finding a bill of indietment in the county courts, it excludes the jurisdiction of the superior courts, except by the regular course of appeal; State v. Yarborough, 1 Ruff. 78. And the circuit courts of Tennessee have concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of the United States, under the act for the penalty of retailing spirituous liquors; Hartley v. The United States, 3 Hayw. 45, and see the cases abridged above. And also the fol lowing cases; Hopkins v. Lee, 6 Whent. 109; Harris v. Richards, 2 Gallis. 220; Mandy v. Harris, 2 Johns. 24; Mills v. Durgee, 7 C auch, 453; Hampton v. M Connel, 3 Wheat. 234; Rogers v. Coleman Hidan's Rep. 413; Saunders v. Marshall, 4 H. & M. 455; Cobb v. Curtis, 8 Johns. Rep. 470. Abricged under tit. "Jurisdiction." tion consent of parties cannot give it. |