to a copyright, depended altogether upon this act, I should be of opinion that it would be complete, provided he had deposited a printed copy of the title of the book in the clerk's office, as directed by the second section, and that the publication of a copy of the same would only be necessary to enable him to sue for the forfeiture created by the second section. In this respect, the act corresponds, and was probably intended to correspond with the stat. & Ann. c. 19; which, and the construction given to it in the case of B'ackswell v. Harper, 2 Atk. 93; Beckford v. Wood, 7 T. Rep. and some others, were no doubt within the view of the legislature which passed this act. But a subsequent act was passed on the 29th April 1802, c. 36, as a supplement to the before mentioned act, which declares, that every person who shall after a certain day, claim to be the author, or proprietor of any book, and shall thereafter seek to obtain a copyright of the same, agreeably to the rules prescribed by law, before he shall be entitled to the benefit of the act to which this is a supplement, he shall, in addition to the requisites enjoined in the third and fourth sections of the said act, give information, by causing the copy of the record, which, by said act, he is required to publish in one or more newspapers, to be inserted at full length in the title page, or in the rage immediately following the title. With respect to this new and additional requisite, it is most obvious that the proprietor can acquire no title to the copyright, unless it is complied with. He must cause the copy to be inserted as directed, before he can be entitled to the benefit of the act of 1790. What was the benefit conferred by that act? The answer is apparent:-a copyright for a certain number of years, with all the privileges, advantages and remedies which that act confers upon the proprietor of such copyright. If he has not that right, he can have no remedy of any kind. But the supplemental act declares that the person seeking to obtain this right, shall perform this new requisition, in addition to those prescribed in the third and fourth sections of theactof 1793, and that he must perform the whole, before he shall be entitled to the benefit of that act. It seems to me that the act will admit of no other construction. The meaning could not, I think, have been more clear and intelligible if the act had declared that "the proprietor, before he should be entitled to the benefit of the act of 1790, should cause a copy of the record of the title to be published; and shall deliver a copy of the book to the secretary of state, as directed by the third and fourth sections of that act; and shall also cause a copy of the said record to be inserted at full length in the title page, &c. That this was the intention of the legislature is strongly illustrated by the second section of this act, which secures to persons who shall invent &c. any historical or other print, the sole right of printing, publishing, &c. the same, provided he shall perform all the requisitions in relation thereto, as are directed in relation to maps, charts, and books, by the third and fourth sections of the act of 1790, and shall moreover cause the same entry to be engraved on such plate, with the name of the proprietor, and printed on every such print, as herein before required to be made on maps or charts. I am therefore of opinion that the plaintiffs are not enititled to a copyright in the Pharmacopoeia, of which they claim to be the proprietors, and that the injunction ought not to be granted. 3. NICHOLS V. RUGGLES, June T. 1808, 3 Day's Conn. Rep. 158. Per Cur. The provisions of the statute, which require the Contra to the preced author to publish the title of his book in a newspaper, and to de-ing case. liver a copy of the work itself to the secretary of state, are merely directory, and constitute no part of the essential requisites for securing the copyright. The publication in the newspaper is intended as legal notice of the rights secured to the author, but cannot be necessary, where actual notice is brought home to the party. The copy to be delivered to the secretary of state, appears to be designed for public purposes, and has no connection with the copyright. Swift and Smith, Js., dissented. 4. NICHOLS V. RUGGLES, June T. 1808, 3 Day's Conn. Rep. 158. This was an action of book debt; and among other charges in A contract the plaintiff's account, was one for printing a part of a book en- to reprint any literary titled "The Federal Calculator." It was proved, and admitted work, the copyright that when the printing was done, one Hawley had obtained the exclusive copyright of the book, as author, throughout the Uni- has been ted States. Per Cur. A contract to reprint any literary work, the copyright to which has been secured to the author, is void, unless it is entered into with the consent of the author, or his assignee. And the printer who executes the contract, with a knowledge of the rights of the author, can recover nothing for his labour. Swift and Smith, Js., dissented. to which secured to the author, is void. Contraton. See tit. Trover. Conveyance. See tit. Decd. Copics. See tit. Evidence. Persand dries of cor Corontr.* See tit. Sheriff. 1. GILES V. BROWN. June. T. 1917. 1 S. Ca. Const. Rep. 230. Per Cur. At common law, and by the act of 1706, the pow ers and duties of the coroners were both ministerial and judicial. In F ́s judicial capacity he is to inquire into cases of sudden death, by a jury of inquest, super visum corporis, at the place where the death lappered. If any one be found, by his inquest, guilty of homicide, the coroner must commit him to prison for further trial. He is to inquire also concerning accessaries before the fact or whether they have fled or not, and of all things that caused the death. Another branch of his jurisdiction, in his judicial character, is to inquire concerning shipwrecks, and to certify whether wreck or not, who is in possession of the goods, &c. also co cerning treasure trove, who are the finders, where it is, and and whether consealed or not. In his ministerial capacity, he is merely the substitute of the sheriff, as where the sheriff is a party, or where exception may be taken to the sheriff by reason of any partiality, for being a party to the suit, or of kin to either party. South Carolina Digest, page 112. * The worl coroner is derived f om corona, because he is an officer of the crown who hold pleas of things concerning the crown; 2 Inst. 31. It seems questionable whether the origin of coroner is later or coeval with that of the sheriff; see Bacon on Government, 66; Umf. on Coroner, 2. Nevertheless, it is an office of great antiquity, and ie is more the servant or officer of the king than the sheriff. It is evident he was a oficer in Alfred's time, for the king punished with death a judge for sentencing a party to sufer death upon the coroner's word, without allowing the delinquent liberty to traverse; Bacon on Government, 66. And Dodridge, J. says, the ofe› of cor mer is so ancient, that its commencement is not known; 3 Bu'st. 176. However the introduction of a coroner seems coeval with the sheriff, or the ancient write, for the election of sheriff, could not have been directed to the coroner; sco Gilb. Hist. of Exchequer; 6 Peterdorff's Abr. 407 (531.) 2. DAY and WHITTLESEY V. BRETT, May T. 1810, 6 Johns. New- pos When the sheriff her er, he is This was an action of debt, against the defendant, as coroner, for the escape of one Lawrence a sheriff. It appeare I that the plaintiffs had obtained a judgment against Lawrence upon which a ca. sc. was issued and delivered to the defendant as coroner, bed to At the trial, the plaintiff proved the judginent and ea sa. and that the defendant confessed, that having the ca. sa. in his session, he met Lawrence and told him of the ca. 54., that Law- of keeping rence then said he had in his custody a convict, and was going ody. with him to the state prison, and claimed on that account an exemption from arrest; that the defendant permitted Lawrence to proceed to the city of New York, that after his return the defendant arrested him, about the first of July 1809, and delivered him in gaol to the deputy sheriff who was gaoler; that on the same day, Lawrence left the gaol and went at large. Per Cur. Kent Ch. J. The only difficulty is to know what the coroner is to do with the sheriff, after he has taken him in execution; and this was the only embarrassing point with the court, in the case of Somes v. Lenthall, Sty. 465. In the present case, the defendant, after he had arrested the sheriff on the 1st of July, (for the preceding interview with the sheriff did not amount to an arrest,) delivered him in the gaol of the county, to the deputysheriff and gaoler, and he was immediately thereafter seen at large. The sheriff has, by statute, (Laws, vol. 1. 209.) and so he had at common law, (Dalton's sheriff, p. 5.) the custody of the gaols and prisons of the county, and the prisoners in the same. It is absurd, then, to suppose, that the sheriff can be committed to the gaol, of which he has, by law, the custody, and of which he appoints the keeper. None of the provisions in the statutes, relative to sheriffs and gaols, do or can, by eny reasonable construction, apply to this case, of an imprisonment of the sheriff himself. This must be considered as a casus omissas in the statute book, and it is left as it was at common law, by which the sheriff might make his own house, or any other place, a prison; (Latch. v. 16. Anon.) This is what the coroner ought to have done; for when process is awarded to him, to be executed, he is, as the old books express it, locum tenens vice comitis, and has the common law powers of a sheriff. He was bound, in this case, to have found some other place within the county tag the cominon gaol, for the imprisonment of the sheri!. It is to be regretted that there is no legislative provision applicable to tLig him a cus But if the coroner ar rest a depu case; and until some be made, we must lay down the rule of the common law as we find it, however inconvenient it may be to the officer, or hard upon the party. It is not to be admitted that a sheriff is to be exempted from the payment of his debts, or from the established means provided to compel a debtor in all other cases. The delivery of the sheriff to the county gaol, and leaving him there, was an escape; and judgment must be for the plaintiff. 3. COLBY V. SAMPSON, May T. 1809, 5 Mass. Rep. 310. This was an action of the case against the defendant, a coroner for misfeasance in his office in the service of an execution isty sheriff, sued upon judgment recovered by the plaintiff against one Miand the sher nott, a deputy sheriff. iff is not at the gaol, nor any per the coroner It appeared that the defendant had an execution against Mison author nott who was himself the deputy gaol-keeper under the sheriff, ized by him and that the defendent arrested Minott and carried him to the leaving the gaol-house (the sheriff being himself out of the state at the time prisoner at the gaol is on his own private business,) and left a copy of his precept in discharged, the house with Minott; that Minott was never confined in the iff is guilty gao', but continued to live in the gaol-house, pursuing his ordinaof an escape ry business, as if not arrested, or committed; and that the execution remained wholly unsatisfied. and the sher Per Cur. Parsons, C. J. From the facts before us in this case we are to decide whether the defendant was guilty of a misfeasance in his office, for which he is liable in this action. The execution was properly directed to the coroner, as the judgment debtor was a deputy of the sheriff. For by the statute of 1783. c. 43, executors are to be directed to the sheriff or his deputy, unless a party, and then the direction is to be to the coroner. The coroner has no gaol, and can commit only to the county gaol, of which by law the sheriff is the keeper. On this account exeutions against sheriffs are against their estates, but not against their bodies, because they cannot be committed. When therefore a coroner has arrested on execution, he like a constable, can only carry the prisoner to the gaol and offer to deliver him with a copy of the precept. If the sheriff refuse to receive and safely keep him, or if the sheriff is not there, nor any keeper appointed by him, to receive and confine the prisoner, the coroner has done his duty; and if afterwards the prisoner go at large, it is the escape of the sheriff. In the present case, the sheriff was not at the gaol, nor any deputy, to receive and confine Minott. For Minott being the only gaolkeeper, he could not receive and confine himself. Minott must |