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10.

STATE V. GUILD. Sept. T. 1828. 5 Halst. N. J. Rep. 163.

twelve

In this case a boy aged twelve years and five months, was Even a boy convicted on his own confessions, of the crime of murder, and years of age executed. The court said the capacity to commit a crime, necessarily supposes the capacity to confess it. In the case of State v. Dillon, 4 Dall. Rep. 116, quite a boy was indicted for arson, and the court allowed his voluntary confessions to be read, slightly corroborated by two witnesses; S. C. 3 Dane's Abr. of American Law, 339, sec. 27.

11.

STATE V. GUILD. Sept. T. 1828. 5 Halst. N. J. Rep. 163.

corroborat

Per Cur. A prisoner may be convicted on his own confession, Though un when proved by legal testimony, although it is uncorroborated ed, provid by any other evidence, provided the corpus delicti be proved.

12.

THE PEOPLE V. WEEKS. Oct. T. 1818. 3 Wheeler's Crim. Cas.
Gen. Sess. N. Y. S. P. COMMONWEALTH V. STEWART,
3 Dane's Abr. of American Law, 338, sec. 17; YOUNG V.
THE STATE. 2 Yerger's Tenn. Rep. 292.

ed the cor

pus

pus delicti proved.

confession

ken all to

The amount of this case is, that the whole of a prisoner's A prisoner's confession must be taken together, and the Mayor in charging must be ta the jury, said that where exculpatory facts were not contradicted by any other testimony, and as they were not improbable, inconsistent, or absurd, the jury were bound by them as much as the confession.*

13.

YOUNG V. THE STATE. July T. T. 1829. 2 Yerger's Tenn.

Rep. 292.

gether.

part.

Per Cur. Peck, J. The confessions of a prisoner must be And the ju taken altogether, but if his statements are irreconcileable, or ifry may be lieve a part part of the confession be disproved, or, if from all the facts and and reject a circumstances taken in connection with the confession, the jury believe a part, but not all of the statement, they must reject such parts as they are satisfied are not true, and act upon the other part without rejecting the whole confession.

cannot be recited to supply defective evidence; The King v. Mosey, 1 Leach, C. L. 265, n.

*The rule in the text agreer with the English rule. It is an established rule, that whenever a person's confession be made use of against him, it must be taken altogether, and not by parcels. See 2 Hawk. P. C. 643. sec. 5.

On an indict

ment for

14.

STATE V. SMITH. June T. 1811. 5 Day's Conn. Rep. 175.

The prisoner was convicted for passing counterfeit money, passing and a new trial was moved for, on the ground that his declaracounterfeit tions relating to such money, tending to evince his knowledge of declarations its spuriousness, were illegally admitted as evidence.

money, the

of the pris oner tend

ing to e vince a

ousness,

Per Cur. Mitchell, C. J. It is objected, that the Superior Court admitted evidence of a conversation of the prisoner, relknowledge ative to his uttering the note in question, in which he said, that of its spuri he did not know one S., with whom it appeared he came into held admis New Haven, where the bill was put off; and in which it was claimed, that S. had passed other counterfeit bills of the same bank. This testimony was offered as proof of the prisoner's scienter, and for that purpose, whatever he said or did relating to the counterfeit note was admissible.

sible.*

Ifa prisoner in speaking

witness who

was true as

went. but

15.

FINN V. THE COMMONWEALTH. Nov. T. 1827. 5 Rand. Va.
Rep. 701.

Per Cur. Brockenbrough, J. The plaintiff in error was inof the testi dicted for feloniously passing to one Whittaker, a counterfeit mony of a bank note. Judgment having been rendered against him, he obhad testified tained a writ of error at the last term of this court, and the quesagainst him; tion now is, whether the judgment shall be reversed or affirmed. says, "that what C.said The first branch of the bill of exceptions sets forth, that the atfar as he torney for the Commonwealth introduced a witness, who proved that he did that he had, during the last winter, a conversation with the prisnot say all, oner, while he was confined in jail, concerning the prosecution; or enough," this is noted the witness warned the prisoner against making any communias cation, informing him that he should be compelled to detail in of the pris evidence, whatever he communicated. The prisoner replied, does it lay that he knew it, and meant to explain the matter to him; the any founda prisoner then said, "that what Mr. Candler swore, at the called ving what court, was strictly true, as far as he went, but that he had not told all, or enough." An interruption of the conversation here took place, whilst the prisoner was in the act of speaking of Candler's testimony, nor was an opportunity again afforded him

confession

oner; nor

tion for pro

C. did

wear to.

• STATE V. PHELPS. Feb. T. 1794. 2 Root's Conn. Rep. 87; Superior Court; S. P. STATE V. OSBURNE. 1 Root's Rep. 152.

This was an information against the defendant for making counterfeit guineas, the prosecutor was unable to produce any of the spurious guineas, but the court permitted him to give in evidence, confessions of the prisoner as to his making the counterfeit guineas.

of renewing it. In this interrupted conversation, the prisoner
did not attempt to recapitulate the testimony which Candler had.
given at the called court; but merely referred to it as before
mentioned. The attorney for the Commonwealth, then offered
to prove by other witnesses, what Candler had testified before
the called court, having first proved that Candler, though living,
is beyond the jurisdiction of the court, having left the common-
wealth soon after he was summoned to attend the court as a wit-
ness. The prisoner objected to this evidence, but the court ad-
mitted it, instructing the jury, however, that although the testi-
mony was admissible, yet it was peculiarly proper for them to
consider and decide on the weight to which it was entitled, from
the interruption of the conversation, in which the prisoner had
spoken of Candler's evidence. It seems to this court, that
there is a weighty objection to the admission of the evidence
which was introduced to prove what Candler had sworn to in the
called court. The attorney for the commonwealth supposed
that he had laid a foundation for the introduction of that evi-
dence, in the interrupted conversation of the prisoner. The ob
jection to the evidence is, that in reality the prisoner made no
confession of guilt at all; the conversation was rather a decla-
ration of his innocence, than a confession of his guilt.
was it a confession that Candler's evidence was true, he said that
what Candler swore to, was true, as far as he went, but he did
not say all, or enough. If a witness has told the truth, but not
the whole truth, his evidence is not true. The conversation, then-
of the prisoner, laid no foundation whatever, for the introduc-
tion of the other evidence, and both should have been excluded
from the consideration of the jury.

Judgment reversed.

16.

STATE V. RIDGELY, May T. 1785. 2 Maryland Rep. 120.

Nor

The court

tions of a

The prisoner was indicted for murder, and the question was, admitted whether the declaration of the prisoner antecedent to the the declara fact, was admissible, when it tends to explain and reconcile his prisoner conduct. The Court allowed the declaration to be evidence, be- a murder, cause it tended to discover the quo animo the act was commit- which tend ted.

made before

ed to ex

plain his conduct.

17.

COMMONWEALTH V. WAITE, May T. 1809, 5 Mass. Rep. 261.

The confes

S. C. 3 Dane's Abr. of Amr. Law, 338, sec. 14. Per Cur. Parsons, C. J. The confession of a witness in a sions of a

a criminal

tency, are

witness, in criminal prosecution, as to his competency, cannot be admitted case, as to to disqualify him. If the law were not so, any unwilling withis incompe ness for the commonwealth, might deprive the commonwealth of his testimony, by declarations of his interest, in the presqualify him, ence of the friends of the defendant, who by testifying to those declarations, might always prevent his being sworn.

ble to dis

The confes

to members

18.

COMMONWEALTH V. DRAKE, May T. 1818, 15 Mass. Rep. 161. sions of a The defendant was indicted and convicted for open and gross party made lewdness. After verdict a new trial was moved for, on the of the same ground that evidence had been given of the confessions of the church may defendant, which had been made by him, as penitential confessbe given in evidence. ions, to the witnesses, as members of a church, of which the de

To make the declara

fendant was also a member, and none but such members having been present at such communications. The Court, deliberating, overruled the motion, and sentenced the defendant.

The confession of a prisoner, though confidential, may be given in evidence against him; The State v. Thompson, Kirby's Rep. 345. S. C. Norris' Peake, 44; note.

19.

COMMONWEALTH V. GEORGE CROWNINSHIELD, Nov. T. 1830, 10 Pickg. Mass. Rep. 497. See COMMONWEALTH V. JOSEPH JENKINS KNAPP, 10 Pickg. 477.

Richard Crowninshield, J. Frances Knapp, Joseph J. Knapp, tions of a and George Crowninshield, the prisoner at the bar, were indictconspirator, ed for the murder of Joseph White, the two former as princiance of the pals, and the two latter as accessaries.

in further

common ob ject, admis sible in evi dence a

conspirator,

One Palmer testified to the following effect: On the 2nd. of April, 1830, I was at the chamber of George and Richard gainst a co Crowninshield. At about 2 o'clock J. Francis Knapp, and one it is suffi Allen came there. The Crowninshields, Francis and Allen, cient that walked away together, George and Francis being a little ahead they have been proved of the other two. At four o'clock the Crowninshields returned by a compe tent wit to the chamber. George told Richard, that Francis said his brother, Joseph J. Knapp, wished him (George) to kill Joseph White of Salem. George said Francis told him that Joseph K. would pay one thousand dollars to any individual who would commit the act. George said White had gone to his farm in Beverly. George said he told Francis he could not give him. an answer now, but that he would see him again at 8 o'clock, and would then give him an answer. George asked me if I would

ness.

kill White, saying that I was in want of funds, and that this would be a good time to supply my wants. Richard told me it would be a good time to go out and meet White, and overturn his carriage; that he was so old, this must inevitably kill him. George told me if I would kill White, I should have one third of the sum which the Knapps were to give him. I said I would have nothing to do with the affair. Richard told George, that what he had said was too poor a story to be palmed off upon him and me. George then said he had made April fools of us. Richard then said yesterday was fool's day; upon which George said he had made a fool of himself, and laughed. In the evening between 6 and 7 o'clock, Francis returned and took Richard away with him. The witness was going on to state what Richard said at that time, George not being present, when the counsel for the prisoner objected.

Per Cur. If there was a conspiracy, it would be immaterial by whichcf the conspirators the murder should be committed. Ta king the testimony of Palmer to be admissible in the case, there is a proposition by Francis to George to commit the murder. George communicates it to Richard. There is evidence of the murder having been perpetrated by Francis as principal. The main object has been effected. The question is, whether George and Richard conspired to effect it. George states in the pres ence of Richard and the witnesses, the proposition made by Francis. He urges the witness to participate in the murder, and Richard proposes a mode of executing it. George adds in the presence of Richard, that if the witness would perform it, he should have one third of the reward offered. This would seem to be a proposition by George to pay one third. Richard was assenting, inasmuch as he proposed a mode of doing the murder, and if Palmer assented, the reward was to be divided between the three. We are of opinion, that there is sufficient evidence to show that Richard and George came into an agreement so far as the deed was to be done by the hand of the witness, and it is immaterial by whose hand it was afterwards effected. We think the declarations in question are to be admit ted as evidence against George.

20.

THE STATE V. POWELL. May T. 1824. 2 Halst. N. J. Rep.

p. 244.

Indictment for manslaughter.

On an in

dictment for

The attorney for the state, in opening, observed, that he manslaugh VOL. III.

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tor, declara

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