The second form of citing amended acts, noting the original law and all its changes, it is believed is constitutional in all states. The third form — citing the last amendment only — is legal in all states. Formerly in Illinois the court held that only the last amendment of an act was the law if the amendment was "enacted so as to read as follows." The court adopted the view that the original act was entirely replaced by the amendment. It was an absolute repeal. The amendment was a law back of which the courts could not look. Their concern was only with the present law and the amendment alone was the present law. Since the court held also that no law could amend a repealed act, the conclusion was that a law purporting to amend an original act, instead of the subsequent amendment, was void. A similar holding controls in Indiana.2 But this view was repudiated in Illinois in 1904.3 The weight of authority favors the validity of an amendment to an original act even if another amendment previously adopted is not mentioned. In practice, however, in citing amended laws for subsequent amendment it is best to cite them "as amended" - the second form described above. Amending Repealed and Unconstitutional Acts An interesting question arises when an act purports to amend a law which technically has no existence. Of ter of law. If a second amendment refer to the original law it is liable to be held void. Similar, Peele v. Ohio and Indiana Oil Co., 63 N. E. 763 (Ind. 1902). 1 Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company v. City of East St. Louis, 134 Ill. 656 (1890). 2 Peele v. Ohio and Ind. Oil Co., 63 N. E. 763 (Ind. 1902). 3 Village of Melrose Park v. Dunnebecke, 210 Ill. 422 (1904). these acts there are two sorts, those which are drawn to amend laws which have been repealed, and those which attempt to validate by amendment acts which have been declared unconstitutional. Theory lies all on one side of the argument. A law which amends an unconstitutional law or one the existence of which was terminated by repeal, should have no more force than one which purported to amend any other document to which the character of law had been denied or had never been given. But the majority of decisions follow a milder rule. Unconstitutional laws are printed in the statute books as are other laws. The same technical work has to be done in amending them as in amending valid laws. There may be the argument of convenience that it is unnecessary to republish a long law when the change of but one section will cure the defect. Further, if the law cannot be amended to make it valid, it cannot be repealed to remove it from the statutes - for the same logic would deny that there was any law to amend or to be removed. But it is an obvious advantage to have the power to take the void laws off the statute books, for if they remain they confuse the law and continue to control the action of the people who see the printed statute but do not know that its force has been destroyed. In the case of repealed laws, too, the acts are already on the statute books and there can be no reason, barring constitutional limitations, why the amendment cannot be held to work a revival of the parts which are not 1 Technically they have never been laws, actually they may have been on the statute books and obeyed for years. A validating amendment may, so far as the effect on the public is concerned, do no more than an amendment of a valid law. changed.1 As far as those who obey the law are concerned, the amendment of a repealed law would have the same effect as a new law, and the law would be as easily ascertained as would be the case if a valid law of the same date were amended. 1 A repealed act may be amended, Minn. and M. Land and Imp. Co. v. Billings, 111 Fed. 972 (U. S. C. C. Ap. 1901), (dictum). Col. Wire Co. v. Boyce, 104 Fed. Rep. 172 (1900). Harper v. State, 109 Ala. 28 (1895). Fletcher v. Prather, 102 Cal. 413 (1894). Reynolds v. Board of Education, 72 Pac. 274 (1903). State v. Brewster, 39 Ohio 653 (1883). A repealed act may be amended "so as to read as follows,"- White v. Inebriate's Home, 141 N. Y. 123 (1894). Van Clief v. Van Vechten, 55 Hun. 467 (N. Y. 1890). Golonbieski v. State, 101 Wis. 333 (1898). Act amending a repealed act is void,— Louisville & N. R. Co. v. City of East St. Louis, 134 Ill. 656 (1890). Lampkin v. Pike, 115 Ga. 827 (1902). In re Terrett, 34 Mont. 325 (1906). Wall v. Garrisen, 11 Col. 515 (1888). Peele v. Ohio, etc., Oil Co., 158 Ind. 375 (1902). Blakemore v. Dolan, 50 Ind. 194 (1875). An unconstitutional act may be amended,- Minnesota and M. Land and Imp. Co. v. Billings, 111 Fed. 972 (U. S. C. C. Ap. 1901). People v. De Blaay, 137 Mich. 402 (1904). Keystone, S. T. & T. Co. v. Borough of Ridley Park, 28 Pa. Sup. Ct. 635 (1905). An unconstitutional act cannot be amended,— Cowley v. Town of Rushville, 60 Ind. 327 (1878). City of Plattsmouth v. Murphy, 74 Neb. 749 (1905). An unconstitutional act may be repealed,— The weight of opinion is in favor of the validity of amendments of repealed and unconstitutional acts. The present holdings of the state courts are, however, so divided that unless an authoritative state decision covers the point the safe standard is not to amend a repealed act and not to rely on amendment to make an unconstitutional law valid. CHAPTER XIII RESOLUTIONS Barring a constitutional limitation, any purpose accomplished by a bill may be accomplished by a resolution. Differences between the two are chiefly customary; a measure which begins with words of enactment such as "Be it enacted by the Legislature of is a bill, a measure which begins "Be it resolved" is a resolution, though the content of the two may be identical.1 After passage into law the bill becomes an "act," the resolution formally remains a "resolution." In essence, then, bills and resolutions differ in form but not necessarily in substance. Often legislative rules provide a more summary procedure for the passage of resolutions and where this is the case resort will be had to them where the added technicalities of bill procedure proper make it opportune. The use of resolutions, however, is subjected by custom to important limitations and our constitutions often intentionally, sometimes apparently without design, place restrictions on their use. Custom has made the rule that the ordinary means of lawmaking shall be by bill and has confined resolutions to a subordinate sphere in which they facilitate the making of laws or declare the wish of the legislature without fixing a definite, permanent and general rule of 1 1 In some states, however, a practice is now developing by which resolutions start with an enacting clause to avoid possible conflict with the constitutional rules as to "style." See, for example, the South Carolina practice. |