The furnishing of the first luncheon was with the knowledge of the defendants' counsel who made no objection to proceeding before the referees, but until the day after the award had been published counsel did not know of the second luncheon at which cigars also were supplied. Trust Co. v. Abbott, 162 Mass. 148, 153, 38| great value the plaintiffs did not keep them N. E. 432, 27 L. R. A. 271; Moseley v. Simp-in a safe place, were so remote, speculative, son, L. R. 16 Eq. 226. collateral and immaterial as bearing on the question of the value of the insured property as well as tending to confuse the jury and direct their attention from the material issues upon which they were to pass, that their exclusion was within the sound discretion of the judge. Abbott v. Shepard, 142 Mass. 17, 21, 6 N. E. 826; Anthony v. New York, Providence & Boston R. R., 162 Mass. 60, 37 N. E. 780; Dolan v. Boott Cotton Mills, 185 Mass. 576, 579, 70 N. E. 1025. The exclusion in cross-examination of a witness called by the plaintiffs of a question calling for his recollection of what a witness had said before the referees, and of a question to one of the plaintiffs if he testified before the referees substantially as he had at the trial and also "something more than at the trial" and of a copy of the brief for the defendants submitted to the referees, does not appear to have prejudiced the substantive rights of the defendants. Worrell v. Baldwin Chain & Mfg. Co., 222 Mass. 355, 110 N. E. 967; St. 1913, c. 716, § 1. [10, 11] The entertainment of an arbitrator or referee by one of the interested parties ordinarily is censurable. It may be so flagrant in character as to justify and require the setting aside of the award. See Robinson v. Shanks, 118 Ind. 125, 20 N. E. 713. But the jury to whom in the case at bar this question was rightly left could find, that there was no concealment by the plaintiffs on either occasion, and that they did not act corruptly or with the intention of inducing the referees to decide in their favor, and that the referees accepted the hospitality only as a courtesy, not deeming the occasion as one of them a witness for the defendants was properly permitted to state in cross-examination, of any importance, and that the referees had not been influenced thereby but acted throughout the proceedings in good faith. Brown v. Bellows, 4 Pick. 179, 192; Strong v. Strong, 9 Cush. 560; Farrell v. German Ins. Ass'n, 175 Mass. 340, 347, 56 N. E. 572; Morville v. American Tract Soc., 123 Mass. 129, 139, 140, 141, 25 Am. Rep. 40; Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Goehring, 99 Pa. 13; Crossley v. Clay, 5 C. B. 581; Hopper v. Wrightson, L. R. 2 Q. B. 367, 374. [14] It furthermore does not appear that all the evidence introduced by both parties before the referees was offered at the trial, and a portion is manifestly insufficient to enable a jury to determine whether the referees committed such gross mistakes of overvaluation as to show misconduct. Brown v. Bellows, 4 Pick. 179, 192; Bell v. Price, 21 N. J. Law, 32, 36, 37, 38. The jury on the evidence submitted to them were to decide under suitable instructions whether the total amount awarded was so grossly in excess and out of all proportion to the actual loss sustained, as to show when viewed in connection with the other allegations of misconduct, that there was fraud or partiality on the part of the referees. [12, 13] The policies having insured the patterns, drawings, models, jigs, and blueprints and printed matter pertaining to the manufacture of planers and other machinery, and also all the fixed and movable machinery and machines with extra and spare parts [15-18] It being plain for reasons previousof the same and the shafting, belting, pul- ly stated that on its face the award as leys and hangers which were contained in matter of law was not invalid on either the plaintiffs' three-story frame building, ground alleged, and could only be impeached basement and additions, and the defendants by extrinsic evidence, the request that a verhaving pleaded that the award was so gross-dict for the defendants be ordered could not ly in excess of the actual amount of the loss have been given. It is sufficient to say, that as to show that the referees must have been the plaintiffs not having contended that the biased or acted corruptly, a large amount of demand by the defendants for resubmission evidence as to the value of the property at had been waived, the requests relating therethe time of the fire was introduced by the to were immaterial, while full and accurate parties. But offers of proof by the defend- instructions were given that the plaintiff's ants, that the style of planers to be manu- could not recover unless the award was found factured by the plaintiffs, and the drawings to be valid. The judge was not required to and patterns therefor had been greatly di- give the requests based on particular portions minished in value because other planers of of the evidence. Moseley v. Washburn, 167 alleged improved types had been put upon the Mass. 345, 362, 45 N. E. 753. And the plainmarket, and of the cost to the plaintiffs of tiffs' requests to the giving of which the demanufacturing the planers and the time re- fendants excepted were correct and approquired and the number of men who neces-priate. Washington Mills Mfg. Co. v. Weysarily must be employed, and the percentage mouth Ins. Co., 135 Mass. 503; Farrell v. of planers made by other manufacturers, and German Am. Ins. Co., 175 Mass. 341, 56 N. E. the place in which the plaintiffs' drawings 572; Hanley v. Ætna Ins. Co., 215 Mass. 425, and models were stored, or whether they 102 N. E. 641, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 53. The decould have been put in a safe, or why if of fendants also excepted to the instructions. It was unnecessary for the judge to recite the [ sufficient to warrant submission of the issue of evidence. The jury were told: the landlord's negligence. "If you find that in the making of this award there was fraud on the part of one or more referees, or bias or prejudice, or that there was misconduct on the part of Doherty or some one else that influenced one or more of the referees in the making of the award, then the award would not be valid. But if you find that these referees acted honestly and with a desire to arrive at a just and correct result, then the award would be valid. That is to say gentlemen, if you find that the referees were free from bias, prejudice or fraud in the making of the award and that there was no misconduct on the part of the plaintiff or anybody else that influenced them in the making of the award, then you will be justified in finding the award was valid." "One of the grounds on which the defendants base their claims is that as they allege the award was grossly excessive. The plaintiffs deny that the award was excessive. The plaintiff's claim that the actual value of the insured property at the time of the fire was in excess of the amount of the award, so it becomes necessary for you to ascertain whether the amount of the award was excessive. "Even if you should find that the award was excessive that would not be sufficient to warrant you in finding that because of that circumstance alone there was fraud, bias or prejudice on the part of any of the referees. It is only when the award is so grossly and palpably above the actual loss as to afford intrinsic evidence of fraud, bias or prejudice on the part of one or more of the referees that you would be warranted in finding that there was fraud, bias or prejudice on the part of one or more of the referees because the award was in excess of the actual value of the insured property." The charge is to be considered as a whole, and without further review the law by which the jury were to be guided was correctly and clearly stated. Conners Bros. Co. v. Sullivan, 220 Mass. 600, 108 N. E. 503. We have considered all the exceptions in so far as argued and finding no reversible error the order must be: [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Landlord and Tenant, Cent. Dig. §§ 6146, 667, 684; Dec. Dig. 169(11).] Exceptions from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Frederick Lawton, Judge. Two actions by Maria C. Stagnaro and by John Stagnaro, her husband, against James Fitzgerald. To the court's refusal to rule that on all the evidence plaintiffs could not recover, defendant excepts. Exceptions overruled. F. W. Fosdick, of Boston, for plaintiffs. Dickson & Knowles, of Boston, for defendant. PIERCE, J. [1] There was evidence from which the jury could find that the defendant, as owner of the premises, had possession and control of the stairway; as such, it was his duty to use reasonable care to keep it in as safe condition for its intended use as it was, or appeared to be, when the male plaintiff beWard v. Blouin, 210 Mass. came a tenant. 140, 96 N. E. 61; Domenicis v. Fleisher, 195 Mass. 281, 81 N. E. 191. [2] There was evidence that it was not in as good condition at the time of the injury as when the plaintiffs first moved in; that the defendant's attention had been called to the alleged "unsafe and dangerous condition of the stairway" at least two weeks before the accident; that the "treads" had gradually "worn way down to the scotia"; "to a hollow which had worn the nosing out"; that the nosing was worn through to what is known as the scotia; that "the scotia were broken in the center where the treads were most worn"; that the plaintiff, Maria C. Stagnaro, on January 22, 1912, as she testified, "started from her living apartment on the third floor to go to her office which was on the second floor; that she started to go slowly down the stairway in question with her hands on the rail; that when she got about on the middle of the stairs she put her right foot down and her left foot got caught on a broken step, 'got caught right in the middle, you know, in one of the steps got 1. LANDLORD AND TENANT 169 (11)-INJU- caught, and I hold myself with my hands, RIES TO TENANT-DEFECTS IN PREMISESDUE CARE-EVIDENCE-SUFFICIENCY. but I went like that'; that she fell to the botEvidence that plaintiff started to go slow-tom of the stairs; that her foot was on the ly down a stairway, with her hands on the rail, eighth step when she fell, 'the eighth going but that her foot caught and caused her to fall, Exceptions overruled. STAGNARO v. FITZGERALD (two cases). (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Suffolk. May 20, 1916.) owing to the fact that the treads were worn and up, eighth coming down.' On cross-exam the scotia broken, is sufficient to warrant sub-ination she testified that she thought she realmission of the issue of her due care, in suits ly knew how she got hurt; that according against the landlord. to her story she was terribly injured; that the exact stair where her foot got caught was in the middle of the stairs; that no one has told her that the edge of the eighth stair was worn a little more than any of the oth [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Landlord and Tenant, Cent. Dig. §§ 646, 667, 684; Dec. Dig. 169(11).] 2. LANDLORD AND TENANT 169(11)-INJURIES TO TENANT-DEFECTS IN PREMISES NEGLIGENCE OF LANDLORD-EVIDENCE-SUF-ers; that she caught her heel in the mould FICIENCY. Such evidence, where it also was in evidence that the landlord had been notified of the dangerous condition of the stairway two weeks before the accident and had not repaired it, is ing which was underneath the edge of one of those treads which were in evidence, a broken step; that as she fell she struck on the post and fell around the corner and landed For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes against the wall in the hall, near the office 5. BANKS AND BANKING door. Upon these facts and upon the evidence which the jury might derive from an inspection of the treads and scotia which were shown to the jury, and exhibited to the court at the argument, the presiding judge was warranted in submitting the issue of the female plaintiff's due care and that of the defendant's negligence to the jury. It follows that he refused rightly to rule "that upon all the evidence the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover." Exceptions overruled. (224 Mass. 190) WEITZEL v. BROWN. (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Suffolk. May 19, 1916.) BANKS ASSESSMENTS 250(4)-NATIONAL - RIGHTS OF STOCK The Comptroller's certificate being sufficient evidence of a receiver's appointment, where the receiver is ordered to enforce shareholder's individual liability, he may sue in his own name. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Banks and Banking, Cent. Dig. §§ 932, 933, 937, 938; Dec. Dig. 250(4).] 6. BANKS AND BANKING ERS-ACTIONS. 250(1)-RECEIV in Kentucky may sue in the courts of Massachusetts a stockholder resident in that state, since he is clothed with all the rights the bank itself had. The receiver of an insolvent national bank [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Banks and Banking, Cent. Dig. §§ 932, 933, 936; Dec. Dig. 250(1).] 7. BANKS AND BANKING 248(1) NATION- [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Banks and Dec. Dig. 248(1).] 1. EVIDENCE 44, 341-ADMISSIBILITY-OF- Banking, Cent. Dig. §§ 913, 915, 926, 929-931; FICIAL DOCUMENTS JUDICIAL NOTICE. Under Rev. St. U. S. § 884 (U. S. Comp. St. 1913. § 1496), providing that every certificate of the Comptroller of the Currency in pursuance of law, under seal, and all copies certified, shall be received in evidence in all places and courts, and sections 178, 327 (sections 260, 498), providing that a deputy may exercise the powers of the Comptroller's office, and the rule that the courts will take judicial notice that a certain person was a deputy Comptroller and assume that at the date of his certificate he was duly authorized to act, all certificates from the Comptroller's office, authenticated by seal, are admissible. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. §§ 66, 1289-1292; Dec. Dig. 44, 341.] 2. BANKS AND BANKING 287(2)-NATIONAL [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Banks and Banking, Cent. Dig. §§ 1089-1093; Dec. Dig. 287(2).] Report from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Jabez Fox, Judge. Action by Fred W. Weitzel, receiver of the First National Bank of New London, Ky., against Henry Park Brown. Verdict directed for defendant. Case reported on stipulation. Judgment for plaintiff as stipulated. Brandeis, Dunbar & Nutter, of Boston (J. Butler Studley and Austin T. Wright, both of Boston, of counsel), for plaintiff. Henry P. Brown, of Boston, pro se. BRALEY, J. [1] By Rev. Sts. U. S. § 884 (U. S. Comp. St. 1913, § 1496), "every certificate, assignment, and conveyance executed BANKS-POWERS OF COMPTROLLER. Since, under Rev. St. U. S. § 5234 (U. S. by the Comptroller of the Currency, in Comp. St. 1913, § 9821), the power to adjudi- pursuance of law, and sealed with his seal cate that a national bank is insolvent, and to of office, shall be received in evidence in all appoint a receiver, and to levy assessments on stockholders and order their collection, is vest-places and courts; and all copies of papers ed in the Comptroller of the Currency, a stock-in his office, certified by him and authentiholder, sued by the receiver for assessments, can-cated by the said seal, shall in all cases be not question the legality of the receiver's ap- evidence equally with the originals. An impointment. pression of such seal directly on the paper shall be as valid as if made on wax or wafer." And by sections 178, 327 (sections 260, 498), a deputy Comptroller of the Currency may exercise the powers and discharge the duties attached to the office of Comptroller during a vacancy in that office or in the absence or inability of the Comptroller. If necessary the court also will take judicial notice that a certain person was deputy Comptroller, and will assume "that at the date of his certificate he was authorized to exercise the powers and discharge the duties of the Comptroller and was therefore at the time acting Comptroller." Keyser v. Hitz, An assessment on stockholders of an insolv- 133 U. S. 138, 10 Sup. Ct. 290, 33 L. Ed. 531. ent national bank by the Comptroller binds It is plain under these statutes that all of stockholders, even if levied without notice to 3. BANKS AND BANKING 236-NATIONAL BANKS ASSESSMENTS - RIGHTS OF STOCKHOLDERS. The validity of a national bank's incorporation is not open to collateral attack by the stockholder whose liability the receiver seeks to enforce. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Banks and Banking, Cent. Dig. §§ 888-892; Dec. Dig. 236.] 4. BANKS AND BANKING BANKS HOLDERS. them. ASSESSMENT 248(2)—NATIONAL RIGHTS OF STOCK [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Banks and Banking, Cent. Dig. § 914; Dec. Dig. 248(2).] the certificates from the Comptroller's office authenticated by his seal were admissible in evidence. Keyser v. Hitz, 133 U. S. 138, 10 Sup. Ct. 290, 33 L. Ed. 531; Adams v. John For other cases see same topi. and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 112 N.E.-60 son, 107 U. S. 251, 2 Sup. Ct. 246, 27 L. Ed. 386. See Wigmore on Ev. §§ 1677, 1684. having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and (224 Mass. 215) (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Suffolk. May 20, 1916.) 1. POWERS 41 VESTING OF ESTATE IN DONEE. Although a power is exercised by a testatrix, the property vests in the appointee under the will of the donor of the power. 41.] [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Powers, Cent. Dig. § 156; Dec. Dig. 2. PERPETUITIES MULATIONS. 4(20) - POWERS - Accu [2-5] The power to adjudicate that a national bank is insolvent, and to appoint a receiver, and to levy assessments on the stockholders, and to order their collection being vested in the Comptroller, the defendant cannot inquire into the legality of the DEXTER v. ATTORNEY GENERAL et al. plaintiff's appointment. Rev. St. U. S. § 5234 (U. S. Comp. St. 1913, § 9821). It is enough that he has been appointed and is a receiver in fact. Cadle v. Baker, 20 Wall. 650, 22 L. Ed. 448. The jury from the defendant's answers to the interrogatories and his correspondence with the plaintiff well could find that, even if he did not assent when the charter of the bank was renewed, he neither withdrew nor transferred his shares, but continued to receive dividends as An appointment by will, devising a life they were declared, and his name as a share-estate to several, and at death of survivor to holder appeared on the books of the bank accumulate to be paid to grandnephews and with his consent at the date of insolvency. grandnieces, if any, who may then be living as It moreover is settled that the validity of the bank's incorporation is not open to collateral attack by the stockholder whose liability the receiver seeks to enforce. Casey v. Galli, 94 U. S. 673, 24 L. Ed. 168. The assessment made by the Comptroller also bound the defendant, even if levied without notice to him. United States v. Knox, 102 U. S. 422, 26 L. Ed. 216; Finn v. Brown, 142 U. S. 56, 12 Sup. Ct. 136, 35 L. Ed. 936. And the Comptroller's certificate being sufficient evidence of the plaintiff's appointment, and having been ordered as receiver to enforce the individual liability of the shareholder under the assessment the action can be maintained in his own name. Kennedy V. Gibson, 8 Wall. 498, 19 L. Ed. 476; Bank v. Kennedy, 17 Wall. 19, 21 L. Ed. 554; Howarth v. Lombard, 175 Mass. 576, 578, 56 N. E. 888. 49 L. R. A. 301; Platt v. Beebe, 57 N. Y. 339. [6, 7] It is urged that the trial court was without jurisdiction. But being domiciled in this commonwealth and the plaintiff as receiver being clothed with all the rights which the bank as a citizen possessed to bring suit on any demand it might have held against him, the defendant can be impleaded in our own courts, and the plaintiff is not obliged to resort to the federal tribunals. Act Cong. March 3, 1887, c. 373, § 3, 24 Stat. 554 (U. S. Comp. St. 1913, § 1048); Leather Mfrs.' Nat. Bank v. Cooper, 120 U. S. 778, 7 Sup. Ct. 777, 30 L. Ed. 816; Petri v. Commercial Nat. Bank of Chicago, 142 U. S. 644, 12 Sup. Ct. 325, 35 L. Ed. 1144; Ex parte Jones, 164 U. S. 693, 17 Sup. Ct. 222, 41 L. Ed. 601; Cragie v. Hadley, 99 N. Y. 131, 1 N. E. 537, 52 Am. Rep. 9; Davis v. Watkins, 56 Neb. 288, 76 N. W. 575. The liability is contractual and not statutory. Richmond v. Irons, 121 U. S. 27, 7 Sup. Ct. 788, 30 L. Ed. 864; Converse v. Ayer, 197 Mass. 443, 454, 84 N. E. 98. The plaintiff having been entitled to go to the jury before a court they shall respectively attain 21, with remainder Where there is a gift to a class, the estate vests whenever a member of the class comes within the description. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. §§ 1116, 1121; Dec. Dig. 524(1).] 4. WILLS 524(6) CONSTRUCTION-DESIGNATION OF DEVISEES "THEN LIVING." In a will devising a life estate to several, on death of last survivor, to accumulate to be paid to grandnephews and grandnieces, if any, "who may then be living," as they attain 21, the words "then living" refer to grandnephews survivor, and are descriptive of the class who and grandnieces alive at the death of the last are to take, and are not used as defining the time when they are to come into enjoyment of the property. Dig. § 1122; Dec. Dig. 524(6). Second Series, Then Living.] 733(3)-CONSTRUCTION-DEVISE TO CLASS "THEN LIVING." In such case, a grandnephew and grandniece, living at death of last life tenant, and any nine months thereafter, take title to the properissue of married nephews or nieces born within ty, a proportionate distribution thereof with accumulated income to be made whenever a distributee arrives at 21 years. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. §§ 1825, 1826; Dec. Dig. 733(3).] Case Reserved from Supreme Judicial Court, Suffolk County. Suit for construction of a will by Philip Dexter, trustee, against Henry C. Attwill, as For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes Attorney General, and others. Decree or- shares among the legal representatives of a dered in accordance with opinion. daughter and grandson of the testator, the Malcolm Donald and Stafford F. Johnson, survivors of the four children for whom the both of Boston (Fish, Richardson, Herrick & residuary provisions were made, or whether Neave, of Boston, of counsel), for Gwladys C. the clause should be construed as meaning Hopkins, adm'x with the will annexed of a gift in favor of the grand-nephews and Mark Hopkins, Jr., et al. Currier, Young & grand-nieces who are living when the first Pillsbury, of Boston, for Frederic B. Green-grand-nephew and grand-niece reaches the halge, guardian ad litem for unborn issue age of twenty-one, under which construction of Georgiana Musgrave. Arthur H. Brooks, the gift is void for remoteness, the charity of Boston, guardian ad litem for Mark Hop- fails, and a partial intestacy resulting, the kins et al. Robert Homans, of Boston, for heirs at law of the testatrix take the entire Royall Parsons et al. Benj. Loring Young, property which would include her own propof Boston, for executors of will of A. J. Par-erty and the property over which she was givsons. A. G. Grant, of Boston, for executors of will of Georgiana Parsons.. Henry C. Attwill, Atty. Gen., and Wm. Harold Hitchcock, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the Attorney Gen eral. en the power of appointment. While the testatrix intended to exercise, and did exercise, the power, the property vested under the will of the donor of the power. Raymond v. Commonwealth, 192 Mass. 486, 490, 78 N. E. 514. But whether by the terms of the power it could be exercised at a period ex BRALEY, J. [1-5] The testatrix after de vising her real property either in fee or up-ceeding the limits of the rule against peron certain trusts and making gifts of pecuniary legacies under the sixth clause, where she states that the will is to operate not only on the "remainder of my property and estate of every description," but "including all which I may be in any manner entitled to dispose of, or may be authorized to exercise any power of appointment over by virtue of any will, deed of trust, settlement of an annuity, or other instrument me enabling or however otherwise," declared in the sixteenth clause: "All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate including all over which I have any right of disposal as above I dispose of as follows. The trustees under my will are to divide and pay over the whole net income thereof equally between my mother, my sister Georgiana, and my brother Jeffrey and the survivors and the last survivor of them for and during their natural lives, such payment to be made them annually at such time as may be most convenient. And upon the death of the last survivor, the said income is to be added to the principal to be allowed to accumulate, and the whole trust fund then to be paid over in proportionate shares to my grandnephews and grandnieces, if any, who may then be living, as they shall arrive respectively at the age of twenty-one years; and if none living to take the same, then to pay over and distribute the whole rest, residue and remainder of my whole estate to and among such charitable institutions in New England as they, the trustees, may select & judge to be most beneficial and useful, especially preferring, but therein, however, acting at their own discretion, such as are for the benefit of children." The codicils changing the legacies and certain devises of real estate do not affect these provisions. The last life tenant having deceased, at whose death a grand-niece and grand-nephew of the testatrix were living, the question is, whether they are entitled to share in the trust fund, or whether the gift is limited to the children of the two nephews and one niece who were living when the testatrix died, or whether the appointment by the testatrix under the power given in the will of her father is void for remoteness, and if held void, the fund should be distributed under the residuary clause of his will in equal petuities, and therefore no part of the donor's property passed, need not be decided. The life tenants were living not only at her death but at the death of her father, and from the language used by the testatrix, it is manifest she intended that her grand-nieces and grandnephews living at a certain time should take the residue of her estate. A grand-niece and grand-nephew were living when the last life tenant died, and where there is a gift to a class the estate vests whenever a member of the class comes within the description. Fosdick v. Fosdick, 6 Allen, 41, 43, 44. The words "then living" refer to the grandnephews and grand-nieces alive at "the death of the last survivor," and are descriptive of the class who are to take. Sears v. Russell, 8 Gray, 86; Thomson v. Ludington, 104 Mass. 193; Boston Safe Deposit Co. v. Blanchard, 196 Mass. 35, 81 N. E. 654. And are not used as defining the time when they should come into enjoyment of the property. Ball v. Holland, 189 Mass. 369, 372, 75 N. E. 713, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1005. The gift accordingly vested, although possession is postponed until they arrive respectively at the age of twenty-one years, which measures the period of accumulation, but imposes no unlawful restraint on alienation. Claflin v. Claflin, 149 Mass. 19, 20 N. E. 454, 3 L. R. A. 370, 14 Am. St. Rep. 393. The result is that Mark Hopkins and Gwladys Hopkins being the only grand-nephew and grand-niece of the testatrix living at the termination of the life estates; and any issue of Georgiana Musgrave, a niece of the testatrix born within nine months after the death of the last life tenant, are to share the fund, a proportionate distribution of which with the accumulated income is to be made whenever a distributee arrives at the age of twenty-one years. Hubbard v. Lloyd, 6 Cush. 522, 53 Am. Dec. 55; Hall v. Hancock, 15 Pick. 255, 26 Am. Dec. 598. Decree accordingly. |