franchises and privileges, in such manner as they shall, from time to time, direct." used both in said charter and in said act of 1859. These words all had a common meaning in the Revenue Law of that period. It is a rule of construction that the words of a statute must be taken in their plain, obvious, and ordinary signification as used in like statutes. 2 Sutherland on Stat. Const. (2d Ed.) 864. The phrase "assessed by the auditor," in said section 22 of the charter, was common in the revenue statutes of that day. It was understood that it must be based upIn Town of Lebanon v. Ohio & Mississippi Railway Co., 77 Ill. 539, the court said: A provision similar to this is found in the Constitution of 1870, except that there was no requirement in the Constitution of 1848, as in the present one, that this method of taxation should be by general law and that the taxation should be uniform as to the class upon which it operates. Sterling Gas Co. v. Higby, 134 Ill. 557, 25 N. E. 660. It is because of this last-named provision of said section 2 of article 9 of the Constitu- on valuation. tion of 1848 that this court upheld the provisions of this charter authorizing the substituted method of taxation in the nature of a commutation of taxes, in lieu of ordinary taxes. Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. County of McLean, 17 Ill. 291; Hunsaker v. Wright, 30 Ill. 146; People v. Barger, 62 Ill. 452; State Board of Equalization v. People, 229 Ill. 430, 82 N. E. 324; State v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 246 Ill. 188, 92 N. E. 814. It may be conceded for the purposes of this case that the Legislature, in granting this charter, not only could have departed from the rules of uniformity, equality, and apportionment of value as to the requirements in the payment of the 5 per cent. and the 2 per cent. on the gross income of the company, but could also have departed therefrom in levying a so-called state tax, had they so desired. That, however, in our judg ment, is not the question here to be decided. The question' is: Did the Legislature by the provisions of section 22, read in connection with the rest of the charter, intend to depart from such rules in levying on the property of appellant the state tax provided for in said section 22? The rule is elementary that the authority to impose upon property an unusual tax, or revenue liability upon an exceptional basis of value, must be given, under the law, in clear and unmistakable terms. Fidelity Co. v. Board of Review, 264 Ill. 11, 105 N. E. 704; People v. Griffith, 245 Ill. 532, 92 N. E. 313; Town of Drummer v. Cox, 165 Ill. 648, 46 N. E. 716. We find nothing in the wording of the charter that supports the argument of counsel for the state on this point. Said section 22 on this point reads that: “An annual tax for state purposes shall be assessed by the auditor," etc. The "It is indispensable there must be a valuation to support every levy or assessment of taxes." No provision is made, either in the charter of said company or in said act of 1859, as to what method shall be pursued by the auditor in assessing and levying taxes. natural and reasonable conclusion would be that the auditor was to follow the same method and be governed by the same rules as used by other public officials in listing, assessing and levying state taxes. We find nothing in the wording of the charter or said act of 1859 that in any manner suggests anything to the contrary. Counsel for the state argue that if the Legislature had intended by section 22 to provide for the ordinary state tax, levied in the same manner as regular state taxes are levied under the Revenue Law, they could easily have inserted a provision in the proper place in said section to the effect that the auditor should fix the assessable value for this tax in the same manner as may be provided by law for fixing the assessable value of other property throughout the state, and that he should levy thereon in each year, in the manner provided by law, from time to time, the tax for the state purposes at the same rate at which this tax is levied upon other property throughout the state. inserted, but the fact that it was not does not support the argument of the state on this question. If this argument of the state be a sound one, then it might well be asked, by the same line of reasoning, why the Legislature did not, in referring to the state taxes, simply provide that such tax should not be levied in excess of three-fourths of 1 Undoubtedly such a wording could have been per cent. per annum, instead of providing, as they did: "Whenever the taxes levied for state purposes shall exceed three-fourths of one per centum per annum, such excess shall be deducted from the gross proceeds or income herein required to be paid." The language, in our judgment, is clear and unambiguous, and means that the property and assets of the company shall bear the burden of ordinary state taxes. The same idea is carried out in the remainder of the section wherever these taxes are referred to, as in the expression "whenever the taxes levied for state purposes shall exceed If the auditor alone could settle the rate three-fourths of one per centum," and in the of state taxes, without any reference to the term "revenue arising from said taxation." state taxes levied on other property, why The proviso also refers to "state taxes." insert a useless provision that might result Said act of 1859, with reference to the meth-in levying more than three-fourths of 1 per ods of levying this state tax, is still in force, cent. on the dollar, and then require the and the words "list," "valuation," "assess," deduction of the excess over and above "taxation," and "tax for state purposes," are three-fourths of 1 per cent.? Manifestly, This court has held that the assessing and levying of taxes by the auditor did not affect the tax levied. Porter v. Rockford, Rock Island & St. Louis Railroad Co., 76 Ill. 561; People v. Commissioners of Cook County, 176 Ill. 576, 52 N. E. 334. this provision of the charter as to levying | 30, § 30; Private Laws of 1851, § 14, p. 50. more than three-fourths of 1 per cent. and deducting the excess can only be given a reasonable construction, if it is understood to mean that the rate of state tax is fixed by some other authority than the auditor, and that official then is required to take that rate in levying a state tax on the property of appellant company. "We feel authorized and required to sustain the provisions of the twenty-second section of the act incorporating the plaintiffs, and that the payments provided for in the eighteenth section of their charter, have been constitutionally substituted, under the second section of the Constitution, in lieu of the general rule of uniformity and proportion fixed in its first clause." In State v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 27 Ill. 64, this court said (page 67): "If, then, the property is more valuable in 1859 or in 1860 than as now found or in subsequent years, the taxes will be assessed accordingly, so that the injunction of the Constitution that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his or her property' will be regarded." Under the rulings of this court, in construing the charter of the company we can reach Counsel for the state further insist that no other conclusion than that the state taxes the charter made a perpetual liability on the referred to in said section 22 were, under part of the company to pay a state property the restrictions provided for in said section, tax, and it must have been known to the the regular state taxes that were to be state Legislature, at the time the charter levied on other property. In Illinois Central was granted, that all other property might | Railroad Co. v. County of McLean, 17 Ill. be relieved, under the provisions of the Con- 291, it was said (page 292): stitution, from paying state taxes, and that therefore the Legislature must have intended that the auditor was not to be governed in any way by the General Revenue Law in assessing and levying this tax. It is true, as stated by counsel, that a general property tax, such as a tax on personal property of the kind existing in this state and other states at the present time, is being done away with in other countries, yet up to the time this charter was granted a personal property tax was not only general in this country, but in other countries of the world. It is true some writers assert that there is reason for abolishing the personal property tax, similar to our state tax on that kind In Neustadt v. Illinois Central Railroad of property, in all jurisdictions, and while under the Constitution of 1848 authority was Co., 31 Ill. 484, it was said that in consider given to exempt from state tax by a sub- ation of the payment of said 7 per cent. the stituted form of taxation, the members of company was relieved from the payment of the constitutional convention of 1870 doubt-all other than state taxes. The same thing less had little thought of its being practi- was again said in Illinois Central Railroad cable ever to abolish state taxes, for they Co. v. Irvin, 72 Ill. 452, and again in People provided in section 6 of article 9 of our pres- v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 215 IL. 177, ent Constitution, that: 74 N. E. 116. The same thing was repeated, in substance, in State v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 246 Ill. 188, 92 N. E. 814. The history of the payment of the 7 per cent. by the company on its gross receipts or income to the state and the levying and collecting of the state tax, as heretofore given in this opinion, shows that up to the present time all officials who have been charged with duties in connection with the payment of this revenue by the company to the state, as provided in its charter, have understood the "The General Assembly shall have no power to release or discharge any county, city, township, town or district whatever, or the inhabitants thereof, or the property therein, from their or its proportionate share of taxes to be levied for state purposes, nor shall commutation for such taxes be authorized in any form whatsoever." If state taxes are ever done away with in this state, by a constitutional change or otherwise, it will then be time enough to consider whether the doing away with state taxes on other property will render nugatory the provision of section 22 of the char-state taxes to mean ordinary state taxes. ter of appellant company as to the payment of state taxes. The question is not before us in this case and need not be here considered or decided. If it be assumed that the meaning that should be placed upon the charter provisions of appellant company here under consideration is doubtful, then the contemporaneous, The further argument of counsel for the uniform, and long-continued construction state that this state tax was to be assessed, placed upon these charter provisions by publevied, and collected by other officers than lic officials will have great weight with the those who assessed, levied, and collected oth-court. Nye v. Foreman, 215 Ill. 285, 74 N. er state taxes, does not, in our judgment, E. 140; Cook County v. Healy, 222 Ill. 310, tend to support their argument as to the na-78 N. E. 623. ture of the state taxes provided for in this section. Other taxes at that time were assessed and levied by the auditor. Act to provide for a general system of railroad incorporation (Laws of 1849, 2d Session) p. "It was not only the immediate sense of the officers of the state, but their continued sense through a number of years, that the bank was exempt from all taxation, and when the right of taxation was asserted a license tax was not included. And we have authority for saying that a license tax was not demanded during a period of 58 years, notwithstanding the many changes in the administrative officers of the state." Citizens' Bank v. Parker, 192 U. S. 73, 24 Sup. Ct. 181, 48 L. Ed. 346. It is insisted by counsel for the state that the assessment should be levied on the basis of the full cash value, and not on the onethird value, and that the charter provision For more than 60 years all departments found in section 22 provides that the tax of the state government have construed this shall be "upon all the property and assets of provision of the charter to mean the ordi- every name, kind and description belonging nary annual state tax similar to that levied to said corporation"; that said act of 1859 on the property of all other persons. This requires the auditor to assess the stock, proppractice should not be lightly set aside. It erty, and assets upon the full value, and should only be done if the language of that when an appeal is taken to the Supreme the charter is so clear and unambiguous that Court the question to be heard and determinsuch action would be required. As we have ed is "the aggregate value of the stock, propalready seen, this is not the fact. In our erty and assets owned by said company," judgment the language of the statute, fairly and the tax is to be levied upon such "aggreconstrued, can bear no other construction gate value" so found. Until 1898 the statute than that placed on it. by all public officials, of this state always required the state tax to including this court, that the annual tax be levied upon the full cash or actual value levied against the property of appellant com- of property; but it is a matter of common pany is the ordinary annual tax and is sub-knowledge that before that act was passed ject only to the limitations specifically set out in said charter. Equalized Value. property was not usually assessed at its full value. This court has always taken notice of that practice as being long in vogue, unchallenged, and recognized by the public "The assessor had always adopted some proportionate basis of value, and while it was necessary for him to determine the full value in order to take a certain proportion or share as the assessed value, he set down the assessed that the assessed value should be one-fifth of its actual cash value (Hurd's Stat. 1898, p. 1365e), and by the subsequent act of 1909, which provided that the assessed value shall be one-third of the full value (Hurd's Stat. 1909, p. 1882). [6, 7] The record shows by the testimony authorities. Bureau County v. Chicago, Burof the members of the state board of equal-lington & Quincy Railroad Co., 44 Ill.` 229; ization, and also by that of other public of- City of Chicago v. Fishburn, 189 Ill. 367, ficers called from 65 representative counties 376, 59 N. E. 791, 793. In this last case it of the state, including county treasurers, was stated: county clerks, members of boards of assessors, and others having practical knowledge of the methods of assessment in the counties, that during the year 1913, and for years prior thereto, the uniform practice through-value only." out said counties was to adopt as the full This practice was recognized by the Revevalue of taxable property, not the full cashnue Law of the state in 1898, which provided value, but an amount not in excess of 70 per cent. of the full cash value of such taxable property, with the exception that in most of the counties moneys and mortgages listed by owners were assessed at full value. The testimony shows, also, that from 1903 until 1913 the state board of equalization had Counsel for the state insist that, regardless taken this same standard-that is, not to ex- of these statutes, and regardless of the forceed 70 per cent. of the full cash value-mer practice that existed previous to the pasas the standard to be followed by that body in assessing that class of property required by law to be originally assessed by that board. In some of the years from 1903 to 1913 the record shows that the state board of equalization passed a resolution to that effect. The proof shows that the property of all other railroad companies in this state for the year 1913 and prior thereto was assessed by the state board of equalization in accordance with this standard; that is, fixing the "full value" of the property of all other rail-auditor in fixing the valuation or the duty roads on a basis not to exceed 70 per cent. of the actual cash value. The auditor, in levying the assessment here in question, levied it upon what he had fixed as the full cash value of the property, while the commissioner appointed by this court recommends that the tax should be levied on only one-third of the total equalized value and that such assessment should be governed by the requirements of the statute as to levying all other state taxes. Hurd's Stat. 1913, p. 2081. sage of these acts, the property of appellant should be assessed at its full cash value for these state taxes. With this we cannot agree. What we have already said with reference to these state taxes being the ordinary taxes levied on other property practically answers all the arguments urged by the state, but the question is so important that we deem it advisable to consider it further. The words "the aggregate," in the statute of 1859, in no way changed the duty of the of this court on appeal. In our judgment the fair meaning of these words is that, instead of finding the value of each separate item of the property, the court shall find its total or aggregate value. They do not refer specifically to the finding of the equalized value, or as to the duty of the court to decide whether the one-third of the full valuation should be the value upon which the assessment must be levied. Manifestly, however, in view of the issues raised in this case, It is the duty of the court to find whether the auditor should extend the assessment for the state tax upon the full cash value or only upon one-third of the equalized value. This being an ordinary state tax, as already stated, the provision of the Constitution of 1848, and of the present Constitution, that the tax should be levied by valuation, "so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to his, her or its property," must control in levying this tax. This court, in discussing a similar question in Law v. People, 87 Ill. 385, said (page 405): valuation. Uniformity in taxing implies equality in the burden of taxation, and this equality the mode of the assessment, as well as in the of burden cannot exist without uniformity in rate of taxation. * * It must be extended to all property subject to taxation, so that all property must be taxed alike, equally, which is taxing by a uniform rule.”” In Chicago & Alton Railroad. Co. v. Livingston County, 68 Ill. 458, this court said (page 460): "So the evidence shows the valuation returned by the company to have been a fair and correct one, on the basis of one-third of the actual value, yet the board doubled this valuation, so "As we have seen, all other property in the that the property of this company was assessed state had been assessed at one-half its cash at two-thirds of the actual value, while that of value. Under the law the state board had no natural persons in the county was assessed at power to increase the aggregate valuation be- only one-third of its actual value. This cannot yond 1 per cent. on such aggregate assessed val- be done under our Constitution. Taxation must uation. It became a question: What was to be uniform. There can be no discrimination be done? Whatever may be the statutory injunc- against persons. They must be taxed alike." tion as to making valuations of property for taxation, the controlling authority as contain- In Bureau County v. Chicago, Burlington ed in the Constitution is, it shall be so valued & Quincy Railroad Co., 44 Ill. 229, the evithat every person and corporation shall pay a dence disclosed that the property of the comtax in proportion to his or its property. A strict observance of the *pany had been valued at a much higher ratio would have worked manifest injustice, as well than had been used in valuing other properas a plain violation of that constitutional re- ty. The court said (page 238): quirement that the burden of taxation should be made to bear equally upon all property, whether owned by private persons or by corporations. That which the Constitution imposed was the higher duty, and the state board was not at liberty to disregard its provisions." statute * * * "The question is before us in all its length and breadth: Can a railroad company, by any action of the corporate authorities of a county, be required to pay more than its fair share of taxes as compared with those paid by individuals? Does the power exist anywhere to destroy In Jack v. Weiennett, 115 Ill. 105, 109, 3 the cardinal principle of uniformity of taxation N. E. 445, 446 (56 Am. Rep. 129) it was said: so forcibly and prominently insisted upon by the Constitution? "In an exercise of the power to tax, the purity as the vital principle, the dominant idea * Regarding uniformpose always is that a common burden shall be of the Constitution, where can the power reside sustained by common contributions, regulated to produce its opposite? Where is the power by some fixed general rule, and apportioned by lodged, in view of this principle, to compel A. the law according to some uniform ratio of to pay, on his land or personal property, of no equality." more value than the same kind of property belonging to B., 40 per cent. more taxes than are assessed against B.? We affirm such a power nowhere exists, and if it did it would be so revolting in its exercise to the lowest sense of justice with which our species is imbued as to justify any and every lawful expedient for relief against it. In City of Chicago v. Larned, 34 Ill. 203, it was said (page 275): "The framers of our Constitution have taken unexampled pains by these separate sections to affirm the principles of 'equality' and 'uniformity' as indispensable to all legal taxation, whether general or local." In Primm v. City of Belleville, 59 Ill. 142, the opinion said (page 143): "Equality and uniformity of taxation have been repeatedly recognized and enforced by this court. They must be applied, not only to the rate of taxation and to the district to be taxed, but also to all the property subject to taxation." In Ex parte Ft. Smith & Van Buren Bridge Co., 62 Ark. 461, 467, 36 S. W. 1060, 1062, the Supreme Court of Arkansas said: "How, then, was the county court to afford relief to appellant? The only relief it could have afforded was to reduce the valuation, so as to make it conform to the standard adopted in the valuation of other real property in the county or the average valuation of such property. Why should not this relief be granted? * * * By granting it a constitutional right will be enforced and by denying it will be with held." In Cummings v. National Bank, 101 U. S. 153, 158 (25 L. Ed. 903) the court said: * * * It is an admitted fact on both sides to this controversy that the property of no one owner in the county of Bureau has been taxed on its real value, and that the per cent. added by the board of supervisors to the valuation of the property of appellees imposes on them a greater proportionate_burden than the law requires them to bear. We are of this opinion, and therefore consider the action of the board unfounded in justice, and in direct opposition to the Constitution. The great and attractive feature of uniformity has been disregarded by the board and appellees victim. ized." In Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. v. Boone County, 44 Ill. 240, where the same question was considered, the court said (page 242) that: The county board was not authorized "to withdraw the property of appellants from the protection of this constitutional principle of uniformity, and by the addition of 20 per cent. on their rolling stock, and of 50 per cent. on their fixed and stationary personal property, compel them to pay thereby more taxes on the valuation of their property than the individual citizen paid on his.' "In construing this provision of the Constitution the Supreme Court of Ohio has said that This court in discussing the statute of 1898 'taxing by uniform rule requires uniformity not only in the rate of taxation, but also uniformity fixing one-fifth of the actual value as the in the mode of the assessment upon the taxable basis for the assessment, said in City of Chi cago v. Fishburn, 189 Ill. 367, on page 375, 59 N. E. 791, 793: "The meaning of the term 'assessment' in connection with taxation is well understood. It is an official valuation of property for the purpose of fixing the proportion of taxes which each one shall pay. Judge Cooley, in his work on the Law of Taxation, * defines it as follows: An assessment, strictly speaking, is an official estimate of the sums which are to constitute the basis of an apportionment of a tax between the individual subjects of taxation within the district. As the word is more commonly employed, an assessment consists in the two processes of listing the persons, property, etc., to be taxed, and of estimating the sums which are to be the guide in an apportionment of the tax between them.'" Deducting Debts from Credits. [8] The further question is raised as to whether appellant company, in having its property assessed, is entitled to the deduction of its bona fide debts from the credits listed by it, as provided by the General Revenue Law of the state. Section 3 of the Revenue Law provides that personal property shall be valued at its fair cash value, less such deductions as shall be allowed by law to be made from credits. Credits, whether payable in money, labor, or property, are taxable under the second paragraph of section 3 of the Revenue Act of 1872. Hurd's Stat. 1913, p. 2025. Section 27 of this last-named act provides that: "In making up the amount of credits which any person is required to list for himself, or he shall be entitled to deduct from the gross for any other person, company or corporation, amount of credits the amount of all bona fide debts owing by such person, company or corporation, to any other person, company or cor poration, for a consideration received," etc. Section 28 provides that: "No person, company or corporation shall be entitled to any deduction from the amount of any bonds, stocks, or money loaned," etc. To assess implies more than to fix the full valuation at a given rate. It means to impose a tax according to some method or upon a basis of assessed valuation which may be provided by law and which does not violate the mandate of the Constitution that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his or its property. It includes all the steps which the law requires to subject the property to the tax. The state tax levied under the provisions of section 22 of appellant company's charter being practically an ordinary state tax, to levy-requiring that all intangible property be it on a basis of full value when the state tax'es on all other property were levied at a much less value would be violative of every principle of uniformity and equality of taxation as laid down in the Constitution. This should not be done, even though the standard or basis fixed by the public authorities for the assessed valuation is less than that fixed by the statute. The requirements of the Constitution that there shall be uniformity and equality in taxation must control over any statute or practice of assessing officers, so that the properties of persons and corporations shall pay a tax in proportion to their respective values. assessed under the description of capital "It is not within the power of the Legislature to provide that different classes of property shall be valued differently." As has already been stated in this opinion, the property of appellant company must be assessed by valuation, so that the company's constitutional share, only, can be imposed for the state taxes. This constitutional provision admits of no discrimination. Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. County of McLean, 17 Ill. 291; People's Loan & Homestead Ass'n v. Keith, 153 Ill. 609, 39 N. E. 1072, 28 L. R. A. 65; Consolidated Coal Co. v. Miller, 236 Ill. 149, 86 N. E. 205. In Boyer v. Boyer, 113 U. S. 689, 695, 5 Sup. Ct. 706, 709 (28 L. Ed. 1089), the court, in considering a claimed discrimination against national bank stock, said: The separate section to the Constitution of 1870, which provides that no contract obligation or liability whatever of the Illinois Central Railroad Company shall ever be released, suspended, modified, altered, or omitted, does not in any way change the obligations of the charter of the company. If that section had not been adopted, the liability of the company to pay the state tax under existing legislation would be just as it is at the present time. The charter prescribes the tax to be assessed upon a valuation, which under our construction of the charter obligations and the laws bearing on the subject means that this tax is to be assessed in just proportion under the provisions of the Constitution. Before the Constitution of 1870, the state, in levying this tax, was bound to do so with due recognition of the rule that every person and corporation should pay a tax in propor--and held that such a provision discrimtion to his or its property, and since the tax must have been so levied before 1870 so must it now be, because of this particular section to which reference is made by counsel. "That a state law which permits individual citizens to deduct their just debts from the valuation of their personal property of every kind, other than national bank shares, or which permits the taxpayer to deduct from the sum of his credits money at interest or other demands to the extent of his bona fide indebtedness, leaving the remainder to be taxed, while it denies the same right of deduction from the cash value of bank shares, operates to tax the latter at a greater rate than other moneyed capital" inated against bank shares. To the same effect are State Bank v. Board of Revenue, 91 Ala. 217, 8 South. 852, and Detroit Citizens' Street Railway Co. v. Common Council, 125 |