[1] Such stipulations are regarded as valid | policy, and where it did not, in reference to and reasonable, and, when violated, the in- a return of the premium. In one instance surer may, when a loss occurs, defend on the return of the premium is essential, in the ground of a breach of the contract in the other it is not. this respect. Thus far there is no ground for controversy. Appellee's main objection to the answer is that the procuring of additional insurance did not render the contract void, but only voidable at the election of the insurer, and hence that it became appellant's duty as a condition precedent to defend upon this ground to return or offer to return the unearned portion of the premium, and that the absence of such averment in the answer rendered it insufficient to state a defense to the complaint. [2] Appellee's contention that the stipulation against procuring additional insurance does not render the policy void, but voidable at the election of the insured, is, as well as kindred stipulations, abundantly supported by the authorities. Saville v. Etna, etc., Co., 8 Mont. 419, 20 Pac. 646, 3 L. R. A. 542; Carpenter v. Providence, etc., Co., 16 Pet. 495, 10 L. Ed. 1044; Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Michael, 167 Ind. 659, 74 N. E. 964, 79 N. E. 905, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 708; Turner v. Meridan Fire Ins. Co. (C. C.) 16 Fed. 454; Commercial Life Ins. Co. v. Schroyer, 176 Ind. 654, 95 N. E. 1004, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 968; Germania, etc., Co. v. Klewer, 129 Ill. 599, 22 N. E. 489. [3] This as well as the Supreme Court and the courts of other jurisdictions generally have frequently held that both as to fire and life insurance policies, where a defense is based upon a breach of the policy that renders the contract ineffectual from its inception, and where, in fact, no risk attached, under such circumstances there is no consideration for the premium received, and that the insurer upon learning of the breach should seasonably offer to restore the premium received by it, and, failing to do so, it could not insist upon a forfeiture of the policy. Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Michael, supra; Catholic Order of Foresters v. Collins, 51 Ind. App. 285, 99 N. E. 745. "Premiums paid to secure insurance cannot be recovered if the risk has once attached. If a policy is valid at its inception, then the company ceived." Standley v. Northwestern Mutual, etc. cannot be required to refund the premiums reCo., 95 Ind. 254; Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Houser, 89 Ind. 258; Northwestern, etc., Ass'n Am. St. Rep. 414; American Insurance Co. v. Bodurtha. 23 Ind. App. 121, 53 N. E. 787, v. Replogle, supra. Cooley in his brief on the Law of Insurance (page 1043) says: "It is a principle of almost elementary character that, if the risk has once attached, there can be no return of the premium." And further (page 1048)' he says: "On the principle that, when the risk has once attached, a premium must be considered not justify a recovery of the premium paid in as earned, a valid forfeiture of the policy will the absence of an agreement giving the insured such a right." In Georgia Home Insurance Co. v. Rosenfield, 95 Fed. 358, 37 C. C. A. 96, Lurton, J., speaking for the court, uses the following language: "So, if the risk attached and the policy became void subsequently through the conduct of the insured, no part of the premium can be recovered." This case involved the question of additional insurance in violation of the provisions of the policy. In the recent case of Marion, etc., Bed Co. v. Empire State Security Company, 52 Ind. App. 480, 100 N. E. 882, a review of the authorities was had as to when and under what circumstances it was necessary for the insurer to tender back the premiums in order to defend upon certain grounds, and it was there announced as the judgment of the court that, the policy having taken effect, the insured was not entitled to a return of the premium; that it was only when the policy was void ab initio that the premium must be tendered or returned to the insured. In Etna Life Ins. Co. v. Paul; 10 Ill. App. 431, in an action in assumpsit to recover premiums paid, it said, after discussing the conditions under which the insured was entitled to a return thereof: "But where the risk is entire, and has once commenced to run, though it be for ever sq short a period, there can be no apportionment or return of the premium." The policy before us indemnified appellee against loss by fire or lightning to his prop [4] That liability attached, under the policy in suit, upon its execution and delivery, is not denied by either party, and this is true up to the date of the procuring of the additional insurance. At this date appellant takes the position that liability ceased on its part, while on the part of appellee it is contended that there was no cessation of liability, in the absence of an election on the part of appellant to avoid the contract by a return or offer to return the unearned pre-erty for a period of three years for the gross mium. In view of the fact that this subject has been before the courts of this state heretofore, nothing further need be said than that this jurisdiction is committed to the doctrine that finds support in various jurisdictions that there is a distinction resting upon a legal principle between where a liability attached upon the execution of the sum of $39.60, and appellant was not, under the authorities, required to return any part of the $39.60 under the circumstances, unless the provision of the policy in reference to the cancellation thereof can be construed to require such return. The provision of the policy as to cancellation, so far as it relates to appellant, is: "If canceled by the company, it shall only retain a pro rata share of the premium for the time elapsed." It might be further added that the policy provides for cancellation by both the insured and insurer at any time. which it was intended-that of indemnity in case of loss. But the provision here under consideration against procuring additional insurance is clearly expressed and in unambiguous terms, and to disregard the same would be to disregard the contract entered into beIn Colby v. Cedar Rapids Ins. Co., 66 Iowa, tween the parties. Additional insurance hav577, 24 N. W. 54, the insured sought to cancel ing been procured, and the loss having occurcertain policies of insurance and apply the red thereafter, which is disclosed by the anunearned premium on a new policy in answer under consideration, the same states a other company. His method of attempting defense to the complaint. An answer similar to do so was by assigning the unearned pre- in all respects to the one under consideration mium to the agent of the company issuing the was held good in the .cases of Bowlus V. latter policy, and in discussing the irregular-Phenix Ins. Co., 133 Ind. 115, 32 N. E. 319, ity of the method resorted to to cancel or at-20 L. R. A. 400, and Sisk v. Citizens' Ins. tempt to cancel the former policy the court Co., 16 Ind. App. 565, 45 N. E. 805. said: "It is not denied by plaintiff, and could not be properly, that if the Phoenix insurance was obtained before the virtual cancellation of the policies in the defendant company, these policies would be avoided by Murray's act in violating this condition, and there would be nothing left to cancel, and no claim would accrue for unearned premiums." Holding the answer sufficient virtually holds that the question is properly raised in this manner, and disposes of appellee's further contention that the complaint was so drafted that appellant should have raised the question of additional insurance by demurrer, and by not doing so it was waived. present the same. This was where there was a stipulation in [7] The sufficiency of the replies to avoid the policy against additional insurance, and the paragraphs of answer on the ground of it was held that the violation of the con- waiver is not before the court for consideratract against additional insurance avoided the tion. However, if the defense interposed by policy, and there was nothing left to cancel. the answers was waived by the insurer, a The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in discuss-reply setting up such waiver would properly Continental Ins. Co. v. ing a provision in a policy that gave the insurer the right to terminate the contract at Vanlue, 126 Ind. 410, 26 N. E. 119, 10 L. R. any time, at its option, by giving notice A. 843; Ft. Wayne Ins. Co. v. Irwin, 23 Ind. and refunding a ratable proportion of the App. 53, 54 N. E. 817; Evens v. Queen Ins. premium for the unexpired term, where there Co., 5 Ind. App. 198, 31 N. E. 843. was a loss by fire after additional insurance was effected in violation of a condition in the policy, said: "The provisions in the policy authorizing the company to terminate the contract at any time, at its option, bore no special relation to that concerning other insurance. By the plain terms of the policy, other insurance without the consent of this company would ipso facto avoid the contract; and in the case of a contract thus avoided it would not be obligatory upon the insurer to repay any of the unearned premium. It required no affirmative act of election on the part of the company to make operative the clause avoiding the contract whenever the specified conditions should occur.' Johnson v. American Ins. Co., 41 Minn. 396, 43 N. W. 59. [5, 6] Both upon authority and reason it seems that appellant's action in denying lia bility by reason of the conduct of appellee in effecting other insurance cannot be treated as a cancellation of the policy, calling for a return of the pro rata share of the premium for the time, between the date appellee effected the insurance to the date when the policy would expire, as disclosed upon its face. This disposes of the main question presented for consideration, and in so concluding we are mindful that contracts of insurance such It follows that the court erred in carrying the demurrer addressed to the replies back and sustaining the same to the paragraphs of answer to which the replies were addressed respectively. Judgment reversed, with instructions to the trial court to overrule the demurrers to the second and eighth paragraphs of answer, and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. (63 Ind. App. 54) NATIONAL LIFE INS. CO. v. HEADRICK et al. (No. 9023.)* 1. tiff (Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 1. TRIAL 343-VERDICT-CONSTRUCTION. of every fact essential to a recovery. Where there is evidence from which the facts found by a verdict may have been reasonably inferred by the jury, it is sufficient on appeal, even though other and contrary inferences may be reasonably drawn therefrom. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3928-3933; Dec. Dig. 1001(1).] 3. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT ~163(1), 175(1)— "RATIFICATION. as are here under consideration are strictly "Ratification" means the adoption of that which was done for and in the name of another without authority, and, after ratification, the act stands as an authorized one, and makes the whole act, transaction, or contract good from the beginning. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Principal and Agent, Cent. Dig. §§ 619, 662, 664-666; Dec. Dig. 163(1), 175(1). For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, 173(3)—RATIFI Ratification is a question of fact, and ordinarily may be inferred from the acts, words, silence, dealings, and knowledge of the principal, as well as other facts and circumstances tend ing to warrant the inference or finding of the ultimate fact of ratification. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Principal and Agent, Cent. Dig. § 661; Dec. Dig. 173(3).] 5. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT 171(1)-RATIFICATION-ACCEPTANCE OF BENEFITS. Knowingly accepting the benefits of an unauthorized employment amounts to a ratification of such contract of employment, and is in the nature of an estoppel to deny the authority to make such contract. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Principal and Agent, Cent. Dig. §§ 644, 645, 653, 654; Dec. Dig. 171(1).] 6. CORPORATIONS 426(5)-ACTS OF OFFI CERS RATIFICATION. As corporations act only by and through their officers and agents, ratification by a corporation may be inferred from affirmation, or from passive acquiescence, or from the receipt of benefits with knowledge, without any formal action of its board of directors. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 1702; Dec. Dig. 426(5).] 7. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT 173(3)—RATIFICATION-KNOWLEDGE-EVIDENCE. Knowledge, like other facts, need not be proved by any particular kind or class of evidence, and may be inferred from facts and cir cumstances. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Principal and Agent, Cent. Dig. § 661; Dec. Dig. 173(3).] 8. APPEAL AND ERROR 216(2)—OBJECTIONS -INSTRUCTIONS. Where instructions, if incomplete, were correct as far as they went, appellant, having failed to present more complete instructions on the subject could not, on appeal, object for that reason. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Dec. Dig. 216(2); Trial, Cent. Dig. §§ 627, 628.] ment an appeal was taken to the Marion superior court, where the case was tried by a jury on an issue formed by a general denial of all the averments of the complaint. The jury returned a verdict for appellees in the sum of $95, and also answers to interrogatories. From a judgment on the verdict appellant has appealed and assigned as error the overruling of its motion for a new trial and certain other alleged errors, which are not grounds for independent assignments of error, but causes for a new trial. the court erred in giving the jury certain A new trial was asked on the ground that instructions; that the verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence; that it is contrary to law; that the assessment of the amount of recovery is erroneous, in that the verdict is too large. In its brief appellant states that: "The theory ultimately relied on by appellees and adopted by the trial court was that the employment of appellees was not authorized by appellant, but that it ratified it. The theory, therefore, is that of ratification, and this is by the Appellate Court." the theory of the case which must be adopted This proposition is not denied by appellees, but they contend that the services were rendered with the knowledge and approval of appellant, under such circumstances as to show an acceptance of the benefit of the services by appellant, and a ratification of the employment. There is ample evidence to show the rendition and value of the services, but the question of ratification is sharply controverted. There is no denial of the fact that services were rendered in connection with the business of appellant under an employment or arrangement by and between appellees and one V. C. Vette, who was at the time general manager of the railroad accident department of appellant at Indianapolis; but it is contended that he held such position under a written contract which did not authorize him to bind appellant by any contract for the employment of attorneys. The evidence tends to show that appelAppeal from Superior Court, Marion Coun- lant's principal office was in Chicago; that ty; Chas. J. Orbison, Judge. Action by William D. Headrick and others against the National Life Insurance Company. From a judgment for plaintiffs upon a verdict rendered on appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace for plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Affirmed. Miller & Dowling, of Indianapolis, for appellant. Headrick & Ruick, of Indianapolis, for appellees. FELT, P. J. This suit originated before a justice of the peace, where a judgment was rendered for $100 for legal services alleged to have been rendered appellant at its special instance and request. From the judg Mr. A. M. Johnson was president of the company during 1911 and up to April, 1912; that Mr. Vette was acquainted with Mr. Johnson, and in the summer of 1911 appellee Ruick and Mr. Vette attended a convention of insurance commissioners or state officials appointed by the Governors of the several states, held in Milwaukee, and while there Mr. Vette introduced Mr. Ruick to Mr. Johnson, and in conversation with him in the presence of Mr. Ruick informed him that, if they consummated their contemplated arrangement for Mr. Vette to represent the company, "We will,expect to have Mr. Ruick as our attorney," to which Mr. Johnson answered, "Yes, that is all right;" that during the time the services of appellees were being For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes rendered Mr. Vette spent part of his time and ordinarily may be inferred from the in his Indianapolis office and part of the time in the Chicago office of appellant; that Mr. Hallman was chief clerk in appellant's accident department, and Mr. J. B. Boyer was attorney for that department; that one C. H. Boyer was general manager of appellant's casualty department, which included the railroad department. One Howard Beechem testified that he had worked for Mr. Vette, and had also been employed in appellant's Chicago office, and worked in the accident department from November, 1911, to the latter part of March, 1912, under Mr. C. H. Boyer, and also under instructions of Mr. Vette; that Vette had charge of the railroad department at Indianapolis after the 1st of January, 1912; that he heard the names of appellees mentioned by Mr. Hallman and Mr. J. B. Boyer in connection with the business of appellant in the Chicago office a number of times; that on one occasion Mr. Hallman told him they were sending some proofs back to Indianapolis to be examined and discussed by Mr. Vette and appellee Ruick; that Mr. Hallman and Mr. J. B. Boyer spoke of appellees as attorneys for the railroad department. conduct of the parties. The acts, words, silence, dealings, and knowledge of the principal, as well as many other facts and circumstances, may be shown as evidence tending to warrant the inference or finding of the ultimate fact of ratification. 1 Mechem on Agency, §§ 347, 348, 349, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434; I. U. Traction Co. v. Scribner, 47 Ind. App. 621, 630, 93 N. E. 1014; Minnich v. Darling, 8 Ind. App. 539, 544, 36 N. E. 173. [5] Knowingly accepting benefits of an unauthorized employment amounts to a ratification of such contract of employment, and is in the nature of an estoppel to deny the authority to make such contract. [6] Ratification by a corporation may be shown by conduct, without any formal action of its board of directors. Corporations act only by and through their officers and agents, and ratification may be inferred from affirmation, or from passive acquiescence or from the receipt of benefits with knowledge. [7] Knowledge, like other facts, need not be proved by any particular kind. or class of evidence, and may be inferred from facts and circumstances. I. U. Traction Co. V. Scribner, supra, 47 Ind. App. 629, 630, 93 N. E. 1014, and authorities cited; Willison v. McKain, 12 Ind. App. 78, 80, 39 N. E. 886; American Quarries Co. v. Lay, 37 Ind. App. 386, 392, 73 N. E. 608; Voiles v. Board, 58 The evidence also tends to show that in 1912 Mr. Vette traveled back and forth between Chicago and Indianapolis frequently, transacting the business of his department, and in his absence from Indianapolis Mr. Ruick attended to any business of appellant | Ind. 510, 511. The jury inferred from the that needed attention; that Mr. J. B. Boyer and Mr. Ruick, in January, 1912, had communications about printed matter to be used by the company in its business, Mr. Boyer being at the time in Chicago and Mr. Ruick in Indianapolis; that Mr. Vette severed his connection with appellant the latter part of April, 1912. Mr. Vette testified that the services of appellees were rendered for appellant, and not for him personally; that appellees made out their bill against appellant, and handed it to him with a request that he see that it was paid by the company. evidence the ultimate facts of ratification by appellant of the employment on its behalf of appellees by appellant's agent Vette. Other and different inferences might reasonably have been drawn from the evidence, but we cannot say there is a total lack of evidence warranting the inference drawn by the jury. [8] Some objections are urged to the instructions, but a careful reading and study of all the instructions shows that they state the law substantially correctly and the jury could not have been misled by them. If some of them are incomplete, they were correct as far as they went, and appellant, having failed to present more complete instructions on the subject, cannot be heard now to object for such reason. Other questions suggested are waived by failure to present them in the briefs. We find no reversible error. Judgment affirmed. [1, 2] The verdict of the jury is a finding for appellees of every fact essential to a recovery. If there is evidence from which such facts may have been reasonably inferred by the jury, it is sufficient on appeal, even though other and contrary inferences may be reasonably drawn therefrom. Abelman v. Hachnel, 57 Ind. App. 15, 21, 103 N. E. 869; Parkison v. Thompson, 164 Ind. 609, 620, 626, 73 N. E. 109, 3 Ann. Cas. 677. [3, 4] Ratification means the adoption of (63 Ind. App. 349) that which was done for and in the name of BARNUM v. RALLIHAN et al. (No. 9437.)* another without authority. It is in the nature of a cure for authorization. When ratification takes place, the act stands as an authorized one, and makes the whole act, RULING ON DEMURRER-MEMORANDUM. transaction, or contract good from the beIn reviewing the sustaining of a demurrer ginning. Ratification is a question of fact, to a complaint for insufficiency of facts alleged, (Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 1. May 16, 1916.) 1. APPEAL AND ERROR 837(4)—REVIEW For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 112 N.E.-36 *Rehearing denied. Transfer denied. - PAYMENT TO TREASURER-EFFECT. though not in reviewing the overruling thereof, | 10. TAXATION 824 IRREGULAR SALEinsufficiencies not pointed out in the memorandum required by Burns' Ann. St. 1914, § 344, cl. 6, will be considered. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 3274; Dec. Dig. S37 (4).] 2. TAXATION 652-ENJOINING TAX SALE OF REALTY-RESORT TO PERSONALTY. One liable for taxes having personal property in the county out of which the tax may be made may enjoin sale of his realty for payment of such taxes. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 1324-1331; Dec. Dig. ~652.] 3. TAXATION 611(5) — ENJOINING COLLECTION OF TAXES-PLEADING AND PROOF. One seeking to enjoin collection of taxes altogether must show by averment and proof that the assessed property is not subject to taxation, or that the tax has been paid. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 1250, 1251; Dec. Dig. 611(5).] 4. TAXATION 624-COLLECTION-RESORT TO PERSONALTY. Under Burns' Ann. St. 1914, § 10324, personalty is the primary source of funds out of which to pay all taxes, and, the person liable having personalty in the county, it is the collection officers' duty to exhaust it before selling the assessed realty. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 1268-1270; Dec. Dig. 624.] 5. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS 212 TAXES PAYMENT FROM PERSONALTY CHARGE. Taxes accruing on realty before death of the owner, but not those accruing after his death, become a charge against him, and should be paid by his personal representatives of his personalty. [Ed. Note.--For other cases, see Executors and Administrators, Cent. Dig. 88 747, 762; Dec. Dig. 212.] 6. TAXATION 508-DATE OF ACCRUING OF TAXES. Taxes accrue on the date when the lien thereof attaches to the assessed property. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. § 942; Dec. Dig. 508.] 7. TAXATION 734(1)—IRREGULAR SALE—TI TLE. The law for collection of delinquent taxes on realty having in various ways not been followed, the purchaser could not acquire title to the realty under the sale. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 1408, 1470, 1471; Dec. Dig. 734(1).] 8. TAXATION 724-PAYMENT CONDITIONS -RECOVERY. The amount necessary to redeem from a tax sale having been turned over to the county treasurer and received by the state, an attempted imposition of conditions in the tender was ineffectual, and noncompliance therewith would not authorize recovery. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 1443, 1444; Dec. Dig. 724.] 9. TAXATION 824-INVALID SALE -TRANSFER OF LIEN. Though sale of realty for valid taxes is invalid because of the law not being followed, and so ineffectual to pass title, the state's lien is transferred to the purchaser. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. § 1632; Dec. Dig. 824.] Payment to the county treasurer of the amount necessary to redeem from an irregular sale for valid taxes inures to the benefit of the purchaser, and satisfies the lien acquired by him. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. § 1632; Dec. Dig. 824.] 11. PLEADING 72-RELIEF-PRAYER. The relief to which a party is entitled is determined by the facts averred, and not the prayer of the pleading. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Pleading, Cent. Dig. §§ 143, 144; Dec. Dig. 72.] 12. PLEADING 49 CONSTRUCTION-PRAYER. In determining the theory of a pleading, the relief demanded thereby may be looked to in connection with the averments. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Pleading, Cent. Dig. $$ 107-111; Dec. Dig. 49; Action, Cent. Dig. § 143.] 13. EVIDENCE 83(1)-PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTY-PRESUMPTION. Regarding the sufficiency of a pleading, it is presumed that public officials have done and will do their duty, till the contrary is shown by averments. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. § 105; Dec. Dig. 83(1).] 14. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS 513 (3) IRREGULAR SETTLEMENT - COLLATERAL ATTACK. A settlement of a decedent's estate, though irregular, cannot be attacked collaterally. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Executors and Administrators, Cent. Dig. § 2269; Dec. Dig. 513(3).] 15. TAXATION ~722(3)—TAX SALE-SUIT TO REDEEM. A complaint so far as seeking redemption from a tax sale is insufficient, it appearing that the redemption is in legal contemplation already fully consummated, and that there is no need to invoke the power of the court. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. § 1451; Dec. Dig. 722(3).J 16. TAXATION 531(1)-PAYMENT OF TAXSUBROGATION. One who has from necessity, to save loss of part of his real estate, paid a tax which should have been paid by others is by subrogation entitled to recover it of those who should have paid it. Cent. Dig. § 986; Dec. Dig. 531(1).] 17. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS 224 Claim for taxes against a decedent's estate need not, like ordinary claims, be filed, but may be collected from the administrator out of funds in his hands, or by seizure and sale of the property assessed. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Executors and Administrators, Cent. Dig. §§ 768–788; Dec. Dig. 224.] 18. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS 315 (6)-SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE-CLAIM AGAINST LEGATEES. One who by necessity, to protect his property, paid taxes, which should have been paid by testator's executor, has after settlement of the estate no cause of action against the legatees, at least in the absence of showing that they still have the property received by them. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Executors and Administrators, Cent. Dig. § 1309; Dec. Dig. 315(6).] For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes |