"Where the law requires that a record or paper, to make it admissible as evidence, shall be Many of the instructions given to the jury, ed by the seal of his office, the omission of the certified by the official custodian and attestwhen standing alone, lack clearness of ex-seal is fatal, and the document is not admispression. Taking the instructions as a whole, however, the jury was informed as to the law applicable to the issues joined and the facts involved. There was no error in refusing to give either of the instructions tendered by appellant.

ords, and the authorities generally, if appel- [ field School District No. 186 and others. lant's contention is true that there was an From a judgment. of the Appellate Court on omission of the recorder's seal, the certified appeal from a judgment of the circuit court copies of the deeds were not properly au- denying an injunction and dismissing the thenticated, and were erroneously admitted appeal reversing and remanding, with direcin evidence, and the error would be reversi- tions to grant the injunction, defendants apble, as this was the only method resorted to peal. Affirmed. by appellee to establish the title to the real estate in question.

M. U. Woodruff, H. L. Child, and Clinton L. Conkling, all of Springfield, and Charles B. Wood, of Chicago (Wilson, Warren & Child and Conkling & Irwin, all of Springfield, and Wood & Oakley, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellants. B. L. Catron, of Springfield, for appellee.

[1] A close examination of the record discloses that, while the seal of the recorder was not attached to the certificates of the recorder to the copies of the deeds, just above the certificates and upon the copy of the deeds appear the words, "Decatur County Recorder's Seal, Indiana." The better practice would have been to have placed the seal up- CARTER, J. This was a bill filed in the on an appropriate place on the certificate. circuit court of Sangamon county, praying From the examination we have made, how-that Springfield school district No. 186, and ever, of the record, we cannot say under the circumstances that there was not a substantial compliance with the statute; therefore there was no error in admitting the certified copies of said deeds in evidence.

We have carefully examined each of the questions presented by appellant, and find no error that calls for a reversal of the judg

ment.

Judgment affirmed.

(272 Ill. 458)

its board of education and officers, be restrained from purchasing a new schoolhouse site and from building a schoolhouse thereon. The circuit court denied the injunction and dismissed the bill for want of equity. The Appellate Court for the Third District, on appeal, reversed the decree and remanded the cause, with directions to grant the injunction as prayed for.

Most, if not all, of the facts, so far as they relate to the questions necessary to be decided in this cause, are undisputed. Said

HYSLER v. SPRINGFIELD SCHOOL DIST. school district includes all of the city of

Springfield and certain adjoining territory. The whole district by the last federal census had more than 35,000 and less than 100,000 inhabitants. It is acting under a special charter. Its affairs are managed by a board of education of seven members elected by the people and vested with the powers and duties provided by the general school laws of the state for such boards of education. Schools are maintained in many buildings, one being Some on what is known as the Douglas site. dissatisfaction arose as to the fitness of that building and the location of its grounds for school purposes. March 2, 1914, a petition signed by not fewer than 500 legal voters was filed with the board of education, asking that an election be called to submit to the voters the proposition of acquiring, by purchase or condemnation, as a school site for said school, certain premises located about a third of a mile from the old site and of building a schoolhouse on said proposed

NO. 186 et al. (No. 10565.) (Supreme Court of Illinois. April 20, 1916.) SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS 53(1), 68, 97(4) BUILDINGS - ELECTIONS MAJORITY VOTE. Under School Law (Hurd's Rev. St. 1913, c. 122) § 119, forbidding the board of directors to purchase or locate a schoolhouse site or to build a schoolhouse without an election thereon, and providing that a majority of the votes cast shall be necessary to authorize the directors to act, and section 127, requiring the board to buy or lease sites for schoolhouses, and forbidding the board to purchase or locate a schoolhouse site, etc., unless authorized by a majority of the votes cast at an election called therefor, the propositions to build a new schoolhouse, to acquire a new site, and to issue bonds, submitted to voters of a school district. together with the names of candidates of members of the board of education of a city, coincident with the district, where 22,901 votes were cast in the district and the total vote on the respective propositions was 16,419 with 9,152 in favor, 15.725 with 8,860 in favor, and 16,055 with 8,759 in favor, the majority was to be computed on the majority of votes cast at the election, and not on the majority cast for any proposition, and site. Other residents of the district apparhence there was no majority for either proposition; and, even if considered as a special election of the district, it could not be determined that the majority of the votes cast on the propositions was cast for either one of them.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Schools and School Districts, Cent. Dig. $$ 113, 127, 128, 134, 135, 226; Dec. Dig. ~53(1), 68, 97(4).]

ently preferred the old site, as another petition, signed by not fewer than 500, was filed on March 20th, asking the board to submit to the voters the proposition of building a new schoolhouse on the old site. We deem it unnecessary to specify all the various proceedings of the board with reference to these Appeal from Appellate Court, Third Dis- two petitions. March 20, 1914, however, the trict, on Appeal from Circuit Court, Sanga- board authorized an election on the proposimon County; James A. Creighton, Judge. tions to acquire a new site and to build a Bill by Herman Hysler against the Spring-schoolhouse thereon and also on the proposi

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

|

The principal question necessary for decision in this case is whether a majority of the votes cast at the election on the school propositions was in favor of said propositions.

Section 119 of chapter 122 of the Revised Statutes of Illinois provides as follows: "It shall not be lawful for a board of directors to purchase or locate a schoolhouse site, or to purchase, build or move a schoolhouse, or to levy a tax to extend schools beyond nine months, without a vote of the people at an election called and conducted as required by section 198 of this act. A majority of the votes cast shall be necessary to authorize the directors to act. If no locality shall receive a majority of the votes, the directors may select a suitable site. The site selected by either method shall be the school Hurd's Stat. 1913, p. site for such district."

2200.

*

Section 127 of said chapter 122 provides: "The board of education shall have all the powers of school directors, be subject to the same limitations, and in addition thereto they shall have the power, and it shall be their duty: Fifth-To buy or lease sites for schoolhouses with the necessary grounds: Provided, however, that it shall not be lawful for such board of education to purchase or locate a schoolhouse site, or to purchase, build or move a schoolhouse, unless authorized by a majority of all the votes cast at an election called for such purpose in pursuance of a petition signed by not fewer than 500 legal voters of such district, or by one-fifth of all the legal voters of such district," etc.

tion of issuing bonds to pay for the same, | new site and build thereon. He thereon and called an election for April 7, 1914, to prayed an injunction, as heretofore stated. vote on said three propositions. No election was ordered on the question of building a new schoolhouse on the old site. March 21st the board ordered that the names of the candidates for members of the board of education be certified to the board of election commissioners of the city of Springfield, to be placed on the ballots, used at the election to be held in that part of the school district within said city on April 7, 1914. On said April 7th an election was held in the entire district as to said three propositions and also for three members of the board of education. In that part of the school district outside the city of Springfield each voter was given one ballot containing the names of candidates for members of the board of education for the three places to be filled and another ballot containing the three school propositions. The voters within the city of Springfield were given, in addition to these two ballots, a ballot containing the names of candidates for township officers and another ballot upon the question whether the city should become anti-saloon territory. The proof shows the limits of the city of Springfield are coincident with those of Capital township. In the city the election was conducted under the direction of the board of election commissioners. Only one set of ballot boxes was used for all the ballots and one set of pollbooks and returns made. Ac cording to the pollbooks, 22,901 voters voted at said election in said school district. The ballots cast on the school propositions were as follows: Acquiring new site: For, 9152; against, 7267; total, 16,419. Building new schoolhouse on the new site: For, 8860; against, 6865; total, 15,725. Issuing bonds: For, 8759; against, 7296; total, 16,055. The county court thereafter entered an order to the effect that each of the said three propositions had failed to receive a majority of the votes cast at said election. At a meeting of the board of education August 4, 1914, that board adopted a resolution declaring the proposed new site for the Douglas school to be the legally located site and appointed a committee to procure options on land, which the committee proceeded to do. The board decided not to issue bonds for said building,tion, in order to carry, must receive a mabut to take the necessary amount of money from the building fund. October, 22, 1914, appellee, as a taxpayer in the district, filed this bill, setting forth, among other things, that the board had unlawfully refused to submit the proposition of building a new school-250, 100 N. E. 208. house on the present site; that the ballots were so prepared and printed that only one site was submitted to the voters; that it did not appear from the records of the board that ten days' notice was given; that the board was not authorized by a majority of the votes cast at the election to acquire a

Counsel for the appellants insist that, in order to decide whether the necessary majority of the votes was cast in favor of the school propositions, we should only take into consideration the votes cast on those propositions, and the circuit court so held; while counsel for appellee argues that to decide as to whether the necessary majority was cast in favor of the school propositions we must base the computation on the majority of votes cast at the election, and the Appellate Court so held. In all the cases called to our attention in this state when any given proposition has been submitted to a vote of the people at a regular election at the same time that the voters were voting for county, state, city, or township officers, and the different ballots were all placed in one ballot box and only one set of pollbooks kept and returns made, it has been held that the said proposi

jority of the votes cast for the officials voted on at the election. People v. Brown, 11 Ill. 478; People v. Wiant, 48 Ill. 263; Chestnutwood v. Hood, 68 Ill. 132; People v. Weber, 222 Ill. 180, 78 N. E. 56; People v. Cincinnati, Lafayette & Chicago Ry. Co., 256 Ill.

Under the reasoning of these cases, it must be held, as 22,901 voters cast their ballots at this election in this school district, that for any one of these propositions to have carried it must have received a majority of said 22,901 votes; that is, 11,451 votes.

Counsel for appellants insist that the hold

In view of the conclusions reached on the questions here discussed, we are not required to consider the other points raised by counsel in their briefs.

The judgment of the Appellate Court will be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

ing of this court in People v. Brown, 189 Ill. | of the board of education under any of the 619, 60 N. E. 46, is not in harmony with this authorities from this or other jurisdictions. conclusion. An examination of the opinion It necessarily follows, in our judgment, that and record in that case, we think, will show by no process of reasoning can it be held that counsel are in error. It was there held that any one of the three propositions here that the fact that an election on the estab-in question received a majority of the votes lishment of a township high school was held cast at that election. at the same time and place as that at which the trustees of schools were elected did not, when the election was held on the annual town meeting day, make it a part of the township election; but, on the contrary, it remained a special election, conducted under the provisions of the school law, it being distinctly stated in that case that the decision was based on the fact that there were two separate elections, the ballots being placed in separate ballot boxes, and, so far as we can judge from the record and the reasoning of the opinion, it was understood by the court that the two elections were managed and conducted entirely separate from one another, except that the same set of judges and clerks conducted them both. Here, as already stated, in that portion of the school district in the city of Springfield, not only were the ballots all cast in one ballot box, but only one set of pollbooks was kept and one set of returns made.

If, however, we were to assume, for the purposes of this case, that the election as to the three school propositions was a separate and special election, we do not see how it can be held, from the record before us, that a majority of the votes cast at such special school election on these propositions

was cast for either one of them. The total vote cast on the first proposition, alone, for and against, was 16,419; the total vote cast for and against the second proposition was 15,725; the total vote cast for and against issuing bonds was 16,055. The argument of counsel for appellants must necessarily be based on the supposition that no voter cast a vote on either the second or third proposition who did not also cast a vote on the first proposition. Beyond question, from the variation of the total vote cast on each of these three propositions, many voters voted only on one or two propositions and not on all three, and no one can determine, from the facts in this record, whether all the people who voted on the second or third proposition, or both of them, voted on the first proposition. To hold, as would be necessary to sustain the position of appellants, that the voting on each one of these three propositions, all on the same ballot, was a special election, each by itself, obviously would be most unreasonable. Neither this court nor any other, so far as we are aware, has so held. We may say in passing that we do not see how it can reasonably be argued that the election on the school propositions, on the facts here stated, could be considered a special election separate from the election of the members

1.

(223 Mass. 575)

BRADLEY et al. v. BORDEN et al. (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Suffolk. April 21, 1916.)

EQUITY 409 MASTERS QUESTIONS OF
LAW AND FACT.

In referring a case to a master, with or
without the consent of parties, the court may re-
quire him to determine any question of law or
fact necessary or useful to the decision of any
being advisory, while his findings of fact, in the
pending issue; his report of rulings of law
absence of a report of all material evidence, have
the weight of a special verdict of a jury.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Equity, Cent.
Dig. 88 904, 920-923; Dec. Dig. 409.]
EQUITY 401-MASTERS - REFERENCE OF

2.

WHOLE CASE.

Without the consent of parties, the court cannot refer the entire decision of the whole case to a master; but, with consent, such has long been the practice in equity and at law. Dig. §§ 869-873; Dec. Dig. 401.] [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Equity, Cent.

-

3. EQUITY 405(1) - MASTERS - AUTHORITY CONFERRED BY RULE.

A rule reading, "And now it is ordered that the above-entitled cause be referred to W. F. F., Esq., as master, to hear the parties and their report thereon to the court," conferred authority evidence, to find the facts, decide the case, and on the master to make such findings as would have been made by a justice of the Supreme Judicial Court.

Dig. 88 880-885; Dec. Dig. 405(1).]
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Equity, Cent.
4. JOINT ADVENTURES 4(1),

STOCKHOLD

ERS' SYNDICATE MANAGERS-DISCRETION. Where managers of a syndicate acquiring an interest in the majority of the stock of a copper things by them in their sole and absolute discrecompany were authorized "to do any and all tion deemed proper, necessary, or expedient to carry out the purposes of this agreement," in the absence of bad faith with regard to the exvested in them the managers were not subject to ercise of the discretion and authority thereby the control of any superior tribunal.

-

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Joint Adventures, Cent. Dig. § 3; Dec. Dig. 4(1).] 5. JOINT ADVENTURES 4(1) STOCKHOLDERS' SYNDICATE-AUTHORITY OF MANAGERS. holders in a copper mining company in employing The act of managers of a syndicate of stockan expert to complete a partial report of the values of ore bodies, which he had prepared and submitted to the copper company, was within the authority of the managers, vested with power "to do any and all things by them in their sole and absolute discretion deemed proper, necessary, or

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

expedient to carry out the purposes of this agree ment."

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Joint Adventures, Cent. Dig. § 3; Dec. Dig. 4(1).]

6. JOINT ADVENTURES 4(1) - STOCKHOLDERS' SYNDICATE--AUTHORITY OF MANAGERS. The vote of managers of a syndicate of stockholders in a copper mining company to set aside 2,500 shares of stock, to be delivered to third persons at the termination of the syndicate agreement in recognition of faithful past services rendered the copper company and the syndicate, was unauthorized and void; the managers being authorized "to do any and all things by them in their sole and absolute discretion deemed proper, necessary, or expedient to carry out the purposes of this agreement."

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Joint Adventures, Cent. Dig. § 3; Dec. Dig. 4(1).] 7. JOINT ADVENTURES 4(1) STOCKHOLDERS' SYNDICATE-AUTHORITY OF MANAGERS. The vote of managers of a syndicate of stockholders in a copper mining company, grant ing an option to a third party to purchase, at any time before termination of the syndicate agreement, 5,000 shares of stock at an agreed price, stated to be upon the consideration of present and future services, the syndicate being under no legal obligation to pay for past serv ices, and there being no agreement, binding upon the third party, to render any in the future, was unauthorized and void; the managers being authorized "to do any and all things by them in their sole and absolute discretion deemed proper, necessary, or expedient to carry out the purposes of this agreement."

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Joint Adventures, Cent. Dig. § 3; Dec. Dig. 4(1).] 8. JOINT ADVENTURES 4(1) STOCKHOLDERS' SYNDICATE MEETING OF MANAGERS NOTICE.

Where managers of a stockholders' syndicate of a copper mining company, at a meeting held December 2, 1911, voted that the syndicate approve and recommend the installation of a suitable concentrating mill at the mine, if the directors of the company should determine that the installation was for its best interests. notices of a meeting of the managers, called for March 9, 1912, sent out March 24, stating that the meeting was called for the purpose, among others, of "(3) considering and taking action on ways and means of aiding the Butte Central Copper Company to procure additional funds required to install the proposed mill at the mine," were sufficient, in view of the vote of December 2d, to apprise the individual members of the purpose of the meeting of March 9th.

their sole and absolute discretion deemed proper, necessary, or expedient to carry out the purposes of this agreement."

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Joint Adventures, Cent. Dig. § 3; Dec. Dig. 4(1).] 10. JOINT ADVENTURES 4(1) SYNDICATE OF STOCKHOLDERS-ACT OF MANAGERS-VA

LIDITY.

Where the agreement of a syndicate of stockholders in a copper mining company provided that the affairs of the syndicate should be wound up at a set date by the managers, and the net proceeds in cash or securities distributed pro rata among the subscribers not in default, the vote of the managers placing the syndicate's stock in a voting trust for a period of three years after the time of termination of the syndicate, a step necessary to the protection of the syndicate interest in the company, was not illegal and void, as infringing any right of syndicate memright of disposition of copper stock on terminabers to receive the possession, enjoyment, and tion of the agreement, which did not provide for a distribution of stock pro rata in specie: the right of the individual members of the syndicate being to an accounting after reasonable time for winding up the affairs of the syndicate after its termination by agreement.

tures, Cent. Dig. § 3; Dec. Dig. 4(1).]
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Joint Adven-
11. JOINT ADVENTURES 5(1) - STOCKHOLD-
ERS' SYNDICATE-MANAGERS' OBLIGATION TO
ACCOUNT.

Where suit for an accounting was brought by members of a syndicate of stockholders in a copper mining company against the managers of the syndicate before expiration of a reasonable time after the agreed date for winding up the affairs of the syndicate, the managers were under no obligation to account.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Joint Adventures, Cent. Dig. § 7; Dec. Dig. 5(1).] Case Reserved from Supreme Judicial Court, Suffolk County.

Suit by George F. Bradley and others against Frederick W. Borden and others. On reservation for the determination of the full court. Decree in accordance with opinion.

H. T. Richardson, of Boston, for plaintiffs. James E. Cotter and Jos. P. Fagan, both of Boston, for defendant Federal Trust Co. Blodgett, Jones, Burnham & Bingham and Addison C. Burnham, all of Boston, for defendant First Nat. Bank of Boston. Arthur [Ed. Note.--For other cases, see Joint Adven- E. Burr, of Boston, Wm. R. Tillinghast, of tures, Cent. Dig. § 3; Dec. Dig. ~4(1).] Providence, R. I., and Lee M. Friedman, of Boston, for certain respondents. E. M. 9. JOINT ADVENTURES 4(1) STOCKHOLDERS' SYNDICATE-AUTHORITY OF MANAGERS. Schwarzenberg and Walter N. Buffum, both A vote of the managers of a syndicate of of Boston, for Albert E. Gladwin and others. stockholders of a copper mining company, authorizing the transfer of part of the syndicate's stock to the treasurer of the company, to be given as a bonus with the company's income bonds, to be sold to raise money to carry on development work by installing a mill for the treatment of ores at the mine, so as to maintain the value of the stock of the syndicate, and placing the remainder of the syndicate's stock in trust for three years or until the bonds should be paid, to be voted as the managers should direct, was authorized; the transaction being business of the syndicate within the terms of the syndicate agreement, one of the objects of which was to enable the managers, through the voting power of the syndicate's stock, to control the management of the company, while the managers were authorized "to do any and all things by them in

PIERCE, J. This case, by consent of parties, was referred to the master without objection to or appeal from the terms of the order, which read:

"And now it is ordered that the above-entitled cause be referred to Walter F. Frederick, Esq., as master, to hear the parties and their evidence, to find the facts, decide the case and report thereon to the court."

The rule in the cross-bill read:

"On the above-entitled cause it is ordered that the cross-bill and pleadings therein be referred to Walter F. Frederick, Esq., as master, to hear the parties and their evidence, to find the facts, and report the same to the court."

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
112 N.E.-27