ings of evidentiary facts in relation to fraud MORRIS, J. Action by appellants for the and a constructive trust; that the statutes of limitation may be interposed as a shield, but not used as a sword. Generally speaking, statutes of limitation are laws of repose, and merely affect the remedy, and are available only as defenses. Cassell v. Lowry (1904) 164 Ind. 1, 72 N. E. 640. But open, notorious, exclusive, uninterrupted, and adverse possession of real estate for 20 years, regardless of color of title, is as effectual to confer complete title on the occupant as a grant, and he may use it as a shield for defense or as a means to recover a possession lost after its acquisition. Roots v. Beck (1887) 109 Ind. 472, 9 N. E. 698; Bowen v. Preston, 48 Ind. 367; Pyott v. State (1908) 170 Ind. 118, 122, 83 N. E. 737; Rennert v. Shirk, 163 Ind. 542, | 554, 72 N. E. 546; 19 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 146; Craven v. Craven, 181 Ind. 553, 103 N. E. 333, 105 N. E. 41. possession and accrued rents of real estate. The court sustained a demurrer to appellants' complaint, and this ruling is assigned as error. The complaint alleges that John F. Rodabaugh died testate, in 1910, owning personalty worth about $4,000, and real estate worth $50,000; that appellants and the appellees, other than the executors, are the heirs of decedent; that the appellees, other than the executors, are named in the will as legatees or devisees; that all the benenciaries named in the eighth item of the will survived the testator excepting Milton McFerran, and all except one, who is aged 29, are over 30 years old; that the executors, with the assent of the devisees and legatees, are in the possession of the real estate, collecting the rents and profits thereof, and applying the same on debts and legacies, and have already received rents to the extent of $3,000. The There was no error in overruling appel-will is made a part of the complaint. Its first lant's motion for a venire de novo. Knight v. item provides for a monument to cost not Kerfoot, supra. [16] One of the grounds urged for a new trial was the refusal of the court to permit appellant's husband to testify to a transaction between Ruth Gundrum and Albert Davenport. The offered evidence was properly excluded. Sections 522, 525, Burns 1914. There was evidence to support the decision of the trial court, and appellant's motion for a new trial was properly overruled. Judgment affirmed. (185 Ind. 513) RAUB et al v. RODABAUGH et al. * (No. 23102.) (Supreme Court of Indiana. June 2, 1916.) 1. WILLS 527-CONTENTS-CERTAINTY. Where a will directed the division of the residue of an estate after payment of debts, legacies, etc., such provision was not void for uncertainty because there might be no residue to divide, but passed to the residuary devisees a fee-simple title to the testator's real estate. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. 1140; Dec. Dig. 527.] 2. DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION 77-RIGHT OF HEIR TO MAINTAIN ACTION RELATING TO REAL PROPERTY. Heirs of a testator who have no interest in the real estate left by him cannot question its possession by the executors. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Descent and Distribution, Dec. Dig. 77.] less than $2,500, nor more than $3,000; the second gives appellee Adam Rodabaugh, for his life, $30 per month, and, after his death, the sum of $20 per month to his widow during her life; the third gives appellee Jane McFerran $25 per month, during life, while the fourth bequeaths to appellee Thomas J. Rodabaugh $25 per month during his life, and thereafter the sum of $15 per month to his widow, during her life; the fifth bequeaths for life to appellee Sarah Bowman the sum of $8 per month, and the sixth gives to each child of a named deceased brother the sum of $300. Item 8 reads as follows: "I give, bequeath, bequest and devise within five years after the death of my beloved brothers, Adam and Thomas J., and my sister, Jane, the residue of all my estate that may remain after the payment of all just debts, the legacies of this will, my funeral expenses, the cost of the monument hereinbefore directed to. be erected upon my lot in said Lindenwood Cemetery, the payment of the costs and expenses of the execution of this will, and the administration of said estate, and the payment of all as directed and required by this will, and not to include any interest or part of my estate that is herein disposed of in this will, and providing the legatee named in this item 8 is at the time thirty or more years of age, and if such legatee is not thirty or more years at that time, then at the time such legatee shall have arrived at the age of thirty years, shall be given and taken upon the conditions herein before set forth in this item 8 by the following named persons, the Appeal from Circuit Court, Allen County; following mentioned proportions, viz.: Edward O'Rourke, Judge. Action by Samuel A. Raub and others against Adam Rodabaugh and others. Demurrer to the complaint sustained (109 N. E. 803), and plaintiffs appeal. Transferred from Appellate Court under Burns' Ann. St. 1914, § 1394, cl. 2. Affirmed. P. V. Hoffman, of Auburn, John H. Aiken, of Ft. Wayne, Mountz & Brinkerhoff, of Garrett, and Underwood & Geake, of Ft. Wayne, for appellants. E. O'Rourke and M. H. Luecke, both of Ft. Worth, for appellees. "To my nephews, Walter and Robert Rodabaugh, sons of my brother, Adam Rodabaugh, and to Jennie McFerran, daughter of my sister, Jane McFerran, one-fifth each; "To Milton McFerran, Sadie Skelton, Anna ter, Jane McFerran, and to the daughter of my McFerran, Lizzie McFerran children of my sisbeloved sister, Harriett Fisher, who is afflicted with a diseased hip, one-fifteenth each; and to John McFerran, George McFerran, and Benjamin McFerran, children of my sister, Jane McFerran, two-thirtieths, to be equally divided among said three children. "In the event, however, of the death of any of said legatees named in this item 8 before my death, with children surviving at my death, For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Eminent Domain, Cent. Dig. 88 551, 627, 700; Dec. Dig. 243(1).] then the children of said legatee so deceased shall | ness, or from the wrongful act of those engaged take the interest such deceased parent would in the work, must be assessed. have taken, and in the event of the legatee named in this item 8 die before I die without children at my death, then, the legatees named therein who may be alive at my death shall take in the proportions as near as can be as they take in this item 8 the interests of such de ceased legatee who died without children before my death." 3. EMINENT DOMAIN_203(1)—PROCEEDINGS -EVIDENCE AS TO DAMAGES. flowed by a dam, testimony as to the method of In proceedings for condemnation of land tiling wet lands and as to the difficulty of tiling Item 12 bequeaths $500 to a cemetery asso- that part of a landowner's farm affected by the ciation for the care of a cemetery lot. Ap-question of damages, as showing that the moist backwater from the dam is competent on the pellees Adam Rodabaugh and Herman Mi- condition of the subsoil produced on lands afchaels were appointed executors. The will fected by the dam could not readily be overcome contains no express language authorizing the by drainage. executors to take possession of the real estate or collect the rents and profits thereof. [1, 2] It is contended by appellants that item 8 of the will is void for uncertainty, and that the fee simple of the real estate vested at testator's death in his heirs as intestate property, subject to the payment of bequests and debts after the exhaustion of the personalty. Unless this contention should prevail the complaint is insufficient, for appellants must show some interest in the real estate or they have no right to question the possession of the executors. Appellants' counsel say that the beneficiaries named in item 8 are to get nothing except what may be left after the payment of debts and legacies; that nothing may remain after such payment; and that because of such uncertainty the fee-simple title and right of possession vested in testator's heirs at his death. We cannot adopt such theory. We are of the opinion that the testator did not die intestate as to any of his property, and that item 8 is not void, but passed the fee-simple title to the realty in question to the devisees therein named. dred v. Sylvester (1916) 111 N. E. 914; Alsman v. Walters (1916) 106 N. E. 879; Id., 111 N. E. 921. Consequently whether the executors are entitled to possession is a question in which appellants are not concerned. The complaint was insufficient. Judgment affirmed. (185 Ind. 9) Al SOUTHERN INDIANA POWER CO. v. KEANE. (No. 22773.) (Supreme Court of Indiana. May 31, 1916.) 1. EMINENT DOMAIN 238(6)-REVIEW BY COURT-TRIAL-RIGHT TO OPEN AND CLOSE. Where, in an action to assess damages for the appropriation of land, exceptions to the report of appraisers have been filed, and an appeal taken to the circuit court by both parties, the landowner has the right to open and close. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Eminent Domain, Cent. Dig. § 619; Dec. Dig. 238(6).] 2. EMINENT DOMAIN 243(1)-PROCEEDINGS -DAMAGES-PERMANENT DAMAGES. main, Cent. Dig. § 542; Dec. Dig. 203(1).] [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Eminent Do Appeal from Circuit Court, Lawrence County; Oren O. Swails, Judge. Action by the Southern Indiana Power Company against Morgan Keane. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. Brooks & Brooks, of Bedford, and George H. Voight, of Jeffersonville, for appellant. John H. Edwards, of Mitchell, for appellee. SPENCER, J. [1] This action, instituted by appellant for the purpose of assessing the damages sustained by appellee through the appropriation of a part of his lands for flow age from appellant's dam at Williams, Ind., is in many respects a companion case to that of Southern Indiana Power Company v. Monical, 183 Ind. 588, 109 N. E. 763, and the decision there announced serves as controlling authority on some of the questions presented by this appeal. What we there said as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict of the jury is applicable here in substance, and that case, together with the decision in Indiana, etc., R. Co. v. Cook, 102 Ind. 133, 26 N. E. 203, sustains the rule that where, in an action to assess damages for the appropriation of land, exceptions to the report of appraisers have been filed, and an appeal taken to the circuit court by both parties, the landowner has the right to open and close. [2] Appellant further insists that the trial court erred in giving to the jury instructions 5 and 7 tendered by appellee. These instructions, however, properly apply to this case the general rule that: In condemnation proceedings "all damages, present or prospective, that are the natural or reasonable incident of the improvement to be made or work to be constructed, not including such as may arise from negligence, or unskillfulness, or from the wrongful act of those engaged in the work, must be assessed. Damages are assessed once for all, and the future necessities as well as the present needs of the condemnor are to be taken into consideration." Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Hadley, 179 Ind. 429, 441, 101 N. E. 473, 477 (45 L. R. A. [N. S.] 796), and cases cited. In condemnation proceedings all damages, present or prospective, that are the natural or [3] Finally, it is contended that the lower reasonable incident of the improvement to be made or work to be constructed, not including court erred in permitting two witnesses for such as may arise from negligence, or unskillful-appellee to testify as to the method of tiling For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes VENDOR AND PURCHASER 285(3)-REMEDIES OF VENDOR-LIEN-ENFORCEMENT. Where the grantor of land knew that it was subject to a vendor's lien, a judgment requiring her to pay into court the amount due the holder of the lien out of the purchase price of the land still in her possession, and providing that she should be subject to citation and punishment for disobedience of the decree, is proper. wet lands and as to the difficulty to be ex- 16. No error appearing in the record, judgment of the trial court is affirmed. (63 Ind. App. 318) ESSIG et al. v. PORTER. (No. 9559.)* (Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 2. May 31, 1916.) 1. VENDOR AND PURCHASER DIES OF VENDOR-LIEN. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Cent. Dig. § 803; Dec. Dig. 285(3).] 7. APPEAL AND ERROR 1184-DISPOSITION OF CAUSE-DEATH OF PARTY. Where a judgment is found correct and the death of appellee pending the appeal is suggested, the judgment will be affirmed as of date of submission. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 4407, 4635; Dec. Dig. 1184.] Appeal from Circuit Court, Hamilton Coun254(5)—REME-ty; Meade Vestal, Judge. Where plaintiff, having purchased and paid for land and gone into possession, procures a conveyance directly from his vendor to his purchaser, he is entitled to a vendor's lien for the unpaid portion of the price. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Cent. Dig. § 627; Dec. Dig. 254(5).] An instrument promising for value received to pay a sum of money "negotiable and payable at" a named bank is negotiable, though it does not contain the words "or order, or bearer." [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Bills and Notes, Cent. Dig. § 363; Dec. Dig. 147. For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Negotiable Note.] 3. VENDOR AND PURCHASER 266(6)—REME DIES OF VENDOR-LIEN-WAIVER, The taking of a note for the unpaid portion of a purchase price of land does not waive the vendor's lien previously held by the payee. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Cent. Dig. §§ 733, 734, 748-750; Dec. Dig. 266(6).] 4. VENDOR AND PURCHASER OF PARTIES-NOTICE. 265(2)-RIGHTS Action by Samuel J. Porter against Samantha P. Essig and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed. O. H. Mendenhall, of Atlanta, and Christian & Christian, of Noblesville, for appellants. J. F. & N. C. Neal, of Noblesville, for appellee. IBACH, J. This was an action by appellees against appellants to enforce a vendor's lien against certain real estate. The errors assigned in overruling appellant's demurrers the arguments as to such errors are met by to the complaint will not be discussed, since what will be said concerning the facts of the case as found by the court, and his conclusions of law thereon. [1] In 1877 appellee owned 40 acres of real estate in Hamilton county, in which Barbara Hertzler had a life estate. She and appellee agreed that if appellee would purchase a certain 10-acre tract of land in the vicinity, and construct on it a dwelling house, and convey it to her, she would release to him her life estate in the 40-acre tract, surrender possession of it to him, and pay him the difference in value between the 10 acres and dwelling house, and the life estate. Appellee purchased the 10 acres, entered into possession, and built the house in accordance with his agreement, then had the deed of conveyance made 880(2)—PRESENTING direct from the former owners to Mrs. HertzQUESTIONS IN TRIAL COURT-PREJUDICIAL ler, and she surrendered her life estate in EFFECT OF ERROR. A grantee of land who was present when her grantor executed a note and knew of its execution and that it was for unpaid purchase money and was unpaid when the land was deeded to her, took the land with notice that it was subject to a vendor's lien in favor of the payee of the note. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Cent. Dig. §§ 702-708; Dec. Dig. 265(2).] 5. APPEAL AND ERROR Where the court stated as conclusions of the 40 acres to him, and was indebted to him law that land in the hands of a grantee was on account of the excess of the value of the subject to a vendor's lien in favor of the gran- 10-acre tract and cost of the dwelling house tor's vendor, to the extent of the unpaid por- which had been paid by him. This was suftion of the price due from the grantee, which was secured by a note, and the grantee has not ficient to cause to exist in appellee's favor a excepted to the conclusions of law or made any lien against the 10-acre tract of land for the motion to modify the judgment, the appellate purchase price. When the actual vendor court will not consider whether the grantee, having given his note for the unpaid portion of the holds only a title in equity, and the conveyprice due the grantor, is an innocent purchaser ance is made direct from the party holding as to the entire purchase price, since any er- the legal title in trust, a vendor's lien arises ror in the conclusion of law in this respect is not in favor of the actual vendor. "Where a purprejudicial to the grantor, who also appealed. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and chaser has paid the whole purchase money, Error, Cent. Dig. § 3586; Dec. Dig. 880(2).] he is, in equity, regarded as the real owner For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes *Rehearing denied. Transfer denied. of the land for every purpose. He is so in very substance, and a conveyance to him is but a compliance with a form of law. It would be a surprising doctrine, that a court of equity would so stick upon form, in utter disregard of right, as to deny to him the implied lien for purchase money, which it would give if he had held also the legal title." Johns v. Sewell, 33 Ind. 1, 4. See, also, Dwenger v. Branigan, 95 Ind. 221; Otis v. Gregory, 111 Ind. 504, 515, 13 N. E. 39. [2] In 1896 the amount owing by Barbara Hertzler to appellee as purchase money had not been paid, nor secured in any manner, and it was agreed between her and appellee that she owed him $318, and she executed to him her note therefor, in part in the following language: "One day after death for value received * * * promise to pay to S. J. Porter the sum of $318 and attorneys' fees, negotiable and payable at the Union Bank at Tipton, Indiana, with interest at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum from date until paid." This instrument must be held to be a negotiable note. If a note does not contain the words "or order, or bearer" or other like words of negotiability, it is nonnegotiable. Tiedman Commercial Paper, § 21; Maule v. Crawford, 14 Hun (N. Y.) 193; Hackney v. Jones, 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 612. But if it contains words which clearly show that it was intended to be negotiable, it is not necessary that the words "order" or "bearer" be used. It is clearly stated that this note shall be "negotiable and payable at the Union Bank at Tipton, Indiana," and therefore it must be held to be a negotiable instrument. Tiedeman, Commercial Paper, § 21; Raymond v. Middleton, 29 Pa. 530. [3] However, the taking of this note did not operate as a waiver of the vendor's lien previously held by appellee. "The presumption of payment, which ordinarily arises from the giving of a note governed by the law merchant, will be controlled when its effect would be to deprive the party who takes the note of a collateral security, or any other substantial benefit. In such cases the presumption of payment is rebutted by the circumstances of the transaction itself." Jouchert v. Johnson, 108 Ind. 436, 9 N. E. 413. See, also, Bradway v. Groenendyke, 153 Ind. 509, 55 N. E. 434; Scott v. Edgar, 159 Ind. 38, 63 N. E. 452; Aldridge v. Dunn, 7 Blackf. 249, 41 Am. Dec. 224; 39 Cyc. 1842. [4] On October 3, 1911, Barbara Hertzler executed a deed conveying the above-mentioned 10-acre tract of land to appellant Samantha P. Essig, her daughter. This tract of land was Mrs. Hertzler's only property. The consideration for the deed was services rendered to Mrs. Hertzler and a home furnished to her, of ample value for the land. Appellant Essig was present when her mother gave the note in question to appellee, and knew of its execution, that it was for unpaid purchase money, and that it was unpaid when the land was deeded to her. Hence she took the land with notice that it was subject to a vendor's lien in favor of appellant. [5] On February 2, 1912, Barbara Hertzler died insolvent, and on March 1, 1912, appellant Essig conveyed the aforesaid 10-acre tract to appellant Cocain for the consideration of $2,000, of which he has paid her $1,500 in cash, of which payment she now has $1,300 in cash, and the remaining portion of which was evidenced by his promissory note for $500 secured by mortgage, on the real estate sold. On March 5, 1912, he was notified of appellee's claim against the real estate. It is undoubtedly true that appellant Cocain would not be an innocent purchaser as to the amount of the purchase price unpaid by him at the time when he received notice of appellee's lien against the land, if at that time he had not already executed his promissory note for that amount. Certain v. Smith, 53 Ind. App. 163, 101 N. E. 319; Higgins v. Kendall, 73 Ind. 522. The court found that appellee has and is entitled to a vendor's lien on the land to the extent of the unpaid purchase money owing by appellant Cocain, and also upon the purchase money in the hands of appellant Essig, and stated conclusions of law accordingly. It is unnecessary for us to consider whether appellant Cocain, having given his promissory note for the unpaid portion of the purchase price, can by that fact be said to be an innocent purchaser as to the entire purchase price. This appellant has not excepted to the conclusions of law, or made any motion to modify the judgment rendered thereon, and any error in this respect as to him would not be prejudicial to appellant Essig. [6] The court as a part of its judgment decreed that appellant Essig shall within 30 days pay into court the sum of $689.98 which he found to be due on the note, with interest, in discharge of appellee's lien, and upon her failure to do so, she shall be subject upon appellant's motion to citation and punishment for disobedience of the decree. Appellant Essig moved the court to strike out this portion of the judgment rendered, but the overruling of this motion was not error. Appellants were neither personally liable for the debt represented by appellee's vendor's lien, but appellant Essig, with knowledge of such lien, having sold the land upon which it was attached, equity will transfer the lien to the funds received from the sale of the lands, and require her to pay the lien therefrom. [7] The death of appellee while this appeal has been pending having been 'suggested, the judgment is therefore affirmed as of date of submission. Judgment affirmed. (224 Mass. 323) insuring the plaintiff against liability to BAY STATE ST. RY. CO. v. NORTH SHORE newsboys "while boarding, riding upon or NEWS CO. (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Norfolk. May 23, 1916.) 1. INDEMNITY 9(1) CONTRACTS CON STRUCTION. The unambiguous terms of an agreement between a news company and a street railway, whereby the news company agreed to save the railway harmless for all loss or damage on account of injuries received by newsboys in its employ while boarding, riding upon, or leaving cars, could not be cut down by the fact that the policy which the news company was obligated to carry for the railway's benefit was not so broad. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Indemnity, Cent. Dig. § 16; Dec. Dig. 9(1).] 2. INDEMNITY 3-CONTRACTS-LEGALITY. An agreement whereby a news company insures a street railway against liability to newsboys while boarding, riding upon, or leaving cars is valid. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Indemnity, Cent. Dig. §§ 2-6; Dec. Dig. 3.] Appeal from Superior Court, Norfolk County; Frederic H. Chase, Judge. Action by the Bay State Street Railway Company against the North Shore News Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Judgment affirmed. ROBINSON v. DOE et al. (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Suffolk. May 22, 1916.) 1. MASTER AND SERVANT 330(3)-INJURIES TO THIRD PERSONS-EXISTENCE OF RELATION EVIDENCE. Where a person who threw a missile, which struck plaintiff, appeared to be in charge of a portion of a circus tent and the contiguous grounds, and on the night when the circus license expired was openly engaged with others similarly dressed in taking down the tent, the jury may infer that he was in the employment of the circus owners, and with their consent was in control of their property. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. § 1272; Dec. Dig. 330(3).] 2. MASTER AND SERVANT 330(3)—INJURIES TO THIRD PERSONS-SCOPE OF AUTHORITY-EVIDENCE. Where one was in charge of the work of taking down a tent, the jury may infer that in scope of his employment, though the throwing of driving boys away he was acting within the a missile such as struck plaintiff may not have been intended or contemplated by his employers. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. § 1272; Dec. Dig. C 330(3).] Action to recover under an agreement between the Boston & Northern Street Railway Company (now the Bay State Street Railway Company) and the defendant by which agreement the railway company granted to the news company the privilege of selling newspapers on its cars and the news company undertook to save harmless the railway company from loss, cost or damage on account of injuries received by newsboys while boarding or riding on cars or while 3. TRIAL 260(8)-INJURIES BY SERVANT— on the railway company's tracks. Injuries were sustained by a newsboy named Higgins and it was to recoup damages recovered in an action by him against the railway company that the latter brought this suit on the agreement. ACTIONS-INSTRUCTIONS. Where the court charged that there could be no recovery for injuries from a missile thrown by a circus employé in driving boys away if the employé was on a frolic of his own, that he must be acting within the scope of his authority, and that if the man who threw the brick was doing that for a pastime of his own, the defendant was not liable, the refusal of an instruction that if the act was to punish the person at whom the missile was thrown, or to offendants were not liable, was not error. wreak his own vengeance upon this person, de Henry V. Cunningham, of Boston, for ap pellant. Foster & Turner and William D. Turner, all of Boston (George Hoague, Boston, of counsel), for appellee. LORING, J. [1] We are of opinion that the injury to Higgins was within the contract by which the defendant agreed to save the plaintiff "harmless from all loss, cost or damage on account of injuries received by newsboys in its employ * [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. § 657; Dec. Dig. 260(8).] 4. MASTER AND SERVANT 332(4)-INJURIES TO THIRD PERSONS-INSTRUCTIONS. The refusal of an instruction that if the person or persons at whom the missile which struck plaintiff was thrown by a circus employé were not interfering with defendants' while board-property, but were running away, defendants evidence that the boys had been driven away were not liable, was not error where there was more than once, that they came back and would not leave the premises when requested. ing, riding upon or leaving the cars of the Street Railway Company." The unambiguous terms of this agreement are not to be cut down by the fact (if it is a fact) that the policy which the defendant (by article 6) was to carry for the plaintiff's benefit was not so broad. [2] 2. The agreement here sued on is nothing more and nothing less than an agreement [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. § 1277; Dec. Dig. 332(4).] 5. TRIAL 234(8)-INSTRUCTION-RULES OF EVIDENCE. An instruction that defendant has produced no evidence as to who the party was who For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes |