1. Testamentary devise "I give, devise and bequeath to B in trust for C the
sum of $5,000 and also the house and land where D formerly lived. To have
and to hold the same to her the said B, her heirs, executors and administra-
tors for the use and benefit of C, her heirs, executors and administrators,
with power to manage the same generally and if need be in her opinion to
sell the same and reinvest the proceeds thereof and with power to convey
said real estate to her, her heirs and assigns at any time when she may think
proper and with power to pay over to her said money or any part thereof
according to her discretion." "In all cases where I have given property
in trust for the use and benefit of other persons, and have not specially pro-
vided for its disposition on their decease, my will is that the trustee shall on
such decease pay and convey the same in fee simple discharged of all trusts
to the persons who by the laws of the State of Rhode Island would inherit
it, had the persons for whose benefit it was so given died seized and
possessed thereof in fee."
The trustee converted the real estate into money.
Held, that complainant as husband of the equitable life beneficiary was entitled
to the balance of the trust estate.
Held, further, that the word "inherit" was not used in its technical sense, but
as equivalent to "take" it being the intent of testator that the property
should pass as the intestate property of C.
2. While words should be construed, in accordance with their technical mean-
ing whenever possible, the court will adopt a broader interpretation whenever
necessary to effectuate the intent of testator.
3. Where the estate to be divided is in the form of personalty the words "heirs"
or "heirs-at-law" will be held to mean those entitled to succeed to personal
estate in case of intestacy. Quinn v. Hall, 56.
4. Where testatrix was at the time of her death a resident of this State,
bequeathing by will personal property which was both within and without
the State, the will is presumed to have been made in accordance with the
existing laws of this State.
5. A foreign succession tax depends upon the jurisdiction over the property and
is not sustainable as a regulation of the exercise of testamentary power by
the citizen of another state; therefore such tax is merely a charge upon the
particular property and not upon pecuniary legacies given by the will, and
as the executors are compelled to pay the tax in order to obtain control of
the property, the charge is properly an expense of the administration.
6. Property to be administered embraces all that was originally within the state
of testator's domicile, or that the executor has been able to find elsewhere
and bring there. Whatever sums the executor may be obliged to pay to
bring the property within the state merely reduces the amount within the
control of the court.
7. Where testatrix was at the time of her death a resident of this State
bequeathing by will legacies out of property which was both within and
without the State, the amount paid by the executors on account of the inheri-
tance tax of a foreign state, in order to get possession of the assets of the
estate cannot be deducted from the amount of the pecuniary legacies, but is
a proper expense of administration. Bullard v. Redwood Library, 107.
8. By will testator bequeathed his estate in trust, to pay over the income to the
widow during her life, with bequest over of "all of my estate which may be
remaining in the hands of my said trustee at the time of the decease of my
said wife, to my children, share and share alike, and should any of my children
die, previous to their mother having child or children my will is, that the
issue of such deceased child, shall take from my estate the share its parent
would have taken had that parent survived its mother, and that subject
to these provisions my estate shall vest in my children aforesaid in fee
simple."
After the decease of testator, the widow advanced certain money to one of the
sons, and in consideration of such advances, the widow, and the son
entered into an agreement that upon the termination of the trust
"wherein he (the son) has a vested interest contingent upon his surviving
(his mother) the said amount shall be deducted from any share divisible
to him, out of said trust."
Thereafter the son became bankrupt, his adjudication and discharge in
bankruptcy both occurring prior to the death of the life beneficiary, and
after her decease, his trustee in bankruptcy claimed his share in the trust
estate, except so much as might be found due the estate of his mother.
Another son deceased in the life time of his mother, unmarried, and intestate.
Held, that the intention of testator was not to give any present estate or
interest to the children at the time of his death, but to postpone the gift to
them until the decease of the widow, and to have the estate remaining in
the hands of the trustee at her death distributed among a class composed of
his children living at the death of the widow and the issue of any deceased
child, living at that time. The members of this class could not be ascer-
tained until the death of the widow and the issue of a deceased child would
take as purchasers under the will and not as heirs of the deceased child.
Such a gift was wholly contingent both as to the time of vesting and as to
the persons in whom it would vest, and was neither devisable, nor descendi-
ble, nor capable of being conveyed, while the life estate continued, but during
that period was only a future possibility contingent upon the survival of the
child.
9. Held, further, that the executor of the will of the life beneficiary was entitled
to receive from the share of the son the amount advanced to him under the
terms of the executory agreement.
10. Sec. 70 of the Bankruptcy Act, provides that "The trustee shall be vested
by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt as of the date he was
adjudged a bankrupt, to all (5) property which prior to the filing of the peti-
tion he could by any means have transferred or which might have been
levied upon and sold under judicial process against him."
Held, that the son had no interest in the trust estate, which passed to his
trustee in bankruptcy. Luttgen v. Tiffany, 416.
11. Unless a contrary intention appears in the will, it will be presumed that it
was the intention of testator to dispose of his entire estate, and not to die in-
testate as to a portion of it, and where a will is susceptible of two construc-
tions the law will place upon it that construction which disposes of the entire
estate.
12. The intent of a testator may be found in the terms of the will or may be
determined in case of ambiguity or misdescription by extrinsic evidence.
In carrying out the apparent intent of a testator, words may be rejected
or so restrained in their application that the literal meaning of a particular
sentence will be changed.
13. A will which describes the property devised with sufficient particularity to
establish its identity is a valid instrument. It is not necessary that the
description of the property be accurate if there is enough in the will itself,
together with such extrinsic evidence as may be offered to lead to the
identification of the estate.
14. Testamentary devise by a non-resident of "my piece of land in Providence,
R. I."
Testator did not own any land in Providence, either at the time of the execu-
tion of the will or thereafter, but his only real estate in Rhode Island con-
sisted of a parcel of land in "East Providence."
Held, that it being apparent from the will that testator intended to dispose of
his entire estate, the word "Providence" would be disregarded as a mis-
description and the property allowed to pass to the devisee. Merrill &
Macomber, 458.
15. A devise of the income or of the rents and profits or use and occupation of
land is a devise of the land itself and there is no distinction between real
estate and personal property.
16. A testamentary provision that in case of the marriage of the legatee one-
half of the income bequeathed to her should pass to other children of testator
is void as an illegal limitation and inoperative as a restraint upon marriage.
17. A clear gift is not to be cut down by anything which does not with reason-
able certainty, indicate an intention to cut it down.
18. By a holographic will testator devised his estate to his widow for life, (4)
"my daughters E. and K. to live with her and to be provided for out of
her income and at her decease I give to K. and W. executors of this will my
estate at the corner of R. I. Avenue to my daughter E. for a home so long
as she lives; also the income from all personal property that I may possess."
E. was under disability. (5) "At the decease of E. her interest in my
estate to her brother and sisters. If K. should marry, one half of her income
to W. and E." (6) "All the reference to my daughter C. in this will to be
left to the judgment of my executors. I want mother to help (C.) all she can
from her income." (7) "The Washington Square Estate, the income from
that must pay insurance, taxes and expenses, the balance of the income, one-
half to K., one-quarter to W. and E., one-quarter to C. as long as she is the
wife or widow of S. and in case of her decease to her children. The same in
the case of W. to his children. I think you can manage the estate R. I. Ave.
to get quite an income from that." (10) "After the decease of my children
E., K., W., & C. my real estate in trust and trustee to be paid to take care of
the property for my grandchildren, share and share alike, and after them,
their children." (11) "You have my permission to sell the Washington
Square Estate if you can add to your income by so doing, the funds to go
into a trust fund":-
Held, that it was the intention of testator that E. should have the benefit
of the Rhode Island Avenue property and of the income from his personal
estate, and the bequest of the income presupposed the setting apart and
investment of the principal and the disbursement of the profit by some one in
behalf of the cestui, and that the executors under the provisions of paragraph
4 took the Rhode Island Avenue property with the residue of the personal
estate in trust for the life of E.
Held, further, that the words "for a home so long as she lives," were used in a
sense broader and beyond their literal meaning, intending that the estate
should be used in such a manner as would best provide or contribute to a
home for E.
Held, further, that the words "at the decease of E. her interest in my estate
to her brother and sisters" were used to describe that portion of his estate
which he had set aside for the benefit of E. during her life, and as to that
the brother and sisters stood in the position of vested remaindermen.
Held, further, that a valid testamentary disposition to C. having been made,
the expression "all the reference to C. to be left to the judgment of my ex-
ecutors" being devoid of any construction which would harmonize it with the
rest, must be held to be nugatory.
19. Held, further, that it was the intention of testator to charge the Washington
Square Estate with the payment of the insurance, taxes and expenses of the
Rhode Island Avenue Estate which was made a part of the life estate of E.;
that a legal rather than an equitable estate was created in the Washington
Square property and that an undivided half interest was given to K. and an
undivided eighth to E. and that W. and C. took one-eighth and one-fourth
interests for their respective lives which passed upon their decease to their
children.
20. Held, further, that in regard to the real estate embraced within the provis-
ions of paragraph 5 and paragraph 7, the devises being without words of limi-
tation, under Gen. Laws, cap. 254, § 14, would be construed to pass a fee
simple unless a contrary intention appeared in the will, but such intention
appeared in paragraph 10, which being irreconcilable with paragraphs 5 and
7 must prevail as the later expression of testator's intention and hence the
estates given under paragraphs 5 and 7 both present and in remainder must
be construed to be life estates.
21. Held, further, that from paragraph 10, it appeared testator intended to
create a trust and the words used were sufficient for that purpose, since
equity would not permit a trust to fail for want of a trustee.
22. Held, further, that the limitation to testator's grandchildren was valid
since the number of grandchildren must be ascertained at the death of
testator's children and all his children must be begotten before his death, but
the attempted devise for the benefit of his great-grandchildren was void as in
violation of the rule against perpetuities.
Held, further, that the trust was valid so far as the grandchildren were con-
cerned and the remainder of the estate would pass to the heirs at law of
testator and such heirs would take a vested legal estate in remainder by
operation of the statute of uses.
23. Held, further, that under paragraph 11, permissive authority to sell the
Washington Square property was given the executors, acting in good
faith and upon such sale the proceeds would pass into a trust the income to be
disposed of in the same manner and proportions and to the same parties
who would have been entitled to the income had the estate remainded
unsold, following so far as valid the provisions of paragraph 10. Goffe v.
Goffe, 542.
R. I. Hos. Tr. Co. v. Rhodes, 141.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT.
1. The Workmen's Compensation Act was passed, and received the executive
approval April 29, 1912, to take effect October 1, 1912.
Held, that an acceptance of its provisions filed by an employer September 26,
1912, would be presumed to have been filed with the intention that it should
take effect when the act went into effect, and was sufficient compliance
with Section 5 of said act, in that regard. Coakley v. Mason Mfg. Co., 46.
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