The expedition in 1863 under command of Gen. Henry H. Sibley was successful in driving across the Missouri river those of the Indians who had not surrendered, excepting those who had taken refuge in British territory.

The object of the expedition led by Gen. Alfred Sully in 1864, designated in official orders as the "Northwestern Indian Expedition," but more commonly called Sully's expedition or campaign, was to further chastise the Sioux who had massacred the white immigrants of southwestern Minnesota, and, if possible, to compel their complete submission. The Minnesota contingent of this expedition, designated as the Second Brigade, rendezvoused at Fort Ridgely on June 1st, 1864, and was composed of the following Minnesota troops: the Eighth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, mounted, Lieut. Col. Henry C. Rogers in command; six companies of the Second Minnesota Volunteer Cavalry, Col. Robert N. McLaren in command; the Third Minnesota Battery, of one section of six-pounder smooth-bore guns, and one section of twelve-pounder mountain howitzers; fortyfive scouts; and a train of ninety-three six-mule teams and twelve ambulances. The fighting force consisted of twentyone hundred men, all mounted. Col. Minor T. Thomas, of the Eighth Minnesota, was placed in command of the brigade by Gen. Sibley.

Until a short time before the rendezvous at Fort Ridgely, no more than five companies of the Eighth Minnesota (of which the writer was a member) had been together during a service of twenty-one months. The companies were enlisted at Fort Snelling in August, 1862, for service in the Civil War; but none of them were mustered in until three months later. Then, being more needed at home than in the South, as fast as they were ready for service, each company was sent out to the western Minnesota frontier, in citizens' clothes, in most in*Read at the monthly meeting of the Executive Council, December 14, 1896.

stances only half of the company being armed, and those arms being the old Belgian or Austrian muskets, with very little camp equipage of any sort, while the only means of transportation were teams impressed from farmers and others, the impressment often being made under protest and frequently being resisted by force. Vouchers were, in nearly all instances, given for use of teams and for supplies taken. This is a digression, but is related to show the hardships encountered at the outset of our service on the frontier. The murder by the Sioux of citizens at Acton, Meeker county, August 18th, 1862, was four days after our enlistment; and that murder was the beginning of the general Indian outbreak and massacre which caused the death of nearly one thousand men, women, and children, in the newly settled western part of Minnesota, besides the destruction of a large amount of property. The massacre also caused a further loss in population by several thousand leaving the state, a large proportion never to return.

The officers and men in the expedition of 1864 were well prepared, by the discipline and experience of nearly two years' service, for the hardships that were to be encountered. This service of the Eighth Minnesota had been of a desultory character, but not void of danger, for a number of our men had been killed by the Sioux. It was the kind of service to make each soldier familiar with the character of the Indians, and with the terrible atrocities perpetrated upon those who fell into their hands. Every soldier had witnessed scenes to arouse the uttermost bitterness toward those who seemed destitute of any sentiment of humanity, and all were filled with an insatiable desire for revenge. Many of the command had had their families murdered, and were instigated to enlist by the wish to avenge themselves upon the perpetrators of those outrages. I know of two instances wherein this was accomplished with compound interest.

The light artillery, Capt. Jones, had been in the expedition of 1863, and the other organizations had seen more or less service on the frontier, so that, as a whole, the command was well prepared to meet the Indians; and it was hoped to encounter them in so large body that an engagement with them might be dignified as a battle.

The interval of five days between our arrival at and departure from Fort Ridgely was fully occupied in preparations for our long expedition, which was to extend beyond the Missouri river. Its route is shown on the accompanying map.

On the 6th of June the command left Fort Ridgely, and I must confess that to me, and no doubt to others, this seemed more like war than anything we had previously experienced. Few of our regiment had before seen so large a body of troops; and I can also say that, during a year's service in the south, after our return from this campaign, I did not see a finer body of men. Further I may add, quite as truthfully, that we looked much finer on the day of our departure than we did on that of our return, four months later. Our wagon train was increased by a hundred and twenty-five teams, with two hundred and fifty men, women, and children, and their supplies, bound for Idaho, who were to accompany us to the Yellowstone river. These emigrants, from the start to our parting with them, were an encumbrance, causing delay and hampering all our movements.

Our march to the Missouri was not marked by any especially noticeable occurrence; and after the novelty of travelling through a new country wore off, the day's march became tedious. Soon after leaving Big Stone lake, the command began to suffer from the lack of good water, and some days from the scarcity of water of any kind. The few small lakes were impregnated with alkali, and nearly all the streams were dried up, except occasional pools which were stagnant and fouled by buffalo. On one occasion, after getting our tents pitched, the camp was struck by a tornado, levelling it instantly and causing considerable damage, besides stampeding many of the horses and mules, all of which were, however, recovered with considerable difficulty.

After passing the Coteau des Prairies, a few buffaloes and considerable numbers of antelopes were seen; but, as orders had been issued against shooting, only a few of either were secured. Buffalo chips were plentiful, and constituted our fuel until we reached the Missouri river. It was the practice of the soldiers, on nearing the camping location, to collect the chips on their ramrods until they would hold no more, and when the camp was reached to deposit them in a common pile for the cook. These chips made an intense fire and were far preferable to wood, requiring less labor to secure. They were very handy, too, when on the march, if one wished to make a cup of coffee, as it required but a moment or two to make a fire. For heating a "bean hole" the chips were also much superior to wood.

On approaching the Coteau du Missouri, the country became more rolling and the scenery less monotonous; and when it was finally reached, an abundance of good water and excellent grazing for the animals were found. The latter had not only suffered from a lack of good water, but the grazing had been very poor, owing to the drouth. The distance from Fort Ridgely to the Missouri Coteau was accomplished in twentyfour days, an average of sixteen miles a day, Sundays not included. Only an occasional Indian had been seen; these evidently watching our progress. But on going into the Missouri valley, the scouts reported seeing several parties, and several fresh trails indicated their presence a short time before.

The scouts also reported that Gen. Sully was one day's march down the river, and the next day we joined his forces. The day before our arrival, a surgeon attached to Gen. Sully's brigade had been shot by the Indians while out hunting.

On July 2nd the combined commands marched down the Missouri river to a point opposite the mouth of the Cannon Ball river. There we found three steamboats laden with supplies for the command and with material for the post that was to be built on the west bank of the Missouri.

On the 9th of July the command was transferred by the boats to the west side. Gen. Sully's command, now called the First Brigade, was made up of the following troops: eleven companies of the Sixth Iowa Cavalry, Lieut. Col. Pollock commanding; three companies of the Seventh Iowa Cavalry, Lieut. Col. Pattee commanding; two companies of Dakota Cavalry, Capt. Miner in command; the Thirtieth Wisconsin Infantry, Col. Dill commanding; Col. N. Pope's Battery of two sections; and Brackett's Minnesota Battalion of Cavalry.

The Thirtieth Wisconsin was detached to build and garrison the new post, subsequently called Fort Rice.

The Second Brigade comprised the same regiments and companies that formed it when at Fort Ridgely, Col. Thomas being continued in command by Gen. Sully.

On July 19th, the command having been supplied with sixty days' rations, and leaving behind all surplus baggage, marched up the valley of the Cannon Ball for several days, expecting to find a camp, reported by the scouts, of fifteen or eighteen hundred tepees, near the source of the river; but the Indians did not await our coming, and the evidences of their having been there recently were all that were found.