are in equity equivalent to knowledge itself. Cardover v. Hall, 17 Wall. 1. It is useless to repeat here what has already been said about appellant's knowledge or means of knowledge. It must suffice to say that he had notice, or was chargeable with notice, of such defects in the title he was obtaining from the trustee as bars him from recovery for improvements.

Much has been said in the argument about the negligent failure of B. P. Woodward, the debtor, to give notice at an earlier date of his objection to the sale, and of his standing by and seeing the purchaser put valuable improvements on the place without making known his objections. The debtor lived in the city of Norfolk, seventy-five miles from the property, and the record fails to disclose that he saw the property or knew that any improvements were being made thereon, from the day of sale until just before this suit was brought. It is not shown how much of the improvement was made before, and how much after, this suit was brought, and it is not clear that the alleged improvements, consisting chiefly of painting and plastering were necessary, or that the value of the premises was actually increased thereby. See Code, sec. 2763. However this may be, this suit to set aside the sale was brought within about forty days after the date of the sale, and thirty days after the appellant obtained his deed. The complainant was not negligent in bringing his suit. Walker v. Bauchler 27 Gratt. (68 Va.) 511; Wasserman v. Metzger, supra. It is urgently insisted that the decree of the circuit court should be reversed because the proper parties were not befor the court, and the court could not properly adjust the rights of the parties, if the sale were set aside, unless all parties were before it. The only person not before the court at the time the decree was entered, and whose absence is complained of, was Mrs. Pattie Story, the creditor

secured in the first deed. While it is true that a part of Mrs. Story's debt was originally paid from the proceeds of, the dwelling purchased by Smith, yet before the decree complained of was entered, the terms of sale of the farm and factory had been complied with, and the court, with ample funds in hand, by the decree complained of, readjusted the rights of the parties so as to indemnify the other funds from the proceeds of the sale of the farm and thereby in effect to discharge the full amount of Mrs. Story's debt from the proceeds of the farm, and leave the residue of the proceeds of the farm and the whole of the proceeds of the dwelling and peanut factory to the creditors secured by the second and third deeds of trust. This was a proper method of procedure, and as Mrs. Story's debt was thus wholly discharged from the proceeds of the farm, she was neither a necessary nor proper party. The decree then cancelled the credits on the bonds of B. P. Woodward to F. P. Pope and J. Davis Woodward, respectively, and directed that said bonds be returned with credits cancelled, and also directed the trustee to refund to J. W. Smith the $3,650 collected of him. The effect of this was to reinstate the second and third deeds of trust. It would have been more regular to have substituted Smith to the lien of the second and third deeds of trust as a security for his debt, but it was admitted at the bar that the trustee is amply solvent, and as he can indemnify himself from the proceeds of sales under the second and third deeds of trust, it would seem that substantial justice has been reached, without prejudice to the rights of any of the parties. Where substantial justice has been reached and the rights of all parties in interest have been adequately safeguarded by the decree appealed from, this court will not be astute to find technical objections by which such decree may be reversed.

Affirmed.

TAYLOR v. COMMONWEALTH.

(Richmond, January 24, 1918.)

1. CRIMINAL LAW-Change of Venue-Jury. The trial court must be allowed a wide discretion in deciding motions for change of venue, or for a jury from another county; and where the motion is based on the ground that an impartial jury cannot be obtained in the county, the fact that an impartial jury has subsequently been secured therein is conclusive proof that the motion was without foundation.

2. IDEM-Evidence-Appeal and Error.-The statements of a child in the presence of her father, the accused, as to an assault by the father upon her mother, to which no objection was made on their introduction, must upon writ of error be regarded as a part of the evidence before the jury.

3. IDEM-Evidence-Improper Admission-Direction to Disregard.— Where improper evidence has been admitted, in either a civil or a criminal case, the error is rendered harmless by the subsequent action of the trial court in striking out the evidence and specifically instructing the jury to disregard it, unless from the circumstances of the particular case there be reason to apprehend that such improper evidence has prejudiced the minds of the jury, in which latter event the error is reversible.

Error to Circuit Court of Fairfax county.

Affirmed.

Fredric R. Whippler, for the plaintiff in error.

Attorney-General Jno. Garland Pollard, Assistant Attorney-General J. D. Hank, Jr., Leon M. Bazile, for the Commonwealth.

KELLY, J.:

James L. Taylor was indicted in Fairfax county for a felonious assault upon his wife, the charge being that he "did make an assault, and unlawfully, maliciously and feloniously did cause to said Blanch C. Taylor great bodily injury by beating, striking and bruising the said Blanch C. Taylor with his fists and by kneeling upon her body with his knees, and throwing down the body of her the said Blanch C. Taylor with great force and violence, whereby her body, head and face was greatly injured, with intent

to maim, disfigure, disable and kill her the said Blanch C. Taylor, against the peace and dignity of the Commonwealth."

The trial resulted in a verdict of guilty, fixing the punishment of the accused at two years in the penitentiary, upon which the court sentenced him accordingly.

The accused made preliminary motions for (1) a jury from another county, (2) a jury from a remote part of Fairfax county, (3) a change of venue, all of which were overruled, and the accused excepted. The alleged grounds for the motions were, that the charge against the accused had been widely discussed in the county, that threats of violence had been made against him, and that he would not be able to obtain a fair and impartial trial unless some one of the motions should be granted. With these motions were filed the ex parte affidavits of six residents of Fairfax county and one resident of Alexandria county, all of which, while rather brief and general in their statement of facts, may be said to have tended strongly to prove the existence of such a state of local prejudice as would have prevented the accused from obtaining a fair and impartial trial. On the other hand, however, the clerk, the sheriff and the deputy sheriff of the county, who were examined as witnesses, testified ore tenus to the contrary, the clerk stating, among other things, that "hundreds of jurors could be obtained (in that county) who had never heard of the case." That these witnesses were correct, and that the court properly weighed their testimony, satisfactorily appears from the sequel. From the first venire facias of sixteen, six jurors were found free from exception, and thereupon the court ordered "that an additional writ of venire facias be now issued by the clerk directed to the sheriff commanding him to summon from the by-standers ten (10) persons of this county in addition to those heretofore

summoned, residing remote from the place where the felony of which the prisoner stands accused is charged to have been committed and who do not live within three miles of said place and qualified in other respects," etc. This order was complied with, and every one of the ten men thus summoned being examined upon their voir dire, were found to be competent and qualified jurors. There was not an exception taken to either of the sixteen jurors composing the panel from which the twelve who tried the case were selected.

This court has repeatedly held, and it is the established rule in Virginia, that the trial court must be allowed a wide discretion in deciding motions for change of venue or for a jury from another county; and moreover, that where the motion is based on the ground that an impartial jury cannot be obtained in the county, the fact that an impartial jury has subsequently been secured therein is conclusive proof that the motion was without foundation. Wormley's Case, 10 Gratt. (51 Va.) 658, 672-3; Cahoon's Case, 21 Gratt. (62 Va.) 822; Bowles Case, 103 Va. 816; Richards' Case, 107 Va. 881, 1 Va. App. 750; Looney's Case, 115 Va. 924, 8 Va. App. 210.

Before taking up the next assignment to be discussed, it will be quite necessary to state somewhat fully the material facts relating to the assault, as disclosed by the evidence for the Commonwealth. The efficacy of the most material assignment in the case depends upon these facts.

There was some conflict in the evidence, but this was due mainly, if not indeed solely, to denials by the defendant himself, who was the only witness introduced in his behalf and whose character for truth and veracity was successfully and overwhelmingly impeached. Viewing the evidence from the standpoint of the Commonwealth, as we must do upon an appellate review of the case, the follow