On the other hand, an analysis of the agreement in the case in judgment shows the existence of a del credere agency and not a sale. By the terms of the latter instrument, the consignors agreed to ship certain named brands and quantities of fertilizers to the consignees to be sold by the latter as their agent on their account, upon terms and conditions named in the agreement. The prices of the different brands of fertilizers were fixed by the consignors, who were to receive the net proceeds of sale after deducting expenses and the consignees' commission. Fertilizers were to be stored and insured by the consignees, these charges to be added as part of the price charged to purchasers. Settlements for fertilizers sold by the consignees were to be made by them July 1, 1913; and time sales made by the consignees were to be payable December 1, 1913. On goods paid for on July 1, 1913, there was to be deducted from the net time prices seven per cent. discount. The consignees were to deliver to the consignors, or their order, when called for, all cash, notes, accounts, or other proceeds of sales of fertilizers sold; and also to guarantee the payment of all sales made; and in the event notes should be taken from the consignee as further evidence of their guaranteeing sales made by them, such notes were to be made payable at the Bank of Orange, the consignors to be at liberty to use and have the same discounted; but when such notes were paid by the consignees, they were to be entitled to the notes, accounts, or other proceeds of sale, for which they were given as a guaranty. Upon all sales of fertilizers the consignees were only to guarantee the analysis on the sack, and not results from their use. And lastly, it was agreed that all fertilizers consigned to the consignees under the agreement were to remain the property of the consignors until sold, and that after sale the cash, notes, accounts, or other proceeds of sale were consignors' property, and to be

accounted for as such by consignees, who, furthermore, were to relinquish and assign to consignee all their interest in any lien, mortgage, or account taken by, or due to consignces for goods sold or money loaned to parties who had purchased any of the above fertilizers from consignees until the amount due consignors therefor was fully paid.

The fundamental difference between the agreement in the Arbuckle Brothers case and others of that type, and the agreement in this case, is that in the former the consignees acquired such an interest in the property under the agreement that the title passed, and the consignor was the seller and the consignee the buyer of the property; while, in the latter case, the title remained in the consignor and only the possession of the fertilizers passed to the consignee. There is no element of purchase in the agreement in the instant case. It amounts merely to a consignment of goods by one party to another to be sold by the latter for the benefit of the former, who has never parted with the title. In such case, the relation is that of principal and factor, and not of seller and buyer.

Our conclusion is that the title to the property did not pass from the Pocahontas Guano Co., Inc., to the Swan Carpenter Co., Inc., and therefore the decree must be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Reversed.

POWERS ET ALS v. CITY OF RICHMOND.

(Richmond, January 24, 1918.)

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Taxes-Lien on Interest of Remaindermen Const. 1869. sec. 16. Art. X; Const. 1902. sec. 50.-An act amending the charter of a city so as to secure to the city a lien on the interests of remaindermen for unpaid taxes. does not impose, continue. or revive a tax, and so is not affected by the provisions of section 50 of the present Constitution, or section 16, Art. X, of the Constitution of 1869. Moreover, those provisions apply

only to the ordinary and general taxes for State purposes, and such as are imposed generally on all the taxable property in the State, and not to local taxes for local purposes.

2. TAXES Assessment-Life Tenant-Lien on Interest of Remaindermen-Acts 1899-1900, p. 944—Code, sec. 465.-Under the Virginia statute property is properly assessed for taxation in the name of the life tenant, and if properly assessed the taxes constitute a lien thereon.

3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Municipal Corporations Special Charter Powers-Const., sections 117, 168, 170.-Section 117 of the Constitution was clearly intended to continue all special acts relating to, and special provisions in, charters of municipal corporations in this State, except in so far as they were repealed by the Constitution or by the general assembly; and section 1 of the Schedule of the Constitution expressly preserves all existing statutes which are neither repugnant to the Constitution nor expressly repealed. A pre-existing statute, therefore, giving a city a lien on the interest of remaindermen for taxes on real estate assessed in the name of the life tenant is not affected by section 168 of the Constitution.

4. IDEM-Statutes-Title-Const., section 52.-The title of a statute which expressly states that it relates to the lien of a city for taxes assessed on real estate and to the sale thereof for nonpayment of taxes is sufficient to sustain the provision that the lien of the city for taxes shall be on the land and every interest therein.

5. IDFM-Fourteenth Amendment-Taxes-Correction of Errors— Code, sec. 444.-Where a tax is levied on property according to its value, the law must afford an adequate method for the correction of errors, and where this is done it constitutes due process of law; the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is satisfied if an opportunity be given to all those who are interested to question the validity of the amount of the tax, either before that amount is ascertained, or in subsequent proceedings for its correction.

Appeal from Chancery Court of city of Richmond.

Affirmed.

Robert H. Talley, for the appellants.

H. R. Pollard, for the appellee.

PRENTIS, J.:

The City of Richmond filed its petition in the pending cause of Powers v. Powers, alleging that certain property known as No. 3116 East Broad Street, Richmond, Va., had been purchased by direction of the court in that cause for the use of Annie I. Talley (who was the widow of Jefferson

Powers, deceased,) during her life, with remainder to the appellants, his children; and asserting the claim of the city to a lien for $774.61 and interest, alleged to be due for taxes thereon from 1905 to 1915, inclusive. These taxes had accrued during the time the property was held and occupied by Mrs. Powers, the life tenant. The appellants, filed an answer to that petition, denying the existence of the lien for taxes against their interests as remaindermen, and denying that the taxes claimed had been legally or properly assessed upon the property, as well as the autho ity of the city to levy therefor, insisting that the taxes were a lien upon the life estate only, and that the provisions of the charter of the city under which the claim for taxes is based are violative of both the Federal and State Constitutions.

The property having been sold under decree of court, a sufficient sum was retained to satisfy the claim of the city. The trial court determined that the city was entitled to the amount of the taxes claimed, entered its decree to this effect, and from that decree this appeal was taken.

The claim of the city is based upon an act approved March 6, 1900, (Acts 1899-1900, p. 944), entitled "An Act to amend and re-enact sections 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 82 and 83, of the act approved May 24, 1870, providing a charter for the city of Richmond and the acts amendatory thereof, relating to the lien of the city for taxes assessed on real estate, and to the sale thereof for non-payment of taxes." These amendments to the charter of the city were passed at the session of the legislature immediately succeeding the decision of the case of Tabb v. Commonwealth, 98 Va. 47, which held that neither State nor city taxes assessed on real estate held by a life tenant constituted a lien upon the interest of the remaindermen in property so assessed. The avowed purpose of securing these amendments to the charter was to secure to the city a lien on such interests, and to this end

section 75 provides, that there shall be a lien on all real estate and on each and every interest therein for city taxes assessed thereon from the commencement of the year for which they are assessed; section 79, that any person having an interest in such real estate by way of reversion, remainder or otherwise, may redeem the same, if the land has been sold for such taxes; section 82, that nothing in that section shall be construed to affect or impair the lien of the city on said real estate, and on each and every interest therein, or to affect, limit or impair the right of the city when it becomes a purchaser of such real estate at a delinquent tax sale; and section 83, that the city may, at any time, elect to enforce its lien for such taxes in a court of equity. There can be no doubt whatever that this act, if valid, fully sustains the decree of the trial court.

1. It is claimed by the appellants, among other things, that his act was invalid at the time of its adoption, because section 16 of Article X of the Constitution of 1869, provides that, "Every law which imposes, continues or revives a tax, shall distinctly state the tax, and the object to which it is to be applied, and it shall not be sufficient to refer to any other law to fix such tax or object," as well as under section 50 of the present Constitution, which provides that, "Every law imposing, continuing or reviving a tax shall specifically state such tax, and no law shall be construed as so stating such tax which requires a reference to any other law or any other tax." These sections are substantially similar, so that it may be said that if invalid under that section of the present Constitution it was invalid under the former Constitution. We cannot, however, accept the suggestion that either of these sections is in conflict with the act referred to. The act simply relates to the lien of the city for taxes. It neither imposes, continues nor revives a tax, and so the constitutional provisions referred to do not affect the question. While we think the language of the two Constitu