1846, April 8. PUBLIC WORKS. Railway vs. City, 37, 70.
ACTS OF ASSEMBLY-(Continued.)

1848, April 11.

1847, March 20.

CORPORATIONS. Comm. vs. Conover, 56.
MARRIED WOMEN. Camp et ux. vs. Stark, 528.
RAILROADS. Railway vs. Railway, 75.
Railroad vs. Lawrence, 604.
{
JUDGMENTS. Bright vs. Coal Co., 609.
TAXES. Hancock vs. Thayer, 25.

Coal Co. vs. Curran, 543.
SCHOOLS. Bouton vs. Royce, 559.
DIVORCE. Pennington vs. Pennington, 22.
STREETS.
In re Perry's Court, 27.
City vs. Michener, 30.

66

BUILDING.

BUILDING INSPECTORS. Hancock vs. Thayer, 25.
CORPORATIONS. Grubb vs. Manufacturing Co., 316.
In re Credit Mobilier, 2.
Hurlburt vs. Firth, 135.
CITY CONTRACTS. McGlue vs. City, 348.
CORPORATIONS. Bacon vs. Morris et al., 93.
Young vs. Oil Co., 525.

{

LANDLORD and Tenant. Ins. Co. vs. De Coursey, 88.
TAXES. Felty vs. Uhler, 512.

{ Mortimer vs. O' Reagan, 500.

LANDLORD AND TENANT. Ins. Co. vs. De Coursey, 88.
TAXES. Coal Co. vs. Curran, 543.
Mortimer vs. O' Reagan, 500.
MORTGAGE. Wright vs. Vickers, 381.
City vs. Railway, 165.
FAIRMOUNT PARK. { Comm. vs. Park, 445.

STREETS. In re Thirty-fourth Street, 197.
BUILDING Cos. In re Building Co., 106.

SUMMONS ATTACHMENT. Washburn vs. Baldwin, 472.
CRUELTY TO ANIMALS. Comm. vs. Randall, 451
EVIDENCE. Camp et ux. vs. Stark, 528.

FAIRMOUNT PARK. City vs. Railway, 165.

DELINQUENT TAXES. McAfee vs. Bumm, 157.
LOCAL OPTION. Comm. vs. Keenan, 194.
LICENSE.

Comm. vs. Saal, 496.

Duhring's Appeal, 181.
In re Arch Street, 117.

CORPORATIONS. Lejee vs. Railway, 362.

1871, May 3.

66

SURVEYS.

ACTS OF CONGRESS,

LANDLORD AND TENANT. Mortimer vs. O'Reagan, 500.
ELECTIONS. Bouton vs. Royce, 559.

considered.

1839, Feb. 28. IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT. In re Thomas, 82.
1864, April 29. SHIPPING. French vs. The Victoria, 292.

ADMIRALTY. See DEMURRAGE, 1, 2.

1. Where salvage services are performed merely by the permission of another
wrecking company, which had possession of the vessel, and which services were
rendered with the understanding that the wrecking company, and not the vessel,
was to be responsible :-Held, that the vessel is not liable for such salvage ser-
vices. Baker vs. The Tros, 223.

2. The rule of maritime law that a passenger who has no opportunity to leave a
vessel in distress, cannot render a salvage service, may adrait of a qualified excep
tion where he has promoted her safety by an extraordinary and peculiar service
which he was not compellable to render. But in admitting such an exception in

ADMIRALTY-(Continued.)

favor of a passenger, the greatest caution is necessary, and especially so where he
is of the nautical profession. Brady vs. S. S. Co., 283.

3. Where a passenger of the nautical profession who had rendered such service,
afterwards assumed and exercised illegitimate authority over the vessel, though
the circumstances were not such that he incurred an absolute forfeiture of the
salvage compensation, its amount was nevertheless materially reduced by reason
of such usurpation of authority. Id.

4. The Hazel Dell and Victoria-two sailing vessels close hauled and having
the wind on different sides-were beating up a narrow inlet against a head wind,
when a collision took place: Held, that by the 12th and 17th articles of the rules
and regulations for preventing collisions (13 Stat. 58), it was the duty of the Hazel
Dell-the wind on her port-side and being the overtaking vessel-to give way and
to keep out of the way of the Victoria. French vs. The Victoria, 292.

5. That whilst by the 18th article the Victoria, under ordinary circumstances,
was entitled to hold her course, she was bound by the 19th article, from the special
circumstances of the particular case, to depart from the rule in order to avoid the
immediate danger. Id.

6. That the evidence brought the case within the principles of The Maria Mar-
tin (12 Wall. 31), and the damages, caused by the collision, should be divided
equally between the libellant and respondent. Id.

7. A State court has no authority by a proceeding in rem to enforce a maritime
contract. Rutherford vs. The Ornen, 369.

8. Pilotage is a maritime contract. Id.

9. The treaty of December 11, 1871, between the United States and the German
empire, containing provisions which give to the consuls of the respective govern-
ments exclusive cognizance of differences of every kind arising between the cap-
tains and crews of vessels belonging to the respective countries, and enacting that
the local tribunals shall not, on any pretext, interfere in these differences, it was
held, that a sailor, who was a Hollander, who had shipped at Liverpool as a sea-
man, on board of a German ship, and who, upon the arrival of the ship in this
port, had been arrested and handed over to the German consul upon a requisition
made by him on a complaint preferred to him by the captain of the ship, could
not maintain an action in this court against the captain for such arrest." Meyer
vs. Basson, 414.

AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENCE LAW. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7.

1. A general allegation upon information in an affidavit of defence that another
than the plaintiff owns the note in suit, is insufficient. The averment must be
more specific as to the source and character of the information. Gowen vs.
McPherson, 358.

2. Judgment entered against administrators, in a suit upon a contract of their
decedent, for want of an affidavit of defence, is irregular and void, and will be
stricken off on motion. Wright's Executors vs. Cheyney's Administrators, 469.

3. Judgment cannot be taken for want of a sufficient affidavit of defence where
the plaintiff was dead at the time of the issuing of the writ, and the writ was not
amended till after judgment day. Lynch vs. Kerns, 335.

ALDERMEN AND JUSTICES. See ATTACHMENT EXECUTION, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11.
CRIMINAL LAW.

1. Judgment taken before alderman on March 24, bail for appeal entered April
10, and the appeal not filed in court till May 3, held in time. Lingerfield et al.
vs. George, 80.

2. In criminal trials before justices of the peace with a jury of six, their records
must show in some reasonably intelligible form a case within their jurisdiction,
and that all the elements of a fair legal trial have been observed, and that a
definite and authorized judgment has been entered. Comm. vs. Morey et al., 400.
3. A greater degree of precision is required in these criminal cases than in the
ordinary civil cases that are tried before them. Id.

4. The law gives them jurisdiction in cases of larceny where the value of the
property stolen does not exceed $10, and it is error if they try a case where the
property appears to be of the value of "about $10." Id.

5. It is error if the property stolen be not charged to belong to some person, and
if the place of the larceny be not stated. Id.

6. It is error if it do not appear that the jurors are clectors in the township,
borough or city, where the trial takes place." Id.

ALDERMEN AND JUSTICES (Continued.)

7. How the proceedings are to be made up and certified in return to a certiorari.
Id.

A certiorari in such cases cannot issue without a special allowance by the court
or the district attorney. Id.

8. In such cases the Christian name of the defendant ought to be given and not
merely the initial letter, and so the jurors ought to be named. Id.

On a charge of larceny against the defendants, made and tried before a justice
of the peace, and brought up by the defendants by certiorari. Id.

9. A summary proceeding before a justice of the peace is in the nature of a
criminal prosecution for a public crime or offence, and must be regulated by rules
similar to those adopted by the common law in criminal prosecutions, the accused
being acquitted or condemned by the decision of the person appointed by the
statute for judge. Comm. vs. Davenger, 478.

10. The record of a conviction or judgment in such a case must show jurisdiction
on the part of the magistrate; it must specify the ordinance violated; it must note
a penalty imposed conforming precisely with the fine covered by the ordinance;
it must show either that the defendant confessed the charge, or that it was made
out by the proofs; that the witnesses were sworn or affirmed; that the commission
of the offence was within the city or borough enacting the ordinance, and that
judgment was duly entered. Id.

11. A judgment of a justice of the peace affirmed or reversed on certiorari is
final, and execution can issue out of the Court of Common Pleas for the debt,
interest and costs, when affirmed, and for the costs when reversed, under the act
of 1810. Long vs. Shelly, 506.

12. The record need not be remitted to the justice except where the proceedings
are non prossed. Id.

13. The act of May 24, 1871, by which a person in Mercer county may be tried
and convicted before a justice of the peace and a jury of six persons for selling
liquor without a license, is unconstitutional. Comm. vs. Saal, 496.

14. It is contrary to the bill of rights, which declares "that trial by jury shall
be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolate." Id.

15. When a defendant is summoned to appear at 14 o'clock, it is error if the
transcript sets forth that at 2 o'clock plaintiff appeared and defendant did not.
Smith vs. Fetherstone, 306.

16. Where judgment has been entered by a justice against a defendant who was
in default, but who, within twenty days, entered bail for an appeal which he
neglected to bring into court, certiorari will not avail to set aside an execution
subsequently issued, even though the service of the summons be shown by the
record to have been defective. Taking the appeal amounts to a recognition that
the case was regularly before the justice, and is a waiver of the defect which other
wise would have been fatal. Jones vs. Canal Co., 570.

17. An agent may appear before a justice and take an appeal. The justice is
the judge of the agent's authority, which, it must be presumed, was satisfactorily
shown. Id.

Where upon appeal the recognizance is defective, as by reason of the want o a
second surety, the appeal will not be stricken off, but the appellant will be permitted
to perfect his recognizance. A. D. Hummer vs. The Ephrata School District, 494.
APPEARANCE. See PRACTICE.

ARBITRATION. See BANKRUPTCY. REPLEVIN. BANKRUPTCY, 16.

1. The act of April 6, 1870, must be so construed as to give it practical effect, and
not to embarrass a reasonable administration of it, by sustaining critical exceptions
on account of form, or time or manner of filing papers, notes of testimony and
memoranda of proceedings. Van Syckle vs. Stewart, 547.

2. When a legal arbitrator fails to file all the papers of a case, the proper remedy is
to apply to the court to have such defects supplied, and if necessary, for an enlarge-
ment of the time for filing proper exceptions. When this course is not pursued,
an exception that all the papers were not filed will be sustained, particularly when
all are on file before and at the time of hearing. Id.

3. The law provides two modes of correcting errors in proceedings under it:
First, by motion to set aside the award: Second, by filing exceptions to the rulings
and decisions of law. Id.

4. An exception that the legal arbitrator did not duly reflect upon the case, being
insusceptible of proof, will be dismissed. Id.

ARBITRATION-(Continued.)

5. It is no ground for exception that the body of the award of the arbitrator
is not written by himself, but by another hand. Id.

6. If a party alleges "failure of mental vigor" in the arbitrator, during the trial,
he must apply to be relieved from the submission for that reason. After electing
to take his chance, and an award against him, he cannot except on this ground. Id.
7. It is not "misbehavior" on the part of an arbitrator to use printed notes of
testimony, not shown to be incorrect, furnished by one party, the other refusing
to contribute to the expense of preparing them. Id.

8. An exception that a party used "undue influence" upon the arbitrator, with-
out specification of the act or acts, and not proved, will be dismissed. Id.

9. Counsel have a right to withdraw points of law submitted to the arbitrator
for his opinion in writing, before the award is made. It is unusual for one party to
except because the points of the other are not answered. Such exceptions, if made,
will be disregarded unless accompanied by specifications of some error in them, or
the rulings or decisions of the arbitrator about them. Id.

10. An exception to the award of a legal arbitrator that it is "illegal in sub-
stance and form, and without law or evidence to support it," is merely an assign-
ment of "general errors," and is of no value without proper specifications. Id.

11. The rule of law that, where parties to an executory contract appoint an
arbiter to decide disputes which may arise under it, whose decision shall be final,
no action will lie for a breach of the agreement by one against the other, does not
apply to a contract which forms the basis of a mechanic's lien. Kreilich et al.
vs. Klein, 486.

12. The ordinary covenant in such an agreement that the costs of any changes
or additions to the building, or any other matter affecting the contract, shall be sub-
mitted to an architect, whose decision shall be final and binding on the parties,
will not operate to exclude the mechanic or material-man from filing his lien
under the mechanics' lien law. Id.

ASSIGNMENT.

1. An assignee may be charged in his second account with items received prior
to the filing of his first account. Truitt's Estate, 16.

2. An assignee will be charged with interest on balances in his hands, where he
has neglected to perform his duties faithfully. Id.

3. Brown's Estate, 8 Phila. Rep. 197, followed and approved. Id.

4. The inventory is prima facie evidence of the amount of the assignee's liabil
ity. Id.

ATTACHMENT. ACT OF 1869.

A defendant is entitled to the benefit of the exemption law in a proceeding
commenced by attachment under the act of 17th March, 1869, if the original de-
mand be founded on contract. Washburn vs. Baldwin, 472.

ATTACHMENT EXECUTION. See EVIDENCE, 6.

1. A garnishee in an attachment execution is not bound to answer irrelevant
interrogatories. Rhine vs. Railroad, 336.

2. Horses and carriages kept at a livery stable are not subject to attachment
execution against the livery stable keeper. They may be levied on directly. Hall
vs. Manufacturing Co., 370.

3. Judgment will be entered against a garnishee on the amount admitted in his
answer to be due, although it became due after plea filed by the defendant. Mul-
len vs. Maguire, 435.

4. A fi. fa. and attachment execution may both issue and be pursued at the
same time, and plaintiff will not be compelled to elect upon which he will pro-
ceed, unless property is seized under either sufficient to pay the judgment. Shaw
vs. Kenath, 444.

5. Jurisdiction by attachment in execution must be exercised by aldermen and
justices of the peace within the scope of the authority conferred upon them by
statute; otherwise their proceedings are illegal and void. Masters vs. Turner, 482.
6. When judgment has been recovered against a defendant, and execution thereon
returned, "no goods," debts due to him, deposits of money made by him, stocks,
or other personal property, not exempt by law, belonging to him, may be attached,
and the person in whose hands such property is, may be summoned as a garnishee;
and after a service of interrogatories and a rule upon him to answer, as the law
directs, if he be in default, or if it appear by his answers, or be shown by the
proofs on hearing, that he owes the defendant a debt, or has property belonging to

ATTACHMENT EXECUTION-(Continued.)

him equal to, or less in amount or value than the plaintiff's judgment, then judg-
ment should be specially entered that the plaintiff have execution of such amount
or sum, naming it, thus in the hands of the garnishee; and that, if the garnishee
refuse or neglect, on demand made by the constable, to pay the same, then it
should be levied of the garnishee's goods and chattels, as in case of a judgment
against him for his own proper debt; and further, that he be thereupon discharged
as against the defendant of the sum so attached and levied. Id.

7. If, however, the debt thus due by the garnishee or the value of the property
thus attached, be greater than the plaintiff's judgment, then the special judgment
should be that the plaintiff have execution of so much thereof, naming the amount,
as will satisfy his judgment against the defendant, with interest and costs; to be
followed as in the former instance, by the additional entry relative to a refusal to
pay, and also relative to a discharge on the part of the garnishee. Id.

8. Where the garnishee is in default, or contests his indebtedness to the defend-
ant, or where there is a recovery against him for an amount greater than that
admitted by his answers to be due to, or belonging to the defendant, the plaintiff
is entitled to have execution against him for the costs of the attachment proceed-
ing; but it is otherwise where he admits his indebtedness, or admits that he has
property of the defendant, and surrenders it. Id.

9. The execution against the garnishee should recite the form of the judgment, and
contain a command to the constable in substantial conformity with it. A further
command should be inserted, that in the event of a levy and sale of the goods
and chattels of the garnishee, if the proceeds exceed the amount for which the
execution issued, the overplus, less the costs of sale, should be returned to the
garnishee. Id.

10. A plaintiff has no right to receive from a constable anything more than the
sum to be collected under the command of the writ, even though his judgment
against the original defendant be greater than that against the garnishee. Id.

11. A judgment entered against a defendant and a garnishee jointly is without
Tarrant in law; and though neither appeal nor certiorari be taken, and six years
afterwards it be revived against the garnishee alone, neither appeal nor certiorari
being then taken, and execution be issued on the latter judgment, commanding
the constable to levy the same of the goods and chattels of the garnishee, certi
orari, if taken in time, will avail to set aside the execution. Age, no matter how
great, can never infuse vitality into a judgment entered by an alderman or justice
of the peace, which lacks statutory authority originally. Id.

ATTORNEY.

1. An attorney cannot bind his client by an agreement for the sale of land.
Burkhardt vs. Schmidt, 118.

2. A power of attorney to institute suit executed by the president of a bank with-
out authority from the board of directors, is not sufficient. Bank vs. Keim, 311.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL. See PASSENGER RAILWAYS, 3.

BANKRUPTCY. See MORTGAGE, 3.

1. Proceedings in bankruptcy-Injunction issued restraining defendants from
collecting any rents from real estate in which the bankrupts have any legal or
equitable estate, and appointment of a receiver. Keenan vs. Shannon, 219.

2. Confession of judgment, and execution under it, where it must necessarily
stop the debtor's business, is a void transfer and preference within the meaning of
the bankrupt act, as of the date of the entry of judgment. Zahm vs. Fry, 243.

3. The court can decree a restoration to the assignee of the fund realized, although
it may be in the custody of a State officer. Id.

4. Without actual fraud a creditor so preferred will be allowed, upon surrender,
to participate in the bankrupt's assets. Id.

5. Judgment notes given bona fide, and for an amount actually received, will not
be set aside merely because they were entered a month before a petition in bank-
ruptcy was filed against the defendant. Some of the notes were dated three and
four years before the petition was filed. Piper vs. Baldy, 247.

6. After a bankrupt's estate has been placed in the hands of a trustee under the
direction of a committee of creditors, by virtue of the 43d section of the bankrupt
act, the court cannot, in the absence of fraud, call a meeting of creditors to control
the committee's action. In re Jay Cooke et al., 262.

7. On the death of an involuntary bankrupt before a jury trial has been had to
determine whether he has committed an act of bankruptcy, the proceedings must
abate. In re McDonald, 273.