regulate its Members in order to perform its legislative re- On July 7, 1980, the Department of Justice filed a motion to dismiss and an accompanying memorandum on behalf of the defendant United States. In general, the arguments in the memorandum were similar to those made by the Congressional defendants (involving standing and prudential considerations), but additionally the Department contended that, as to the executive branch, the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred the suit. Since the plaintiff did not allege that the 1856 Pay Act was unconstitutional and could point to no statute providing him with a substantive right against the United States, and since sovereign immunity had not been waived, the memorandum asserted, the court had no jurisdiction over the defendant. Further, according to the Department, the Pay Act neither explicitly nor implicitly created a private right of action in the plaintiff's favor. On August 1, 1980, Mr. Hammitt filed a memorandum in opposition to the motions to dismiss. First addressing the purpose of the Pay Act of 1856, the plaintiff asserted that "section 6 was enacted more to economize on public expenditures than to aid in producing quorums”. [Memorandum of Don R. Hammitt in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, August 1, 1980, at 9] Further, the plaintiff contended, the section, by virtue of its placement in Title 2 of the United States Code in the chapter entitled "Compensation and Allowance of Members" (containing other provisions on pay and allowances of Members) was a duly-enacted limitation on the Members' compensation; it was not merely a parliamentary mechanism, but an enforceable statute. Turning to the question of standing, Mr. Hammitt asserted that his case was "unique" because he was not seeking "broad taxpayer standing to challenge the constitutionality" of the statute in question, but was merely trying to compel compliance with an admittedly constitutional law. Mr. Hammitt contended that a private cause of action could be inferred from the Pay Act because its purpose was to save revenue (not, as the defendants maintained, to control attendance) and its violation therefore caused him and the class he represented direct injury as taxpayers. "The money lost by plaintiff and his class must be in the tens of millions for the past decade alone. Such injury demands redress, and plaintiff contends this suit is the best and appropriate way to attain such relief." [Id. at 13-14] Finally, the plaintiff argued that the enforcement sought would not intrude upon the internal self-governance of Congress because the suit did not involve judicial review of internal House rules or procedures but of a legally enacted statute. "[T]he claim that it would involve the court in supervising how members of Congress use their time is pure poppycock. The injunction would merely enforce the law as written. A court order would have no effect at all on any of the Standing Rules of either House or on any other internal procedures." [Id. at 23] On October 16, 1980, the Congressional defendants filed a reply memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss. In it, they maintained that, under relevant precedents, the plaintiff did not have standing even if he was merely attempting to mandate compliance with, rather than challenge the constitutionality of, a federal statute. The memorandum also contended that it was irrelevant whether the Pay Act was viewed as a means of regulating attendance or a revenuesaving measure to limit compensation of Members; in either case, according to the defendants, the "salient consideration" was that judicial enforcement would involve the Federal courts in the daily operations of Congress. On October 17, 1980, the Department of Justice filed a reply memorandum on behalf of the United States. It again asserted that the relevant case law made plain that Mr. Hammitt did not have standing to bring the suit based solely on the "incidental expenditures" of tax monies caused by the alleged failure to enforce the Pay Act. Further, it agreed with the Congressional defendants that even accepting the plaintiff's interpretation of the purpose of the Pay Act (as a limit on compensation), the suit was barred under the political question doctrine. Finally, the Justice Department contended that no private right of action could be inferred from the Pay Act because there had been no intent by Congress to provide such a right in enacting the statute, and it could not be implied on the basis of Congressional silence on the subject. On October 28, 1980, the plaintiff filed his reply memorandum in opposition to the motions to dismiss. In it he restated his arguments as to standing and the inapplicability of the political question doctrine. He did not, however, challenge the claim of the United States to sovereign immunity. On November 12, 1980, oral argument on the pending motions was heard before U.S. District Court Judge Spencer Williams who dismissed the suit. In a short written order filed on December 16, 1980, Judge Williams held that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the action, thus depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction. The court found further that the case presented a nonjusticiable political question because "the Constitution has committed to each House of Congress the power to regulate the attendance of its Members and because it would be inappropriate for the courts to inquire into or supervise the attendance of Members of a coordinate branch of government." Finally, Judge Williams noted that the plaintiff had not contested the Government's assertion of sovereign immunity. Status-The case is closed. United States v. Maryland No. 80-1298 (4th Cir.) On July 18, 1978, the United States filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland against the State of Maryland and Louis Goldstein, Comptroller of the Treasury of the State of Maryland (the official responsible for the administration of the state tax system). The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the imposition of the state's income tax on the compensation paid by the United States to Members of Congress who represented other jurisdictions but maintained places of abode in Mary land in order to attend sessions of Congress. The complaint asserted that Maryland was prohibited from imposing such taxes by Federal law, specifically 4 U.S.C. § 113, enacted on July 19, 1977. Section 113 provides, in relevant part: (a) No State, or political subdivision thereof, in which a Member of Congress maintains a place of abode for purposes of attending sessions of Congress may, for purposes of any income tax (as defined in section 110 (c) of this title) levied by such State or political subdivision thereof (1) treat such Member as a resident or domiciliary of such State or political subdivision thereof; or (2) treat any compensation paid by the United States to such Member as income for services performed within, or from sources within, such State or political subdivision thereof, unless such Member represents such State or a district in such State. The complaint further stated that the prohibition against the imposition of such taxes would have been in effect even in the absence of section 113. [Complaint, July 18, 1978, at 4] In addition to declaratory and injunctive relief, the complaint sought a refund of such taxes as had previously been collected by Maryland from Members of Congress. (The refunds were sought on behalf of the Members and not the United States.) On August 15, 1978, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which was based, inter alia, on the following grounds: failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted; lack of subject matter jurisdiction; absence of a case or controversy between the parties; lack of standing by the United States; a jurisdictional bar raised by the Tax Injunction Act (28 U.S.C. § 1341); and a bar raised by the Eleventh Amendment. The United States opposed the motion to dismiss and moved, on September 20, 1978, for partial summary judgment. The state of Maryland then filed a supplementary motion to dismiss and, alternatively, a cross-motion for summary judgment. After the Government filed its opposition to this latter motion, a hearing was held on November 9, 1978 before District Court Judge Frank A. Kaufman who denied both motions for summary judgment and suggested that the parties submit an agreed statement of facts together with memoranda of law on the various legal issues before the court. Thereafter, extensive memoranda were filed by the parties. On March 31, 1980, Judge Kaufman issued his opinion [United States v. State of Maryland, 488 F. Supp. 347 (D.Md. 1980)] upholding the validity of section 113, and holding further that the United States had standing to bring the action and that the Tax Injunction Act did not bar maintenance of the suit. With respect to the validity of section 113, the court noted: In 1977, more than a century and a half after McCulloch [v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)]. Congress, in enacting the statute herein at issue, sought to provide for Members of Congress the same type of protection that had earlier been given to servicemen, i.e., an exemption for those Members of Congress "from the substantial burdens of seriate taxation by the states in which they may be required to be present," Dameron v. Brodhead, 345 U.S. at 324, in order to attend sessions of Congress. That determination must be respected, and the constitutionality of the statute must be upheld, if it is shown that the federal legislation was enacted in furtherance of any of the powers entrusted to the federal government, either expressly or impliedly, by the Constitution. ... It goes almost without saying that the duties of each Member of Congress are directly related to all of the activities which the Constitution has delegated to the legislative branch of the federal government. Accordingly, if Congress determines that taxes such as the Maryland taxes in question impose an undue burden on the federal government and thus impede Congress' ability effectively to execute any or all of its constitutional powers, Congress possesses the power under the Constitution to enact whatever reasonably related legislation it deems "necessary and proper" in order to alleviate that substantial burden and enable it thereby to carry into execution its constitutional powers. [488 F. Supp. at 356-7] On the standing issue, Judge Kaufman concluded: As Judge Winter observed in [United States v.] Solomon, [563 F.2d 1121 (4th Cir. 1977)], the Fourth Circuit has permitted the United States to bring suit, absent express statutory authority, in cases where the national government has "a property interest to be protected or there was a welldefined statutory interest of the public at large to be protected," 563 F.2d at 1127. As in the case of servicemen, Congress has expressly determined that the public interest is served by exempting from the burdens of Maryland income tax laws those Members of Congress who maintain Maryland abodes in order better to enable them to attend to their official duties in Washington. For reasons stated supra, this court holds the 1977 legislation to be valid. It follows that under [United States v.] Arlington County, [326 F.2d 929 (4th Cir. 1964)], the United States has standing to bring this action to protect that "well-defined statutory interest of the public at large" and to ensure the "proper implementation of [the national government's] policies and programs." The fact that the United States does not have a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of the . . . litigation does not deprive it of implied authority to bring suit. [Id. at 364 (footnote omitted)] As to the defendants' contention that the Tax Injunction Act barred the suit, Judge Kaufman held that it did not erect a jurisdictional bar to an action brought by the United States as plaintiff to protect itself or its instrumentalities from "unconstitutional state exactions." [Id. at 365, citing Justice Fortas in Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 358 (1966)] Because of his finding that section 113 expressly provided Members of Congress with immunity from Maryland's income tax, Judge Kaufman did not rule on the question of whether a Member enjoyed an implied constitutional immunity even in the statute's absence. Additionally, pursuant to Rule 42 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Judge severed the question concerning the refunds claimed from the issues relating to declaratory and injunctive relief. Although the refund issue was in essence stayed, the court did state in a footnote [488 F. Supp. at 350, n. 9] that if the claims were not disposed by the Maryland Tax Court in a manner satisfactory to the United States, there would be an opportunity to reopen the matter. Also on March 31, 1980, Judge Kaufman filed an order entering final judgment in favor of the United States, holding section 113 valid, and enjoining Maryland from subjecting any non-Maryland Member of Congress to any state or local income tax in contravention of section 113. On April 16, 1980, the state filed a notice of appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and on June 9, 1980, filed its brief. The brief raised three issues on appeal. First, it maintained, Congress had exceeded its constitutional authority in enacting section 113, because the law served no demonstrable Federal interest, but merely the private, pecuniary interest of the Members. Second, it contended, the United States lacked the requisite standing to bring the suit, because it was not the Federal Government, but the individual Members of Congress whose liability for the Maryland taxes was at issue and whose interests were adverse to the state. Third, it argued, the Tax Injunction Act barred the district court from enjoining the levy or collection of state taxes regardless of whether the United States was the plaintiff. On August 8, 1980, the United States filed its brief urging affirmance of the district court's decision. Section 113, it maintained, was constitutional and within the scope of Congressional power to protect its legislative function. Further, it declared, the United States had standing to protect and implement federal interests and programs even when it had no pecuniary interest in the outcome of the litigation. And finally, it asserted, it was settled law that the Tax Injunction Act did not bar suits by the United States. In a reply brief filed on August 22. 1980, the state of Maryland argued that although Congress admittedly had the power to provide for the compensation of its Members. that power related only to appropriating money from the Federal treasury and could not be evtended to immunize that compensation from subsequent taxation. It reiterated that the Members of Congress, not the United States, were the real parties in interest, and contended that they did not have standing and that their action should be barred on jurisdictional grounds by the Tax Injunction Act. The case was argued before a panel of the Fourth Circuit on December 3, 1980. In a per curiam opinion issued on December 31. 1980, the judges affirmed the lower court decision "for reasons sufficiently stated by the district court." [United States v. Maryland, 636 F.2d 73, 75 (4th Cir. 1989)] Status-The case is pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The complete text of the March 31, 1980 decision of the district court is printed in the "Decisions" section of this report at p. 656. |