Jenrette v. Abdul Enterprises, Ltd. [Not Reported] (D.D.C. 1980) A Member of Congress who is being investigated by a Federal grand jury and who alleges that Federal prosecutors presented illegally obtained evidence to the grand jury, cannot, in a civil action against the United States, enjoin the criminal proceedings against him if resolution of the criminal case would likely moot, clarify, or otherwise affect the various contentions made in the civil case.

Katon v. Anderson [Not Reported] (Sup. Ct. D.C. 1980)

A subcommittee staff member's dissemination of information to a reporter may be a proper subject of discovery procedures in a defamation suit against the reporter, although questions regarding the acquisition of information by the staff member, and his communications with his superiors or colleagues about the information, would not be legitimate areas of inquiry.

Laxalt v. Kimmitt [Not Reported] (D.D.C. 1978)

Rule XLIV of the Senate Code of Ethics, which places a limit on the amount of outside earned income a U.S. Senator may receive, does not violate Article I, Section 3, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution by imposing an additional qualification for membership in the Senate; nor does the Rule abridge freedom of speech or equal protection rights ensured by the Constitution. [This case is on appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.]

League of Women Voters of California v. Federal Communications Commission, 489 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1980)

(1) A challenge to a statute which forbids noncommercial broadcast licensees to editorialize or endorse or oppose candidates for public office is not ripe for adjudication if there is a distinct likelihood that the Federal Communications Commission will not seek to penalize a broadcaster for violating its terms. (2) When no attempt is made by the defendant executive branch agency, in this case the FCC, to defend the challenged statute, no genuine adversariness of interests exists and therefore there is no case or controversy under Article III of the Constitution. [This case is on appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit.]

McClure v. Carter (D. Idaho)

Issues raised. (1) Can a Federal statute that specifically authorizes Members of Congress to challenge in court the legality of judicial appointments confer standing on Members who, absent the statute, would have no standing to sue? (2) Does a U.S. Senator, suing in either his individual capacity or his official capacity as a senator, have standing to challenge the validity of the appointment of a Federal judge? [This case is pending in U.S. District Court.]

McSurely v. McAdams (formerly McClellan), 535 F. 2d 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 438 U.S. 189 (1978)

(1) A Member of Congress and his aides are not immune under the Speech or Debate Clause from liability in a private suit for damages in which the plaintiff alleges that private papers and documents illegally taken from the plaintiff's home by state officials and trans

ported to Washington by a Senate investigator were disseminated outside the halls of Congress. (2) Even though material comes to a Congressional committee by means that are unlawful or otherwise subject to judicial inquiry, the subsequent use of that material by the committee in the course of official business is privileged legislative activity.

Mims v. Thurmond [Not Reported] (5th Cir. 1980)

A Federal court does not have jurisdiction over a defendant Member of Congress if the court is not located in the jurisdiction where the Member resides, where the specific acts involving the Member allegedly took place, or where the Member has an agent.

Murray v. Morton, 505 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1981)

Taxpayer plaintiffs who allege no other interest, apart from their views with respect to religion, to distinguish themselves from any other taxpayers, have no standing to challenge the authorization and payment of salaries and expenses for the Chaplains of the House and Senate, particularly in view of the constitutional authority of Congress to choose its officers and make its internal rules. [This case is on appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.] National Small Shipments Traffic Conference, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 618 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1980)

(1) A court will not rely on a statute's legislative history if by so doing it would reach a result contrary to the plain meaning of the statute, particularly where the plain meaning is in no way unreasonable. (2) The fact that interest groups who fail to persuade a majority of Congress to accept particular statutory language often are able to have inserted in the legislative history of the statute statements favorable to their position underscores the importance of following unambiguous statutory language absent clear contrary evidence of legislative intent.

Ragas v. Davis [Not Reported] (E.D. La. 1979)

The Speech or Debate Clause does not immunize a Member from liability for defamatory statements made to members of the press. [This case is pending in U.S. District Court.]

Riegle v. Federal Open Market Committee [Not Reported] (D.D.C. 1979)

A Member of Congress has no standing to file suit against executive branch officials if his alleged injury did not result from executive branch action that frustrated an otherwise effective statute, but instead resulted from the failure of Congress to pass remedial legislation. [This case is on appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.]

Ryan v. Department of Justice and Halpern v. Department of Justice, 617 F. 2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 1980)

(1) The responses of Senators to a questionnaire sent by the Attorney General regarding procedures employed to recommend persons to the President for appointment to Federal district court judgeships are "agency records" for purposes of the Freedom of Information Act.

(2) These responses are, however, exempt from disclosure under the Act as deliberative "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters" except for factual segments which do not reveal the deliberative process and are not entwined with the policy-making process. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 648 F.2d 118 (3rd Cir. 1981)

(1) The proper focus in a challenge to an administrative subpoena is the motivation of the agency itself, not the motivation of a Member of Congress who influenced the agency to issue the subpoena. (2) A court may properly refuse to enforce an administrative subpoena if it finds that the agency which issued the subpoena never consciously evaluated the need for the subpoena, but instead issued the subpoena solely because a powerful third party had asked it to do so. [This case is pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit.] Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations v. Cammisano [Not Reported] (D.D.C. 1980)

(1) Civil contempt is available as a remedy pursuant to the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (28 U.S.C. § 1364) when a witness, properly immunized, refuses to comply with a validly issued Senate committee or subcommittee subpoena. (2) The period of confinement for civil contempt will not exceed the period in which the committee or subcommittee continues to certify an interest in the testimony sought, and will end at the adjournment of the current Congress. [This case is on appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.]

United States ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1981)

(1) A complaint filed by a private citizen against a U.S. Senator and his aide, which alleges that the Senator authorized payment of the aide's Congressional salary during a period when the aide worked exclusively on the Senator's re-election campaign, does not state a claim under the False Claims Act in view of the absence of any discernible standard or a Congressional policy determination to be applied in considering such allegations. (2) A complaint brought against a U.S. Senator under the False Claims Act will be subject to dismissal if the complaint fails to specify which members of the Senator's staff were involved, what personal services they performed, and when the alleged unlawful activities occurred. [This case is pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.] United States v. Diggs, 613 F.2d 988 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 982 (1980)

Use of the Congressional clerk-hire allowance to pay either a Member's personal or Congressional office expenses is illegal. [House Administration Committee Order 30, published subsequent to Rep. Diggs' conviction, now permits the transfer of up to $15,000 in clerk-hire funds to the allowance for official expenses with proper certification.]

United States v. Eilberg, 507 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. Pa. 1980)

(1) Even though no statutory cause of action exists, the Government has an implied Federal common law civil remedy for a Federal official's alleged fraud involving receipt of fees in violation of a criminal statute. (2) The executive and judicial branches can determine whether Members' phone calls have been properly charged to the House of Representatives, since calls which are not strictly official are incidental to the exercise of central legislative functions and therefore are not legislative acts protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. [This case is pending in U.S. District Court.]

United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477 (1979)

(1) In a criminal action against a Member of Congress on charges of bribery, the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution does not permit the Government to introduce into evidence correspondence and discussions which, while not themselves legislative acts, make_reference to legislative acts. (2) Assuming that a Member can waive Speech or Debate Clause protection, a waiver can occur only after an explicit and unequivocal renunciation of the protection has been made. (3) Assuming that Congress can waive Speech or Debate Clause protection for its Members, there is no evidence of such waiver in the language or legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 201 (Bribery of Public Officials).

United States v. Helstoski, 635 F.2d 200 (3rd Cir. 1980)

Dismissal of an indictment against a Member of Congress is a proper remedy when evidence protected by the Speech or Debate Clause was considered by the grand jury and was a substantial factor underlying the grand jury's decision to indict.

United States v. Jenrette (D.D.C.)

Issues raised.-(1) May Government undercover agents approach a Member of Congress for the purpose of enticing him into criminal activity despite the fact that the Government had no reason to believe that the Member was engaged in criminal activity in the past? (2) Under what circumstances may it be said that Government agents, in planning and implementing an undercover investigation designed to gather evidence of criminal activity, became so involved in the criminal activity they were investigating that any prosecution based on evidence gathered during the investigation would be barred as a matter of law. [This case is pending in U.S. District Court.]

United States v. Kelly [Not Reported] (D.D.C. 1980)

(1) An indictment against a Member of Congress will not be dismissed as violative of the Speech or Debate Clause if the indicted Member fails to show either: (a) that documents and materials protected by the Clause were reviewed by the grand jury and were a substantial factor underlying its decision to indict; or (b) that the grand jury lacked sufficient competent evidence to establish probable cause to indict. (2) That portion of the bribery statute (18 U.S.C.

§ 201(c)) which prohibits a public official from soliciting anything of value in return for his promise to perform an "official act" does not require the Government to prove that the official act was capable of being performed. (3) The Punishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which provides that each house of Congress may punish its Members for disorderly behavior, does not deprive the judiciary of jurisdiction to try a Member of Congress on charges that he used his official position for illegal purposes. Remaining issue raised-Under what circumstances may it be said that Government agents, in planning and implementing an undercover investigation designed to gather evidence of criminal activity, became so involved in the criminal activity they were investigating that any prosecution based on evidence gathered during the investigation would be barred as a matter of law? [This case is pending in U.S. District Court.] United States v. Lederer [Not Reported] (E.D.N.Y. 1980)

(1) The fact that Government officials, in disclosing information regarding an ongoing criminal investigation to the press, may have acted improperly or even illegally does not necessarily constitute grounds for dismissal of an indictment resulting from the investigation. (2) The dismissal of an indictment on the grounds of prejudicial pre-indictment publicity will not be granted unless the defendant shows that he suffered actual prejudice as a result of the publicity. Remaining issue raised--Under what circumstances may it be said that Government agents, in planning and implementing an undercover investigation to gather evidence of criminal activity, became so involved in the criminal activity they were investigating that any prosecution based on evidence gathered during the investigation would be barred as a matter of law? [This case is pending in U.S. District Court.]

United States v. Maryland, 636 F.2d 73 (4th Cir. 1980)

Members of Congress from states other than Maryland who reside in Maryland to attend sessions of Congress cannot be subjected to individual income taxation imposed by Maryland or its political subdivisions in contravention of a valid Federal statute (4 U.S.C. § 113) which prohibits states where Members live solely to perform their duties from treating them as residents for state and local tax purposes. [The U.S. Supreme Court has been asked to review this case.] United States v. Murphy, and United States v. Thompson [Not Reported] (E.D.N.Y. 1980)

(1) The fact that Government officials, in disclosing information. regarding an ongoing criminal investigation to the press, may have acted improperly or even illegally does not necessarily constitute grounds for dismissal of an indictment resulting from the investigation. (2) The dismissal of an indictment on the grounds of prejudicial pre-indictment publicity will not be granted unless the defendant shows that he suffered actual prejudice as a result of the publicity. Remaining issue raised-Under what circumstances may it be said that Government agents, in planning and implementing an undercover investigation to gather evidence of criminal activity, became so involved in the criminal activity they were investigating that any prosecution based on evidence gathered during the investigation would be barred as a matter of law? [This case is pending in U.S. District Court.]