APRIL, 1794.] Non-Intercourse with Great Britain. the West Indies, we have not only suffered spoliations on our trade, but our citizens have been exposed to the most aggravated insults and abuse. All wished to obtain redress for these injuries: the difference of opinion respected mode. It was, therefore, extremely unfair to charge the gentlemen who opposed this measure with tameness under the insults and injuries offered to their country, because they deemed this mode to be inefficient, when they declared their readiness to pursue those measures which they conceived were most effectual to obtain satisfaction for the injuries we have sustained. The gentlemen who advocate the resolution on the table, contend, that it is calculated to prevent a war, to preserve peace, obtain satisfaction for our injuries, and bring Great Britain to her senses. If such would be the effect of the measure, no person would oppose it. But what reason have we to believe that such will be the effect it will produce? The only principle by which the measure can operate, is, that so important and interesting to Great Britain is our commercial connexion, that rather than sacrifice it, they will comply with our terms. But can it be said, that our commerce is so important to them, that to deprive them of it will necessarily produce this effect? The contrary was demonstrated in the late war, which termínated in our Revolution. The British nation were able to exist not only without our commerce, but, at the same time, to carry on a war against us, and against France, Holland, and Spain, in which they obtained victories over the fleets of those nations. All this they were enabled to do without our commerce, and they cannot now be said to be so dependent on us that they cannot live without us. It cannot, therefore, be said that this measure must necessarily produce the effects which are contemplated. [H. OF R. the reparation we demand. An act of Congress is to govern one of the most proud, insolent, and powerful nations on the globe. If we are not proud and insolent, we at least have a claim to a liberal share of vanity and self-confidence. This would be an excellent instrument to govern the British nation; but we have reason to think that they will laugh at the idea, instead of being frightened. Mr. S. then remarked, that we ought to pursue a different mode; that, by the Laws of Nations, negotiation, unaccompanied by any menacing measures, was the proper step, and there was the fairest prospect of success. He considered the controversy and dispute subsisting between Great Britain and the United States to be in a situation peculiarly proper for negotiation, and that there was the fairest basis for explanations and accommodations. He said that no complaint had been made on our part to the Court of Great Britain, stating our injuries, and demanding satisfaction; and that when Mr. Pinckney, our Minister at London, demanded an explanation of the intention of the British Court, by the order of the 6th of November, they declared that no condemnations were to take place in virtue of it, which would not have been legal if the order had not been issued. A construction was put upon that order by the Ministry, which denies the principles on which the condemnation in the West Indies had been founded, and which of course. disavows the transactions of which we complain. We may, therefore, fairly suppose that the Court of Admiralty in the West Indies have contradicted the orders and intentions of the British Ministry. We have not heard what effect these condemnations of our vessels have had on the British Court. If we should state to them the injuries we have sustained-which we ought to do, as they have been committed in a remote part of their dominions, apparently contrary to the design of the Court-there is the strongest reason to believe that we shall obtain redress; because, by their own construction of the order of the 6th of November, they have disapproved of the principle by which the injuries have been committed, and of course they are bound, by their own construction, to make us that satisfaction which we demand. Mr. S. observed, that there were conclusive reasons to believe that the resolution would not produce such effects. It must certainly be considered as containing a menace-a threat, and as dictating terms to Great Britain. All acknowledged that nation to be haughty, insolent, and imperious, in the highest degree. Will not their pride and importance be wounded at an attempt to impose upon them the conditions by which our commercial connexion is to be continued? Will they not con- Mr. S. said, if we conducted a negotiation withsider the national dignity to be insulted? Will it out giving offence, it was probable we should obnot excite a resentment and indignation that will tain the influence of the British subjects in our preclude all possibility of reconciliation? The favor. If, when the American merchants in Lonsentiments of the British nation in these respects don, discovered the order of the 6th of November, are by no means to be justified, but if we intend a they were alarmed, and immediately demanded negotiation, we ought to pursue it in such a man- an explanation of the Court, this shows that there ner as will probably produce success, and not ad- is a powerful interest in that country in favor of dress a proud nation in that menacing tone which a commercial connexion with this. If we do will defeat the object we wish to obtain. It hap-nothing to wound their pride, this influence will pens that some gentlemen have made singular be exerted to preserve the connexion. The mucalculations upon the success of this measure. They suppose that if Congress pass an act prescribing the terms of accommodation, and transmit it to our Minister resident at London, that Great Britain will be alarmed and frightened at the prospect of the loss of our commerce; that they will immediately comply with our terms, and make us tual interest and welfare of both countries may be fairly taken into consideration, in adjusting the dispute. But if we adopt a menacing measure, offensive to the nation, we shall lose the influence of our friends in accomplishing an accommodation. While such is the state of our affairs, we ought to try a fair negotiation, on equal and liberal H. OF R.] Non-Intercourse with Great Britain. terms, unembarrassed by any menace or insult, and there can be no doubt but that the measure will be attended with success. But if Great Britain will not negotiate and do justice to this country, Mr. S. pledged himself to support the most energetic measures to assert our rights, and maintain our national dignity. When war had become unavoidable-and that time might happen-he would meet it with firmness and fortitude; but while it was possible to preserve peace, he conceived it to be a duty he owed to his country to do all in his power to preserve it. [APRIL, 1794. discover the terms on which they will negotiate, and then it will be in our power without any embarrassment from an antecedent law to consider what is best to be done, and make any concession that our interest requires and which is compatible with honor. If Great Britain should be disposed to negotiate and comply with the conditions we offer, such is the nature, variety and extent of our disputes, that the discussion and adjustment of them would require so great a length of time, that the loss arising from the interruption of our commerce Mr. S. observed, that while he considered nego- during that period would be of greater consequence tiation to be attended to by all nations, he had than the objects of dispute. For, if this measure particular reasons to wish that it might be adopted be adopted, we must expect a total interruption of by the United States. He wished that this Re-all commerce with all parts of the British dominpublic might establish and act upon a principle ions, as relative to exports as well as imports, for which was calculated to bring national disputes though the resolution only contemplated the proto an amicable accommodation and prevent the hibition of manufactures from Great Britain and calamities of war. Ireland; yet, we might be satisfied that Great Britain would not give us a trade that was profit perty; foreign articles would rise, and domestic fall. An immense profit would accrue to the owners on the Spring goods which might arrive before it was intended that the act should commence its operation. There could be no doubt but that in a short time a variation in the value of property contrary to the interest of this country would take place to a far greater amount than all the spoliations which had been committed on our commerce. Merchants who had large quantities of goods on hand, would profit by the measure, and the agricultural part of the community would be obliged to sustain the loss. Mr. S. then remarked upon some particular objections to the resolution. He said that the sur-able only to ourselves. render of the Western posts and payment for Mr. S. observed that we ought to consider that negroes carried away contrary to the Treaty of if this proposition should be adopted what great Peace was a subject of controversy that had no alterations would take place in the value of proconnexion with and ought not to be connected with the spoliations committed on our commerce; and was calculated not only to prevent the obtaining of that compensation to which our merchants were entitled, but to cut off forever all commercial intercourse with Great Britain. It is a well known fact, that Great Britain has charged the United States with being guilty of the first infraction of the treaty, and that the United States have retorted the charge. While they seriously believed, that we were the first violators of the treaty, what would they say to an act of the Legislature which renounced all connexion with them, unless they would fulfil the terms of a treaty which they considered themselves to be discharged from by our first violation? Could it be expected, that they would comply with terms so haughty and insolent? Could any person suppose that the proud nation of Great Britain would humble themselves before us in this manner? Would they not consider their national honor to be affected, and abandon all connexion with us before they would submit to terms so humiliating and degrading? Mr. S. remarked, that he did not mean to say, that the United States first infringed the treaty; for the purpose of his argument, it was sufficient to say, that Great Britain thought so, and such being her impression the same consequences would follow as if such was the fact. And the dispute respecting the Western posts, which could be of but little importance to this country, might forever interrupt a commerce which was of the greatest importance. He did not think that the Western posts were worth so great a sacrifice. If this resolution be adopted, we cannot recede in honor unless there be a compliance with every article. It may then happen that a dispute respecting some trifling subjects may prevent a restoration of that commerce which will be of great and important value. But if we do not in the first instance give them our ultimatum we may It had been suggested that the people were anxious for the measure. It was probable that some, who had a particular interest to serve, by the interruption of trade, were in favor of it; but the most considerate part of the community were by no means of that sentiment. But let the popular opinion be what it would, too much had been said about it. We are not to be influenced by such considerations, but are only to regard the public welfare. That we ought to guard against all popular influence as being of the most dangerous tendency. That there was no danger to be apprehended from the Government; that it had not the power, and had never shown any disposition to encroach upon or oppress the people; that the only danger that exists is from the encroachment of the people on the Government, and if the Government ever does fall, it will be owing to the too great prevalence of a local popular influence, which does not speak the general sense of all the community. But if this resolution should be rejected and a negotiation pursued, it will be accompanied with an implied declaration that if it fails, the United States will take proper steps to obtain redress, which will have all the influence to enforce and facilitate a negotiation that can be derived from this measure, unembarrassed with any of the in. APRIL, 1794.] Non-Intercourse with Great Britain. conveniences. If the negotiation should fail, we can have recourse to this measure with the same efficacy then, as now, and it will produce the effects; for our commerce must be as important to Great Britain at the end of six months as now. It had been suggested that the opposers of the resolution were under British influence and interest. Mr. S. did not intimate that any gentleman of the Committee had thrown out that idea, but he said it was a popular opinion, and very prevalent. He remarked that the charge was unjust, cruel, and unfounded; that for himself, he felt no influence; he stood on American ground, and was influenced only by American feelings. He did not advocate any commercial connexion with Great Britain from any regard to that nation, but merely from a regard to his own country, whose interest he conceived to be promoted by that connexion. He remarked that some, who were considered as British agents, had boasted of their influence in the Legislature. He declared that no such influence existed; and that he most heartily despised those persons, who had the effrontery to pretend that it did exist. Mr. S. remarked that a popular opinion in some parts of the Union had been prevailing, that many of the Representatives in Congress were under such an influence arising from the funding system, that they dared not adopt measures necessary for the public defence, for fear the interest of the national debt should remain unpaid. He said that a most unreasonable and unfounded jealousy respecting the funding system existed among the people; that he was satisfied, during the time he had held his present office, that no measure had been influenced by an exclusive regard to the public debt; that he had never owned a farthing in the public funds; but he considered that, let whatever events take place, the national debt must be paid; that if it were necessary he would vote for a land tax for that purpose, for he considered the faith of the Government pledged for the payment of that debt, and he would never violate the national faith; such being the security of the debt, none of the holders had any reason to apprehend a failure of payment, and therefore none of the Committee could be influenced by an apprehension of the failure of payment. Mr. S. said that we ought to consider the tendency of this measure to a war. Many of the friends of it had denied this, and declared that they considered it to be a peaceful measure; but will all say this? A gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. DAYTON] has said that he is in favor of it; because he considers it to be a stepping stone to the threshold of sequestration. Mr. S. said that he respected the virtues and the talents of that gentleman; he believed his integrity to be unimpeachable, and that he acted from the purest motives; that he did not wish to wound his feelings, but that he was bound in duty to express his sentiments respecting any proposition he should make; he considered the proposition of sequestration as connected with this measure by what the gentleman himself had said, and from thence he derived an argument against [H. OF R. it. He had said that this resolution was the stepping stone of sequestration; if that be true, Mr. S. said he should step on this stone with horror and indignation; he should consider it to be the step stone to the temple of infamy, wretchedness, and ruin; he considered that it would not only involve his country in disgrace, but in all the calamities of a war. He said that gentlemen ought to unfold the whole system of their measures with their object and design, and not deceive people into measures which they would reprobate if they knew the consequences; that he believed while there were gentlemen who had nothing but peace in view, that there were many who intended to defeat a negotiation, to dissolve our commercial connexion with Great Britain forever, and who were willing to plunge us into a war with that nation. If gentlemen had not that design, let them come forward and declare it; but while there was reason to suspect such a design, the gentlemen who were in favor of the resolution under consideration, but intended nothing more, ought to be cautious how they adopted a measure that would lead to the most mischievous consequences. On a full consideration of the subject, Mr. S. said that he was convinced that this measure would lead to a war; but if a fair negotiation should be attempted, he had no doubt but that all controversies might be settled, ample satisfaction obtained, commerce restored, and that our country would continue to flourish and prosper. Mr. SMITH (of S. C.) was opposed to the measure, because it was inconsistent with that spirit of negotiation which was contemplated not only by the Executive, but by Congress; for, although some members seemed averse to any further attempt at negotiation, yet it was evidently the wish of a considerable majority to give it another trial. The measure carried with it a menace: it held out this language: that, unless Great Britain would consent to certain measures, the United States would punish her by certain other measures. This language had a direct tendency to defeat all negotiation; for no nation would ever treat on such terms. Even were Great Britain disposed to make complete satisfaction for every injury, her pride would restrain her from making concessions which might appear the result of threats and apprehensions. This had been compared to the case of an individual, and it had been shown that, in common life, no man of spirit would make atonement for an injury when it was demanded with a threat of punishment, if withheld. Mr. S. applied the case to ourselves. He brought it home to the feelings of the members themselves, and he asked if they, under similar circumstances, either as private or public characters, would not, from a spirit of national pride, spurn at the idea of having redress extorted by menaces? Great Britain would be disposed to make_or withhold reparation according to events in Europe, and according to her view of the advantages or disadvantages resulting from a war with the United States. By that view would her an H. OF R.] Non-Intercourse with Great Britain. [APRIL, 1794. must do something more. But the gentleman, in the warmth of his imagination, had mistaken things to be done for things actually done. The fact was, that the gentleman was entirely unfounded in all these assertions. We have not for als, we have not augmented our military strength. It is true we have it all on paper, but the very revenues necessary for the existence of all those essential points, are not yet reported by the Committee of Ways and Means; and, until those revenues exist, the laws we have passed will be of little avail. It was proposed by the law, that the non-importation should not take effect_till_November next, and that distant period was fixed for its operation, to afford time for the result of the negotiation, and that Congress might previously be in session, in order to repeal the law if the negotiation should succeed. Thus, while the very law itself admitted the propriety of a negotiation, it carried with it the very death-wound of all negotiation, by expressly purporting to be in terrorem. If it was not intended as a threat, why not wait till November, and then adopt the measure, if expedient. Suppose this House should in November deem the measure inexpedient, they cannot repeal it without the concurrence of the Senate and PRESIDENT. Thus they forestal the judgment of the House, and deprive themselves of that independence which they ought to possess, to act in the next session according to their then view of things. swer be governed. Should the Cabinet of that nation hesitate with respect to peace or war, a measure like this would undoubtedly decide them against peace. Their language would naturally be, "we were disposed to accommodate all differences on the most amicable terms; but such a dis-tified our harbors, we have not supplied our arsenposition, under the present circumstances, would appear to be the result of fear excited by your threats, and commit our reputation in the eyes of all the world. You must, therefore, pursue your measures, and we shall pursue ours." Mr. S. asked whether this would not be the language of every nation in a like situation? He was persuaded it would be ours. There was nothing pusillanimous in asking reparation in decent terms, unaccompanied with threats. It was the common practice of all nations. Genoa had recently, though her neutrality had been violated, and her port blocked up, sent an Envoy Extraordinary to Great Britain to demand satisfaction. Her demand was couched in mild and civil language; yet Genoa was universally applauded for her firmness and the dignity of her conduct as a neutral Power. It was not enough to say that we had been grossly insulted; this was admitted in its fullest extent. But every nation, when it required redress, was previously insulted. The very demand of satisfaction implied antecedent injury. Nations, however, negotiated without threats. Why, then, did gentlemen so frequently cry out, what! shall we negotiate with a nation which has violated our rights? He would ask those gentlemen, when negotiation was necessary, but in the case of violated rights? He would further ask Some members had proposed the 1st of Novemthem, whether they were not the first to urge ne- ber, in order to admit the Fall goods; but, if that gotiation with the Dey of Algiers, who had cap- was the design, the period would be an improper tured our vessels, and degraded our miserable fel-one, for it would be extremely unequal in its opelow-citizens to the level of beasts of burden? Whether they did not oppose the Naval Armament, lest it should irritate the Algerines, and prevent the success of negotiation? Was it not the constant policy of this country to negotiate with the Indians when practicable, rather than to make war with them? Why, then, raise objections to a negotiation with England? Or why, after having admitted that negotiation shall be attempted, defeat it by these projects? If a majority of the House are ripe for war, let us say so, and act consistently; but let us not hold one language at one time, and contradict it at another; let us not say we are for peace, and immediately adopt a war measure. rations. In some of the States, the Fall vessels might generally be arrived by that time; but, in some of the Southern States, they would be generally excluded, and those States deprived of their expected supplies. He further objected to the measure, on the grounds of its dictating the terms of negotiation, which was not within the province of this House, and was therefore interfering with the Executive, and so far a departure from the spirit of the Constitution; but this ground having been fully discussed by other members, he should not dwell on it. One member had expressed an affection for this measure, because it was, as he had termed it, a Mr. S. inferred from these observations, that ne stepping-stone to sequestration. Mr. S. thought gotiation being determined on, he was bound to it would be more properly called a stumbling resist any and every act which tended to frustrate block to negotiation. He disapproved of it in that negotiation. But, while he was thus for the both shapes. He objected to it, both as to the suavitur in modo, he was, at the same time, for mode in which it appeared, and as to the time: the fortiter in re, and he called upon the advo-as to the mode, because it specified particular cates of this scheme to join him in those measures, which, at the same time that they were free from the foregoing objections, would, in his opinion, either give effect to the negotiation, or prepare us for the event of its failure. A gentleman had said, we have fortified our harbors, we have filled our arsenals, we have increased the Military Establishment: now we grievances, and thus, while it embarrassed our Executive, it menaced the Executive of the nation with whom we were to treat, and made the redress of those specific grievances the sine qua non of all future intercourse; as to the time, because as it was not to take effect till the next session of Congress; there could be no other view in passing it now, but that it might operate as a APRIL, 1794.] Non-Intercourse with Great Britain. threat; and, as this intention could not be mistaken, it would undoubtedly defeat all accommodation. Such being his view of the subject, he could not reconcile it to his duty to vote for it. He thought Congress owed it to their constituents to avoid a war, if possible. The ground of negotiation being taken, they were bound to reject every measure which might have a tendency to defeat it, and to do every thing which might give it a fair chance of success. But while he said this, (as a neutral nation could not justly give umbrage by taking measures to support her neutrality and assert her just rights,) he pledged himself to concur in every act which might place us in a condition to make ourselves respectable, to vindicate our national honor, and to obtain ample retribution for any wrongs which the course of events might leave unredressed. [H. OF R. the resolution involved a principle, which might be useful both for obtaining justice and preserving peace, but that its present shape rendered it not only useless but injurious; believing, too, that it is improper for this branch of our Government to begin a negotiation with a foreign nation, and peremptorily dictate the terms of it, I proposed an amendment, which left the principle in all its force, and avoided some of the objections. We have heretofore heard much about a spirit of accommodation; but the friends of this resolution have not discovered it. After wearying themselves in hunting for a reason against the amendment, it was negatived without any. They will agree with us, but it must be precisely on their own terms. This is the language of accommodation : Hear and believe whatever we teach; stoop down and bear whatever we impose. Victory is in our own power; a triumph is better than peace. If, sir, it be connected with discord and public calamity, the laurel is too withered to excite my envy. If, amid the fire which rages, we have not forgotten the cause which produced it, we must remember that the condemnations of our vessels in the West Indies, in consequence of the orders of the British Government of the sixth of November, are the great and immediate cause of complaint. Have we, sir, demanded a recompense for this injury, and waited a reasonable time for an answer? So far is this from fact, that we have not taken one step towards this, nor have we even heard from Britain since it was known there that any condemnations have taken place. Our last despatches from our Minister at London tell us, that Lord Grenville declared that he presumed no condemnations would take place in consequence of those orders. The words themselves certainly do not justify any. Mr. DEXTER introduced his observations by remarking that he had never risen with so great reluctance on any former occasion. At so late an hour when patience seemed exhausted, when reasoning had given place to invective, when to oppose the resolution was but soliciting reproaches, when the friends of it, confident of a majority, were from all sides of the House impatiently calling for the question, when the mover of it heard arguments against it only that he might treat them with contempt, and their authors with insult, he said it was in vain to ask for an attentive hearing. He should not have risen but for a remark just fallen from a gentleman from New Jersey, [Mr. DAYTON] which had forbidden him to be silent. That gentleman, said Mr. D., has told us that the present measure is a stepping-stone to sequestration of British debts. Viewing it therefore as the beginning of a system of hostility, which is to be so conducted as to sacrifice not only our interest and peace, but our national honor, the duty to resist it Have we any right to say that a demand of rebecomes indispensable. Whatever may be thought compense would be fruitless, when the injuries we of making laws to annihilate the ties of honor and complain of are thus expressly disavowed by the personal confidence, and to dissolve the moral Minister? Did we know that a demand would be obligation of contracts; whatever may be thought fruitless, still we ought to make it, in conformity of the modern usage of nations, which probably to the usage of nations, from a decent respect to from general consent has become a law, which their opinion, and to convince them, in case of a cannot now be violated without perfidy; what-war, that our enemies are altogether the aggressors, ever may be thought of the odium it might bring and that we have been just and circumspect. We on our national character, and the complete de- are judging in our own cause, and we ought not struction of our credit át a moment when we shall to trust ourselves to deviate from established prinneed the utmost extent of it; we have not taken ciples, lest prejudice should mislead us. But it is those previous steps for pacific accommodation, said, that we have negotiated in vain, respecting which the custom of nations and all writers of au- the breaches of the Treaty of Peace, and that the thority hold to be the first in order and indispen- delays here are sufficient to justify immediate sable. We have not made that demand for a re- war. Do we not know, sir, that there are two compense, which ought to precede every species sides to that negotiation? Have they not made deof reprisal. After the observations, sir, which I mands on us for breaches of the same treaty? The made in the beginning of the debate, it will not be negotiation is still pending in the ordinary train. thought strange that I suffer on the present occa- We have never given them our ultimatum on the sion an unusual conflict of reasoning and of feel- subjects of it. It is now under the direction of ing. I then stated, with the frankness which I the Executive, which is the Constitutional authorifelt, and with the zeal which the hazardous crisis ty. It is not proper for us to assume to put an of our country inspired, the reasons and passions end to it by an act of legislation. Who, sir, that which kept my mind in a state of vibration. Strug- calls himself an American, would dare to pursue gling with indignation at the injustice and folly of a measure which may tarnish our national honor? Britain, I said we have suffered until confidence If any one would take even a doubtful step, is folly-until patience is a crime. Believing that "shame ought to burn his cheek to cinder." To 3d CoN.-20 |