be despotic. It may be true, and, in my judgment, it is true, that the preservation of our civil institutions depends upon the middle class-a class between the extreme rich and the extreme poor-and it may also be true that this middle class ought to be invested with the power of creating one department of the government. A department thus created might be a real, and not a nominal check on the other branches of the state authorities. But to form a co-ordinate branch of the legislature who might safely be relied on to accomplish such an object, the restriction of a freehold qualification of two hundred and fifty dollars is entirely insufficient. It is but a feeble evidence, in this country, of a man's prudence and sagacity that he has acquired a freehold estate of the value of two hundred and fifty dollars; and it is still less an evidence of pecuniary independence. In order to secure the election of a legislative house, by electors who may be presumed to act with perfect pecuniary independence, each elector ought to be worth at least one thousand dollars, over and above all debts. A senate chosen by such electors might be said to represent the property of the community; and what is of still more importance, they unquestionably would represent that middling class of our fellow-citizens, who stand between the very rich and the very poor; and on whose firmness, intelligence, patriotism and virtue, I have already intimated, that even now the preservation and perpetuity of our civil institutions depend. There can be no reason to apprehend danger from the separate action of the extreme poor, because the middling class, in such case, would unite with the rich and overbalance the poor both in numbers and intelligence; nor is there reason to fear danger from the extreme rich, for were they to undertake to act as a distinct party, the middling class would unite with the extreme poor and effectually defeat all their projects. Perhaps danger may be anticipated

from an union of action between the extreme rich and the extreme poor, it being possible that these two classes may overbalance the middling class.

Another great object which engaged the attention of the convention, was a reform or alteration in the judicial department of the government.

The judiciary of the state of New-York, under the old system, had merited and acquired a high reputation for legal learning and talent, as well as for independence and integrity in the administration of justice. This reputation was not confined to our own state. The decisions of our high judicial tribunals were treated with marked respect, not only by the ablest lawyers in our sister states, but by the legal profession and superior courts of England. Chancellor Kent, at the time of the convention, was actually giving equity law to every state in the union. There were, however, complaints existing against some of the judges of the superior courts, and especially of the supreme court. It was urged that the population and commerce and capital of the state had immensely increased, probably it had quadrupled, since the supreme court, consisting of five judges, had been formed. That, while the business of that court, and the court of chancery, had increased in a ratio at least equal to the increase of population and wealth, the number of judges employed in the administration of justice had continued to be the same; that the despatch of business which the public exigency demanded, required more force; and many thought that a different organization of the courts of law and equity had become necessary. But this was not all: Complaints were made that the judges of the supreme court had become political partisans; that, while the tenure of their offices secured them from removal, and from the fate of other political partisans, that very immunity emboldened them to be guilty of greater violence as partisans. An

other advantage which they held under the old constitution, of which they did not fail to avail themselves, was, that although they could not be removed from office, yet they could be candidates for better offices whenever they chose to be so. This was a palpable error in the constitution of 1777. That constitution, by rendering the judges of the higher courts eligible to elective offices, held out a sort of inducement for them to become politicians; and it gave them an unreasonable advantage, for it enabled them to play a political game in which they could not lose, but might win.

The report of the committee on the judiciary, was such as one would think would have been perfectly satisfactory to the chancellor and judges themselves.

Mr. Monroe, as chairman of the judiciary committee, reported: That the court of chancery should consist of a chancellor and vice-chancellor, and that the legislature should be authorized to provide for the appointment of a second vice-chancellor, if, in their judgment, the public exigency demanded the measure; that appeals should lie from the vice-chancellor to the chancellor; that there should be created a superior court of common pleas, which should possess jurisdiction, with very trifling exceptions, concurrent with the supreme court; and that, from this court, error might be brought, directly to the court for the correction of errors; that the judges of these courts should be judges at Nisi Prius, and try all the issues joined in their respective courts; and that they should hold their offices during good behaviour, or until they were sixtyfive years old:

That the chancellor, vice-chancellor, and judges of the supreme and superior courts, should, together with the senate, constitute the court for the correction of errors; that they should not be eligible to any elective office until two years after they should cease to be judges; and that

the probate and registering of wills should be confided to the courts of common pleas.

This scheme was originally formed, and, as I believe, in all material parts, matured, by that learned lawyer and able statesman WILLIAM A. DUER. At any rate, I have reason to believe such to be the fact, because he communicated the plan to me some time before the meeting of the convention.

On the 22nd of October the convention took this report into consideration.

Mr. Monroe opened the debate by an expose of the principles upon which the committee had acted. The committee, he stated, were unanimous in their report, with the exception of Mr. Wheeler, who entertained opinions adverse to the majority. Mr. M., in his address, carefully abstained from any allusions to party considerations, or to the political principles or conduct of any of the judges. He discussed the question in the abstract, and confined himself entirely to topics of a public and general charac

ter.

Immediately upon the close of this speech, Gen. Root rose and offered a substitute, providing that the judicial power of the state should be vested "in a court for the trial of impeachments and the correction of errors, to consist of the president of the senate, and the senators; in a supreme court, to consist of a chief justice, and not more than four, nor less than two, associate justices; in circuit courts, and courts of common pleas, and in justices of the peace, and in such other courts, subordinate to the supreme court, as the legislature may from time to time establish. The state shall be divided into a convenient number of districts, subject to alteration, as the public good may require; and for each, a circuit judge shall be appointed: He shall have the same powers as a judge of the supreme court, at his chambers: He shall have

the power to try issues, joined in the supreme court; to preside in courts of oyer and terminer and jail delivery; and, if required by law, to preside in courts of common pleas and general sessions of the peace. The supreme court, shall have jurisdiction, in all cases, in law and equity; and the legislature may, in their discretion, vest chancery powers in other courts of subordinate jurisdiction: Provided, however, That the court of chancery, as at present organized, shall continue, until the legislature shall otherwise direct."

This proposition contemplated a total revolution in the judiciary department.

It proposed, first-The abolition of the existing, and the creation of a new supreme court. Second-The creation of a corps of district judges for the trial of all issues of fact. Third-The abolition of the court of chancery, and the transfer of the equitable powers of that court to the courts of common law.

So far as the interests or feelings of parties were concerned, the great object, on the one hand, was to get rid of the judges of the supreme court, by constitutionizing them out of office, and, on the other hand, to preserve them. With respect to Chancellor Kent, as he would become ineligible to hold the office of chancellor within a few months after the new constitution could go into operation, no mere party considerations could have operated on any portion of the convention in their action in relation to the court of chancery. Colonel Young argued in support of Mr. Root's project. He attempted to produce an impression that the plan did not pre-suppose a removal of the judges. He was sustained by Judge Radcliff. Mr. Wheaton, on the other hand, argued in favor of the report of the committee.