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shall discontinue any regular passenger train, or other public service facility, or change any regular passenger train schedule or time table, without first obtaining authority from the Commission so to do. (Acts of 1915, chap. 8.)
Sec. 5. The commission is hereby given power to investigate all methods and practices of public service corporations or other persons subject to the provisions
C. &0. Ry. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 75 W. Va. 100 West End Business Men's Asso. v. United R. Co., P. U. R. (Mo.) 1915D-482.
A street railway was denied the right to substitute motor bus service for street car service on an unprofitable line where steep grades and sharp curves render the operation of motor vehicles dangerous and part of the street was impassable for such vehicles during certain seasons of the year. Re Charleston Interurban R. R. Co., Bul. No. 15, Bien Rep. 1915-16, p. 224; P. U. R. 1916F-338.
The West Virginia Commission has no authority to approve in advance the abandonment by a utility of a part of its property devoted to public use, under a statute giving it jurisdiction to determine whether a utility is rendering adequate and sufficient service. Re Charleston Interurban R. R. Co., Bul. No. 15, Bien. Rep. 1915-16, p. 224; P. U. R. 1916F-338.
The West Virginia Commission has jurisdiction to determine the propriety of the abandonment of street car service and the substitution of motor bus service therefor, under a statute authorizing it to determine whether the utility is rendering adequate and sufficient service, where the Commission is requested to order the service_to be continued and to be improved. Re Charleston Interurban R. R. Co., Bul. No. 15,Bien. Rep. 1915-16, p. 224; P. U. R. 1916F-338.
Whether passenger service to a town of 1,400 population, situate on a branch line of a railroad, two miles from its main track, costs more than it will pay, is not determinative of the legal duty to install such service. Vawters v. C. & O. Ry. Co., 1 An. Rep. 74.
8 W. R. C. R. 685. 1 N. J. 646. Mere excess of estimated operating expenses above prospective returns from the required service on a branch line is inadequate upon the question of reasonableness. C. & 0. Ry. Čo. v. Public Service Commission, 75 W. Va. 100. Nelson v. Ry. Co. 8 W. R. C. R. 85; Railroad Co. v. Com. 58 So. (La.) 862; State v. Railway Co., 239 Mo. 196; Railroad Co. v. Com. 152 Wis. 654; Railroad Co v. Com. 54 Col. 64; Railroad Co. v. Gill 156 U. S. 649; Smith v. Ames 169 U. S. 466; Commissioners v. Ry. Co. 7 I. C. C. 69; Brabham v. Railway Co., 11 I. C. C. 464.
In legal contemplation under the laws of W. Va., å branch line of a railroad system is devoted to the transportation of passengers as well as freight, even though actually used only for the latter. C. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Public Service Commission 242 U. S. 603; Atl. Coast Line R. Co., v. N. C. Corp. Corn. 206, U. S. 1; Mo. P. R. Co. v. Kans., 216 U. S. 262; Wash. ex rel Oregon R. & Nav. Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U. S. 510; B. & Q. R. Co. v. Railroad Com., 237 U. S. 220.
The obligation imposed by West Virginia Laws upon a branch line as part of a railway system, to use it for both passenger and freight service, cannot be thrown off or extinguished by any act or omission of the railway company. C. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Com. 242 U. S. 603.
SERVICE STATION FACILITIES
The commission will not require a flag stop at a small town on defendant's railway, when the town has a population of only about 67 families scattered over a territory of about 3 miles, with a station one mile distant on one side of the proposed stop and 22 miles on the other side; and where, if ordered, would give other towns the right to demand similar service, which if allowed would cause defendant's trains to stop 6 times in seven and one-quarter miles, for the reason that such service along the rallway would take up too much of the train's time, and greatly inconvenience the traveling public. Johnson v. Virginian Ry. Co. 1 An. Rep. 95.
A change in the location of a railroad depot, to shorten by several hundred feet the distance the great majority of passengers must walk, and to overcome inadequate means of ingress and egress and insufficient facilities, will not be required in a village of only 500 inhabitants where the cost of the change will be several thousand dollars more than the cost of constructing adequate approaches and facilities at the present location. In re Borders v. N. & W. Ry. Co., Bul. No. 16, 1917 An. Rep. 116.
C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. R. R. Com. 237 U. S. 220.
Total receipts averaging $71.75 per month in a town of some 400 population situate across a river about one mile from another station of defendant, will not justify the erection and maintenance of a depot and spurtrack or siding. In re Henderson v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., Bul. No. 17, 1917 An. Rep. 125.
A common carrier does not do its full duty to its passengers which would dump them out at a crossing along its main line, located two miles away from a town of 1,400 inhabitants and require them to walk two miles along the railroad track to arrive at their destination. Vawters v. C. & 0. Ry. Co. 1 An. Rep. 74.
The branch line is essentially a part of the main line so far as operations are concerned, and the commission cannot distinguish any difference as to the legal duty of the carrier in failing to render passenger service, to a town situate on a branch line two miles distant from its main line, than in a case where the town is located directly on the main line and the company should refuse to make the stop there and prefer to make the stop some two miles away and decline to install a station at the seat of population. Vawter v. C. & O. Ry. Co. 1 An. Rep. 74.
of this act; (11) to require them to conform to the laws of this state and to all rules, regulations and orders of the Commission not contrary to law; and to require copies of all reports, rates, classifications, schedules and time-tables in effect and used by such corporation or other person, to be filed with the commission, and all other information, desired by the Commission relating to such investigation and requirements.
The Commission may compel obedience to its lawful orders by proceedings of mandamus or injunction or other proper proceedings in the name of the State in any circuit court having jurisdiction of the parties or of the subject matter, or the Supreme Court of Appeals direct, and such proceedings shall have priority over all pending cases.
The Commission may change any intra-state rate, charge or toll which is unjust or unreasonable and may prescribe such rate, fare, charge or toll as would
POWER OF COMMISSION-CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (11) The powers conferred upon the Public Service Commission by sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Acts, are within constitutional limitations, as an exercise by the state of its police powers. United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 73 W. Va. 571; 1 An. Rep. 206.
Regan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362; R. R. Com. cases, 116 U. S. 307; Tilley v. Savannah, etc. R. Co., 5 Fed. 641; Stone v. Yazoo and M. V. R. R. Co., 62 Miss. 607; R. R. Co. v. Transportation Co., 25 W. Va. 325. Minn, etc. R. Co., v. Minn. 186 U. S. 257; C. B. & Q. R. Co. v. Jones, 149 Ill. 361.
Secs. 5, 6 and 7 of said act adapted to all kinds of public service corporations, are in substance sections 1, 2 and 3, of the Interstate Commerce Act, and as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States, with respect to orders and judgments of the Interstate Commerce Commission the orders of the Public Service Commission are final and not subject to judicial interference on review by this court, unless “(1) beyond the power which it could constitutionally exercise; or (2) beyond the statutory power; or (3) based upon a mistake of law." United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Service Com., 73 W. Va. 571; 1 An. Rep. 206.
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union P. R. C. 222 U. S. 541.
POWER OF COMMISSION-LIMITED BY COURT DECISIONS
The decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission, although not binding upon the commissions, should be cons.dered as persuastive authority. National Tube Co. v. P. C. C. and St. L. R'y Co., Bul. No. 41.
The Public Service Commission being strictly an administrative body exercising, quasi-judicial functions, has no powers other than those vested in it by the Public Service Commission Act. It therefore cannot follow the Interstate Commerce Commission decisions nor apply the common law rules of construction of statutes in determining whether its action in striking a tariff from its files, revives a former tariff on the same subject. National Tube Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., Bul. No. 42.
Interstate Commerce Commission's decisions to the effect that the striking from the files of the commission of a tariff which had become effective revives a former tariff, are based upon the Interstate Commerce Commission Act and the rule adopted by the Interstate Commerce Commission on this subject. There is no similar provision in the Public Service Commission Act of West Virginia, nor has the commission ever adopted a rule similar to that of the Interstate Commerce Commission on this subject. National Tube Co. v. Baltimore & O. R. R. Co., Bul. No. 42.
It must be presumed that the legislature of West Virginia, which used almost the very language of sec. 2 of the Interstate Com. Com Act when it enacted Sec. 6 of chap. 9, Acts, 1913, into law, was familiar with the decisions which had been rendered thereon, to the effect that said sec. only allowed common carriers to transport free of charge or at a lesser rate than that charged to the general public, those employees and persons expressly named in the Act to the exclusion of all others, and knew the construction which had been placed upon the language it was enacting into law. Re Wheeling Electric Co. (request for ruling) i An. Rep. 237.
When a statute has been adopted from another state or country, the courts usually follow the construction which it had received by the courts of the state or country from which it is taken. Rose v. Public Service Commission, 75 W. Va. 1; 1 An. Rep. 86.
POWER OF COMMISSION TO ENFORCE LAWFUL ORDERS
Until the Public Service Commission, pursuant to the authority conferred upon it by said act, has investigated and determined that a particular rate complained of is unreasonable and invalid as to a particular carrier, the courts cannot interfere by injunctive process or otherwise, to stay the hand of the Commission in the performance of its proper duties and functions. Public Service Com. v. B. & 0. R. R. Co. Bien. Rep. 1915-16, p. 111, 76 W. Va. 399.
B. & O. R. R. v. U. S. 215 U. S. 481.
Tex. & Pac. R. Co. v. Abeline Cotton Oil Co. 204 U. S. 426; McChord v. L. & N. R. Co. 183 U. S. 483; Cin. N. 0. & T. P. R. Co. v. Ints. Com. Com. 162 U. S. 184; Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. Co. 162 Fed. 354; Atl. Coast Line R. Co. v. Macon Gro. Co. 215 U. S. 501; Robinson v. B. & 0. R. R. Co. 64 W. Va. 406; Coal & Coke Ry. Co. v. Ry. Co. 67 W. Va. 448.
be just and reasonable,(12) and change or prohibit any practice, device or method of service in order to prevent undue discrimination or favoritism as between
RATE MAKINGCONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS-DELEGATIONS OF POWER
(12) The rate-making power is inherent in and belongs primarily to the legislature. The presumption is against exclusive delegation of power. Unless there has been such delegation by clear and unmistakable terms, the power remains in the legislatures, which can exercise the same when it sees fit. Benwood v. Public Service Commission, 75 W. Va. 127; 1 An. Rep. 174.
Imp. Co. v. Bluefield 69 W. Va. 1; Judy v. Lashley, 50 W. Va. 628; State v. Sup. Court, 67 Wash. 37; Milwaukee E. R. & L. Co. v. R. R. Com., 153 Wis. 592; Home Tel. & Telg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U. S. 265.
Sec. 5, of chapt. 9, Acts of the Legislature, 1913, is not an invalid attempt to delegate to the Public Service Commission the power specifically limited by section 9, Article XI, of the Constitution, to the Legislature to "from time to time, pass laws, applicable to all railroad corpora. tions in the state establishing reasonable maximum rates of charges for the transportation of passengers and freight.” Public Service Commission v. B. & O. R. R. Co., Bien. Rep. 1915-16, p. 111; 76 W. Va. 399.
United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Service Com., 73 W. Va. 571.
Said section 5 of chapter 9, but confers upon the Public Service Commission powers of a quasilegislative and quasi-judicial nature, limited to intrastate rates, similar to those conferred by Congress upon the Interstate Commerce Commission, limited to Interstate transportation, and to administer and carry into effect the general laws of the state, regulating rallroads and other public service corporations, inacted in pursuance of the constitution. Public Service Commission v. B. & O. R. R. Co., Bien Rep. 1915-16, p. 111; 76 W. Va. 399.
While it is now established law by state and federal decision, that the making of reasonable maximum rates for general application is primarily a legislative function, it is equally so that legislative control over rallways and other public service corporations may, within constitutional limitations, be delegated to public service commission, the reason for such regulative laws being the distinction between prescribing rates generally, without complaint, controversy or investigation, and directing the observance of a particular rate or schedule, after judicial or quasi-judicial investigation of its propriety. Public Service Com. v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., Bien Rep. 1915-16, p. 111; 76 W. Va. 399.
2, Willoughby on The Constitution, sec. 778; Beale & Wyman, R. R. Rate Reg., secs. 1032-35; 1 Drinker on Interstate Commerce Act, pp. 394-5; Interstate Commerce Com., v. Chicago R. I. & Pac. Ry. Co., 218 U. S. 88; Interstate Commerce Com. v. Perry, 3 I. C. C. 740.
The legislature has power to grant to the Public Service Commission the right to regulate and control the operation of jitneys. Charleston Int. R. R. Co. v. Smith., Bul. No. 4; Bien Rep. 191516, p. 133; P. U. R. 1915E-177.
The Public Service Commission has power to change any intrastate rate for service rendered the public, when to do so will conflict with
no paramount law or constitutional inhibition. Benwood v. Public Service Com., 75 W. Va. 127; 1 An. Rep. 174.
RATE MAKING-CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS-DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
Act W. Va. Feb. 22, 1913, (Laws 1913, Chap. 9), relating to public service corporations and creating the Public Service Commission, is not subject to the objection that it authorizes the Commission to take property without due process of law, in that it makes no provision for notice and hearing before the fixing of rates; that being a requirement of the state constitution. Manufacturers L. & H. Co. v. Ott, 215 Fed. 940.
Gas companies held not denied due process of law on a hearing before the Public Service Commission of West Virginia as to the reasonableness of gas rates because of the expression of a request by one of the commissioners that the leading counsel for the companies should withdraw, made after charges against the fairness and integrity of the commission had been made but not substantiated and because of the closing of the hearing after counsel without the jurisdiction of commission had withdrawn and refused to further appear. Manufacturers L. & 8. Co. v. Ott, 215 Fed. 940.
A statute is invalid that requires something to be done which is forbidden by the Constitution, but it is not essential to the validity of a statute that it should enjoin obedience to the Constitution, or re-enact its provision. Manufacturers L. & H. Co. v. Ott, 215 Fed. 940.
Paulson v. Portland 149 U. S. 30; Chi. B. & Q. R. R. v. Neb. 170 U. S. 57; French v. Barber, A. P. Co., 181 U. S. 324.
One entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court on the ground that a state statute deprives him of property rights in violation of the Constitution of the United States cannot be deprived of that right by reason of being given a remedy in the state courts. Manufacturers L. & H. Co. v. Ott, 215 Fed, 940. Smith v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466; United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 73 W. Va. 571; Bacon v. Ruthland R. R. 232 U. S. 134.
This statute (sec.'16, chapt. 9), so construed is not void as depriving a public service corporation, without due process of law of rights guaranteed to it by the State or Federal Constitution. The process of such Public Service Commission provided in said act, with right thereby given to have a review of the order or judgment of said commission by this court, as to matters judicial involved therein, and as provided thereby satisfying the requirements of due process and other constitutional rights protected by the Constitution. United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 73 W. Va. 571, 1 An. Rep. 206.
Prentise v. Atl. Coast Line 211 U.S. 210; Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Garrett, 213 U. S. 298.
An order of the State Public Service Commission requiring the installation and maintenance of a passenger service upon a branch railway line which has hitherto been used for freight traffic only is not repugnant to the due process of law and equal protection of the laws clauses of U. S. Const. 14th Amend. although the passenger service so ordered, if separately considered, may entail some pecuniary loss, where, under the local law, such branch line was in legal contemplation devoted to the transportation of passengers as well as of freight, even though actually used for the latter, and it does not appear either that the railway company's intrastate passenger business
persons, localities or classes of freight; provided, that the commission shall not reduce any rate, toll or charge within ten years after the completion of the
will not yield a reasonable return if the new service is installed, or that the traffic, freight and passenger passing over the branch line to and from points on the main line, will not do so. C. & O. Ry. Co. v. Public Service Com., 242 U. S. 603.
State Law Controlling.
Lindsley v. Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61. RATE MAKING—CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS
While the commission has power to disregard franchise contracts in fixing rates, it will exercise such power with extreme caution so as not to permit a utility to violate its contract unless it clearly appears that the enforcement thereof would either be unconscionable or result in an unjust discrimination. Re C. & P. Tel Co., Bul. No. 32; 1917 An. Rep. 87; P. U. R. 1917E-955.
The West Virginia Commission has power to increase the rates of a public service company notwithstanding a franchise provision that the rates shall in no case exceed the schedule specified therein. Re United Fuel Gas Co., Bul. No. 21, 1917 An. Rep. 80; P. U. R. 1917 A-923.
The commission may change a public service rate which was fixed for a municipality by franchise ordinance prior to the enactment of the law creating the commission, where authority to fix such rates was not expressly delegated to the municipal corporation by the legislature. Benwood v. Public Service Commission, 75 W. Va. 127; 1 An. Rep. 174.
Railroad Company v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155; Manitowoc v. Man. and Northern Traction Co., 145 Wis. 13. The general provisions in a municipal charter authorizing the municipal corporation to
contract and be contracted with,” does not delegate beyond the state's control the power to fix public service rates. Benwood v. Public Service Commission, 75 W. Va. 127; 1 An. Rep. 174.
A grant of power by the legislature to a municipal corporation “to erect, or authorize or prohibit the erection of *
water works" does not vest the municipal corporation with power to fix water rates by franchise or agreement beyond the control of the legislature. Benwood v. Public Service Commission, 75 W. Va. 127; 1 An. Rep. 174.
Home Tel. & Telg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U. S. 265.
The abrogation by the Public Service Commission of a contract or franchise entered into between a city and a public service company providing for service and rates therefor, is not violative of the contract clause of the federal constitution. Benwood v. Public Service Commission (reasons for entering order) 1 An. Rep. 165.
Dawson v. Dawson Tel. Co. (Ga.) 72 S. E. 508; Jones on Tel. and Tel. cases, sec. 214.
The Commission has jurisdiction to fix the rates of a natural gas company, irrespective of the rates and terms and provisions of the company's franchise, and notwithstanding section 28b, paragraph 1, chap. 47, of the code which merely creates an additional remedy for the enforcement of existing rights. Re Glenville Nat. Gas. Ca., Bul. No. 6, Bien. Rep. 1915-16, p. 120; P. U. R. 1915F-848.
Benwood v. Public Service Commission, 83 S. E. 295.
The commission may disregard contracts made by water company with its consumers in pursuance of its ordinance franchise, although such contract relates to the installation and maintenance of service connections rather than to rates. Re Bluefield v. Bluefield Waterworks and Imp. Co., Bul. No. 31; 1917 An. Rep. 197; P. U. R. 1917E-22.
Pocatello Water Co. v. Standley, 7 Idaho 155; Bothwell v. Consumers' Co., 13 Idaho 568; Hatch v. Consumers' Co., 17 Idaho 204, 224 U. S. 148.
Insofar as the contracts of public service corporations conflict with public duties imposed upon them by law, they are not within the protection of the constitutional provisions inhibiting impairment of the obligations of contracts. B. & O. R. R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, P. U. R. 1918B-608; 94 S. E. 545.
It was the intention of the law-makers under sections 4 and 5 of chapter 9, Acts 1913, to give the commission the authority to change such rates as may be unjust and unreasonable, and also such rates as may be discriminatory in their character, even though such rates were allowed to be charged under a franchise either upon the application of the company itself or upon the notice of the commission being called to it. Benwood y. Public Service Commission (Reasons for entering order) 1 An. Rep. 165.
Webster v. Supreme Court, 67 Wash. 37; Troy v. United Trac. Co., 202 N. Y. 333; Manitowac v. Mann. Trac. Co., 45 Wis. 13; Phillipsburg v. Pub. Util. Com., (N. J.) 99 Atl. 1096; State v. Board Pub. Util., 88 Atl. 1096; LaCross v. LaCross Gas & E. Co., 145 Wis. 408; Milwaukee Ry. & E. Co. v. R. R. Com. 145 Wis. 592.
While the Commission has power to disregard franchise contracts in fixing rates, it will exercise such power with extreme caution so as not to permit a utility to violate its contract unless it clearly appears that the enforcement thereof would either be unconscionable or result in unjust discrimination. Re C. & P. Tel. Co., Bul. No. 32; 1917 An. Rep. 87; P. U. R. 1917E-955.
It is the policy of the commission not to interfere with the municipal regulation of utilities whose existence depends upon municipal franchises unless the necessity therefor is clear. Re Charleston Int. R. R. Co., Bul. No. 15; Bien Rep. 1915-16, p. 224; P. U. R. 1916F-338.
Smith v. Nunally, Bul. No. 4; P. U. R. 1915E-177.
Impliedly from general powers, a municipal corporation may have the power to contract in the matter of public service rates, as long as the legislature does not exercise its reserve power in that particular, but any contract
so made is only permissive and is subject to future legislative action. Benwood v. Public Service Commission, 75 W. Va. 127; 1 An. Rep. 174.
Railroad Company v. Iowa, 95 U. S. 155; Manitowac v. Man. & Northern Trac. Co., 145 Wis. 13.
Where, by franchise or ordinance, public service rates within a municipality have been fixed and accepted as between a public service corporation ·nd the public, without express delegation of power in such particular by the legislature to the municipality, a change of rates by the Public Service Commission does not impair the obligation of a contract. Benwood v. Public Service Com., 75 W. Va. 127; 1 An. Rep. 174.
railroad or plant to be used in the Public Service below a point which would prevent such public service corporation, person, persons or firm from making a
Home Tel. & Telg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U. S. 265; State v. Superior Court, 67 Wash. 37; Knoxville Water Co. v. Knoxville, 189 U. S. 434; Wyandotte County Gas Co. v. Kansas, 231 U. S. 622; Dawson v. Dawson Tel. Co., 137 Ga. 62.
A franchise whereby an electric light and water company agreed to place and maintain fire plugs attached to its water main, and to erect and maintain lamps at such places as the corporate authorties should designate, constitutes a contract and reasonable orders of the corporate authorities made in accordance with the provisions thereof should be enforced. Marlinton v. Marlinton Service Co., Bul. No. 3; P. U. Ř. 1915E-277.
While the commission is slow to disturb contracturay relations existing between a utility and municipality or between a utility and its consumers, it has not hesitated to do so where it appears that the enforcement of such contractural relation would operate as an unjust discrimination or impose an undue burden upon either of the contracting parties. Re Light, Fuel & Power Co. etc., Bul. No. 39.
In fixing rates to be charged by utility, it is the policy of the commission not to interfere with franchise contracts unless compelled to do so in order to prevent discrimination. But where, to require petitioners to furnish gas at one distributing point at the price fixed by its franchise, would result in such discrimination, the commission will disregard such franchise contract. Re W. Va. Central Gas Co., Bul. No. 40.
C. B. & Q. R. Co. v. Nebraska, 17 U. S. 57; Bellevue v. Ohio Val. W. Co., 245 P. A. 144.
Contracts between a utility company and consumers whereby a lower rate was charged consumers who entered into an agreement to purchase gas at a stipulated price for a period of 5 years than was charged to consumers having no contract, though made prior to the enactment of the Public Service Commission law, or void and unenforceable. Huntington v. United Fuel Gas Co., 1 An. Rep. 198.
Owensboro Gas Light Co. v. Hildebrand, 19 Kentucky L. Rep. 983.
Contracts of a natural gas company with consumers of natural gas for exclusive service for a term of years in consideration of reduced rates, constitute no lawful basis for discrimination in rates in favor of such contract consumers against other consumers when in other respects the service is rendered all under substantially the same circumstances and conditions; and when the manifest object of such contracts is to monopolize the business of serving the public
with natural gas. United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 73 W. Va. 571, i An. Rep. 206.
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call Pub. Co., 181 U. S. 92.
Successful impeachment of an order of the Public Service Commission requiring a railroad company to furnish coal cars at sidings privately owned, for the use of persons other than the owners, with the consent of the owners, on the ground that it impairs the obligations of contracts between it and such owners, inhibiting such use without the consent of both parties thereto, requires proof of lack of reasonable necessity for such use; the order having been made on some evidence of occasion therefor. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, P. U. R. 1918A608, 94 S. E. (W. Va.) 545.
A rate fixed for natural gas by a state commission cannot be held confiscatory because it would require the companies affected, under contracts made by them, to supply gas to consumers in other states at a loss. Manufacturers L. & H. Co. v. Ott, 215 Fed. 940. RATE MAKING-CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS-IMPOSING BURDEN ON IN
An order of the Public Service Commission requiring an interstate train to haul a sleeping car between points within the state is not necessarily repugnant to the constitution and status of the United States, as imposing an undue burden upon Interstate traffic. The states are permitted to make reasonable regulations affecting interstate carriers, relating to the stopping of trains at populous towns, for the purpose of taking on and letting off passengers, and respecting the changIng of schedules of trains, so as to connect with trains running on other railroads, for the accommodation of the public. C. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 78 W. Va. 667.
Lake Shore & Michigan R. R. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285; Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. N. C. Corp. Commission, 206 U. S. 1.
A state regulation, fixing the price to be charged by gas companies for natural gas furnished to consumers within the state, is not an unlawful regulation of interstate commerce, although some of the gas supplied is piped from other states; Congress having taken no action affecting the subject. Manufacturers L. & H. Co. v. Ott, 215 Fed. 940. West v. Kansas Gas Co., 221 U. S. 229; Simpson v. Shepherd, 239 U. S. 352.
RATE MAKING-ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF COMMISSION Until the Public Service Commission, pursuant to the authority, conferred upon it by law, has investigated and determined that a particular rate complained of is unreasonable, and invalid as to a particular carrier, the courts cannot interfere by injunctive process, or otherwise, to stay the hand of the commission in the performance of its proper duties and functions. Public Service Commission v. B. & O. R. R. Co., Bien. Rep. 1915-16, p. 111; 76 W. Va. 399.
B. & O. R. R. Co. v. U. S., 215 U. S. 481; Texas and Pacific R. Co. v. Abeline Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426; McChord v. L. & N. R. Co., 183 U.S. 483; Cin. N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Com., 162 U. S. 184; Meeker v. Lehigh Val. R. Co., 162 Fed. 354; Atl. Coast Line R. Co. v. Macon Groc. Co., 215 U. S. 501; Robinson v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 64 W. Va. 406; Coal & Coke Ry. Co. v. Railway Co., 67 W. Va. 448.
Chapt. 41, Acts of the Legislature, 1907, limiting railroads to the rate of 2c per mile for carrying intrastate passengers and baggage remains the paramount law, binding upon the carrier, until in the first instance upon application by the carrier or by some one injuriously affected thereby, or upon the initiative of the Public Service Commission, such rate has been investigated by the commission and judicially determined to be unreasonable or confiscatory as to a particular car