Opinion of the Court-Leonard, C. J. * * general legislation, and leave the people in their municipal capacity to organize, and carry on, their government under such general laws. If this be so, then to say that the legislature may not pass a law to incorporate a city, but may to amend an act of incorporation in existence before the adoption of the constitution, or charters formed under the general law, would make this provision of the constitution, practically, amount to nothing. For, if they may amend, they may to the extent of passing an entire new law, except as to one section. Or they may, at one session, amend half the law, and at the next, the other half, and thus the plain and positive prohibition of the fundamental law would be evaded. By such a construction the evil sought to be remedied would continue, if possible, in a more objectionable form. * But, again, to say that the prohibition to pass laws for the incorporation of a city does not include a prohibition to amend, we think is narrowing the language used to an unwarranted extent. When we speak of an act or law to incorporate a city, it may be conceded that we are understood to refer to a law creating the corporation. But if a law is passed that changes or modifies the act creating such law, it is as much for the government of the corporation as was the original act; and it would certainly seem that, if the legislature can not create, neither can they legislate so as to change that which was previously properly created." So we say in this case; if the legislature had not power to pass special laws with respect to the collection of taxes, then it could not, by such laws, legislate so as to change those general laws which were previously properly enacted. In other words, when a general law is passed which provides the ways and means for the collection of taxes, the complete operation of that law can not be materially interrupted, except by the enactment of a general law upon the subject, and until such a law is passed the original act remains in full force and must be carried out, regardless of any special law. (See Atchison v. Bartholow, 4 Kan. 124; Davis v. Woolnough, 9 Iowa, 106.) But it is said that if the sections under consideration are unconstitutional, then section 3238, Comp. L., imposing the Points decided. penalty here sought, is equally so. We agree with counsel for appellants that the last-named section is constitutional. It is a general law imposing the same burdens upon all persons similarly situated, and belonging to the same class. The legislature had the power, by general law, to impose a heavier penalty upon one class than upon another, if, in their judgment, there was good reason for so doing. The legislature is the judge of the means necessary for an efficient system of collection, and within reasonable limits, at least, its discretion may be exercised by general legislation. If we correctly interpret the argument of counsel for appellant, it is that section 3238 is constitutional for the reasons given above, and that the sections under consideration are so for the same reasons. That is to say, by these sections the legislature made a new class, consisting of the persons embraced therein. This argument has already been answered. If it could be held that these persons constitute a class, still it would be true that they were made such by special law enacted for the sole purpose, and as a means, of nullifying, in part, the intended operation of the general law. The purpose must fail, because the means, being prohibited, are inadequate. The order of the court below is affirmed. BELKNAP, J., having been of counsel at a former trial in the court below, did not participate in the foregoing decision. [No. 1,053.] THE STATE OF NEVADA, RESPONDENT, v. THE CALIFORNIA MINING CO. ET AL., APPELLANTS. SPECIAL LAW.-(See State v. Con. Virginia M. Co., ante, 432.) C. J. Hillyer & B. C. Whitman, for Appellants. Lewis & Deal and M. A. Murphy, Attorney General, for Respondent. VOL. XVI-29 Opinion of the Court-Leonard, C. J. By the Court, LEONARD, C. J.: The questions involved in this case are the same, substantially, as those decided in the case of the State v. The Consolidated Virginia Mining Company et al. (No. 1052), and upon the authority of that decision, as well as that in the case of the State v. The California Mining Company et al., 15 Nev. 240, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. BELKNAP, J., having been of counsel in the court below, did not participate in the foregoing decision. |