The cases cited by plaintiff in error in support of his proposition that as to a trespasser or a mere licensee no duty exists and no recovery can be had except in case of willful or wanton injury, and that in order to establish a duty on the part of plaintiff in error towards defendant in error while he was on the car it was incumbent upon defendant in error to establish that he was there as a passenger, correctly state the law as a general proposition. Those cases, however, apply to adults and are not meant to apply to the case of a child of immature age. The question here is not as to the duty of plaintiff in error toward adults, but is, what is that duty in respect to a child of immature years? An adult certainly has no right to enter a car, such as that boarded by defendant in error, except as a passenger. If he should do so upon the invitation of one in charge of the car and without any expectation of paying his fare he will be bound to know that such an act is improper and will be held to be in collusion with the one in charge of the car to defraud the street car company. A child who has not yet arrived at the age of discretion and who might innocently accept such an invitation is not held to such a strict accountability.

In Wilton v. Middlesex Railroad Co. 107 Mass. 108, a girl nine years of age was invited by the driver of a street car to board the car, which she did while the car was moving slowly. When the child had one foot on the step the driver struck the horses and they started on a fast trot. By reason of the sudden starting of the car she lost her balance, fell and was seriously injured. It was admitted that the child was not a passenger for hire and that the driver had no authority to take her upon the car and carry her, unless such authority was to be implied by the fact of his employment by the railroad company as a driver. In holding that the railroad company was liable the court said: "The driver of a horse car is an agent of the corporation, having charge, in part, of the car. If in violation of his instruc

tions he permits persons to ride without pay he is guilty of a breach of his duty as a servant. Such act is not one outside of his duties but is an act within the general scope of his agency, for which he is responsible to his master. In the case at bar the invitation to the plaintiff to ride was an act within the general scope of the driver's employment and if she accepted it innocently she was not a trespasser. It is immaterial that the driver was acting contrary to his instructions. It follows that the plaintiff being lawfully upon the car, though she was a passenger without hire, is entitled to recover if she proves that she was using due car at the time of the injury and that she was injured by the negligence of the driver."

In Little Rock Traction and Electric Co. v. Nelson, 66 Ark. 494, a boy ten years of age attempted to enter a street car upon the invitation of the motorman while the car was moving slowly. As he was boarding the car the motorman turned on the full electric current, thereby causing the car to make a sudden start forward and causing the boy to lose his footing on the steps and his hold on the handle-bars, resulting in a serious injury to him. The facts were quite similar to those in the case at bar. The child had no thought of paying fare and was boarding the car upon the invitation of the motorman. In passing upon the questions involved, the court stated that the employees of a street railway company are under no obligation to keep a lookout to prevent boys endeavoring to ride without permission from entering its cars while in motion, and that a boy who does or attempts to do so is a trespasser and the company owes him no duty save not to injure him wantonly, but in holding that the traction company was liable for the injury to the child, who was upon the car by invitation of the motorman, the court said: "A boy ten years of age, riding upon a street car without paying fare, by invitation of a motorman in charge of the same, who has authority to receive and let off passengers, is not a trespasser. The invi

tation of the motorman is an act within the general scope of his employment, for which he is responsible to his master. If the boy accepts it innocently he is no trespasser, and it is the duty of the company to extend to him the diligence due to passengers of his age and discretion."

In holding the rail"Whatever may be adults, we must not

In the recent case of Solomon v. Public Service Railway Co. 87 N. J. L. 284, (92 Atl. Rep. 942,) the same holding was made in a case where the facts were almost identical with those in the case at bar. Irving Solomon, nine years of age, was beckoned by the motorman of a trolley car to get on and ride. The boy got on the step of the car with both feet, holding the hand-rail, and as he was turning around to sit down on the platform the car gave a sudden jerk and threw him off. It was urged, as here, that the act of the motorman in inviting the child to ride was not within the scope of his employment and that the railway company owed him no duty because he was not a passenger but a trespasser, or, at most, a licensee. road company liable the court said: the rule in this regard as applicable to lose sight of the fact that we are dealing here with the duty owing to children of immature years, of whom, in the light of reason, the same measure of the exercise of discretion is not required. An argument similar in import as made here was advanced in Danbeck v. New Jersey Traction Co. 57 N. J. Law, 463, where it appeared that the plaintiff, a lad of ten years, was invited by the conductor of a car to come on the front platform to receive some money to buy him (the conductor) a package of cigarettes, and while the conductor had his hand in his pocket to get the change the car gave a lurch, whereupon the driver of the car struck the horses to pull them back on the track, which started the horses off at great speed, with the result that the conductor was thrown against the boy with sufficient force to knock him off the car. Chief Justice Beasley, in dispos

ing of the question raised by counsel of the company, on page 465 of 57 N. J. Law, said: "The question is not as to the duty of the defendant towards persons of mature years, but, what is that duty with respect to children? It might be quite reasonable to declare as a rule of law that a grown person has no right to enter a car except as a passenger, and if he does so as the friend of the conductor that such a situation creates no relationship between such person and the car company and that the latter is under no obligation to see to his safety, while it may be unreasonable in the extreme to apply the same rule to a child under similar circumstances. Very few of the rules that regulate the conduct of a man with his fellow could be applied, with the least show of reason, to his intercourse with children. It is the legal duty of everyone dealing with a child to protect it against its own indiscretion.""

The reasoning in these cases is sound. We do not disagree with any of the authorities cited by plaintiff in error in support of his general propositions, but these cases do not apply to children of tender years. Defendant in error was not a trespasser. He was lawfully on the car upon the invitation of the motorman, and plaintiff in error owed him the same duty he owed a passenger.

Complaint is made of the action of the court in giving and refusing instructions. Our discussion of the duty which plaintiff in error owed to defendant in error while he was upon the car disposes of the contentions made in respect to the instructions.

As there is no error in the record the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

ALBERT B. DEWEY, Defendant in Error, vs. THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed June 22, 1916-Rehearing denied October 5, 1916.

1. DEDICATION—when city will be deemed to have accepted all streets in subdivision. If the evidence shows that a city has, by reason of improvements made and other facts and circumstances, accepted the principal streets, and the major portion of them, shown on a common law plat, and has never evidenced any intention to refuse to accept any of them, it will be deemed to have accepted all the streets and alleys shown on the plat.

2. SAME acceptance of common law dedication at any time before withdrawal is binding. Public authorities are not required to immediately formally accept or improve streets shown on a common law plat, particularly where the owner grades the streets and builds sidewalks at his own expense when the subdivision is laid out, and any acts by the public authorities sufficient to show an acceptance before the offered dedication is withdrawn by a deed of revocation is binding upon the owner of the subdivision.

3. SAME-what acts by a city show acceptance of streets. Acts by a city consisting of laying sewers in certain of the streets shown on a common law plat, with wing-sewers at the intersections of certain of the other strects, passing an ordinance changing the name of one of the streets and an ordinance vacating a portion of another, evidence an acceptance by the city of the streets and alleys shown on the plat.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. JESSE A. BALDWIN, Judge, presiding.

RICHARD S. FOLSOM, Corporation Counsel, (A. L. GETTYS, of counsel,) for plaintiff in error.

WILSON, MOORE & MCILVAINE, (N. G. MOORE, of counsel,) for defendant in error.

Mr. JUSTICE DUNCAN delivered the opinion of the court: This was a proceeding in the circuit court of Cook county under the Burnt Records act, by defendant in error against the city of Chicago, plaintiff in error, and others, to establish and confirm his title to a tract of land bounded