follows (the words inserted by the Court of Appeals being italicized):.

"It is further adjudged, ordered and decreed that defendant, its associates, successors, assigns, officers, servants, clerks, agents, and workmen, and each of them be, and they hereby are perpetually enjoined from using in this country or in any possession thereof, in connection with any liqueur or cordial not manufactured by complainants, the trade-mark 'Chartreuse,' or of any colorable imitation thereof unless so used as clearly to distinguish such liqueur or cordial from the liqueur or cordial manufactured by the complainants or the fac-simile signature of L. Garnier, or any colorable imitation thereof or any of the trade-marks above referred to, or any colorable imitation thereof; and they and each of them are likewise perpetually enjoined from importing or putting out or selling or offering for sale, directly or indirectly, within this country, any liqueur or cordial not manufactured by complainants, in any dress or package like or simulating in any material respects the dress or package heretofore used by complainants-and in particular from making use of any [bottle or] label or [package] symbol like or substantially similar to those appearing on 'Complainants' Exhibit, Defendant's Liqueur,' being the bottle now on file as an exhibit in this Court-and from in anywise attempting to make use of the good-will and reputation of complainants in putting out in this country any liqueur or cordial not made by complainants."

The defendant contends that the Circuit Court was without jurisdiction. This objection must fail, as it sufficiently appears from the record that the controversy was between foreign subjects and a New York corporation. And there was also an assertion by the bill of a right under the Federal statute, by virtue of the registration of the trade-mark. Warner v. Searle & Hereth Company, 191 U. S. 195; Standard Paint Company v. Trinidad Asphalt

Company, 220 U. S. 446, decided April 10, 1911; Jacobs v. Beecham, decided May 15, 1911, ante, p. 263.

On the merits, the questions presented are (1) What rights, with respect to the designations and marks involved, were enjoyed by the Carthusian Monks prior to their expulsion from the French Monastery; (2) What effect upon their rights had (a) the liquidation proceedings in France, and (b) the conduct of the Monks in relation to the trade in the liqueur which they subsequently made in Spain; and, in the light of the conclusions upon these points, (3) To what remedy, if any, are the Monks entitled?

It is insisted that the judgment is erroneous in determining that "the word-symbol Chartreuse" constituted a valid trade-mark. It is argued that "Chartreuse" is a regional name; that the characteristic qualities of the liqueur were due to certain local advantages by reason of the herbs found and cultivated within the district described; that even as used in connection with the Monks' liqueur it was still a description of place; and hence, that at most, so far as this word is concerned, the question could be one only of unfair competition.

The validity of this argument cannot be admitted upon the facts which we deem to be established and controlling. It is undoubtedly true that names which are merely geographical cannot be the subject of exclusive appropriation as trade-marks. "Their nature is such that they cannot point to the origin (personal origin) or ownership of the articles of trade to which they may be applied. They point only at the place of production, not to the producer, and could they be appropriated exclusively, the appropriation would result in mischievous monopolies." Canal Company v. Clark, 13 Wall. p. 324. See also Columbia Mill Company v. Alcorn, 150 U. S. 460; Elgin National Watch Company v. Illinois Watch Company, 179 U. S. 665.

This familiar principle, however, is not applicable here. It is not necessary for us to determine the origin of the

name of the Order and its chief Monastery. If it be assumed that the Monks took their name from the region in France in which they settled in the Eleventh Century, it still remains true that it became peculiarly their designation. And the word "Chartreuse" as applied to the liqueur which for generations they made and sold cannot be regarded in a proper sense as a geographical name. It had exclusive reference to the fact that it was the liqueur made by the Carthusian Monks at their Monastery. So far as it embraced the notion of place, the description was not of a district, but of the Monastery of the Order-the abode of the Monks-and the term in its entirety pointed to production by the Monks.

It cannot be supposed that if, during the occupation by the Monks of the Monastery of La Grande Chartreuse, another had established a factory at Fourvoirie and there manufactured a liqueur, he could have affixed to it the name "Chartreuse" or "Grande Chartreuse" or "Gde. Chartreuse" on the ground that these were place names or descriptive of advantages pertaining to the locality. It could not fail to be recognized at once that these were the distinctive designations of the liqueur made by the Monks and not geographical descriptions available to any one who might make cordial in a given section of country. The same would have been true if the Monks had voluntarily removed and continued their manufacture elsewhere. As was forcibly said by the Lord Chief Justice in the Court of Appeal in Rey v. Lecouturier, [1908] 2 Ch. 715, p. 726: "To test this question, let us suppose that the monks had moved their manufacture to another monastery or another building in France and had sold the fabric of the distillery and left the district of La Grande Chartreuse, but had continued to make the liqueur in the same way; could it be contended that any one who bought as old bricks and mortar the distillery at Fourvoirie could immediately call any liqueur made there by the name of

Chartreuse, and put it on the English market under that name? It is to me quite unarguable."

The claim of the Monks to an exclusive right in this designation as applied to the liqueur has been frequently the subject of litigation and has repeatedly been sustained. In 1872, La Cour de Cassation in Le Père Louis Garnier v. Paul Garnier, 17 Annales, p. 259, held that "the word Chartreuse, applied as a denomination to the liqueur made by the religious community of which Père Garnier is the representative, is but an abbreviation and the equivalent of a designation more complete; for it at once indicates the name of the fabricants (the Chartreux); the name or commercial firm of manufacture, which is no other than the community of these same Chartreux, and finally the place of manufacture, that is to say the monastery of La Grande Chartreuse." It was concluded that the designation was the exclusive property of the Monks. Mr. Browne, after quoting the above passage, adds: "That single word" (Chartreuse) "contains a long history of strife. It has repeatedly been held to be a perfect trademark, for the reasons just cited." Browne on Trademarks, § 582; §§ 407-410. See also 17 Annales, 241, 249; Rey v. Lecouturier, supra, p. 726; Grezier v. Girard, and others, United States Circuit Court, Southern District of New York, 1876, not reported; A. Bauer v. Order of Carthusian Monks, 120 Fed. Rep. 78.

We find no error, therefore, in this determination of the judgment. The registered trade-marks were valid. In the statements for registration, the symbols actually used in combination were set forth. Take, for example, the mark in the glass of the bottle, consisting of "Gde. Chartreuse" under the globe, cross and seven stars. This undoubtedly is a valid mark. And the same is true of the other marks, shown on the labels attached to the bottles, which included the ecclesiastical symbols and the facsimile of the signature of L. Garnier. It follows that up to the time VOL. CCXXI-38

of their expulsion from the Monastery, the Monks were entitled to protection against the infringement of these marks, which were their exclusive property, as well as against unfair competition.

The next inquiry is with respect to the effect of the liquidation proceedings in France. Upon the application of the Procureur of the Republic, the French court proceeded to the judicial liquidation of the properties in France held by the non-authorized congregation of the Chartreux, and it was of these properties that a liquidator was appointed. It does not appear that the court assumed jurisdiction of the trade-marks registered on behalf of the Monks in other countries. On the contrary, it appears to have been held that the question of the ownership of such trade-marks was not involved in its determination. After a successful contest of the liquidator with the Abbe Rey, in which a judgment was pronounced to the effect that the latter was an interposed person or passive trustee under a deed of transfer found to be simulated, and that the properties claimed by him personally were in fact those of the congregation and subject to the liquidation, the liquidator sought by way of interpretation of this judgment to obtain a declaration that the assets of the liquidation comprised the trade-marks registered in other countries. On refusing the application (March 27, 1906), the Court of Appeals of Grenoble used the following language, showing that the question had not been determined in the previous decision, and also directing attention to the character of the law under which the liquidation was had as "a law of exception and police:"

"The claim of the receiver to the property of the trademarks registered in the foreign countries, raises the question whether the law of July first, nineteen hundred and one, which is a law of exception and police, controls or not, beyond the territory of the Republic, the properties of the dissolved Congregations, and whether the trade marks